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# THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SERIES

THE STORY OF HUMAN  
PROGRESS AND THE  
GREAT EVENTS OF THE  
CENTURY . . . . .

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
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PROFESSOR WILLIAM P. TRENT.

PROGRESS OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
IN THE CENTURY

BY  
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## PREFACE.

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THIS volume has been devoted primarily to a sketch of the political development of the United States of America in this century. This has been done for two reasons. First, the contributions made by the United States to the art, the letters, the science, the industries of the century, have been fully dealt with in other volumes of this series. Secondly, although the history of the growth of the Republic is marvellous, and although the culture-history of its people is interesting, prime importance attaches to the history of the great experiment in self-government made by the American democracy. Without American inventiveness and energy the century would not have made such marked advance, yet it would still have been the age of steam and electricity. But without the American experiment in self-government the world would have been left without some of the most important of all the political lessons it has ever been taught. The value, for example, of the lesson taught by the democracy when it grappled with and overcame slavery cannot be overestimated. Such lessons can be understood, however, only after the outlines of the nation's political history have been mastered; and hence it is that the attempt has been made to give such outlines rather than to present a

full account of the physical, the mental, and moral growth of the nation—topics which nevertheless have not been overlooked.

It is almost needless to say that many books have been consulted during the preparation of the volume. An endeavour has been made to mention either in the text or in a note the chief authorities that have been relied upon, but naturally it has been impossible to include them all. Here it seems fair to say that for recent years the well-known work of Dr. E. B. Andrews has been very helpful, while for the *ante-bellum* period Mr. James Schouler's five volumes have been invaluable.

W. P. TRENT.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH,  
SEWANEE, TENN., U.S.A.

# CONTENTS.

---

## PART ONE.

### THE RISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

---

#### CHAPTER I.

##### THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE IN 1801.

	PAGE
Area and Population.—Distribution of Population.—General Characteristics of the People.—New England.—The Middle States.—The South.—The Frontiersmen.—Advantages and Disadvantages of the Primitive Life of the Citizens.—The Outlook.....	1

#### CHAPTER II.

##### THE NEW REGIME.

Disputed Election of 1801.—Jefferson's Inaugural.—John Adams's Fears for the Future.—Sketch of Jefferson.—His General Policy.—His Attitude toward the Civil Service.—The Barbary War.—Results of the First Year of the Revolution of 1801.....	10
--	----

#### CHAPTER III.

##### DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY.

The Louisiana Purchase.—Jefferson's Constitutional Scruples.—Federalist Opposition.—Election of 1804.—The Yazoo Question.—John Randolph's Fall from Power.—The Impeachment and Trial of Justice Chase.—End of the War with Tripoli.—The Rule of 1756.—Impressment Abuses.—Abortive Diplomacy.—Burr's Conspiracy and Trial.—Prohibition of the Foreign Slave Trade.	30
--	----

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE WAR OF 1812.

	PAGE
Rejection of the Monroe-Pinckney Treaty.— <i>Leopard</i> and <i>Chesapeake</i> .—Orders in Council.—Berlin and Milan Decrees.—The Embargo.—Election of 1808.—Madison's Policy.—Opposition in New England.—Retirement of Jefferson.—Sketch of Madison.—Erskine Disavowed.—Napoleon's Sharp Practice.—Growth of the War Spirit.—Madison Yields.—War Declared.—Its Untimeliness.—Abortive Invasion of Canada.—Naval Victories.—Election of 1812.—Detroit Retaken.—Andrew Jackson and the Creeks.—Political Mismanagement of the War.—Prospects of Peace.—Capture and Burning of Washington.—Bad Financiering.—Battle of New Orleans.—Treaty of Ghent.....	51

## CHAPTER V.

## EFFECTS OF THE WAR.

The Hartford Convention.—Gallatin's Loans.—Cost of the War.—Growth of National Spirit.—Impetus to Manufacturing.—Protection and Sectional Differences.—The New National Bank.—The Tariff of 1816.—Election of 1816.—Madison Opposes Internal Improvements Undertaken by Congress.—Monroe's Inaugural.—The Virginian Presidents.—Monroe's Cabinet.....	76
---	----

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING.

Relations with Spain.—Jackson in Florida.—Monroe Smoothes Matters Out.—Sketch of Jackson.—The Treaty of 1819.—The Slavery Question.—The Missouri Compromises.—Discussion of the Controversy.—Affairs of the National Bank.—Election of 1820.—Political Factions.—Internal Improvements Vetoed.—Recognition of Spanish-American Republics.—The "Monroe Doctrine."—Scope of the "Doctrine."—Congress and the Greeks.—Growing Demand for Protection.—Tariff of 1824.—Election of 1824.....	91
---	----



## CONTENTS.

ix

### CHAPTER VII.

#### THE PARTING OF THE WAYS.

	PAGE
A Hampered Administration.—Internal Improvements.— The Panama Congress.—Georgia and the Indians.— Deaths of Jefferson and John Adams.—Abortive For- eign Policy.—Intrigues for the Presidency.—“The Tariff of Abominations.”—The South Protests.—Elec- tion of 1828.—Formation of New Parties.....	119

### CHAPTER VIII.

#### A GENERATION'S ADVANCE.

Distribution of Population in 1810.—Standing of States and Cities.—Area and Population in 1820.—In 1830.— Character of Population in the Various Sections.— Homogeneity of Stock.—Growth of the National Spirit. —Economic Impetus.—Early Railroads.—Inventions.— Spiritual and Mental Awakening.—Schools and Col- leges.—Democracy in the South and West.—Æsthetic and Literary Development.—Provincial and Prosaic Traits.—The Next Generation's Task.....	133
--	-----

---

## PART TWO.

### THE STRUGGLE WITH SLAVERY.

---

#### CHAPTER IX.

##### “THE REIGN OF ANDREW JACKSON.”

Jackson's Inauguration.—Introduction of the “Spoils System.”—The Eaton Scandal.—Reorganisation of the Cabinet.—The “Kitchen Cabinet.”—Jackson's Policy. —Georgia and the Indians Once More.—Career of Chief Justice Marshall.—States' Rights.—The Webster- Hayne Debate.—Jackson's Toast.—The Tariff of 1832.— The Ordinance of Nullification.—Jackson Stands Firm. —The Final Compromise.—Character of the Nullifiers.	146
--	-----

CHAPTER X.

FROM TRIUMPH TO DEFEAT.

	PAGE
Jackson's Successful Foreign Policy.—Attack on the National Bank.—Clay's Mistake.—Jackson's Veto.—Election of 1832.—Renewed Attack on the Bank.—Withdrawal of the Deposits.—Resolutions of Censure Pass the Senate.—Financial Disturbances.—The "Specie Circular."—Growth of Abolitionism.—Incendiary Literature.—Southern Indignation.—"Gag-laws" in Congress.—Adams's New Rôle.—Election of 1836.—Sketch of Van Buren.—Panic of 1837.—The Sub-Treasury System.—Popular Indignation against the Democrats.—The Seminole War.—Squabbles in Congress.—Election of 1840.....	162

CHAPTER XI.

THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS.

Death of President Harrison.—Haphazard Methods of Choosing Vice-Presidents.—Sketch of Tyler.—The Whig Programme.—Tyler's Bank Vetoes.—Tariff of 1842.—Largess to the States.—The Ashburton Treaty.—Political Confusion.—Early Stages of the Texas Question.—The North Opposes Annexation.—Tyler's Overtures to Texas.—The Accident on the <i>Princeton</i> .—Calhoun Becomes Secretary of State.—The Treaty of Annexation Rejected.—Van Buren and Clay in a Dilemma.—Election of 1844.—Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island.—Texas Admitted by Joint Resolution.—An Unjustifiable Procedure.....	188
--	-----

CHAPTER XII.

THE MEXICAN WAR.

Character of Polk's Administration.—The Oregon Question Settled.—Negotiations Broken with Mexico.—Taylor on the Rio Grande.—War Declared.—Taylor's Victories.—California Taken.—Polk's Troubles with Congress.—The Wilmot Proviso.—Democratic Efforts to Secure Military Heroes.—Scott's Campaign.—Capture
--

## CONTENTS.

xi

	PAGE
of the City of Mexico.—Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.	
—Death of John Quincy Adams.—Discussions as to	
Free or Slave Status of the New Possessions.—Election	
of 1848.....	205

### CHAPTER XIII.

#### THE COMPROMISE OF 1850.

Pro-slavery Aggressiveness.—Growth of Anti-slavery	
Views at the North.—Taylor's Policy with Regard to	
the New Possessions.—Discovery of Gold in California.	
—The Mormons in Utah.—Clay and Webster Oppose	
Taylor.—Debates in the Senate.—Clay's Proposals.—	
Death of Taylor.—Estimate of his Character.—Web-	
ster's Seventh of March Speech.—Calhoun's Last Speech	
and Death.—Fillmore Becomes President,—Clay's Pro-	
gramme Carried Through.—The Fugitive Slave Law...	219

### CHAPTER XIV.

#### CALM AND STORM.

Period of Political Repose.—Filibustering Expeditions.—	
Mississippi Campaign of 1851.—Election of 1852.—Deaths	
of Clay and Webster.—The Martin Koszta Affair.—	
Senator Douglas.—The Kansas-Nebraska Bill.—“Squat-	
ter Sovereignty.”—Pierce's Support Gained.—The Case	
of Anthony Burns.—The Gadsden Purchase.—Bom-	
bardment of Greytown.—The Ostend Manifesto.—Col-	
lapse of the Whig Party.—Republicans and Know-	
Nothings.—“Bleeding Kansas.”—Brooks's Attack on	
Sumner.—Election of 1856.—Improvement in Kansas.—	
Walker's Filibustering Exploits.—Forecast of Events..	233

### CHAPTER XV.

#### THE BEGINNING OF THE END.

The Dred Scott Decision.—Buchanan's Cabinet.—The Le	
Compton Constitution.—Trouble with the Mormons.—	
Sketch of Lincoln.—The Lincoln-Douglas Debates.—	
Buchanan's Wild Message.—John Brown's Raid.—The	

	PAGE
Covada Investigation.—Split Among the Democrats.—	
The Republicans Nominate Lincoln.—Election of 1860.	
—Southern Reasons for Secession.—South Carolina	
Acts.—Buchanan's Irresolution.—His Cabinet Reor-	
ganised.—Formation of the Southern Confederacy.—	
Efforts to Preserve Peace.—The Situation in March,	
1860.....	256

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE COUNTRY AND THE SECTIONS ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR.

Population in 1840.—Filling in the Waste Places.—Status	
of the Sections.—Area and Population in 1850.—Status	
of the Sections.—Urban Growth.—Area and Popula-	
tion in 1860.—Status of the Sections.—Foreign Element	
of the Population.—The Negroes.—Proportionate Mil-	
itary Efficiency of North and South.—Intensification	
of Types.—The Macrocosm of 1860.—Manufacturing.—	
Farming.—Railroads.—Telegraph Lines.—Inventions.	
—Science and Literature.—Backwardness of the South.	278

## CHAPTER XVII.

### THE CIVIL WAR.

Lincoln's Inaugural.—His Cabinet.—Sumter Fired on.—	
Call for Troops.—The Border States.—Campaigns in	
Virginia.—Partition of Virginia.—First Battle of Ma-	
nassas.—England's Attitude.—Federal Success in the	
South-West.—Vicksburg Surrenders.—The <i>Virginia</i>	
and the <i>Monitor</i> .—Southern Ports Blockaded.—Seven	
Days' Fighting Around Richmond.—Second Manassas.	
—Antietam.—The Proclamation of Emancipation.—	
Fredericksburg.—Chancellorville.—Gettysburg.—Con-	
scription North and South.—Federal Victories Around	
Chattanooga.—Sherman Takes Atlanta.—His March to	
the Sea.—Grant and Lee in Virginia in 1864.—Siege of	
Petersburg.—Surrender at Appomattox.—Political	
Events in the South.—At Washington.—The Case of	
Vallandigham.—Election of 1864.—Assassination of	
Lincoln.—Results of the War.....	294

# PART THREE.

## THE ERA OF INDUSTRIALISM.

### CHAPTER XVIII.

#### RECONSTRUCTION.

	PAGE
Lincoln's Plans for Reconstruction.—Character of Andrew Johnson.—His Attitude toward the South.—Repressive Legislation Against the Blacks.—Partisanship and Ignorance.—Radical Measures in Congress.—Johnson's Lack of Facts.—The Fourteenth Amendment.—The People Side with Congress.—Tenure of Office Act.—Reconstruction Acts.—Results of Military Rule.—“Carpet-baggers and Scalawags.”—The Ku-Klux Klan.—Impeachment and Trial of Johnson.—The French in Mexico.—Purchase of Alaska.—The Alabama Claims.—Election of 1868.....	316

### CHAPTER XIX.

#### THE RESTORATION OF UNITY.

Character of Grant.—Financial Corruption.—Grant Unable to Cope with the Evils of the Time.—The Tweed Ring.—Outrages in the South.—Fraudulent Elections.—Use of Troops at the Polls.—Election of 1872.—Civil Service Reform.—Good Financial Legislation.—Scheme for Annexing San Domingo.—Election of 1876.—Electoral Commission Seats Hayes.—Troops Withdrawn from the South.—Centennial Exposition.—Massacre of Custer's Command.—Progress of the Period.....	335
--	-----

### CHAPTER XX.

#### THE FLOUNDERING OF PARTIES.

Alternation of Party Success.—Defects of the Two-Party System.—Tariff and Free Silver Issues.—Hayes a Good Administrator.—Resumption of Specie Payments.—The Bland-Allison Bill.—Halifax Award.—The Struggle over “Riders.”—Strikers and “Molly McGuires.”—Election	
---	--



	PAGE
of 1880.—Garfield Offends Conkling.—Defeat of the Latter.—Garfield Assassinated.—Character of President Arthur.—Civil Service Commission.—Foreign Affairs. —Chinese Exclusion Bills.—Kearneyism in California. —Election of 1884.—The “Mugwumps” Defeat Blaine.	353

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE TARIFF TO THE FRONT.

Opposition to Cleveland.—He Yields to the Spoilsmen.— Interstate Commerce Act and Other Measures.—The Chicago Anarchists.—Cleveland’s Tariff Message.— Election of 1888.—Election Frauds.—The Sackville-West Incident.—Pan-American Congress.—The Chilian Im- broglío.—Lynching of Italians in New Orleans.— Speaker Reed as “Czar.”—Defeat of the Lodge Bill.— The McKinley Tariff.—The Sherman Act.—Labour Agi- tations.—Election of 1892...	376
--	-----

## CHAPTER XXII.

## FIN DE SIÈCLE.

Cleveland’s Break with his Party.—The Hawaiian Ques- tion.—The World’s Fair.—Panic of 1893.—Repeal of Purchasing Clause of Sherman Act.—The Wilson Tariff.—Cleveland Puts Down the Chicago Strikers.— His Policy toward Cuba.—The Venezuelan Message.— Corruption in New York City.—Election of 1896.—Free Silver.—The Dingley Tariff.—Destruction of the <i>Maine</i> . —The Spanish-American War.— <i>Rapprochement</i> with Great Britain.—Loyalty of the South.—Prowess of the Navy.—Bad Management of the War on Land.—The Treaty of Paris.—Expansion.—Fighting in the Philip- pines.—The Outlook.....	394
--	-----

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## PRESENT AND FUTURE.

Population in 1870.—Standing of States and Cities.—Pop- ulation in 1880.—In 1890.—Rank of Sections and
---

## CONTENTS.

XV

	PAGE
States.—Great Urban Development.—Influx of Foreigners.—The Negro Problem.—Interstate Migration.—Government Employees.—Wage Earners in General.—Educational Statistics.—Standing of the United States among the Nations.—Relative Standing of the Sections.—Intensity of Modern Life.—Growth of Corporate Power.—Mental Development.....	415

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### CONCLUSION.

Comparative Success of the Democratic Experiment.—Devotion of the American to his Government.—Changes in the Democratic Ideal.—American Over-confidence.—Waste of Resources.—Defects of the Governmental System.—No Cause for Pessimism.—American Destiny in the Hands of the People Working under the Guidance of Providence.....	433
--	-----

---

## APPENDIX A.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.....	441
--	-----

## APPENDIX B.

THE PRESIDENTS AND VICE-PRESIDENTS, WITH THEIR TERMS OF OFFICE .....	457
--	-----

## APPENDIX C.

THE STATES AND TERRITORIES, WITH DATES OF ADMISSION, AREAS, AND POPULATIONS IN 1890.....	459
--	-----

## ILLUSTRATIONS.

---

	PAGE
THE AUTHOR.....	<i>Frontispiece.</i>
JOHN C. CALHOUN.....	64
HENRY CLAY.....	160
DANIEL WEBSTER.....	224
JAMES G. BLAINE.....	384

# PROGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE CENTURY.

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## PART ONE.

### THE RISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE IN 1801.

AT the opening of the nineteenth century the territory comprised in the United States of America was exactly the same as had been determined by the Treaty of Paris with Great Britain in 1783. On the north the British possessions formed a boundary to be disputed for many years. On the west, beyond the Mississippi River, stretched vast tracts claimed by Spain, but really possessed by the bison and the Indian. On the south an artificial line set off a narrow strip along the Gulf of Mexico together with the peninsula of Florida as additional and more securely held possessions of the Spanish throne. To the east alone a free outlet was offered to the energy of the new nation by the broad Atlantic, on which many a

small American vessel had been launched within the decade just past.

But it required considerable stretch of the imagination to make the American of 1801 feel cramped toward north, west, and south. He had settled his domain of 827,844 square miles at a ratio of density that did not amount to quite six and one-half inhabitants to a square mile. His centre of population was only eighteen miles west of Baltimore, a prosperous port. His fellow-citizens aggregated 5,308,483, an increase on the returns of the first census, of 1790, of 35.10 per cent.; but over ten years were to elapse before a full half of his wide domain would be settled at the ratio of two or more to the square mile, and at present only in the States stretching along the Atlantic from Virginia to Massachusetts, and only in the tide-water portions of these, was it possible to find from twenty-five to ninety inhabitants to the square mile.

But population, as yet chiefly native-born, was pushing bravely westward in New York and Pennsylvania, in Virginia and North Carolina. The mountain barrier of the Alleghanies had now been passed for about three decades, and Tennessee, Kentucky, and the region soon to be the State of Ohio were filling up, having in 1800 about 370,000 inhabitants. Signs of progress were to be found also in the territory to the south of Tennessee, which Georgia had claimed, but which was now along its southern borders organised into the Mississippi Territory, the adjacent region to the north being left a wilderness for Georgia and the Union to wrangle over.

The mention of Tennessee and Kentucky reminds us, however, that the day of the old Thirteen States



that unanimously chose George Washington to be their first President is over for ever. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson had to contend in 1800 for the votes of sixteen States. After a revolt of several years from New York's control Vermont had been recognised as a State in 1791; Kentucky had been separated from Virginia and admitted to the Union in 1792; Tennessee, after a few years of existence as a Territory apart from its parent, North Carolina, had attained Statehood in 1796. The District of Maine still belonged to Massachusetts, but was very sparsely settled; Connecticut still claimed a strip of land along the northern border of the great North-Western Territory, which had been recently dismembered by the formation of Indiana Territory. The above enumerated States and Territories, together with the Mississippi Territory, the adjacent disputed region, and the Federal District of Columbia, in which the national capital, Washington, was being slowly erected, made up, with the original Thirteen States, the Union as it existed in 1801. In two years the Louisiana Purchase had given the young nation a firm grip upon the vast West; in less than twenty years Spain had transferred the Floridas; the half-century had just passed when by war, purchase, and agreement the present limits of the United States proper had been attained; less than twenty years later those limits had been overleaped by the purchase of Alaska; and the century closes with the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, the acquisition of Porto Rico and the Philippines from Spain, and the temporary control of Cuba. No previous century has ever witnessed such a wonderful occupation and absorption of territory by any people.

But what of the characteristics of that people in

1801? This question can be best answered after some concrete facts about them have been given. Excluding the settlers beyond the Alleghanies, we find about 2,700,000 people living in New England and the Middle States; 2,200,000 living in the South. About 1,000,000 of these inhabitants were slaves, the proportion held in the Southern States being as nine to one. Virginia was the most populous of the States, a position which she held until 1820, when the primacy passed to New York. Massachusetts came next, but was really more prosperous than Virginia, since she had few negroes and not a single slave within her borders. Vermont alone equalled her in this latter particular, but all the other Northern States save New Jersey had passed laws looking to emancipation. The last-named State fell in with the general tendency in a very few years, and it was quite apparent that slavery was doomed in the colder regions of the country. That it would, however, hold its own tenaciously in the Far South was proved by the fact that in South Carolina there were over twice as many negroes as whites.

From the nature of their labour supply it could be at once inferred that the inhabitants of the Southern States were a people devoted to agriculture; but such an inference would have been equally true of the inhabitants of the Middle States. Here and there in the latter region and in New England a few mills had been set up—particularly for spinning cotton yarn—but as a rule agriculture was the staple pursuit of the entire country, save in New England, where commerce and the fisheries made amends for that ruggedness of the soil that was already encouraging a westward emigration. It is little exaggeration, then, to say that the Americans in 1801 were a

nation of farmers; but already a single circumstance—Whitney's invention of the cotton-gin—had prepared the way for the subsequent broad division of the Atlantic region into the manufacturing North and the planting South. Later on the farming West was to emerge into great prominence; but it was to be many years before Mother Earth would be made to yield the most valuable of her treasures in the shape of ores, coal, and oil.

That it was a nation of farmers that had won their independence and established a prosperous republic was further proved by the fact that only 3.97 per cent. of the population lived an urban life.\* In 1890 the percentage was 29.20. There were only five towns with 20,000 inhabitants and upwards: Philadelphia with 70,000; New York with 60,000; Baltimore with 26,000; Boston with 24,000; Charleston with 20,000. About seventeen other places, perhaps, were worthy of being called small towns. New York was most like a city in its liveliness; but Philadelphia, warned doubtless by the yellow fever epidemics of 1793 and 1797, had done most in the way of sanitation, and with its lighted and paved streets and its public institutions strove to keep up its prestige as the adopted city of Franklin and, to the close of the century, the temporary capital of the Union. Like Boston, however, it was a slow, prim place, and in some particulars was less of an urban centre than Charleston, which was the London of South Carolina, being the resort at certain seasons of the stately planters.†

\* About 5 per cent. perhaps if the term "urban" be given a liberal application.

† Jefferson, in a letter of Sept. 23, 1800, wrote: "The yellow fever will discourage the growth of great cities in our na-

Life, then, was simple in the towns and doubly so in the country. Theatres were struggling for existence; newspapers were small, rather uninfluential sheets; travellers consumed many days in journeying by stage over bad roads between important points; inns were bad, indeed hardly attainable in the South; the postal service was in its infaney; fire companies were just as primitive—but after all we must remember that the age of steam had not quite dawned and that the Atlantic coast was almost as much a frontier of Europe as the Alleghanies were of the Atlantic coast. Besides there was not a little solid comfort in the life led by the citizen or the farmer. The rush of modern competition did not disturb him; there was plenty of work to do in a new land full of natural wealth; the pressure of caste was not upon him, even if there was an aristocracy of birth and education in New England and of birth and land in the South. He was sturdy and self-reliant; he had a modest wife willing to work and bear him many children; he was honest and so did not care whether the penal code were barbarous or not; he was not a theorist and so did not care particularly for the full religious liberty barely just attained by the Virginian, or for pure and simple manhood suffrage which existed in but few States. He was happy in his ignorance of Old World luxury and vice, he was on the whole sluggish-minded, though capable at times of being swept away by Jacobin enthusiasms, he was above all conscious that his chances were good for acquiring a competence and making provision for his family.

So far of the average citizen—especially in the  
tion, and I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the  
health and the liberties of man.”

Middle States. A harder type of character presented itself in New England, for the hold of Calvinism, though loosening, was still strong. There the outward aspect of things reminded the traveller of Old England; there labour was more strenuous, the classes more thoroughly divided, the clergyman and the magistrate more potent, the schoolmaster more in evidence—although, to say the truth, this latter functionary was of no elevated character anywhere in America. In the South—apart from the relations of master and slave, which after all were not so bad as they have been represented—a more genial, pleasant type of character appeared, but in a far from encouraging environment. The planter was hospitable, courteous, often cultivated; he was vigorous, fond of riding and out-door sports, a lover of good cheer; but he was too frequently improvident and prone to live on the proceeds of ungrown crops. His system of agriculture was wasteful, his lands, in the older States, were becoming exhausted, he was beginning to lose the energy that had given some of his class such prestige in the Revolution. But he bravely struggled to maintain his status, and he succeeded for many a long year in dominating his “poor white” neighbour who owned no slaves. He would hardly have admitted that his section needed a thrifty middle class, but we can all see it now.

Receding from the tide-water country, we find a different class of inhabitants—what we may call the semi-pioneers. These are in the main farmers who have taken up lands as veritable pioneers, have felled trees and left the stumps to rot, have laboured with their wives and children, and seen other settlers fill the neighbourhood, and have finally become the leading men in thriving back- or up-country communi-



ties.\* They are often of Scotch-Irish or German stock, are deeply religious, indulge in few worldly pleasures, but, when they do, choose coarse forms of dissipation, and make on the whole excellent founders of families. Around and beyond these men live more or less ne'er-do-well families of low extraction who subsist chiefly by hunting and who move on further West as civilisation creeps near them. Sometimes, however, this hunter class is graced by a Daniel Boone, or a "Leather Stocking," and its annals, if often sordid, are frequently illuminated by deeds of courage that should make the blood of every Anglo-Saxon tingle in his veins. The "Winners of the West," whether the families that slowly drove their waggons over the Alleghanies into Tennessee and Kentucky, or those that about the beginning of the century floated in such numbers down the Ohio River in flat-bottomed boats of all sizes and kinds, were empire builders of heroic proportions. The axe with which they felled forests, the rifle with which they quelled panther and Indian, are as deserving of honour as the sword and shield of the mediæval knight. Their achievements form the theme of a veritable American epic, which Cooper has written for all time in his "Leather Stocking Tales." †

It has been intimated above that the population of the United States was not entirely English. Foreign admixture was particularly seen in Pennsylvania and New York, and partly accounted for the political and ecclesiastical confusion that marked these States ;

\* *I.e.*, beyond the main area of settlement or beyond tidewater.

† And Governor Theodore Roosevelt in his excellent volumes entitled *The Winning of the West*.

but loosely speaking there had been for some time no foreign immigration worth mentioning, and the average American of 1801 was little more than a colonial Englishman. He aped English fashions in dress and literature; he had the colonial's self-deprecatory ways, combined with the latter's conceit and ignorance. He was only too likely to be thin-skinned and loud-mouthed and did not change greatly for the better until two generations had passed. But he was destined soon to be aroused from his Arcadian sluggishness. The democratic doctrines of Jefferson took hold upon him, the vast extent of the Louisiana Purchase fired his imagination, Fulton's successful experiment upon the Hudson River ushered in for him the age of steam and developed his inventive capacity, the struggle forced upon him by Great Britain and Napoleon awakened his sense of nationality. He opened his eyes and saw himself to be possessed of natural resources of soil and climate such as had fallen to the citizen of no other country. His character underwent a great change. In a generation he had established a pure democracy and laid the foundations of a material greatness "beyond the dreams of avarice." In another generation he had preserved, through the greatest civil war of modern times, both his institutions and his material development. In a generation more he had exploited a continent, had developed a civilisation tremendous in its possibilities, and was reaching out for trade and possessions beyond the seas. If the territorial development of America in the nineteenth century is marvellous, the change in the character of the American is scarcely less so. And yet the century has produced no man who as man measures up to Washington or epitomises his age as Franklin did.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE NEW REGIME.

THE American people did not enter upon the nineteenth century with all the confidence that befits youth. They had, indeed, just administered a rebuke to the political party in power—those Federalists who had encouraged the warlike flurry against France, who had piled up taxes, who had passed the Alien and Sedition Laws to suppress freedom of speech; but they were by no means certain that the favourite statesman of the masses, Thomas Jefferson, would be permitted to succeed John Adams in the executive chair. After much excitement and intrigue a majority of the presidential electors, who were then in the main chosen by the State legislatures, had been secured for the Democratic-Republican candidates; but unfortunately they had cast their votes evenly for Jefferson and his running-mate, Aaron Burr of New York, who had been picked out for the Vice-Presidency. As the Constitution stood, this meant that the Lower House of Congress, voting by States, must decide which of the two should become President.\* But the Sixth Congress then in session at Washington, which was still but a half-built village, was in the hands of a Federalist majority who were evidently anxious to defeat the will of the people and to perpetuate their own power. They

\* See Appendix A., article 2, section 1.



had at least two ways, both nefarious, of doing this. They could fail to elect by March 4th, the day on which a new Administration was due, and could then run the government by some extra-constitutional, *i.e.*, revolutionary means; or they could tamper with Burr, a tricky politician, secure compromising pledges from him, and then in return elect him over their most radical and redoubtable opponent, Jefferson. There was more danger that the latter course would be pursued than that the former would be risked; for Burr early showed himself willing to receive advances, and Jefferson was such an object of suspicion to every Federalist community that any unfairness to him would be condoned by the constituents of each congressman so offending.

Such being the political situation, it is quite clear that the entire American people must have passed the month of January, 1801, in a state of turmoil and perturbation. In their previous difficulties they had looked to Washington for counsel and guidance; but alas! his voice had been silent for a year. The Federalists, especially in New England, displayed all the chagrin natural to a defeated party and prophesied a reign of anarchy and the downfall of the Republic. The Democratic-Republicans felt thwarted and perplexed, and uncertain whether they might not have to secure their rights by armed force. The political leaders were meanwhile resorting to more peaceful means of persuasion; but those were days of slow posts and the period of suspense must have seemed interminable. Finally, however, in the second week of February, the House began to ballot, and by the 17th of that month Federalist resistance to the will of the people had been broken. Jefferson was chosen President, the Vice-Presidency, which

he was just leaving, falling to Burr. To this result Jefferson's inveterate rival, Alexander Hamilton, had contributed effectually, though not perhaps with full magnanimity.\* Knowing Burr to be corrupt and Jefferson to be honest, he was patriotic enough to lend his great influence to the latter, whose political principles he nevertheless reprobated. This action of Hamilton's, corresponding as it did with the wishes of the people and with the sense of rectitude of moderate Federalists like James A. Bayard of Delaware, relieved the country from its great strain and also furnished a ground of confidence for contemporary and future patriotism. Love of country had won a signal triumph over intense partisanship, and some at least of the gloomy forebodings of the aristocratic party had been set at naught by that party's most distinguished leader. Jefferson could henceforward preach with more confidence his comfortable doctrine of the ultimate supremacy of law and right in a government based upon popular support.

Neither of the two great leaders who, to use Jefferson's expressive phrases, had been pitted against one another in Washington's cabinet like gamecocks, could have understood at the time the full force of Hamilton's dramatic intervention in the electoral crisis. It meant nothing less than that the party which had carried the new Republic over the trying period of organisation under the Constitution of 1787, the party which had drawn to itself the bulk of the wealthy, the well-born, and the cultivated inhabitants of the older States, especially of New England, the party which had promoted, under trained

\* In his famous letter to Bayard he was unnecessarily hard on Jefferson.

statesmen, the financial and commercial prosperity of the country, was to lose its prestige rapidly and irretrievably and to expire within half a generation loaded down by accusations of treason and by a popular odium not entirely undeserved. It meant also that the new party, which was not yet sufficiently conscious of its essential character to accept the name "Democratic" and preferred to be styled "Republican," was to be purged, through its long lease of power, of many of its vagaries and extravagances, and was to continue throughout the century, under the name at first refused, to draw to itself the major part of such Americans as prefer a simple, economic form of government and put trust in the maxim *vox populi, vox Dei*. It meant these things, but it also meant something far more important. It meant that public opinion was about to become a steady and fairly trustworthy force in government, and that a foundation had been laid for that optimistic belief in the nation's ability to emerge unscathed from any crisis which, if it has sometimes been to the American people a source of weakness, has oftener perhaps been a source of strength.

Jefferson's election having been settled, the Federalists showed an indecent haste to save all they could from the wreck of their party. In fact their conduct should make those persons pause who, in their disgust at present political corruption, are inclined to think and say that we have left the golden age of American politics a century behind us. The Federalists had behaved as foolishly as possible when they had restricted freedom of speech in order to silence their opponents; \* they had shown slight sense of political morality and patriotism when they

\* Especially by the "Sedition Act" of 1798.

had intrigued with Burr; now, even in the person of their President, John Adams, they manifested a petty spleen and a greed for official spoils that a Tammany leader of to-day might admire. They deliberately created a new rank of Federal judges for freshly organised circuits and added districts to those already in existence—thus developing a judiciary out of all proportion to the comparatively small body of business then coming before the Federal courts. There was also, of course, quite a cohort of attorneys, marshals, and the like to be recruited from the ranks of the party; new offices were created for the District of Columbia; and the salaries of several judges in Northern districts were raised. Adams at once proceeded to fill the new places with his own party-men, but neither he nor his Secretary of State, John Marshall, could work fast enough. It is said that Marshall was at work at midnight on March 3d making out commissions by candle-light, when an emissary of the new President stopped him in his task. Marshall's own assignment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had been already made, however, and gratitude for this altogether admirable appointment should induce us to condone Adams's want of delicacy with regard to the incoming Executive.\* If, however, he knew what a thorn he had stuck in his successor's official pillow by this appointment, he must be convicted of a refinement of cruelty rare in history. Marshall was destined to serve the country nobly, but he managed at the same time to try Jefferson's patience severely, as we shall soon see.

Having hampered the new Administration as effectively as he could in a practical way, Adams pro-

\* Marshall began to preside over the court in February, 1801.

ceeded to insult it by driving out of Washington at an early hour of the morning of March 4th, in order to avoid attending Jefferson's inauguration.\* The matter is of consequence now only as showing how far even the Founders of the Republic were often removed from that Olympian serenity and dignity which we frequently assume to have characterised them. Yet Adams was a really great man who had served his country well and who would not ordinarily have done a petty thing—especially to an old friend like Jefferson. The fact was that like most of his fellow Federalists he was completely blind to the real significance of the great popular movement that had lifted Jefferson to power. Many of the people had indeed shown an extravagant partisanship for the French revolutionists and an unreasoning rancour against Great Britain; some foul-mouthed editors had assailed the leading statesmen of the times, not even sparing Washington; but the people as a whole were sound in heart and, in their opposition to governmental extravagance and attempted tyranny, more sound in mind than the Federalists were. Yet the latter, just as many an English gentleman in those days of startling changes, fancied that the world was out of joint. Exactly a week after Adams left Washington for his Massachusetts home, Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina, a State in which the Federalists had not a little strength, wrote him a friendly letter containing the following sentences which all persons pessimistically inclined would do well to ponder:

“Long have I been led to think our planet a mere

\* John Quincy Adams did not attend Jackson's inauguration, nor did Andrew Johnson attend Grant's—personal reasons operating in both cases.



bedlam, and the uncommonly extravagant ravings of our own times, especially for a few years past, and still in the highest rant, have greatly increased and confirmed that opinion. Look round our whirling globe, my friend, where you will, east, west, north, or south, where is the spot in which are not many thousands of these mad lunatics?"

To this outpouring Adams replied about a month later:

"I concur with you so fully in sentiment that I very much doubt whether in any period of the world so much ever happened in a dozen years to mortify the vanity of human nature, and to render existence odious to man."

He concluded his letter by wishing prosperity to Jefferson's administration, but felt that its commencement was "too strongly infected with the spirit of party, to give much encouragement to men" who were "merely national." In other words, Adams sincerely believed himself to be a nationalist, although he was equally confident that the mass of his fellow citizens, who constituted a very large part of the nation, were no better than raging maniacs. Like many another able man before and since, he was temporarily confounding party with country.\*

Meanwhile Jefferson was belying the sinister reputation given him by his foes. His inauguration had taken place in a modest way befitting his unaffected republican simplicity, and he had delivered an address which so far from being a partisan fulmination was rather an evangel of political good-will. He maintained his favourite thesis that government should depend upon the support of the governed, and should be economically administered, but he

\* See Part III., Chap. I., *passim*.

maintained also that the Union should be preserved, under the Constitution, in its pristine vigour, and that in reality the political differences existing among Americans did not relate to vital principles. "We are all Republicans," he said, "we are Federalists," and the statement was more than a successful appeal to secure desertions from the ranks of his opponents. At bottom, most Americans of Jefferson's day and since have been at one with regard to the general principles of republican government—principles which were so clearly outlined in this Inaugural Address that it has become a political classic. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none—these and a score of other phrases, however hackneyed they may have become, have lost little of their golden cadence to the ear of the average American. Nor has Jefferson's belief that the government he was about to administer was "the world's best hope" ever ceased to be the honest conviction of his countrymen, who still with him bow to the will of the majority, although they may not be so scrupulous as he was in endeavouring to safeguard the rights of the minority.

But although it is most important to know what were the general political principles dominant in America at the beginning of this century, it is almost as necessary to know something of the personality of the man first called upon to put them into practice. That personality has not lost its fascination with the lapse of years, but it is to be feared that few who feel it to-day comprehend rightly what the man stood for. He is no longer reviled as he was by the New England clergy, but he is quoted in support of causes

and measures which he would reprobate were he with us in the flesh.

Fortune was kind to Thomas Jefferson almost from the moment of his birth in 1743. He was born in the frontier Virginia county of Albemarle, and was thus brought into early contact with a sturdy, honest, more or less plain people, who gave him lessons in practical democracy by teaching him to recognise popular worth wherever he might find it, whether in his own State, or in the North, or in the new commonwealths beyond the Alleghany Mountains. On the other hand his private means and his aristocratic connections gave him a good education and leisure to indulge his scholarly proclivities. His nature was singularly sympathetic and impressionable, and he was born just at the right time to embody the sentimental and speculative spirit of the latter half of the eighteenth century. Entering politics shortly before the culmination of the Revolutionary crisis, he was given admirable training in the art of moulding opinions and of leading both his fellow politicians and the general public. He was no orator, but he was a ready writer, and as a drafter of State papers he has perhaps never been surpassed. His political promotion was naturally rapid and steady. At the age of thirty-three he had drawn the Declaration of Independence. Three years later he was made Governor of Virginia, and if he displayed in this office no great executive ability, he could nevertheless in a few years look back upon his connection with the politics of his native State with the feeling that he had done more than any other man to put an end to feudal and aristocratic privileges and to establish a really effective form of popular liberty, at least for citizens of his own race. Subsequent service in Congress and as



Franklin's successor at the Court of France strengthened his powers and widened his experience, so that Washington felt justified in choosing him as the first Secretary of State. If he did not prove so brilliant and reliable a subordinate as Hamilton, he nevertheless learned in the Cabinet lessons of executive routine that were valuable in later years. His opposition to Hamilton gave coherence to his political philosophy and made him obviously a proper leader for the anti-Federalist or Republican adversaries of the strong central government the Federalists were bent on establishing. Such leadership, indeed, brought into relief certain of his unfortunate qualities—his tendency to inordinate suspicion, to indiscretion, to lack of loyalty to friends; but it enabled him to reply to the Alien and Sedition Laws by the famous Kentucky Resolutions, of which we shall have more to say later, and it gave him a fresh sort of executive training as Vice-President under John Adams.

Such in brief were the steps by which Jefferson rose to the highest office in the Republic. Having followed them, we shall not be surprised to find him most successful in shaping the policy of his two administrations. But he had evidently been trained to make a supple rather than a strong executive, as well as one not entirely capable of taking a catholic, rounded view of his duties and opportunities. He was suspicious by nature and had many of the normal prejudices of an agriculturist against the other classes of the body politic. He was a little too much of a sentimentalist and idealist. He lacked dignity and strenuous energy, and was therefore better fitted to persuade than to command. But to compensate, he had an absolute genius for sym-

pathising with the masses of the people and for understanding them; he was a cosmopolitan in the best sense of the word; he was perhaps the ablest political thinker of his time; he was far ahead of his generation in mental receptivity and in general culture. The last fact leads us to notice the chief injustice that is done his fame to-day. He is made to father, or else quoted to support, nearly every political nostrum applied to present evils by men of limited knowledge and inflexible minds. He is also charged with being the prime source of those evils by the men who dislike the nostrums prescribed in his name. Rarely has grosser injustice been done a statesman. His remedies for the evils of his own times may not have been always successful, but they were always worthy of a philosopher and a trained public servant. Nor is the system of popular government which he advocated and was greatly instrumental in establishing responsible in any large measure for present evils, since that system soon fell into inferior hands and in a debased form had to stand a strain which not even the wisest statesman could have foreseen. For Jefferson, though a democrat at heart and confident of the people's ability to choose leaders capable of guiding them to national peace and happiness, never advocated the virtual abrogation of leadership in the Republic and the assumption by the people of the task of choosing fit policies for every emergency. He thought, and rightly, that the people were wise enough to oppose tyranny and to insist upon economic and equitable government, but he could not have imagined that the day would ever come when the time-honoured dollar which he was mainly instrumental in making the national standard of value, would ever depend for its

purchasing power upon the votes of several millions of citizens unversed in the science of finance. He "felt the popular pulse," but he did not gallop through the country in a coach or traverse it on horseback—the rear-platform of a railway train was not then at his service—in order to determine what foreign policy it would be best to pursue. But now that these necessary points have been touched upon, it will be well to take a nearer view of his policies both foreign and domestic.

John Adams had, as we have seen, expressed the fear that Jefferson's administration was too much committed to partisanship to be successful. Rotation in office had once been a Jeffersonian doctrine, if we may judge from certain constitutions drafted by him for Virginia, and it has since played a conspicuous part in the history of the political organisation that has derived its main principles from him. It is important, therefore, to learn what was Jefferson's attitude toward the civil service, and it is pleasant and instructive to find that he acted towards the subordinates he found in office, not probably as Washington would have acted, but in a dignified way which gives little countenance to what has long been known as the "spoils system." He naturally set aside such of Adams's "midnight appointments" as had not been technically made valid by means of a signed commission, but in a majority of cases he himself commissioned the persons formerly appointed. An attempt to make him issue all the original commissions failed in the famous case of *Marbury vs. Madison*, although Chief Justice Marshall criticised the executive's action severely. A few removals were made in which party motives seemed dominant, chiefly in the Middle

States where office seekers were numerous and partisanship ran high, but on the whole Jefferson behaved with great moderation. He felt that the offices were not equitably distributed between the parties, but he wished to heal, not widen the breach between himself and his adversaries, and his main removals were made on fairly substantiated charges of unbecoming partisanship. He completely falsified Adams's predictions that noisy editors and other offensive henchmen who had helped to turn the Federalists out would be rewarded with place and power; as a matter of fact his failure to reward them set some of them against him, especially the scurrilous James Thomas Callender. Nor did he yield in any way to the vice of nepotism. Such a record is surely worthy of commendation, particularly in the case of a man who believed so thoroughly in the virtues of his own adherents and in the vices of his opponents, and who was a shrewd enough politician to note how well the new leaven was working in States like Rhode Island and Vermont, which could be won from the enemy with a little judicious patronage. He preferred to win them in a more creditable way, however, and he did.\*

His use of the appointing power was good also in a positive sense, as is evidenced by his choice of his cabinet. Only two of his Secretaries are now generally remembered—James Madison, who filled the Department of State with dignity and ability, and Albert Gallatin, who conducted the business of the Treasury with a skill less than that of his predecessor, Hamilton, but greater perhaps than that of any of his long line of successors. Yet if

\* Estimates of the number of officers removed for partisan purposes vary considerably.

it is needless to record here the names of the other secretaries, it is only fair to say that they were competent men who worked in harmony with their chief, much in accordance with principles derived from Washington. Jefferson had learned from his own experience the need of harmony in cabinet councils, and he was too honest and clear-headed to think it necessary, as many of his successors have done, to choose his advisers in order to win the favour of a particular locality or in order to pay a political debt. He actually took two of his secretaries from Massachusetts, the stronghold of Federalism and clericalism, and it would be unfair to him to suggest that he was thinking more of winning converts to Republicanism and liberalism than of the fitness of his appointees. He acted on, even if he did not formally enunciate the principle that "a public office is a public trust." \*

As the Seventh Congress was not to meet until December,† the new Administration had several months in which to get into running order and to outline the policy it wished the legislature to authorise. That policy was sure to be in the main one of "retrenchment and reform," and it therefore suggests the irony of fate to find Jefferson, before the spring was out, with a small war on his hands. Those were days when the leading nations of Christendom purchased immunity for their commerce from the piratical Barbary States, and the latter had been especially insulting in their exactions from the new transatlantic Republic, which had a considerable

\* This apt saying is credited to President Cleveland.

† See Appendix A., article 1, section 4. There are two Congresses to each Administration, members of the Lower House being elected over a year before the normal time of their taking their seats.



interest in the safety of the Mediterranean carrying trade. Matters came to such a pass that Jefferson had to dispatch a small squadron to overawe the Barbary coast and to bring Tripoli, in particular, to her senses. A blockade and the capture of a Tripolitan cruiser in the summer of 1801 effected the latter purpose for the time being, but later and more strenuous exertions were needed to put an end to the whole trouble. Meanwhile Jefferson could recall his long since cherished scheme to unite Christendom against these pests of commerce and could conclude that fate had not been so ironical after all.

Before he could have heard of the temporary success of his naval expedition, the country-loving President had left the insalubriously heated capital for the cool breezes of his rural home, Monticello, in his beloved Albemarle. He was not idle, however, for he had to watch affairs and to keep up his huge correspondence. This correspondence, by means of which he kept in touch with the entire country, is one of the chief proofs of Jefferson's political genius; it also suggests what a change quick posts, telegraphic facilities, telephones, and the modern newspaper have made in political methods. Intrigue and a large, open purse can and do give individuals immense power over the actions of men to-day; but no man, seemingly, is at present able to sway men's thoughts as Jefferson could by means of his pen. The complexity of the agencies now influencing public thought seems to account in part for the fact that no straightforward, consistent guidance for it can be found. Jefferson at Monticello writing to the new minister to France, Robert R. Livingston, for whose benefit he undertook an admirable discussion of the principles that should regulate neutral trade in time

of war, is a picture that the student of American history should constantly contrast with the familiar woodcuts of a noisy, irresponsible modern nominating convention like the Chicago one of 1896.

On his return to the capital Jefferson and his secretaries devoted their energies to preparing for the reforms which the President had already outlined in a letter to Nathaniel Macon, an able and upright representative from North Carolina, who was soon to be chosen Speaker of the House. These reforms, some of which had been begun, were in the main as follows: The Federalist act of 1801 for enlarging the judiciary was to be repealed; the utmost economy, both in expending and in collecting revenues, was to be urged upon Congress; the army was to be reduced to a minimum, reliance being had upon the militia of the States; the navy was to be limited to the smallest number of vessels allowed by law; the diplomatic establishment in Europe was to be cut down to three ministers; last, but not to Jefferson's mind least, all such courtlike functions as levees would be abolished and the President would send his annual message to Congress in writing instead of delivering it in person as his predecessors had done.

This programme, which was carried out with a thoroughness that no modern President would so much as hope for,\* demands a few words of general comment. It is obviously that of a gentleman-farmer, but it is also that of an idealist statesman, of a friend of humanity in the highest sense. It was, of course, open to Federalist criticism when it was promulgated, and it has since been battered and riddled by

\* The messages sent to Congress by recent Presidents are full of recommendations of which not the least notice is taken.

able historians with a sense for logic and an aptitude for seorn. Events speedily proved the reduction of the army and navy to be most unwise; but it must be remembered that in 1801 Europe seemed to be on the eve of a general peace and that a philanthropist like Jefferson could not well have fathomed the depths of selfish ambition of a conqueror like Napoleon. Besides, as we shall see in the next chapter, Jefferson had developed, on Revolutionary precedents, a theory to the effect that America could force any hostile country to terms by refusing to import goods from it. That this was anticipating by more than one century the preponderating influence of economic interests and Christian principles upon the politics of the world may be granted; but it is only justice to Jefferson to contend that the eighteenth century had made such tremendous reforms in all directions that the first decade of the nineteenth had some grounds for believing that it could cap them all; and that at least it is due to humanity that enthusiastic men and nations should attempt the salvation of the race even at greater risks than Jefferson and America ran. It should be observed further that closer study of Jefferson's peaceful policy might, but a few months since, have directed the spirit of American philanthropy along higher and more successful lines than it actually took in the Cuban crisis.

Congress, on assembling early in December, did not devote so much attention to the weakest parts of the President's programme as to one of its strongest features—to wit, the reduction of the judiciary within proper bounds. This was probably due to the fact that the party in opposition yielded to the natural temptation to defend its own actions rather than the country's interests. The debate on the pro-



posed repeal was protracted and heated as well, especially in the passage at arms between Wm. B. Giles of Virginia, the leading Republican in the House, and Bayard, the ablest Federalist. Bayard defended the whole course of his party's history against the attack of Giles in a way that still challenges respect if not approval, but neither he nor Gouverneur Morris in the Senate—that out of place Patrician—nor any other of the Federalist speakers deserved to prevail over the Administration's large majority. Their constitutional arguments, though acute, were not convincing; and the arguments from expediency were mainly on the side championed ably by Macon and a young man, whose name will frequently occur hereafter, the famous eccentric, John Randolph of Roanoke. The final vote was indeed uncomfortably close in the Senate, but in the House corresponded fairly with the hopes of the Executive.

The financial reforms urged by Jefferson and Gallatin were naturally supplemented by the reductions in the judicial and diplomatic salary lists and in army and navy expenditures, but they were more far reaching in character. Jefferson sympathised with his fellow agriculturists of the South and West in their hatred of the excise or internal revenue taxes, and he was utterly indisposed to look upon the national debt\* as a source of stability to the government. Gallatin accordingly proposed to rely on the receipts from postage, sale of public lands, and customs (amounting to about \$9,500,000) in order to run the economically administered government and to devote about \$7,300,000 to the debt which would thus be paid off in half a generation. The latter fact was in harmony with Jefferson's theory that one gen-

\* Then amounting to nearly \$83,000,000.

eration should not bind another; while the abolition of the excise did away with odious tax-gatherers and with all excuse for such popular uprisings as the Whisky Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania, which had caused Washington so much trouble in 1794. The modest figures just given would prove Jefferson's popular sympathies, his distrust of the financial and commercial classes, and his determination not to interfere with internal improvements and other domestic matters then attended to by the respective States, even if we did not have his correspondence to give us his views upon these points. The ready acceptance of his financial programme by his party shows furthermore that he was not the only optimist in the country, for if Congress had deemed war imminent, it is hardly conceivable that even Jefferson could have induced them to be content with a combined army and navy expenditure that did not quite reach \$2,000,000 per annum!

Congress adjourned early in May, 1802, with the country well satisfied with the work that had been done. A glance through their debates shows them to have been a serious and fairly able body of men, few of whom, however, have left memorable names. Their more important work has just been outlined, but it may be well to notice in addition that they admitted a new State, Ohio, allowed a delegate to sit for the Mississippi Territory, legislated for the infant Library of Congress, restored the moderate naturalisation requirements of Washington's day, which the Federalists had disturbed, and discussed the impropriety of continuing to imprison the government's insolvent debtors. The last topic reminds one forcibly of the progress the century has made in a humanitarian way. It is hard to realise that in Jefferson's

time John Rutledge, the younger, of South Carolina, could cite the case of an honest revenue officer of his State who, having through ignorance mixed his accounts and become indebted to the general government, had been already languishing in jail for five years and could look forward to no relief.\* Yet the tide had undoubtedly turned. "The Revolution of 1800," as the success of Jefferson and the Republicans has been termed, had brought the long-suffering people into power, and so far at least had not jeopardised the country. Curiously enough, however, throughout Jefferson's lease of power (1801-1809) a contemporary observer might well have doubted whether this new revolution had not taken a monarchial turn, for few kings have ever had their way so completely as Jefferson had. The political history of the United States during the first decade of this century reads like a biography of Jefferson, but this fact is due not to that statesman's bias towards tyranny—no man ever hated irresponsible power more—but to his skill as a moulder of public opinion and to his sympathy with his fellow-countrymen upon whose support his power rested.

\* Imprisonment for debt was abolished by the Federal government a generation later, and this led to its abandonment in the States.

## CHAPTER III.

## DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY.

JEFFERSON entered on his second year of office with high satisfaction at what his Administration had thus far accomplished and with not unwarranted hopes for still greater future success. He controlled his party and his party controlled the country, while the Federalists were daily losing ground even in Massachusetts. But he was soon to learn that Fortune will desert a humanitarian philosopher almost as soon as she will a self-assertive aristocrat like Adams. He was destined, indeed, to taste her favours long enough to secure himself a triumphant re-election, but soon afterward he could complain of her fickleness as few American Presidents have had just occasion to do. If he had been less of an optimist, the extreme political partisanship displayed in New York and Pennsylvania, the scurrilous abuse heaped upon him in certain quarters, and the restless intrigues of Burr might have disquieted him; but he was apparently more concerned at the correctness of certain reports from abroad which had reached him early in his Administration.

These reports were to the effect that the decrepit Spanish Monarchy had ceded back to France the great Territory of Louisiana which the latter had given up in 1762. It was serious news, for it not only meant the possible growth of a powerful rival empire across the Mississippi, but it made certain a

repetition of the struggles the general government of the United States had already been obliged to make in order to secure for its trans-Alleghany inhabitants the right of depositing their goods at some point near the mouth of their inland waterway. Free navigation of the great stream could mean little unless shippers could store their produce prior to its transference from river boats to ocean-going vessels, and without free navigation of their natural waterway the western men must be cut off from the world's markets. But Spain had haggled at granting the right of deposit, and her minister to the United States in the years immediately following the Revolution had actually intrigued with leading men in the West with a view of detaching the new settlements from the Union that did not secure them in their dearest rights. Indeed, so weak was the tie between East and West that the Continental Congress came near giving up the fight for free navigation, a false step from which they finally recoiled, as it might have cost them the allegiance of the outlying communities. Finally in 1795, after it had seemed likely that an unauthorised attempt might be made to force Spain's hand, a treaty was concluded by which the right of deposit at New Orleans was granted for a short period, with a proviso that some other place might subsequently be chosen.

In view of these uncomfortable experiences it is no wonder that Livingston was instructed to remonstrate against Spain's retrocession to France or else to insist upon the sale to the United States of New Orleans and the Floridas. It seems not to have been clear to Jefferson how much territory Spain was yielding to France, whether she was giving up the strip east of the Mississippi and bordering the Gulf,



known as West Florida, or merely yielding the vast indeterminate tract west of the great river which she had received from France in 1762; but it was clear to him that there was "on the globe one single spot," New Orleans, the possessor of which was the "natural and habitual enemy" of the United States. Jefferson loved France and did not love Great Britain, but he was statesman enough to lay aside his prejudices when he was confronted by hard facts. In his famous letter to Livingston of April 18, 1802, he declared categorically: "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans, fixes the sentence which is to restrain her for ever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." Jefferson has often been accused with justice of being a visionary statesman, but this splendid letter to Livingston proves that on the occasion of the greatest external menace to her safety America has ever encountered, the philosopher showed himself to be as wise and practical a ruler as Washington or Lincoln.

Fortunately Jefferson was not in the end obliged either to form an alliance with Great Britain or to reconcile himself with a steady enmity to France, either of which courses might at any time have led his country into one of those wars he so much detested. At first, however, his diplomacy seemed fruitless. Napoleon had wild dreams of a Western Empire and treated Livingston's propositions with coldness, while the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, pending the transfer to France, suspended the right of deposit. This action, which seems to have been due to stupidity rather than to premeditated

hostile intentions, naturally aroused the West and gave the Federalists in the second session of the Seventh Congress (December, 1802) an excellent chance to embarrass the Administration. Jefferson in his message had barely touched on the cession of Louisiana and had kept silence about the loss of the right of deposit, but he was soon called upon to furnish papers on the latter point. The House Republicans under the lead of Randolph voted their confidence in the Executive, but the Federalists wished to broaden the controversy and to force the House into a debate that might lead to the war Hamilton was advocating in the newspapers. With his usual tact Jefferson secured secret sessions to which he revealed his plans of purchasing New Orleans and the Floridas, and as a result of his diplomacy and Randolph's leadership he succeeded in having \$2,000,000 appropriated for his purposes. He also had James Monroe, lately governor of Virginia, appointed a special envoy to join with Livingston at Paris and Pinckney at Madrid in endeavouring to secure the Florida cession. This appointment was a shrewd one, for Monroe had years before supported the West in its demands for free navigation of the Mississippi. That section at once quieted down, and when later in the session the Federalist Senators endeavoured to insist upon the Administration's at once taking New Orleans by force, two of the calmest and ablest speakers in support of Jefferson's diplomacy were Breckinridge of Kentucky and Anderson of Tennessee. It was indeed queer that the cultured Morris of New York should be found urging backwoodsmen to fight; but partisanship will change men's natures, and the chance to force a war on Jefferson, of all men,

was too good to be lost. Yet the philosopher was a match for his foes, since he not only curbed the temper of the West by his politic arts, but also explained his policy in a way that satisfies posterity of his wisdom. He stated explicitly to a correspondent that he believed in putting off the day of contention until the public debt had been decreased and until a population had been planted "on the Mississippi itself sufficient to do its own work without marching men fifteen hundred miles from the Atlantic shores to perish by fatigue and unfriendly climates." These words are not without their application at the end of the century.

Congress closed without having done much more than to vote Jefferson the money he desired and to authorise him at discretion to call out 80,000 volunteers whom he did not desire. We are therefore justified in calling it a wise legislature and can forgive it for solemnly discussing what disposition ought to be made of jewels given by the Spanish King to the wife of a retiring minister. With Congress out of the way, the President heard with pleasure that the Spanish government had disavowed the action of its Intendant at New Orleans. This was a point gained even if Livingston continued to find Napoleon obdurate. The President could still honestly write of himself and his countrymen, "Peace is our passion," partly because he foresaw that peace was the last thing France and Great Britain were thinking of and that a renewal of war in Europe would mean the abandonment of Napoleon's Western Empire, which was not thriving even in San Domingo. Seldom have a statesman's calculations been more speedily or completely fulfilled. Early in April, 1803, and just before Monroe's arrival, Barbé-Marbois was author-



ised to treat with Livingston for the transfer, not of the comparatively small territory with which Jefferson would perforce have been content, but of the whole undefined area of Louisiana. This, if it certainly did not include East Florida, and probably not West Florida, nevertheless furnished a vast trans-Mississippi empire which would stretch to the Pacific Ocean if American discoveries in the Oregon region could be made good.\* On Monroe's arrival the bargain was concluded at about \$15,000,000, the treaty providing for the liberties and rights of the inhabitants of the ceded province.

The news of the cession was received with enthusiasm in America, but extreme Federalists resolved to make capital out of it, and Jefferson clearly foresaw how they could succeed. It was not certain that the Constitution contemplated the acquisition of new territory, especially when the inhabitants thereof were to be "incorporated in the Union of the United States," as was provided in the third article of the treaty just signed. Still Jefferson was wise enough to cease speculating whether the new States destined to grow up beyond the Mississippi would one day assert their independence, and confined himself to present considerations mainly. The Mississippi question was settled by the cession, and this important gain must not be jeopardised by any delay in ratifying the treaty, especially as Napoleon might change his mind. And after all a constitutional amendment might authorise the transaction after the fact and thus salve the consciences of strict constructionists of that great instrument, including the President. Meanwhile the astute statesman showed

\* Captain Robert Gray, a New England trader, discovered the Columbia River in 1792.

his prescience as well as his interest in science by authorising preparations for an exploration of the new region under Lewis and Clark, which Congress had at his instigation agreed to before the purchase of Louisiana had taken place.\*

The first session of the Eighth Congress convened in October, nearly two months earlier than usual, on account of the pressing nature of the Louisiana business. With the country and the Administration heartily in favour of ratifying the treaty, the Federalists could make neither a winning nor a long fight. They made the most of Spain's displeasure at Napoleon's alleged breach of faith, they urged the constitutional objections that had occurred to Jefferson, they predicted gigantic disasters to the Union consequent upon the growth in the new territory of a restless population alien to the quiet people of the Atlantic seaboard. One Senator went so far as to declare: "But as to Louisiana, this new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be incorporated into this Union, which I have no idea can be done but by altering the Constitution, I believe it will be the greatest curse that could at present befall us." There is little reason to doubt that this gentleman from Delaware meant what he said, nor is it necessary to accuse him of great folly for having said it. He simply could not foresee

\* Captain Merriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark left St. Louis in May, 1804, reached the head-waters of the Missouri River in August, 1805, and in November of the same year saw the Pacific. The return journey occupied about a year and the whole expedition was a notable one. Meanwhile Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike had left St. Louis in August, 1805, to discover the head-waters of the Mississippi. On completing this task he was intrusted with explorations in the Louisiana Territory and discovered "Pike's Peak" in the Rocky Mountains.

that in a few years railroads and telegraph wires would make Iowa nearer to Washington than Delaware was then. Nor were the constitutional arguments urged against this early effort at "expansion" altogether beside the mark, since the theory that the Union was a partnership of sovereign States in which each partner had inviolable rights was widely held at the time, and it was questionable whether new partners could be taken in by the mere action of Congress and the Executive. In this connection it may be remarked that these debates have been much in evidence on account of controversies arising out of the late war with Spain, but have scarcely been used with discretion. The annexation of territory which all parties agreed in regarding as fit material out of which future States might be carved was one thing from the point of view of general republican theory; the annexation of territory not so regarded is quite another, however advisable and legitimate it may or may not be from the point of view of government in general.

After the main question of the Louisiana purchase had been decided, Congress continued in session until the end of March without accomplishing much that was noteworthy. Three topics were, indeed, discussed that were to assume later more or less important proportions. These were the importation of slaves, certain Georgia land claims, and the propriety of impeaching Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court for scandalously partisan conduct on the bench. But at least nothing happened to disturb the popularity of the Administration, and Jefferson was renominated unanimously by a caucus of Republican Senators and Representatives, the veteran New York politician, George

Clinton, being selected for Vice-President in place of the discredited Burr. To prevent any recurrence of a tie vote Congress had proposed an amendment to the Constitution which was duly ratified by three-fourths of the State Legislatures and stands in force to-day as the Eleventh Amendment.\* Under this Jefferson and Clinton were in November, 1804, elected over the Federalists, Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina and Rufus King of New York, by the handsome vote of 162 electors against 14. Meanwhile Burr had been defeated as a candidate for the governorship of New York, and had, partly in consequence, picked a quarrel with Hamilton and killed him in a duel. Jefferson seemed to be now left securely in the ascendant. He had won the gratitude of the country by his annexation of an imperial domain; a new lease of power had been given him; his ablest opponent was dead and his most unscrupulous rival a discredited politician and social outcast; and finally the party and section arrayed against him were in a hopeless minority and had been compelled to abandon, at least temporarily, incipient schemes for a secession of New England from the Union.† He was at the zenith of his power, but the Nemesis that dogs the footsteps of good fortune was haunting him almost as closely as though he were the hero of a Greek tragedy instead of the most typically modern and unsuperstitious man of his generation.

One session of the Eighth Congress remained to round out the Administration that had ushered in the

\* See Appendix A.

† A Federalist plot to detach New England and New York from the Union was undoubtedly formed at this time, but received no encouragement.

“Revolution of 1800.” Not a great deal of strikingly important business was done, but that future congresses would have more to do was indicated by legislation dividing Louisiana into two territories and the Indiana Territory into an equal number. Race troubles had already originated in the former region, but an influx of American settlers would be sure to bring order out of chaos. In the latter, William Henry Harrison, who remained Governor of Indiana after Michigan had been set off under General Hull, concluded advantageous extinguishments of Indian titles to land in accordance with Jefferson’s humane advice on the subject, and something was done in this way in the vast region which had been ceded to the Union by Georgia. This latter cession was not entirely advantageous, for the State had in 1795, through a corrupt legislature, ceded to speculators a large tract known as the Yazoo lands—an action which was declared null and void by the succeeding legislature. Trouble of course ensued, and Madison, Levi Lincoln,\* and Gallatin, as commissioners, advised the reservation of five million acres in order to satisfy claimants—chief among whom was a New England land company. This did not quiet matters, however, and for several sessions Congress rang with violent charges of fraud and corruption preferred against New England moneyed men in general and Gideon Granger of Connecticut, the Postmaster-General, in particular. The chief foe of the speculators was John Randolph, who grew so violent that within a year Jefferson had to look to the Northern Democratic-Republicans for a new leader of the House. Randolph was surely unbalanced, especially when he vented his spleen on Madison, who was no

\* Of Massachusetts—Jefferson’s Attorney-General.



speculator but only interested in effecting some sort of compromise; still it may be feared that even if he exaggerated when he said of his opponents, "They buy and sell corruption in the gross; and a few millions, more or less, is hardly felt in their account," he was laying the long, bony finger he was wont to use so effectively in debate, upon a plague-spot peculiarly natural to a commercial republic and one likely to spread dangerously in the future. We may dismiss the whole sorry business with pity both for the check Randolph's wild, if not insane conduct gave to his brilliant career, and for the numerous scandals that have characterised the use made by individual States and by the Union of the public domain so graciously bestowed upon them by a bountiful Providence.

Randolph's loss of self-control in the Yazoo matter was one of the chief causes of his failure to succeed as prosecutor of Justice Chase, whose trial by the Senate was the most conspicuous feature of the close of Jefferson's first Administration. Chase had, in the trials of certain notorious Republican editors under the Alien and Sedition Laws, proved himself a judge of the Jeffreys type, though naturally less noxious than that tyrant, and more recently had indulged in a political harangue to the grand jury at Baltimore that had brought down Jefferson's wrath and incurred the censure of moderate men. The President had seemingly suggested the idea of an impeachment of the old partisan—such a procedure having State precedents in its favour and being a natural complement of the repeal of the Federalists' judiciary act. But Jefferson had been astute enough not to allow his own hand to be seen in the affair and, perhaps, to play on Randolph's vanity



in order to induce him to assume charge of the prosecution. Be this as it may, the House at Randolph's instance presented charges of impeachment in January, 1804, and a year later the trial began before the Senate and was conducted as though it were a second Warren Hastings affair.\* It would be perhaps unjust to charge Randolph with trying to imitate Burke, but it is not unfair to say that he was by no means equal to the task he set himself. Oratory of an extravagant type could not make up for lack of legal acumen and failure to follow Jefferson's shrewd advice to rest the case on Chase's indecent political harangue at Baltimore. On not a single charge could the necessary two-thirds vote be obtained, and Chase went free. The trial is important in that it helped to show that it would not pay any party to make an open attack upon the judiciary—a fact which has led to the less aggressive practice of “packing the bench” with partisans—and that together with the subsequent failure of the Burr trial, the abortive attempt to impeach President Johnson,† and the decision not to proceed legally against Jefferson Davis and his colleagues, it shows that it is almost impossible to punish so-called political crimes in a free republic inhabited by an easy-going people secure in their liberties. Recent talk about the prosecution of leading citizens for treason, on account of their opposition to certain measures advocated by the Administration in power, is thus seen to be as much beside the mark as it would be in England itself.

Jefferson's second inaugural reviewed briefly the

\* See Appendix A., article 1, sections 2 and 3; article 2, section 4.

† See Part III., Chap. XVIII.

leading features of the Administration just completed and propounded once more his well-known principles of government, which were about to be subjected to a severer test than he could well have imagined. During the summer that followed disputes with Spain with regard to the boundaries of Louisiana, which the United States naturally desired to carry far enough east to include the important port of Mobile, led the pacific President to think of war, but what actually happened was that the war with Tripoli was brought to a happy conclusion. This little contest had now been going on for nearly four years, the small American navy having done as well as it could under the circumstances. By accident the frigate Philadelphia ran on a rock and was captured along with her captain, Bainbridge, and her crew. A daring expedition into the harbour of Tripoli enabled Lieutenant Decatur to burn the hulk of the American vessel to the water's edge, but this gallant exploit could not secure the release of the prisoners nor could the blockade of the town or the destruction of Tripolitan vessels move the Bey to accept a ransom. An adventurous expedition planned and led by General William Eaton finally effected the capture of the town of Derne in the interest of a dethroned brother of the Bey, and the latter potentate was thus induced to make a good treaty and to yield up his prisoners. If viewed as a whole the affair seems petty, it must be at least remembered that the young Republic emerged with more honour from her contest with the Barbary pirates than any Christian power had done for a long period.

Meanwhile a great Christian power was doing America injuries which her own embarrassing position could not excuse. Great Britain, which had

of late seemed quite friendly, suddenly changed her policy in a way that seriously affected the commercial prosperity of New England and the Middle States. Since the signing of Jay's Treaty (1795), which had at first been so unpopular, American shipping had greatly increased owing to the fact that the United States was a neutral power and was thus able to carry goods to France and Spain from their West Indian colonies. The British fleet had swept the ships of its enemies from the seas, but the carrying trade which had been so profitable to Great Britain had practically passed to the Americans. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that Pitt upon his return to power should have been persuaded to apply to American ships what was known as "The Rule of 1756," which prevented a neutral from enjoying in time of war trading privileges not allowed in time of peace, or that Americans should have raised an outcry at his doing so.\* The fact was that not only was there jealousy both in Great Britain and on the Continent at America's reaping prosperity from European turmoils, but there was a quite natural desire on the part of both belligerents to drag her into the contest as an ally. The pacific Jefferson thus found himself in an awkward situation, which was destined to grow more uncomfortable as time went on. Meanwhile British vessels began to seize American in pursuance of the new orders, and the old impressment abuses were increased.

Against these America had long protested in vain. The British theory was that a man could not

\* The rule was soon evaded, however, for French West Indian products were brought to America and then reshipped to France as American products. Great Britain soon stopped this lucrative traffic.

throw off his allegiance; on the other hand the American who had entered the British service could not obtain a discharge. Being mistress of the seas and not having yet conceived much respect for America, Great Britain proceeded to enforce her theory of inalienable nationality in a most exasperating manner. British war vessels would overhaul American merchant ships and take off by force such passengers or sailors as the British officers might declare to be either deserted British sailors—the claim urged at first—or British subjects by birth—the claim made when the need of seamen increased. As Americans spoke English, this rough and ready method of procedure led to many mistakes which could only be partly rectified after great trouble and loss of time. Every Administration had done its best \* to bring Great Britain to some fair agreement about the matter, and in 1803 it looked as if Jefferson would have this success to add to his other claims to popularity, but the opportunity passed, and with the growing stress of the mighty war she was waging for the cause of liberty against the French despot, Great Britain became more overbearing than ever toward the young Republic. American harbours were watched and American vessels subjected to a high-handed treatment which seems almost incredible to modern ears. Yet in spite of the popular clamours and of his own indignation at the injustice done the land he so dearly loved, Jefferson still clung to his idea of balancing America between the belligerents and persuaded Congress to spend money on

\* Perhaps this is not strictly true. America might have done more to discourage British deserters from trying to enter her navy. See Henry Adams's treatment of the subject in his masterly *History of the United States*.

gunboats for harbour defence which a less tractable body would probably have insisted on devoting to the building of frigates. It is hard to defend his policy, but it is at least clear that he deemed it best to get rid of one dispute at a time and that he thought the opportunity good for acquiring the Floridas from Spain by purchase.

Accordingly after sending the Ninth Congress, which opened early in December, 1805, a stronger message than usual, Jefferson transmitted a special message with regard to Spanish affairs which, if it had been received by a more excitable body, would almost surely have led to the war he did not desire. It was not improbably intended to arouse an indignation which would be appeased as soon as it became known that war had been averted by a skilful piece of diplomacy. That his diplomacy might succeed from the start the President undertook in person to inform the Ways and Means Committee of the House through its chairman, Randolph, and another important member, that he wanted an appropriation of \$2,000,000 "for extraordinary expenses attending the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations." But Randolph, who had been losing power in the House and temper with the President, especially as the latter seemed to be relying more and more on Northern members and losing his State and sectional characteristics, positively refused to father such indirect legislation, kept his committee passive, and proposed a distinctly warlike resolution in the House. Jefferson was, however, more than a match for his exacerbad fellow Virginian. He explained his purposes to Bidwell of Massachusetts, who offered a substitute for Randolph's resolution. The House sustained Bid-



well, and by the middle of January, 1806, Jefferson had been intrusted with the funds he had so indirectly asked for. It was a transaction that could not be often repeated with safety in a country desirous of maintaining its liberties; but, if Jefferson's methods smacked of tyranny disguised, his purposes were as pure and patriotic as could have been desired. The purity of his purposes, however, did not move the obstinate Spaniards, and he finally left his chair without having used the money he took such pains to secure. To parody the words of Milton—"Some money once he gained but lost a man"—to wit, John Randolph, who ever after was a free-lance in politics, overwhelming former friends and foes alike with the torrents of his unmatched invective.

The Spanish business disposed of in the House, Jefferson sent in another confidential message on British affairs. It was by no means warlike in tone, although a conservative estimate placed the number of American seamen then detained in the British service at between 2,500 and 3,000. But even under these trying circumstances the President's policy was to be found embodied in a resolution, introduced by another Northern Republican, Gregg of Pennsylvania, to the effect that importations from Great Britain should be suspended until she abandoned her practice of seizing neutral vessels and of forcibly impressing American seamen. The amount of trade that would be affected by total non-importation was about \$30,000,000—the policy would therefore hit Great Britain hard and might lead to war, while it would certainly make the American people restive. It was debated at considerable length in the House, Randolph outdoing himself in



sarcasm, which the measure certainly invited. The final result was a compromise by which the importation of special articles only was prohibited, the act taking effect as late as November 15, 1806. Randolph had a right to sneer at it, but his power in the House was gone, and he failed in his efforts to make a breach between Monroe and the President in order that the former might, as an anti-administration man who believed in more strenuous measures against Great Britain, frustrate Madison's chances of becoming Jefferson's successor.

More ambitious intrigues, culminating in a real conspiracy, astonished the country in the latter part of 1806. The restless Burr having been cast off by his party, having lost the governorship of New York, having been ostracised for killing Hamilton, was in a mood for any desperate scheme to win power and additional notoriety. New England could not be detached from the Union, but perhaps the West might, or at least an empire might be founded in Mexico by a man of sufficient boldness to imitate Napoleon. Already, as Vice-President, Burr had done little presiding over the Senate but had woven various intrigues, and after somewhat theatrically filling his post during the trial of Chase, he had taken a journey down the Ohio and the Mississippi to observe the state of the land. He got some encouragement—or believed that he did—from leading Western men—especially from General Wilkinson, Governor of Louisiana or, more properly, of the Territory of Orleans. To these men he made large promises of French, Spanish, and British support of his plans, but his chief sources of persuasion lay in his own daring and seductive personality. Over one man—an Irishman named Blennerhassett, liv-

ing in considerable luxury on an island in the Ohio River—he exercised a fascination that was indeed deadly. Upon this gentleman's estate men and arms for the romantic but absurd expedition were collected without sufficient precaution: for Jefferson learned of the affair, and despatched a spy who caused the descent of a body of Ohio militia upon the scene. Meanwhile Wilkinson had determined to betray Burr, had made New Orleans, which the latter intended to take, impregnable, and had communicated with the President. Late in December, Blennerhassett, escaping from the Ohio soldiers, joined Burr at the mouth of the Cumberland, and, although the latter was now aware that his scheme was desperate, a start was made down the Mississippi with a small flotilla and about one hundred men. At Natchez Wilkinson's treachery became known, and the expedition was abandoned. Burr was captured in the Mississippi Territory in February, 1807, and sent to Richmond, Virginia, for trial; Blennerhassett was taken later, and the folly of attempting an uprising in the interest of a single man in an extended and liberally governed country like the United States became apparent for all time.

Burr's trial for treason, which took place late in the summer of 1807, was as much a fiasco as his expedition had been. The Constitution required the proof of some overt act of levying war or giving aid to the enemies of the United States,\* and Chief Justice Marshall ruled both that the preparations at Blennerhassett's Island constituted no such act and that such an act must be proved before testimony could be taken as to Burr's intrigues. Thus

\* See Appendix A., article 3, section 3.

the trial for treason collapsed, as did also a trial for misdemeanour. Finally the government gave the whole matter up, and Burr, after going abroad, ended his life in New York, a despised and obscure man. His escape from punishment was a source of vexation to the President, who has been accused both of slackness in putting down the conspiracy and of vindictiveness in endeavouring to influence the course of the trial. Both charges are partly true, but the first is minimised by his well-known and justifiable reliance in the loyalty of the people. With regard to the second charge it must be remembered that Jefferson did not love Marshall and that the latter did not altogether cover himself with glory in the trial. Still, as so often in such matters, the country profited from what was at best a shabby affair. Marshall's decision has made those political blunders or crimes known as trials for treason practically impossible in the United States.

The closing session of the Ninth Congress was naturally marked by excitement about the Burr Conspiracy, which came near causing the passage of an unnecessary bill suspending the right of *habeas corpus* in a few cases; but on the whole nothing important was done save with regard to the foreign slave trade which, according to the Constitution,\* could not be prohibited before January 1st, 1808. An act was now passed forbidding such trade under heavy penalties. The debates were not so acrimonious as they would have been a generation after, for the evils of slavery were much more frankly acknowledged by leading Southerners like Jefferson than was the case later when opposition to abolition-

\* See Appendix A., article 1, section 9.

ism and fear of slave revolts had caused the development of quite a pro-slavery philosophy and propaganda. Still in several instances slight bursts of temper served to indicate the volcano over which the fabric of the general government had been reared.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE WAR OF 1812.

ALTHOUGH the second and, it is to be hoped, the last war between Great Britain and the United States did not actually break out until after Jefferson had been three years in retirement at Monticello, the relations between the two countries became so strained from 1807 that we are warranted in treating in this chapter the closing half of that pacific President's second Administration. The beginning of the end was seen in March, 1807, when Jefferson determined not to submit to the Senate a treaty with Great Britain that had been provisionally signed by Monroe and William Pinkney, the distinguished Maryland lawyer, in order to provide a substitute for Jay's Treaty which had expired. The American negotiators had exceeded their instructions by signing without having secured any real abatement of the impressment abuse. They had found the British negotiators, who represented a transitional ministry, inclined to make some slight concessions with regard to the neutral trade, and for the sake of these had agreed to the treaty, when suddenly the news of Napoleon's famous Berlin Decree creating a paper blockade of the British Isles prompted the additional demand that the United States should agree to withstand French aggressions. Monroe and Pinkney naturally refused thus to commit their country, but they finally signed a

treaty which left to Great Britain the option of doing away with her concessions should the United States not resist Napoleon's decree. Such a one-sided instrument was obviously not worth considering, but Jefferson's rejection gave some show of colour for a new Tory ministry's subsequent haughty conduct. Great Britain's action in the matter deserves censure, but her isolated situation in the splendid fight she was making against Napoleon must always be considered. It has been intimated, too, that she was justified in despising an Executive and a nation that relied on diplomacy instead of arms to win their rights, but this is only a veiled way of asserting the brutal doctrine that might makes right.

The summer of 1807 saw matters come to a crisis. After some minor but exasperating experiences at the hands of British captains, the American navy and, through it, the American people were subjected to one of the most flagrant insults conceivable. On June 22, the United States frigate Chesapeake, Commodore Barron, having on board three coloured sailors claimed to be British deserters yet in reality not such, was hailed by the British ship Leopard, under colour of an order from an admiral at Halifax, and, her commander refusing to muster his crew that the three sailors might be taken, was raked by a broadside from the Leopard, in consequence of which, not being in a condition to fight, she was obliged to haul down her flag after losing three killed and eighteen wounded. The news of this insult to the flag aroused the country as nothing else could have done, and although Canning at first disavowed the act, his subsequent tardiness in offering reparation left the sense of injury so deeply



implanted in the average American breast that nothing but war could wipe it out.\*

It is impossible in the space at command to follow out more than a few of the chief threads of the diplomatic and legislative tangle in which Jefferson's well-intentioned Administration now became involved. No friend of the human race can, indeed, wish to dwell upon a state of affairs creditable to none of the parties concerned; but it should be remembered that in no way can the immense advance made by the United States in the nineteenth century be better brought out than by a dispassionate statement of what the American people were fated to endure at the hands of Great Britain and Napoleon between the years 1807 and 1812.

Immediately after the outrage upon the Chesapeake Jefferson issued a strong proclamation ordering British cruisers out of American waters; the defences of the leading ports were also increased. Congress, too, was called together several weeks in advance of the regular session. Nothing of importance was done by it, however, until after the middle of December, for although it was perfectly disposed to follow the President almost blindly, that statesman was loath at first to abandon his peaceful policy of balancing America between France and Great Britain. But by November the former power had begun to enforce the Berlin Decree most harshly, having confiscated, on the ground that she contained British goods, the American ship *Horizon* which had stranded on the French coast; and the latter

\* Jefferson wrote: "An outrage not to be borne has obliged us to fly to arms, and has produced such a state of exasperation, and that so unanimous, as has never been seen in this country since the battle of Lexington."

power had issued certain Orders in Council which forbade neutral trade with France or her allies save through Great Britain. A month later Napoleon answered this high-handed response to his own high-handed decree by proclaiming from Milan that any vessel that allowed itself to be subjected in any way to British interference should be confiscated. Balancing was no longer possible between such belligerents. America had to decide whether to keep her ships at home or to arm them and send them out with the understanding that they would show fight when attacked. The latter plan naturally did not appeal to Jefferson—indeed with Great Britain's large navy and Napoleon's power to police the Continent it was hardly feasible—and he therefore proposed an embargo.

Congress answered him with a celerity that is almost astounding. Such a measure was sure to cause great internal discontent if kept up for any length of time; it would require the armed exertions of the government to enforce it; it bore more hardly on the trading North and East than on the agricultural West and South; yet such was still the general confidence in the President's wisdom that his policy, which even he regarded as probably a preliminary step to war, went through with far less debate than was expended upon two investigations connected with Burr's defunct conspiracy. There was not even a great deal of debate with regard to the necessary defences of the country, nor were the appropriations for this object at all sufficient.

It is, of course, easy after the fact to point out the folly of this war of Decrees, Orders in Council, and Embargoes. Yet such was the frenzy of the times that it is difficult to argue with certainty what

America should have done. Both France and Great Britain had partisans in the country, and when war did come later, it nearly brought about the secession of New England. A war in conjunction with Great Britain against France would have been sooner or later regarded as a war in the interests of the commercial North, and might have alienated the South and West. An embargo might, after all, cost less in money than war, and would certainly cost less in lives; and it would give time for something to happen that might bring the warring nations to their senses. However this may be, it is at least certain that although the Federalists denounced the policy, many of the State legislatures gave it their approval. It will appear also from the sequel that the section on which it bore most hardly at first subsequently profited from it; the reverse being the case with the South, which supported it.

But it was a policy most difficult to enforce, especially since the necessary coastwise trade between State and State was involved and gave room for frauds. The Canada and Florida borders tempted evasion of the law, particularly in the case of flour, and even upright merchants found it hard to see their trade falling from them without making some effort to induce the government to change its system of defence. But Jefferson persevered in spite of all remonstrances, while complaints grew louder and the Federalists gained strength in New England, where a few leaders like Senator Pickering used language suggestive of secession and actually intrigued with British envoys. It was a harassing and perilous time, yet at the presidential election in the autumn of 1808 Madison and Clinton were elected by a good majority over Pinckney and King, who had been put

up a second time. As Madison represented Jefferson's policy, his nomination by the Republicans, in spite of intrigues in favour of Clinton and Monroe, and his subsequent election, showed that whatever the plight America might be in, her people did not visit the blame for it upon their favourite statesman.

The chief feature of the final session of the Tenth Congress was the debate in the House on what has since been known as Campbell's Report. This represented the views of Madison and of Gallatin, who was to be retained as an adviser, for Jefferson had no new plans to propose and did not wish to hamper his successor. Madison wished to continue the Embargo until June 1st, 1809, and then to pass a total Non-Intercourse Act relative to both Great Britain and the countries under Napoleon's control, the act to be suspended in favour of the power first withdrawing its obnoxious decrees. This, it was believed, would deprive Great Britain and the Federalists of their plea that American legislation was really intended to aid Napoleon, who had smiled at the Embargo. If the new policy failed to work, then Madison was in favour of war with both powers, however rash such a course might seem to be. The debate on the report brought out the fact that the House was not yet ready for war, but preferred to continue the Embargo, though that was tantamount to the country's giving up its right to sail the ocean. It is easy to say that Congress was cowardly and that long acquiescence in a peaceful policy had made it so. But it is certain that Jefferson, who proposed that policy, was much more of a humanitarian than of a coward, and it is not likely that the fathers and grandfathers of men who were ready enough to fight in the Civil War were cowards either. It is more

just to conclude that events had moved too strenuously and quickly for them to adopt a radically new policy at once.

But now for some reason—perhaps to render war more certain—the new leaders carried a bill for making the working of the Embargo more effective by the employment of force.\* It was a drastic measure for a free people to stand, even at the hands of their own legislators, and was bitterly opposed in New England. The Massachusetts legislature actually justified the British Orders in Council which had done so much to cause the Embargo, used language recalling that of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, and rebuked the Governor of the State for employing the militia to enforce the obnoxious act according to the request of the President. In Connecticut Governor Trumbull would not detail militia officers for such a purpose and convened a legislature which remonstrated as that of Massachusetts had done. This was in February, 1809, when Jefferson had but a few more days to serve. He had entered office execrated by New England, had seen his principles triumph there, and now through no fault of his own was ending as he had begun, an object of righteous indignation to the sturdy Puritans. Instead of the flattering testimonials he had been used to, threatening remonstrances and heartrending petitions were pouring in on him. The revenues he had so carefully watched were falling sadly behind through his restriction of commerce, and, to crown all, the House, taking the alarm at the perilous state of the country, would not consent to continue the Embargo till June 1st, but decided that it must stop on March 4th, the day he retired from power. The final breakdown



was not so bad as this, for the Embargo when raised on March 15 was still left to operate against France and Great Britain in the form of the Non-Inter-course Act, which forbade all importations from the two countries and closed the American ports to all their ships. But the humiliations he had been subjected to were sufficient to make the thin-skinned President glad to turn over to his pupil a task which, if it was not beyond his own powers, could not be successfully performed in accordance with his life-long principles.

Thus closed in gloom the public career of one of the greatest men America has given to the world. He was destined still to exert great influence through his correspondence and his counsels, but his executive work was over. This work has been variously estimated, but while it is clear that he was not so balanced a statesman as Washington and that his foreign policy failed ignominiously, it must never be forgotten that he belied the evil reports circulated by his enemies, that he eschewed sectionalism and tried to govern in the interests of the whole country, that he was wise enough to set aside technical scruples and secure the immense domain of Louisiana, that he governed economically and on the whole prosperously for six years, and that in his final defeat he went down holding the flag of fair dealing and peace among the nations. Perhaps when the world has at last learned that war is not an integral part of civilisation but rather of barbarism, a historian will be found bold enough to say that nothing in his political life became him like the leaving it.\*

\* In a letter to Eppes of Sept. 11, 1813, Jefferson gave in one sentence the clue to his policy: "My hope was, that by



In many respects Madison was Jefferson's natural successor, apart from the fact that for many years their political principles had been much the same. With John Adams and Jefferson out of the way, he was the chief surviving statesman of the Revolutionary period. He was not yet sixty and might therefore be expected to use efficiently his wide experience and his profound studies in the art and science of government. In the Legislature of Virginia and the Continental Congress he had made his mark, while yet a young man, by his prudence and his knowledge. He had perhaps done better and more active work than any other man to frame and expound the Constitution and to get it accepted. He had served excellently as a leader in Congress, and, if he followed Jefferson rather than Hamilton, he therein showed himself to be not wanting in sympathy with the people. As Secretary of State he had acted with dignity and discretion, and having learned to obey, he might be supposed to have prepared himself to command. The sequel will show how far such a presumption held, but it may be remarked here, that Madison's character is a hard one to judge even after all these years. He approaches more nearly to the best type of British statesmen, learned, prudent, dignified, solid, than does any other American President; he has been highly admired, perhaps on this very account, by certain American students; yet it is possible to understand how Mr. Goldwin Smith could call him "a cultivated and somewhat prim mediocrity." This he was not—far

giving time for reflection and retraction of injury, a sound calculation of their own interests would induce the aggressing nations to redeem their own character by a return to the practice of right."

from it—but he was at least denied many of the qualities that strike and hold the imaginations and the hearts of men.\*

Madison retained Gallatin and three other members of Jefferson's last Cabinet, but he did not advance the great financier to the portfolio of State as he had intended to do. This honour was reserved for the far less capable Robert Smith of Maryland, Jefferson's Secretary of the Navy. Powerful family and political connections seem to have determined this appointment, and to have shown thus from the start Madison's inferiority to his predecessor. At first, however, he appeared to many people throughout the country to be a superior executive. Great Britain seemed for a moment disposed to recede from her pretensions, and her envoy Erskine, who had liberal proclivities and an American wife, hurried through negotiations, looking to a temporary withdrawal of the Orders in Council and a corresponding cessation of the Non-Intercourse Law, as well as to a proper settlement of the Chesapeake matter. Madison did not realise that Erskine was exceeding his instructions, although Jefferson, accepting the good fortune, warned him against being too hopeful.† A proclamation at once informed the people that on June 10 non-intercourse with Great Britain would cease to be obligatory. Great rejoicings ensued, and the Eleventh Congress met in special session in May feeling that war was now far off. They did little besides providing appropriate legislation for the new policy toward Great

\* Jefferson wrote of him in 1810 as "my successor, who to the purest principles of republican patriotism adds a wisdom and a foresight second to no man on earth."

† See his letters of April 19 and 27, 1809.

Britain and for strengthening harbour and frontier defences, which they hoped would not soon be needed.

Those being days of slow sailing ships, New England and the Middle States had time, not merely for rejoicing, but for getting their vessels started off for hypothetically prosperous voyages before the news came that Canning had disavowed Erskine's negotiations. All was chaos once more, and when the new British Minister, Jackson, actually charged Madison and his advisers with having known that Erskine was going beyond his instructions, there was nothing to do but to refuse to hold further communication with such an insulting envoy. Yet so attached were the Federalists to British interests that Jackson was actually entertained by them as he passed through New England. Meanwhile Madison was left to the unpleasant knowledge that the lifting of the Embargo and the subsequent legislation had let loose American ships, which were constantly being confiscated. He was also made aware that his Administration was responsible for having made shippers run all risks for the sake of the heavy profits attending illicit trade—with the result that a return to the policy of restriction had been rendered extremely difficult. He must have recognised, finally, that the recent legislation had hampered and postponed preparations for the war that now seemed almost inevitable. His superiority to the Jefferson who continued to advise him was not so apparent after all.

It became less apparent still when that master of craft, Napoleon, began fresh intrigues in the summer of 1810 after the bewildered Eleventh Congress, having refused to accept certain commercial restric-

tions upon England and France contained in what was known as "Macon's Bill No. 1," had passed that indignant statesman's putative "Bill No. 2," which gave up the long struggle for neutral rights and provided only that if either Great Britain or France ceased its attacks upon American commerce, the United States would revert to non-intercourse with the power continuing its oppressive policy. The French despot saw clearly that unless he took America at her word, revoked his decrees, and thus made non-intercourse with Great Britain once more operative, British merchants would use every available American merchantman, as they had already used the daring ones, to land goods on the Continent. He had not long since, indeed, shown his real animus toward America by his Rambouillet Decree of March 23, 1810, which authorised the seizure of all American ships in French ports or in those of countries occupied by French forces. Over one hundred and thirty vessels had been seized under this decree, and these he determined to confiscate even while writing to the Duke of Cadore a letter in which he promised that, in view of "Macon's Bill No. 2," he would revoke the Berlin and Milan Decrees from November 1, 1810, it being understood that the British would revoke their Orders in Council or that the United States would resume non-intercourse with regard to the Island Kingdom.

Whatever might be thought of Napoleon's sincerity by Madison and his counsellors, there was nothing for them to do but to notify Great Britain of that worthy's action and to request a withdrawal of the obnoxious Orders. But although there had been a change of ministry, the American demands fell on deaf ears. So Madison issued a proclamation giv-

ing three months' warning of the non-intercourse with Great Britain. Congress, after considerable debate, legislated to the same effect in March, 1811. Meanwhile European complications had done one good turn for the country. West Florida, which Spain still held, was, like that nation, divided into revolutionists and loyalists, and was in such a state of confusion that it seemed best for the United States to occupy the territory before France or Great Britain interfered. Madison therefore authorised the Governor of the Mississippi Territory to take possession under the Louisiana Purchase. Congress subsequently approved this step and authorised the President to seize East Florida—an acquisition which was to come a few years later. The Territory of Orleans, which petitioned at this time for admission to the Union, profited by the occupation of West Florida, for when it was admitted the next year (1812) as the State of Louisiana, its bounds were extended to their present dimensions. Thus a new State destined to figure in the coming war was added to the Union, which had three years earlier carved out of the Indiana Territory a new territory known as Illinois. Yet the westward growth of the nation still disturbed the Federalists, and at this very juncture gave occasion to the now famous speech of Josiah Quincy, a representative from Massachusetts, in which he declared that the admission of Louisiana would "free the States from their moral obligation," and, as it would be the right of all, so it would be "the duty of some definitely to prepare for a separation, amicably if they *could*, forcibly if they must." This speech did not augur well for America's success in war, but neither did the action of the Democratic-Republicans at the close of the Eleventh Congress




(March, 1811) in refusing to recharter the National Bank that Hamilton had established twenty years before. There were, as we shall see, legitimate arguments to be brought against such a powerful institution, but they should not have been urged on the eve of a war, when the government needed all the financial help it could secure.

The adjournment of Congress was followed by a change in the Cabinet, Smith being forced from the State Department on account of his connection with some troublesome intrigues in the Senate. He was succeeded by Monroe, who strengthened the influence of the "war-hawks," as the advocates of a war with Great Britain were called. The growth of this influence was not impeded by the negotiations of the new British Minister, Foster; for the reparation he could make for the Chesapeake outrage was too tardy, and his arguments against Napoleon's sincerity were met by the fact that that crafty personage had at last released certain American ships, while the British had done the reverse. The war fever was further increased by an accidental encounter between the American frigate *President* and the British sloop of war *Little Belt*, in which the latter got the worst of it, and by Governor William Henry Harrison's campaign against the North-Western Indians, whose able leader, Tecumseh, had been stirring them up for years. It seemed clear that this struggle, which was ended by a victory over the savages on the Tippecanoe River \* in November, 1811, had been in part at least incited by British intrigues.

The Twelfth Congress, which assembled a month earlier than usual, was soon seen to be a body bent

\* Tecumseh was not in this battle. He subsequently fought against the Americans in Canada and was killed.





JOHN C. CALHOUN.



on war. Many new and young men had been sent, and the choice of Henry Clay of Kentucky as Speaker showed that the vigorous West was coming into power. John C. Calhoun of South Carolina also made his mark during this session as a war man who believed in asserting the national spirit. Of the characters of these leaders there will be room to speak hereafter; at present we must follow the swift course of events. The House Committee on Foreign Relations reported in a way that meant war and nothing else, and bills were soon passed increasing the navy and authorising the President to call out 100,000 militia. The Federalists, aided by John Randolph, tried in vain to stem the torrent. Gallatin, after somewhat abetting the new spirits, grew alarmed and pointed out that the loans that would be needed would necessitate internal taxes, if interest was to be met. The war men were not daunted, for a large part of the country was behind them. They were further helped by disclosures made by a certain John Henry, to the effect that in 1809 he had been sent into New England by Sir James Craig, Governor of Canada, in order to sound disaffected politicians as to the chances of the Eastern States breaking from the Union. Such a mission, especially if it compromised British ministers, would naturally arouse the greatest indignation.

Meanwhile the President sent in no war message, for he was at heart a man of peace. But a new nominating caucus must soon be held, and it was obvious that the next President must be one who would satisfy the war men. The story runs that he was actually coerced into accepting Clay's policy of a short embargo to be followed by war, as the only

means by which he could obtain the renomination he naturally desired. Put thus baldly the transaction hardly seems credible in view of Madison's character; but it is quite reasonable to suppose that his tendency to indecision was cleverly played upon, and it is clear that he had committed himself before he was nominated.\* An embargo for ninety days was pushed through, a proposal to send the moderate Bayard to England as an envoy was dropped, and on June 1, 1812, the war message was sent in. By June 18, after secret debates, Congress passed a bill declaring war against Great Britain, and Madison's proclamation announced it the next day. A few days later, owing to ministerial changes and to her growing burdens, Great Britain abandoned the Orders in Council—the chief cause of the war; but although the news reached America before hostilities had fairly begun, and although fresh evidence of Napoleon's duplicity made it seem hard to be fighting his battles, the Administration felt that the conflict must go on, especially as Great Britain offered no hope that the impressment abuse would be checked.

The results of the war now begun, as will be shown in the next chapter, were on the whole advantageous to America; but these were hardly foreseen, and it seems clear that the American people should look back upon the struggle with mixed feelings. It was a belated war, for it should, consistently, have followed the abandonment of Jefferson's policy. It was partly at least brought about by Napoleon's shrewdness, and it certainly might have prolonged his despotism had he not attacked Russia.

\* Benton thought that Monroe's counsels decided Madison.

It was begun with no adequate preparation, whether military, naval, or financial, and with a very ludicrous confidence in the ability of raw troops to overrun and hold a country like Canada. Finally, it was begun without a due regard for its political consequences, since a vigorous policy in the early campaigns on the part of the British might conceivably have brought about the loss of New England to the Union. In short it illustrates American good luck rather than American good sense, a statement which might, perhaps, be made about every war the Republic has engaged in since Jefferson's petty struggle with the Barbary States.

Space is lacking for any elaborate account of the campaigns undertaken. The invasion of Canada under General Hull, of Michigan, was a dismal failure. He was no match for the Canadian, General Brock, who drove him back to Detroit, where he surrendered ignominiously (August, 1812). A subsequent attack at Queenstown led to the death of the brave Brock but to little else, for here again the American commanders were inefficient. Operations along the St. Lawrence were equally futile and showed how difficult it would be to secure militia from New England, where governors were refusing to furnish their quotas, so unpopular was the new war. But while the year 1812 brought little save disaster on land, it practically turned a new page in the naval history of the world.

It was the government's intention to use its few ships mainly for the purpose of guarding the most important ports, but before the summer was out events had forced the abandonment of a policy which on its face seemed a prudent one. On August 19th, the frigate *Constitution*, Captain



Hull, which had taken refuge in Boston from a British squadron and had then sallied forth in search of adventures, met the enemy's frigate *Guerrière* in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The American ship was a little stronger than her adversary, which had been notorious for exercising the so-called right of search, but there was no reason to expect that she would disable her opponent in half-an-hour. When the *Guerrière* struck, she was helpless and had lost nearly eighty of her crew, the *Constitution* being almost unhurt. A few weeks later the British brig *Frolic* struck her colours to the American sloop of war *Wasp* after a very similar contest. As a matter of course the English were astonished. They had in many ways shown that they considered the Americans to be an inferior people—an absurd idea since at this time the United States were populated in the main by British stock—now their own naval prestige had been shaken in a way that made it impossible for a nation loving valour and fair play not to admire the foes it had hitherto despised. As for the Americans their joy was unbounded and they gave vent to it in exuberant celebrations. Two other naval duels before the end of the year showed that the two first victories had not been mere accidents. The frigate *United States*, commanded by Decatur, the hero of the Barbary War, defeated the frigate *Macedonian* in two hours; and the *Constitution*, now under Bainbridge, since to give all officers a chance of distinction the few ships owned by the government had to be assigned and reassigned, met the *Java* off the coast of Brazil and destroyed it. In all these contests, save that between the *Wasp* and the *Frolic*, the American ships had carried more guns; but analysis has shown that the results were



mainly due to larger charges of powder and to better American marksmanship. Congress immediately authorised the building of new ships, but of course the immense British navy did not wait to fight more duels, but swept American merchantmen from the ocean. American privateers replied in kind, even darting down on British ports, and in their exploits the people found satisfaction after the American Chesapeake had fallen to the Shannon (June 1, 1813) and the small navy was practically cooped up in ports.

It was unfortunate that, as in the Civil War, a presidential election took place during hostilities. In both cases, however, the Administration remained unchanged, to the great advantage of the country. Madison and his new colleague, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, had rather formidable rivals in De Witt Clinton of New York, nephew of the late Vice-President and a shrewd politician, and Jared Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, for there was much dissension in Republican councils, and the Federalists, in their eagerness to oppose the Administration that had begun the war, intended to support the malcontent Republican, Clinton. But Madison was finally elected by a good majority, and this danger passed just before a greater arose in the downfall of Napoleon, which left Great Britain free to concentrate her strength against America. Meanwhile the Administration triumphed over its opponents in the Twelfth Congress and secured legislation improving the army, particularly in the matter of raising regiments of regulars to do the work for which the militia had shown themselves unfit. The War and Navy Departments were also placed in presumably more competent hands.

Early in 1813 Russia, whose Czar was America's friend, offered to mediate. Madison, no lover of war, immediately sent off Gallatin and Bayard to supplement John Quincy Adams, who had recently been filling at St. Petersburg an important mission which Congress with unwise economy had for some time refused to establish. Gallatin was glad to get away from a depleted Treasury, but he left an unfit successor. The Thirteenth Congress, called together in May, 1813, would also have been glad to give the Treasury the slip, but money is the sinews of war, and willy-nilly they established a direct tax and a system of those internal duties, including a stamp-tax, which Jefferson had hoped to get rid of for ever.

Taking up the thread of military operations once more, we find that the efforts of the Western militia under William Henry Harrison to recapture Detroit and retrieve American honour had not been as yet successful. While serving for a short time in the Senate previous to his willing transfer to the House, Henry Clay had remarked in debate: "I trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state that I verily believe that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet." \* The zealous Westerner had not meant to imply any disparagement of the militia of other States, but he had certainly overrated the capacity of his brave fellow-citizens. Many a gallant Kentuckian fell in the ambush suffered by Winchester's troops near Frenchtown, Michigan, whose inhabitants had been threatened with a British and In-

\* Jefferson wrote in August, 1812: "The acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighbourhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, . . ."

dian raid. The conduct of the enemy under Colonel Proctor was such, however, that no discouragement could prevent Harrison and his men from holding to their purpose of retaking Detroit. This they finally accomplished in the fall, having been materially aided thereto by the notable victory gained by the American squadron under Captain Oliver H. Perry over the British fleet on Lake Erie. All that Hull had lost was thus regained, and Clay could now boast that his Kentuckians had helped to gain temporary possession of a portion of Upper Canada.

Meanwhile the main movement intended against Central Canada had been diverted to the Niagara region and had accomplished little more than the destruction of property at York, now Toronto, which was later to be urged as justification for the destruction of public buildings at Washington. It was not worth while to seize territory without an army large enough to hold it. The replacing of General Dearborn by General Wilkinson and the presence of the Secretary of War, Armstrong, on the scene led to nothing but the same sort of confusion to be observed later from the same causes in the Civil War. Finally the burning of the village of Newark by the Americans and the consequent British retaliations gave a disgraceful close to the campaign.

Meanwhile, after an occupation and subsequent evacuation of a portion of East Florida, the Administration found itself with an Indian war on its hands in the South-West. This was with the Creeks, who had been stirred up by Teeumseh and had been further aided by Spanish and British officers. Their horrible massacre of whites at Fort Mims (August 13) was avenged by their defeat the following spring

at the hands of Tennessee and Mississippi militia led by Andrew Jackson, who thus laid a solid foundation for his speedy rise to fame. Such a victory could not, however, make Americans forget the outrages committed by Admiral Cockburn's fleet along the Atlantic coast—outrages which no American ships could be found to repel.

Congress and the Administration struggled with their difficulties well into the spring of 1814, without being able to do much to bring order out of chaos. Short-term enlistments were abandoned, but competent officers were not to be obtained by legislation. Fresh loans were authorised and an embargo was passed in order to prevent illicit trade with the British—but this unpopular measure was soon dropped in consequence of the news of Napoleon's collapse and of an intimation that Great Britain would be willing to treat with the United States. Nothing might, indeed, come of these negotiations, although Russia's influence had been telling in America's favour; it was quite clear that with Napoleon out of the way, Great Britain could easily concentrate her immense strength and prosecute the war more vigorously; but perhaps her interests would lie rather in the reorganisation of Europe, and at least it was wise to despatch commissioners. Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell were therefore sent to join Gallatin, John Quincy Adams, and Bayard at Ghent.

The fighting in and about Canada this year (1814) was fortunately under the direction of a competent general—Jacob Brown of New York, and American arms were not disgraced, although little was accomplished. At Lundy's Lane the assaults of the British regulars, now being sent over in considerable numbers, were gallantly withstood. Later, a fine

victory by Macdonough on Lake Champlain \* foiled British plans in that quarter, and the net results of the season's fighting were about even. A strip of Maine had been taken, however, and Cockburn had again thrown the coast towns into a state of panic. By August the British demonstrations in the neighbourhood of Chesapeake Bay were quite formidable, and Washington was endangered. Inadequate preparations having been made for its defence, and the raw American troops having fled at Bladensburg, General Ross entered the capital with several thousand men. A wanton destruction of public buildings followed under Cockburn's own instructions, the alleged retaliation for American misconduct in Canada being carried much too far. But with a country of such local independence as America, the destruction of the capital, though exasperating, could mean little in the way of demoralisation, as the British discovered when shortly after deserting Washington they attacked Baltimore and were repulsed after spirited fighting. Indeed one of the chief effects of their raid was beneficial to the Americans, for the incompetent Secretary of War, Armstrong, was forced to resign in favour of Monroe, who had kept his head at the time of the capture, and who, as events proved, was capable of running two departments at once.

Thus far the war, as conducted on land, had been more or less contemptible; the same thing may be said of the political situation, both national and local. Congress assembled early in the dismantled city only to find the nation's finances in a deplorable

\* Governor Theodore Roosevelt, in his *Naval War of 1812*, says that Commodore Thomas Macdonough was the greatest figure in American naval history down to the Civil War.



state. Specie had gone abroad to pay for British manufactures, or was locked up in New England banks, which refused to help the government; and in the rest of the country banks had suspended payment. Now again, however, a partial relief was had by the substitution of an able financier for an incapable Secretary of the Treasury,\* although the movement of New England toward secession, which will be described in the next chapter, still made affairs seem gloomy enough. To add to the dismay, it was known that a strong British force was approaching New Orleans, though it was also known that Andrew Jackson would be there to meet the invaders.

The British fleet, which carried about 10,000 troops, including some of Wellington's veterans, easily landed them, and they were within a few miles of New Orleans by December 23. Jackson had meanwhile thrown up strong defences and had well in hand his 5,000 men, most of whom were backwoodsmen and expert with the rifle. He harassed the enemy by opening fire on their camp, and when later they prepared to advance, he was well posted and damaged them severely with his artillery. Sir Edward Pakenham, his opponent, perceiving the great difficulty of the enterprise, now waited for heavy guns, but when these came up, they were silenced by the American fire. Then on January 8th, 1815, having been reinforced, he attempted to carry Jackson's line by storm. But the bravery of his men only made their slaughter more frightful and certain. The backwoodsmen sent volley after volley with fatal effect from behind

\* Alexander James Dallas, born in Jamaica, afterwards a lawyer in Philadelphia.



their breastworks. Pakenham was killed, and when General Lambert ordered his troops off, at least 2,100 British had fallen, killed and wounded, to thirteen on the part of the Americans.\* It was not only a complete victory; it was proof that democracy † fighting on its own soil, with its own weapons and under its own leaders, was practically invincible.

To the American people the battle of New Orleans was a godsend. It atoned for Detroit, Bladensburg, and Washington, and showed that American soldiers were worthy to stand beside American seamen. Yet so far as the war was concerned it was a needless battle, for on December 24th peace had been concluded at Ghent. The British had made excessive demands at first, especially with regard to the treatment to be given their Indian allies; and Adams and Clay had nearly bungled matters by their attitude with regard to fishing rights, which concerned New England, and navigation of the Mississippi, which concerned the West. But finally all differences were smoothed away or else postponed; the issues that led to the war were blinked, as some like the Orders in Council had ceased to exist and others like impressment were not likely to be raised with a people who fought so well at sea; each country restored its conquests; and the treaty was signed.

\* Figures vary slightly.

† *Democracy* is naturally an ambiguous word, especially as it is used to embody and signify the principles of the Democratic party. It will not be employed in the latter sense in this work.

## CHAPTER V.

## EFFECTS OF THE WAR.

THE members of the Thirteenth Congress dispersed early in March, 1815, in a happy frame of mind. No conscription would be required and the financial distresses of the country would in some way be overcome now that peace had been obtained and American ships could again track the ocean. A few weeks previously, however, another representative body had dispersed in no such happy frame of mind. This was the famous Hartford Convention, which met, under conditions of strict secrecy, in the Connecticut town on December 15, 1814, and adjourned on the 14th of the following January. Of all the effects of the war none had been more unfortunate than the alienation of New England, which not only hampered the Administration but also furnished an important precedent in the expression of political disaffection that was destined to be cited later with powerful effect by the secession leaders of the South. Threats of disunion had indeed come already from the West; and individual States had talked of resuming such portions of their sovereignty as they had yielded to the general government; Jefferson and Madison had pushed the compact theory very far in their famous Resolutions of 1798-99; but no such step had hitherto been taken as the calling of a convention to represent disaffected States, even though

their "obligations as members of the Union" were recognised in the call itself.

We have already seen how eommercial New England had resisted Jefferson's Embargo and Madison's Non-Intereourse Law, how the dominant Federalists had sided with Great Britain to the point of entertaining soeially the minister who had insulted the President; how they had inveighed against the admission of Louisiana and the declaration of war; and how State exeecutives had refused to put the militia at the disposal of the Administration. Against these unpleasant faets must be set the further facts that the Republicans in the section struggled loyally to support Madison, and that in the matter of individual enlistments a very creditable showing was made. Still, as the war progressed, the Federalists got control of every New England State, and when the eoalition with De Witt Clinton failed and other States rallied to the Administration, they developed more fully the policy of isolation eongenial to a Puritan people, among whom old and tried family influences and traditions were still strong. In 1813, the Massachusetts Legislature sent to Congress an emphatie remonstranee against the war, and declared against honouring public naval and military exploits not connected with home defenee in the New England sense of that term. The next year, Madison's proposed embargo was the subject of another remonstranee. Naturally this eonduet aroused indignation throughout the rest of the Union, especially as it was plain that for a long time Great Britain praetieally reeognised New England as an ally by not ravaging her eoasts. But the Administration made the best of the situation, and after

all it is clear that, if a great Republic of widely diversified interests will go to war, it must run the risk of sectional opposition, which, if it be denied expression in the press, on the platform, or in the inferior deliberative bodies, must in the end go far toward destroying all chances for true national unity. The Federalists of New England were doubtless mistaken men, but they were honest and had their rights.

The government had its own rights, however, and when British aggressions were made on the New England coast in 1814, it refused to pay the expenses of militia who were not put under the President's control. At this juncture Massachusetts made great efforts to arm herself and called the convention at Hartford. Connecticut and Rhode Island appointed delegates, but Vermont and New Hampshire were represented unofficially only. The twenty-six members who finally assembled were not disunionists of the extreme type of Pickering, who had ten years before laboured for secession; indeed it is claimed that some of them, like George Cabot of Massachusetts, who presided over the convention, were selected in order that they might keep rasher spirits back. Be this as it may, secession was not the outcome of deliberations with which it seems unlikely that the world will ever be familiar. The report submitted declared that "States which have no common umpire must be their own judges and execute their own decisions"—language which South Carolina was soon to make the most of—proposed certain constitutional amendments as necessary for the protection of minorities, and actually demanded that the States now aggrieved should be permitted to retain such customs dues as were collected within their own borders.

Massachusetts and Connecticut accepted this report and sent commissioners to make the last mentioned demand—which obviously struck at the roots of all sovereignty—of a Congress then supposed to be in the worst of plights. But the commissioners found Washington rejoicing over the news of peace and of Jackson's victory, and returned home sadder but wiser men. Federalism hardly ventured afterwards to raise its head, and the Hartford leaders became objects of popular suspicion and odium; but, although disunion had been avoided, and although it soon seemed as if there were but one political faith held throughout the whole country, a fatal precedent, as we have said, had been set—one all the more fatal because it had been set by men as honest and intelligent in the main as the friends of the Union who execrated them.

We must now turn from political to financial and industrial matters. As we have seen, the country had gone into the war in an unprepared state. Matters were rendered worse by Gallatin's leaving his post—an act for which he cannot be blamed, as he had been made, partly on account of his foreign birth, an object of petty spite, especially in the Senate. He has been blamed, seemingly with justice, for having relied too exclusively upon loans to defray the expenses of the war, but it must be remembered that he had also hoped to be able to use a national bank in placing his loans, and that Congress was recalcitrant in the matter of laying taxes to meet current interest. At any rate, whosoever the fault, the government's financial policy was soon shown to be bad. The first loan was not secured with striking ease, and the loan of March, 1814, was in its final figures nearly \$9,000,000 less than the \$25,000,000



authorised, and this too was taken at rates varying from 80 to 95 per cent. in a depreciated currency. There was also an increasing resort to the expedient of interest-bearing treasury notes, and in the end the chief cities were found furnishing money on condition that it should be used in their respective defences. Another unpromising feature of the situation was the growth of State and private banks, whose uncontrolled issues led to inflation and to perplexing varieties of paper money. In short, Professor Henry C. Adams, the chief American authority on the subject of public debts, seems quite justified in the strictures he has passed upon the entire financial management of the War of 1812.

As to the actual cost of the war in money, conservative estimates place it at about \$200,000,000. Of this about \$100,000,000 went to swell the public debt, which in 1816, as if to spite Jefferson, amounted to \$127,000,000.\* In lives, the cost was about 30,000, and yet outwardly the country was in 1815 just where it had stood in 1812; for it will be remembered that neutral rights had practically been secured before hostilities began. Still the consensus of popular and expert opinion has always been that the country really gained much more than it lost. Certainly the old colonial dependence upon Great Britain and the Continent was done away with, and there was a decided growth of a new national spirit. Political parties coalesced for the moment, but when they were once more differentiated, they stood for policies that were distinctly American. The national pride had been aroused by the splendid record of the little navy, and Jackson's victory had made the Alleghanies less of a dividing line than they had

\* Channing's *Student's History*, p. 368.



been before. A new era of thought and literature began, the results of which were destined to be highly beneficial to a people whose provinciality both in ideas and in manners had been only too apparent. Equally important was the economic revolution effected by the war. Up to the time of the Embargo Americans had devoted themselves chiefly to agriculture and commerce, and to such mechanical arts as subserved these. Manufactures were little attended to because it was easier to export cotton, tobacco, and breadstuffs to Europe and bring back manufactured articles in exchange. Embargo, non-intercourse, and war put an end, however, to this Arcadian existence. Manufactures sprang up both because of public demand for them, and because capitalists had to have some new productive outlet for their wealth, as soon as the shipping industry was closed to them. At the end of the war it was found more profitable to continue the new lines of enterprise, especially in respect to cotton, woollen, and iron manufactures, than to go back to the old industrial conditions.\*

But changes in the industrial sphere do not usually take place without corresponding changes in the political. It was undoubtedly beneficial to the country to develop manufactures, but the advantage was not clear when this development led, as we shall soon see, to a demand for increasing protection, which in its turn led to disaffection. That the country stood the strain to which it was subjected is, of course, true; but it is equally clear that the Embargo laid by a Southern president and supported by

\* Even the agriculturally-minded Jefferson could write in January, 1816: "Experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort."

that section, and the war urged on and maintained by West and South, ultimately forced these sections to contribute to the wealth of New England and the Middle States in a way not dreamed of when hostilities ceased in 1815. That the contributing sections have profited also from the immense growth and concentration of wealth in North and East, is not to be denied;\* yet it is interesting to speculate what the history of the country would have been, had no unnatural impetus been given to manufacturing in a particular section. Perhaps things would have turned out much as they have done, but it is conceivable that the tariff struggles soon to be described might have been dispensed with, and that at least one cause of those sectional differences that have weakened the Union down to the present day might thus have never come into existence. But Providence determined otherwise, and it now behoves us to follow once more the political evolution of a people at peace.

The Fourteenth Congress assembled at the regular time, in December, 1815, with a decided Administration majority in both branches. The main questions before it were naturally of a financial character. From the Treasury Department, Dallas advocated the chartering of a new national bank. After much discussion, in which Clay, Calhoun, and Daniel Webster were all found on the side of the bank, this institution was established with a capital of \$35,000,000, the government subscribing \$7,000,000. Various restrictions were placed upon it and its charter was limited to twenty years, as had been the case with Hamilton's bank. It went speed-

\* They profited also, especially the West, by the emigration from depressed New England which immediately followed the war.

ily to work to justify the fears of its opponents; for it discounted notes of subscribers in order that they might pay their subsequent instalments; but it also satisfied the expectations of its friends by forcing specie payments in a remarkably short time. The government, whose customs receipts in 1816, owing to the sudden growth of importations from Great Britain, amounted to over \$36,000,000, or five times as much as for 1815, was enabled to pay in specie by January 1, 1817, and in March of this year Monroe could with seeming justice refer in his inaugural speech to the "flourishing state of the Treasury," which could plan to pay off \$10,000,000 annually for the liquidation of the public debt.

In his message to the Fourteenth Congress, Madison had suggested, as Jefferson had before him, the propriety of securing an amendment to the Constitution in order to allow the general government to construct roads and canals, which would bind the country together both for commercial and for military purposes; he had also declared that manufactures would "likewise require the systematic and fostering care of the government" on the basis of the "infant industries" and "home market" arguments of which so much was soon to be made. Congress acted on the second suggestion first, and in April, 1816, passed a tariff whose highest permanent rate of duty was twenty per cent. This rate shows, as Professor Taussig has said in his excellent *Tariff History of the United States*, that the act of 1816 ranks with the earlier rather than with the later group of acts, and indicates no marked popular movement in favour of protection. It must be noted, however, that although the manufacturers of cotton, woollen, and iron in the North and East were behind

the movement for protection, many Southerners, like Calhoun, favoured it, while Westerners, like Henry Clay, saw in it an efficient means of developing a home market for their hemp and wool. Such New Englanders, however, as clung to shipping and wished to import goods in the vessels they owned, opposed the tariff, their views being voiced especially by Daniel Webster. The South, nevertheless, soon had reason to range herself beside John Randolph, who had reappeared in Congress as a free-lance, in his opposition to even mild protection; for the introduction of the principle of minimum duties on cottons and woollens speedily laid a prohibition on the importation of the coarser grades of these articles, and forced Southern planters to pay more for the clothes worn by their slaves than they would otherwise have been compelled to do.

With regard to the reduction of the army to a peace footing and the natural augmentation of a now distinguished navy, nothing need be said; but it is worth while to observe that, in the summer of 1815, it became necessary to threaten the Barbary States once more. Algiers in particular had behaved recklessly during the War of 1812, but on the appearance of a squadron under Commander Decatur, the Dey of that State at once signed a very satisfactory treaty, to which Tunis and Tripoli soon agreed. Thus down even to small particulars did Madison's administrations round off those of Jefferson.

In the spring of 1816, the Republican Caucus chose Monroe as its candidate for the Presidency. His strongest rival was the able William H. Crawford of Georgia, soon to succeed Dallas in the Treasury. Monroe was personally popular and had as

Secretary of War shown military gifts that enabled him partly to satisfy the popular desire, which arises after every war, to try in civil life a man who has proved his capacity at the head of an army. Besides, he held by the Revolution as well as by the War of 1812, and if it seemed unfair to select three Virginians one after another, it was equally unfair to let such a consideration deprive the country of the services of a man who was not only the ablest candidate in sight, but also one acceptable even to New England itself on account of his former willingness to treat with Great Britain. Monroe, therefore, and Governor Daniel Tompkins of New York had no difficulty in carrying the country by a very handsome majority over Rufus King, to whom the Federalists did not give a running-mate—so obvious was the issue of the contest.

The most interesting feature of the closing session of the Fourteenth Congress was the debate and passage, by a close vote, of a bill fathered by Calhoun, the object of which was to devote the bonus and future dividends accruing to the government from the National Bank, to a fund for internal improvements, particularly in the way of roads and canals. This bill was in line with Madison's suggestion of the year before—only Calhoun did not recognise the necessity of a constitutional amendment, finding in the so-called "general welfare clause" of that instrument sufficient warrant for his proposed expenditure.\* The line of reasoning taken by him

\* See Appendix A., article 1, section 8. The powers enumerated in this section have been at the bottom of most of the political questions raised in American history. "Loose Constructionists" have endeavoured to enlarge them; "Strict Constructionists" have resisted.



was entirely inconsistent with the principles of strict construction which he espoused later; but there can be no question as to his sincerity in each position. He had not yet looked so far ahead as John Randolph had, and seen that the growth of the nation meant the doom of slavery, which could be preserved only in a Union of States, each of which had its constitutional rights secured to it in their entirety. Hence he was not much affected by Randolph's three hours' speech\* in opposition to the measure. But a more formidable opponent was found in the White House. Almost the last official act of Madison was to veto Calhoun's scheme on the ground of its unconstitutionality. A two-thirds majority could not be obtained for it,† and the old Cumberland Road, which was intended to open up the public lands in Ohio, remained for some time the only reminder of grandiose schemes cherished by such differing men as Jefferson and Calhoun. The States individually took up the matter—De Witt Clinton in New York securing the construction of the Erie Canal, which made New York City the undisputed metropolis of the land; but this meant of course an uneven development of the country. The addition of Indiana as a State and the petition of the inhabitants of Mississippi for the same privilege showed, however, that the country would grow strong, no matter what the policy of the government. The American pioneer with his adventurous spirit and his large family was well able to open up the land with very small aid from Washington.

\* This marvellous speaker had the year before spoken for three days on a certain bill, to the despair of the reporters.

† See Appendix A., article 1, section 7.

Monroe's inaugural, like those of his predecessor, was an uninspired but eminently sane performance. He stressed the need of union and of an adequate army and navy, and he approved benevolently a moderate tariff, and internal improvements if the Constitution were amended. In other words, Monroe, having sobered down, had laid aside the rashness Washington had once had occasion to censure, and had become a reliable statesman of the Jefferson school. As we have already seen, he had certain proclivities towards strong government that made him a favourite with the new-school Republicans and even with the Federalists; we are therefore not surprised to find him perhaps the most popular of all the Presidents—especially as the death of Federalism had left little party differentiation.

But even if Monroe had been a less dignified and competent executive, his election would have been a good thing for the country. He carried the Virginia line of Presidents over the first quarter of the century, and it is not difficult to see how much this fact meant. Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe represented the popular party, but they also represented the oldest State in the Union and the aristocratic traditions of the Revolution. Some years ago Mr. Goldwin Smith, in his remarkably able volume entitled *The United States*, speaking of the influence brought to bear upon Madison just before the War of 1812, concisely declared: "We have come down from Washington to Madison." Such was actually the case, and it had to be. In such a country and under such a government the people had to rule. Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe did a great deal, though unfortunately not enough, toward teaching them how. If a man like Andrew Jack-

son had been brought to power in 1801, perhaps the country might be suffering a good deal more to-day than it is from the accession of that worthy himself in 1829. Then again Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe represented the South, the most restive section of the Union and the one most jealous of any increase of the powers of the general government. Yet at the same time they increased those powers and worked heartily for the Union. If a Northern man had been President in 1808, it is not unlikely that the abolition of the slave trade might have caused a good deal more trouble than it did. Then it was just as well that Virginians, who were in sympathy with the West, should have been in power when that section first began to be a factor in national politics. It may not be fair to take the Adams family as thoroughly representative of New England, but the fact remains that the two Administrations dominated by that section, between 1789 and 1829, give no warrant for believing that the period of Virginian supremacy could have been shortened without loss to the country.

The new President chose a strong cabinet, but did not have Jefferson's good fortune in the matter of unanimity of opinion and action. His choice of John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State was wise, for Adams had had good diplomatic training abroad; but it seems to have offended Clay, who refused the portfolio of war, finally given to Calhoun, and in his position as Speaker of the House hampered the Administration in an exasperating way. It is quite clear that Clay would not have made as good a guide for foreign affairs as Adams, and it is also clear that his marvellously effective eloquence marked him out as a congressional leader whose

figure is probably more picturesque to-day because it was only once subjected to the restrictions of routine work. The less picturesque, though more tragic figure of Calhoun, on the other hand, has not suffered from confinement to routine. He made an excellent Secretary, and attention to business assuredly did not dim the powers of that logical faculty which distinguishes him from all other American statesmen.

The only other public man whom it is necessary to name here besides the eloquent William Wirt, who had won a reputation in the Burr trial and now served Monroe as Attorney-General, was the Secretary of the Treasury, Crawford of Georgia. Crawford seems to have been an alien spirit in the Cabinet, one bent on self-aggrandisement rather than upon the success of the Administration. He had a strong personality, and in the way he used patronage to secure his own ends and to knit his friends to him for weal or woe, he approached as near to the modern political boss as the state of the times and his own proved integrity permitted. Perhaps it will be nearer the mark to say that in his strong practical brain, his capacity to fill excellently the varying functions of Senator, foreign representative, cabinet officer, and judge, as well as in his ability to advance his own interests along with those of his friends, he presents a thorough type of the American politician as opposed to statesman in the highest sense of the word.

The needed appointments having been made, Monroe, whose imitation of Washington has been often noticed, took a long trip through New England, New York, and Ohio, primarily for the purpose of inspecting the new coast defences, and aroused en-

thusiasm wherever he went. The name since applied to his Administrations, "The Era of Good Feeling," seems to have originated during this tour, and may be accepted, with some qualifications, as the heading of our next chapter.



## CHAPTER VI.

## THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING.

MONROE's first message to the Fifteenth Congress was quite an encouraging document. Foreign affairs were in a good condition save as regards Spain and Florida. The Treasury made such a fine showing that Congress might be advised to repeal the internal taxes—which they accordingly did. Moderate protection for manufactures was recommended, but the President was clear in his own mind that, if internal improvements were to be undertaken, a special amendment to the Constitution must be secured. The only disquieting note in the message referred to the establishment on Amelia Island (near Fernandina, Florida) and at Galveston, Texas, of nests of piratical adventurers who claimed to take possession in the name of the revolting State of Buenos Ayres, but who in reality owned no allegiance to God or man. A later message announced that American forces had taken the former place without bloodshed, and would probably have as little difficulty with the latter. The matter was, of course, a delicate one, owing to the desire of the Administration to secure Florida from Spain without a war, but such lawless establishments just over the borders of slave States obviously could not be tolerated. As we shall see presently, Monroe's efforts

to avert bloodshed were fruitless, but he deserves great credit for the way in which he held the balance even between Spain, a country which few Americans liked, and her revolting South American colonies, which had the support of a people who had revolted themselves. This firm neutrality, which might have been imitated with profit more than once in later years, was all the more difficult for Monroe on account of the fact that the eloquence of Clay was put at the service of the revolutionists, sometimes, it would seem, to the distinct and intended detriment of the Administration. A very considerable part of the time of the House was in fact taken up in discussing a proposal of the Speaker's that \$18,000 should be appropriated for an outfit and year's salary for a minister to the United Provinces of La Plata—a proposal which was wisely defeated by a very large majority.

Little specially notable business was transacted at this session besides the repeal of the internal taxes and of the still more obnoxious direct ones, but there was much talk about Spanish-American affairs, as well as about an attempt made by a certain John Anderson to bribe one of the members of the House. Anderson was finally reprimanded by the Speaker and discharged, neither the culprit nor the legislative body being yet thoroughly familiar with the most approved methods of the lobby. Outside of Congress, however, there was a considerable amount of petty political manœuvring, especially in New York and Pennsylvania, but also in New England, where the Democratic party was coming to the front and where the old alliance between Church and State, which had given support to the Federalists, was being broken down as it had been else-

where.\* There was likewise enough doing in a military way to keep the country interested.

The Seminole Indians † in Florida had been giving trouble for years as bandits and marauders and harbourers of escaped slaves. They were particularly stirred up by the British Colonel Nichols, who actually planted many negroes and some Indians in a stronghold called the "negro fort," not a great distance from the American border. It became necessary to reduce this in 1816, and, in consequence of an explosion, a wholesale destruction of its inhabitants ensued. Other troubles soon followed, ending in a massacre perpetrated by the Indians, and by the end of 1817 it had become apparent that a real war with the Seminoles would be necessary. The management of affairs was at once entrusted to the conqueror of the Creeks and the victor of New Orleans, Major-General Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, who immediately enrolled about 1,000 Tennesseans, and, gathering up forces already collected by General Gaines, swept over the Spanish line, burning Indian villages and finding little to oppose his progress. The President's orders had been explicit that care should be taken not to infringe Spanish rights, but Jackson had previously written Monroe begging to be allowed to secure Florida while he was wiping out the Indians, and he was not the man to construe his instructions narrowly. Meanwhile Monroe, who, through sickness, had not read Jackson's letter with care, supposed that the Tennessean would behave with at

\* Manhood suffrage was the rule in new States, and was prevailing in older ones. In New England taxpayers could now vote and need not support any form of worship.

† Really "wanderers" from the Creeks who had coalesced with other tribes.

least fair discretion. It was a wild supposition. Jackson took St. Mark's, hanged two Indian chiefs, and drove the Seminoles far into the swamps. Then he had two British subjects, Arbuthnot, a Scotch trader, and Ambrister, a military adventurer, both of whom had probably been implicated in the Indian uprisings, tried before a court-martial, which sentenced the former to be hanged, the latter to be shot, but finally commuted Ambrister's sentence on account of his youth. The stern commander, however, could show no mercy to white men who allied themselves with those Indian foes whom every true backwoodsman hated with a scarcely credible intensity; and he accordingly had the sentences carried out on both, regardless of the commutation in the case of Ambrister. After this he learned that a Georgia militia captain had through false information been led to fire an innocent Indian village and butcher its inhabitants, and he forthwith demanded that the State officer be handed over to him for punishment—a demand which the Georgia Governor naturally resented, but which showed that, even where Indians were concerned, Jackson had his standard of right and wrong, by which he would abide in “scorn of consequence.” But even this did not close the remarkable campaign, for the impetuous general captured Pensacola, seemingly for no other reason than that it belonged to Spain and would be acceptable to America, despatched General Gaines to take St. Augustine, and then returned in triumph to Nashville before the summer of 1818 was half over.

There was, of course, a good deal of consternation at Washington when the full results of the campaign became known. True to his policy of neu-

trality, Monroe at once ordered the surrender of the captured places, but he liked Jackson and understood him well enough to be willing to shield him from the court-martial which Calhoun, the naturally offended Secretary of War, advised. John Quincy Adams stood by Jackson manfully, both in the Cabinet and in the correspondence he conducted with Spain and with Great Britain. On the whole, however, the prudent President, who even managed to reconcile in part the high-strung Jackson to the undoing of his work, seems to have shown the clearest head in the whole tangled business. Spain and Great Britain were deftly handled, and the only serious notice taken of the matter was in the House at its next session. Here a severe arraignment of Jackson failed indeed to pass, but did not fail to make him very angry and still more popular with the masses. Another and more important result of the affair was that years later, when Jackson was President, he was informed through Crawford that Calhoun, instead of supporting him in the Cabinet, wished to have him court-martialled. The breach of friendship that ensued ruined Calhoun's chances as a national statesman, and helped to drive him along the sectional lines of policy that will be described later.

Meanwhile as Jackson was already looming up as a possible successor to Monroe, it may be as well to say something about his character and to appraise his recent actions. At the time of the Seminole War Jackson was fifty-one years old. Born a poor boy, of Scotch-Irish stock, on the border between North and South Carolina, he had early followed the stream of emigration to Tennessee, and there amid men as uncultured as himself had risen to every office, civil and military, that he cared for. He had all the vir-



tues of the backwoodsman—and they are many—he had not a few of his defects, but very few, perhaps none of his vices. Altogether he was a most favourable specimen of Western manhood, and in the main he represented also the best elements of the new democracy, wherever it might be found. Unlike his great predecessor Jefferson, he was a democratic leader not because he possessed intelligence and sympathy enough to manage the people, but because he answered their demand for a great man sprung from themselves. A great man he undoubtedly was. He had an unconquerable will, a genius for command, a complete devotion to truth and manhood, an unshakable loyalty to country and to friends, and a love of virtue, as he understood it, that counterbalanced his rashness, his vindictiveness, his lack of culture, in short his limitations as a backwoodsman. He was not meant to be a statesman, although his subsequent conduct as an executive is still admired by millions of Americans; but he was meant to be a great man, and as the party of Jefferson had to change leaders and methods, it is perhaps as well that the strenuous Tennessean should have been lifted from the masses in order to show the world that the mistakes of American democracy are always likely to be those of the head—which may be cured through education and salutary, if sad experience—not those of the heart.

In taking leave of Jackson for a while, we must remember that his disavowed actions in Florida were really those of an honest patriot and that they did good to the country. In consequence of them it became quite obvious to Spain that she had better part with Florida while the United States was in a humour to purchase, rather than run the risk of

losing the territory through such encroachments as had been practised during Madison's régime, or such daring defiance of orders and of international law as Jackson had just been guilty of.\* Accordingly early in 1819 a treaty was concluded by which the United States undertook to settle certain claims of American citizens against Spain, and the latter gave up all rights in the Florida territory. This treaty, which was not ratified until two years later, was also serviceable in fixing the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase along the Sabine, Red, and Arkansas Rivers to the 42d parallel, and then along this line to the Pacific. The securing of American claims as far as the Pacific was important through the fact that the Oregon region was claimed by both Great Britain and the United States. Just the year before Monroe had postponed settlement of the matter by a treaty providing for joint occupancy by both countries. The new treaty extinguishing any claim of Spain north of the 42d parallel naturally strengthened American claims to Oregon, but settled that the region known as Texas should not be considered as part of the Louisiana Purchase. This sacrifice, for the time being, of a fertile country to which Americans had already begun to emigrate, seems to have been due to a desire on Monroe's part to avoid the sectional disputes sure to arise on the acquisition of such a large amount of territory from which slavery could not easily be kept out—a display of prudence for which he deserves the praise that judicious historians like Mr. Schouler have not withheld.†

\* In his campaign of 1814 against the Creeks Jackson had also taken Pensacola without orders.

† Jefferson and Benton opposed the giving up of Texas. See the latter's *Thirty Years' View*, I., pp. 15-16.

But prudence then could not avert what prudence could not have averted at the time of the formation of the Union—to wit, the evils sure to arise in connection with the existence of an institution at once profitable and immoral. The Founders had doubtless deemed rightly that the Union, with slavery thrown in, was better than no Union at all; but their decision had only put off the day of reckoning with the fatal institution. One by one, most of the States north of Maryland had wholly or in part got rid of slavery, having been aided thereto by both moral and economic considerations. It is doing them no injustice to say that, if they had been cotton-growing States in which, through the invention of Whitney's gin, slavery could be made profitable to large land-owners, the Puritan conscience would have had a harder struggle with the institution than it did have. It is, however, a peculiar trait of that conscience that from internal conquests, it invariably turns to external; and a large part of Anglo-Saxon progress is traceable to this fact. Thus it was that two irreconcilable forces were preparing for battle within the United States even at the time of the Era of Good Feeling presided over so impartially by the prudent Monroe. At first the conscience of the North was satisfied with the victory over the foreign slave trade. Then again, joined with the conscience of Southerners of the Revolutionary Epoch like Jefferson, it satisfied itself with palliatives, such as schemes for transporting the blacks to Sierra Leone and other congenial places. But all the while it waxed in strength and created much of the opposition on which it fed. Until 1819, however, slavery as a political issue had not occupied a place of prime importance. Although

the Free States, having increased in population faster than the Slave States, partly on account of their freedom, had outstripped the latter in the popular House of Representatives, the Senate with its two members to each State had been evenly balanced. The admission of Indiana in 1816 was followed by that of Mississippi in 1817. The accession of Illinois in 1818 was balanced by that of Alabama in 1819. So long as this balancing kept up there was no danger that slavery could be constitutionally menaced, but it was idle to think that the richest and most populous section would long submit to the continuance of an institution, which, as philanthropical sentiment obtained force in the world, would cast disgrace upon the entire Union. It was idle also to hope that representatives of the Free States in Congress would acquiesce in the spread of slavery in the vast region across the Mississippi that had been purchased in part with the money of their constituents, especially since the Continental Congress had thirty odd years before set apart to freedom the great North-West Territory won by the prowess of General George Rogers Clark.\* It was equally idle on the other hand to expect that the Slave States would sit quietly by and allow the Western territory to be carved up into Free States that would disturb the balance of power in the Senate and perhaps in time make possible constitutional amendments against slavery in the older States.†

Whatever illusions loyal patriots may have had as to their ability to keep slavery out of politics were

\* This exploit (1778-79), one of the most remarkable in American history, is well described in Roosevelt's *Winning of the West*, Vol. II.

† See Appendix A., article 5.

rudely disturbed when, at the end of the year 1818, a memorial from the Territorial Legislature of Missouri was laid before the House asking for permission to form a constitution and to enter as a State. From its position and from the character of its population, which already included many slaves, there was no doubt that the new State, of which St. Louis was the most important town, would favour slavery if left alone. Accordingly James Tallmadge, of New York, moved that the enabling act should contain a restriction to the effect that no slaves should be thereafter imported into the State, and that the children of slaves born after the admission of the State should be "free at the age of twenty-five years." Considerable discussion took place in February, 1819, after the House had exhausted itself on the Jackson escapade, both on Tallmadge's restriction and on a similar one proposed in connection with the act for forming the southern portion of the Missouri Territory into the new Territory of Arkansas. Finally the bill as amended passed the House by a small majority, but was defeated in the Senate. Neither body being willing to yield, Missouri had to retain her territorial status for a while longer. The controversy had fairly begun, but Congress without misgivings began a system of more liberal pensions for military service, and altered the national flag so as to include in the union of stars as many States as might be in existence at any particular time. They little foresaw that the pensions to be allotted those who had striven to keep the number of such stars from diminishing would ever be a source of political corruption to the country.

Although Monroe's message to the Sixteenth Congress dealt mainly with Spain's harassing and un-



warrantable failure thus far to ratify the late treaty with regard to Florida, the Missouri question, which had been much discussed throughout the country during the interim between the two Congresses, was distinctly the important issue of the session. It was rendered more complicated by the petition of the people of Maine, who wished to separate from Massachusetts in order to form a State. If Missouri were made free, the Senatorial balance would be destroyed, probably for all time. The House passed the bill admitting Maine, but as the restriction on Missouri's allowing slavery was again proposed, the Senate decided on February 16, 1820, to admit Maine only on the proviso that Missouri should be received with a constitution authorising slavery. To this the House would not consent, but at the close of the session a way was found out of the difficulty. An amendment proposed by Senator Thomas of Illinois, to the effect that slavery should be allowed within the limits assigned to Missouri, but be for ever prohibited from the rest of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36° 30'—the northern boundary of Arkansas—was finally accepted by both House and Senate, and, on receiving Monroe's sanction, became the law of the land. Thus Missouri was secured as a slave State to balance Maine, but the opponents of slavery got the larger share of the territory involved in the struggle, and the principle that Congress could legislate with regard to slavery in the Territories received a sanction which the South could not overthrow for thirty years, during which period the anti-slavery movement gathered strength and the North gained on the South in population and wealth.

But the controversy was not over yet. Missouri's constitution had still to be approved by Congress,

and the next year, 1821, revealed the fact that the State had forbidden free negroes to enter its borders. This aroused the Northern men once more, but finally, owing to the mediation of Clay, Congress was induced to accept Missouri with her obnoxious constitution, on the understanding that the clause about the free blacks should never be construed so as to limit the rights of citizens of the United States. As free blacks were then regarded as citizens of the United States, this proviso seemed to annul the objectionable clause and to square the State constitution with that of the Union, which perhaps might have been accomplished by judicial action alone. But Congress merely required the Missouri legislature to assent to the new provision, and it was a question whether a legislature could bind a State in a matter relating to a fundamental document like a constitution. Still the Missouri legislature did as it was told to do, and Monroe proclaimed the admission of the State on August 10, 1821.

The country was greatly relieved at this settlement of the trying affair, for it meant immediate peace, and to unimaginative people the present outweighs the future. A few anti-slavery men stood out to the end, however, maintaining that a compromise on a matter involving vital principles could not last and ought not to receive the support of honest men, while a small body of Southerners, headed by John Randolph, resisted the Compromise on the ground that to admit the right of Congress to legislate against slavery in a State or Territory was a sacrifice of principle. The stalwarts in both parties were more nearly right than the moderate men who compromised, yet it is perhaps true that the postponement of a final decision of the mighty

question ultimately gave the North and West time to develop and thus made for freedom.\*

As for the arguments advanced in the debates on the question, it is obviously impossible to do them justice in a book like the present. On the whole, the power of Congress to restrict slavery in a Territory seems to have been agreed to by a Southern President and a preponderatingly Southern Cabinet, as well as by a majority of Southern Congressmen, on grounds which appeal more to reason and justice than do the grounds taken by Southern leaders a generation later.† True, the precedent set in the case of the North-Western Territory was not entirely in point, since the Continental Congress, which passed the famous Ordinance of 1787 devoting that region to freedom, in many ways resembled a body of plenipotentiaries. But, if a Territory was to be regulated at all, such regulation must come from Congress, and it was as true to say that the permission to slavery to enter a Territory practically closed it for ever to freedom as it was to assert that declaring all persons living in a Territory free was to shut it for ever to slavery. The Southerner, of course, looking upon slavery as analogous to property rights about which there could be no discussion, could argue with great fervour and sincerity with regard to the injustice of depriving Territories and future States of what he regarded as rights and privileges. The Northerner,

\* Whether the Compromise of 1820 was a Northern or a Southern measure has been a moot question. It satisfied more Southern representatives than Northern if we may judge by the final vote.

† It is worth remembering that in 1836 the boundaries of Missouri were extended to take a large strip of territory. This extension of slave soil was then regarded as lying within the competence of Congress, and Northern men agreed to it. See Benton, I. 626.

on the other hand, laboured under the disadvantage of having to defend an abstract cause in a technically legal way. Dealing with a clear, unprejudiced mind he was almost certain to succeed in his appeal, but dealing with one fettered by conventionalities and incapable of looking beneath the surface of arguments based upon plausible analogies he was almost certain to fail. So far, however, as the general acuteness and the personal candour of the two contending factions are concerned, there is no need at this late day to make invidious comparisons. Both sides were thoroughly in earnest, both believed that they were labouring for the good of the Union and the cause of abstract right. Each side occupied ground determined not by individual choice so much as by history and environment. If Tallmadge had been from Virginia he would, in all probability, never have made the amendment that has rendered him famous; if his opponent, P. P. Barbour, had been from New York, he might with thorough conscientiousness have proposed the amendment himself.

One argument that played an important part must, however, be singled out for comment. Many Southerners, including Jefferson, believed that to spread slavery over new territory would improve the condition of the blacks, especially in the crowded older States. Their argument seems to have been fallacious, for slaves would have multiplied in parts of the West, and the breeding of slaves would assuredly have received a great impetus in the Border Slave States; thus the institution in an aggravated form would have been fastened more securely upon the country. Yet the belief of these Southerners was thoroughly honest and was but little more Utopian

than the schemes of deportation indulged in by the American Colonisation Society, organised in 1816 and patronised by such men as Clay and John Randolph. Liberia, indirectly founded by the government and by this Society during Monroe's régime, was as little effective in solving the slavery problem as the opening of the entire West to the institution would have been.

But the Missouri Compromises of 1820 and 1821, although the most important domestic features of Monroe's first Administration, are not the only ones deserving attention. The panic of 1818-19 and the affairs of the National Bank demand a word. The resumption of specie payments and the good showing made by the Treasury immediately after the war were deceptive signs of national prosperity. Business had been unduly stimulated, and the currency had been much disturbed by the recklessness of banks in issuing paper currency. Creditors now began to press debtors and great suffering ensued, especially in the South and West, which had not the stable financial institutions and methods of New England.\* The Middle States also suffered, and it soon appeared that the Bank of the United States was increasing the evils it was intended to cure, by making heavy calls upon the local banks whose paper it held. Suspicion arose that the Bank was in straits, and a thorough investigation, chiefly at the hands of John C. Spencer of New York, aided by John Tyler of Virginia, was begun by the House of Representatives in the autumn of 1818. It was soon shown that a ring of speculators at Baltimore had used the institution for their own profit and nearly swamped

\* See Benton's account of the distress of the period in his *Thirty Years' View*, Vol. I., p. 5 (New York, 1864).



its honest branches in New York and Boston. Reform was imperatively necessary, and was intrusted in the main to a new president of the institution, Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, who with his assistants finally brought order out of almost hopeless confusion. At the same time the States grew more careful about chartering banks and caused many poorly managed ones to settle their affairs and go out of business, while the people at large bore up with considerable fortitude under the hard times, which were felt in Europe also. Attempts were indeed made in some of the States to tax the National Bank so heavily as to force it out of business in particular localities, much as Trusts are now assailed; but the Federal courts safeguarded the Bank by their decisions, and by the end of 1820, in spite of the fact that the government had had to ask for a loan of \$5,000,000, Monroë was able to say in his annual message that, on the whole, he could not "regard the pressures to which *he had* adverted otherwise than in the light of mild and instructive admonitions; warning us of dangers to be shunned in future; teaching us lessons of economy, corresponding with the simplicity and purity of our institutions, and best adapted to their support." The United States have seen much greater periods of depression than the years 1818-1820, but the spectacle of a man's resigning political station, as Cheves did, in order to come to the rescue of his country has hardly been paralleled. Such lessons of high conduct are not easily learned, but it would at least seem that the tenth decade of the century should not be attempting to apply financial panaceas discredited in the second.

As the time drew near for new nominations for the

presidency, it became quite clear that Monroe had governed so wisely and was so popular throughout the country that there was no use in opposing him. Rivals like Crawford and Clay had, therefore, to bide their time, and when, in the spring of 1820, the regular Congressional caucus of the Republicans was held, not enough members attended to make it worth while to go through the form of making nominations. When the electoral votes were counted, it was found that Monroe had fallen only one short of a unanimous vote—a New Hampshire elector being determined that Washington alone should be honoured in such a way—and that Vice-President Tompkins had run very little behind him.

Monroe's second Administration furnished to the world the celebrated "doctrine" called by his name, and is, therefore, perhaps more important than his first; but it certainly does not deserve to be considered as forming any part of the "era of good feeling." It is true that party spirit seemed to have died out, and that the President cherished the hope that the old struggles in which his prime had been passed were over for ever; but the day was not far distant when two distinct parties would be contending strenuously on much the same lines as of old, so far as general principles were concerned; and in the meanwhile the political world was divided into factions which pursued a petty warfare more demoralising than any strife of parties could have been.

Into the details of this warfare we fortunately need not enter, a few general facts about it being sufficient for our purposes. No third term was possible for Monroe even had he wished it, for the precedent set by Washington and confirmed by Jefferson was too strong; the succession to the presidency

became therefore, in the absence of any vital political programme, the only thing to be striven for. A mere contest for office of course represents the lowest level to which public life can sink, but it may be at least said for the politics of this period that the struggles of its leaders did not involve so much pecuniary spoils and consequent loss to the people as such struggles involve at present. Perhaps, however, they did involve as much, if not more, personal spite. Three of Monroe's Secretaries aspired to fill his place—Crawford, Adams, and Calhoun; while outside the Cabinet Henry Clay and Andrew Jackson were quite willing that their friends should work for them night and day. Of these candidacies three at least seem to have been clean—those of Adams, Jackson, and Calhoun. The last statesman had but little chance, and before the end came was glad to accept the easily secured place of Vice-President. Jackson was put forward by his own State and was the natural choice of the democracy, of the plain people who dominated the West and formed an influential part of the population of the older sections. Adams was the logical candidate of New England, and, in the absence of competitors, of the North generally; and, as he was Secretary of State, he had precedent in his favour. Besides four out of five Presidents had been Southern men, and it was time for the North to put in its claims. But in spite of all his culture, his sound sense, and his diplomatic, senatorial, and executive training, which made him obviously the fittest candidate, he was cold in manners to the point of being repellent, and even his Northern admirers felt that support of his candidacy was uphill work. Already by 1822 the tendency of democratic masses to suspect

trained talents and to bestow public office much as one bestows one's likings and friendships was a factor in politics, and the lapse of three-quarters of a century has brought little or no improvement.

With regard to the candidacy of Clay, if it cannot be considered entirely clean on account of his early disposition to embarrass Monroe and to make capital out of Spanish-American affairs, it does not at least offend greatly a scrupulous taste. Clay, like Jackson, represented the West and was supported by a host of friends who admired him as perhaps no other American has been admired. His very vices, such as gambling, won him admirers much as Jackson's faults did for him. Yet, unlike Jackson, he was a trained, if a somewhat theatrical statesman, and was thus a dangerous rival of Adams, whom he, of course, far surpassed in eloquence and magnetism. But the most dangerous candidacy in many ways was that of Crawford. As we have seen, he was more of a political manipulator or "boss" than any of his rivals. He had early begun to lay his plans for the succession, and finding that Monroe was sure of re-election, had continued them. Monroe endeavoured to preserve an entire impartiality—especially with regard to the three members of his Cabinet, but even he seems to have found it difficult to get on with Crawford. Adams and Calhoun loathed him, and without adopting their prejudices or doing injustice to his character, it is easy to see that he employed methods not altogether commendable. As early as 1820, he secured the passage of an act by which most officers connected with the public funds were appointed for terms of four years—a measure which helped the subsequent transition to the spoils system and gave the ingenious Secretary

patronage with which to support his presidential aspirations. He also seems to have gained a most remarkable influence over the average Congressman and to have used it to harass at least one rival, Calhoun, whose excellent management of the War Department was subjected through unwise retrenchments to quite needless embarrassment. Altogether the factional struggles of the period give it a sinister aspect for which Crawford and his friends seem to have been responsible to a disproportionate extent.

Little of real importance happened during the period of the Seventeenth Congress, 1821-1823. Business, public and private, was now on a better footing, and schemes of public improvement began to be agitated, especially in connection with the fine national road between Cumberland, Maryland, and Wheeling, now in West Virginia. This road was designed to reach St. Louis and to be very serviceable in opening up the Western country. But Monroe, while willing that Congress should help such enterprises, adhered to his original opinion that without a constitutional amendment the general government ought not to own and control them, except in such cases as came under fair constitutional interpretation, such as improvements of rivers and harbours. His carefully prepared veto prevailed, and although a considerable amount of money went to public improvements under his successor, the country finally accepted the views of the three prudent Virginia Presidents.\*

A matter of less perplexity, both to Congress and to the Executive, was the recognition accorded the

\* Monroe relented as to the Cumberland Road, which was pushed forward from time to time, but of course lost its importance when railroad development began.



revolted Spanish-American States, which was easily effected by appropriating money in March, 1822, for the payment of accredited missions. A territorial government was also given to Florida, which appeared to most people then but a barren possession, but in which Andrew Jackson as governor had just given a fine specimen of what a high-handed American could do in the way of dealing with officials that did not act to suit him. It is needless to describe his sending the ex-governor Callava to jail for a day because he demurred to Jackson's demand for the turning over of certain papers; but it may be as well to note that, if Jackson's character be still fascinating to a large majority of his countrymen, foreign relations with sensitive peoples will not be conducted with all the smoothness desirable.

Foreign relations were in Monroe's time very different from those that confront the country now and are likely to continue to confront it; they were also different from those that had confronted Jefferson and Madison. It was no longer a question of preserving neutral rights upon the sea, but of safeguarding from foreign aggression the immense and tempting area for colonisation spread out in both North and South America. If Europe were to step in just as Spain seemed to be on the point of stepping out, all the Continental quarrels would be duplicated on this side of the ocean, and the internal dissensions and the entangling alliances against which Washington and Jefferson had lifted warning voices would be inevitable features of American politics. And Europe seemed about to step in. The Holy Alliance appeared resolved first to undo the work of the revolution in Spain itself and then to settle the affairs of Spanish America, not by restoring her col-

onies to Spain or by recognising their independence as the United States did as soon as was practicable, but by a redistribution of the territory among the chief powers. Thus a Bourbon might reign at Buenos Ayres, and Russia, which was already making colonial experiments on the North Pacific, might find in San Francisco and the Golden Gate temporary compensation for her exclusion from Constantinople and the Golden Horn.

But Great Britain, also, had an interest in these schemes, and fortunately one in harmony, not in conflict with that of the United States. Canning, now in the Foreign Office since Castlereagh's suicide, would not respond favourably to Richard Rush, the American minister, when the latter urged that Great Britain recognise the independence of the revolted Spanish colonies, but, as the designs of the Alliance became plainer, he proposed joint action between Great Britain and America either by a convention or agreement of some sort, or by Great Britain's securing the United States a voice in the suggested European Congress. Rush discreetly refused to commit his country, but the information he transmitted to Monroe gave the latter an opportunity to promulgate a policy strictly American and yet sure to be agreeable to Great Britain; one that would protect the new republics to the south as well as the outlying areas so tempting to powers bent on colonisation. His message to the Eighteenth Congress in December, 1823, contained, in the last paragraph but one, four sentences in which is to be found the germ of the "doctrine" called by his name—a doctrine which has been so much developed that it will be well to quote the original utterance *in extenso*:—

“We owe it, therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers [*i.e.* the Holy Alliance] to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But, with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur, which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change, on the part of the United States, indispensable to their security.”

It is quite obvious from these sentences that Monroe intended to set a calm menace over against a rash one, and that he did it for the sake of averting future complications. It was really a stroke of consummate statesmanship for which history has no words but praise.\* As we shall see later, Monroe's simple policy has been expanded into a much more

\* In this connection Jefferson's important letters to Monroe written during the summer and fall of 1823 must not be overlooked.

formidable one than he intended. It is quite plain that he did not mean that the United States should assume the hegemony of all the other American republics and fight their battles for them. John Quincy Adams three years later gave the true rendering of the "doctrine" when in connection with the Panama Congress (see *post* I. vii., p.121), he desired that each republic should agree to "guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders." In just so far as an understanding among nations upon a certain vital point differs from a hegemony, so far does the original Monroe Doctrine differ from what most Americans at the close of the century understand it to mean. Whether the development it has undergone can be justified will be discussed in another place, but it may be as well to state here that there is little doubt that Monroe but voiced the general views of his time, and that there is no sufficient reason for attributing the origin of the policy to Canning, although the attitude of Great Britain was not without its influence upon the time and manner in which the "doctrine" was promulgated.

That neither the President nor Congress, at this juncture an able body, was in a hectoring mood appears clearly from the fate of Webster's effort to have the President instructed to send a commissioner to revolted Greece whenever he should deem it expedient. Webster was eloquent and Clay came to his aid; the cause was inspiring if ever cause was; one State legislature, that of South Carolina, had declared that it "would hail with pleasure the recognition, by the American government, of the independence of Greece"; but it was left for John Randolph to voice sarcastically the sober sense of

the country, and sympathy was all that could be afforded by the land of Washington to that of Leonidas. The new light of Massachusetts was for once dimmed by the old light from Virginia, which in more than one particular blazed like a torch of prophecy. "Not satisfied," exclaimed Randolph, "with attempting to support the Greeks, one world, like that of Pyrrhus or Alexander, is not enough for us. We have yet another world for exploits: we are to operate in a country distant from us eighty degrees of latitude, and only accessible by a circumnavigation of the globe, and to subdue which we must cover the Pacific with our ships, and the tops of the Andes with our soldiers. Do gentlemen seriously reflect on the work they have set out for us? Why, sir, these projects of ambition surpass those of Bonaparte himself."

Webster had previously struck the typical American note, not merely of the period but of the century, when he had exclaimed: "The attitude of the United States, meanwhile, is solemn and impressive. Ours is now the great Republic of the earth." It was well for a growing country to have such a strong and buoyant representative as Webster; it was also well for it to have such an insistent, even if eccentric critic as Randolph, who unfortunately could not prevent the increasing demand for protective duties which led to the Tariff of 1824.

The movement for higher duties was not altogether unnatural, as Professor Taussig has shown. After the hard year of 1819 farmers demanded a home market, and the new industries preferred governmental bounty to struggling for themselves. Monroe favoured increased protection in many of his messages, and in the session of 1819-20 Congress



came very near complying with the demands of the manufacturers. The Middle and Western States which clamoured for a home market had been disastrously affected by bad banking and paper money, while New England, less injured in these particulars, was still interested in importing goods with her ships and was thus not a unit for protection. The South, on the whole, opposed the movement of 1820, having had time to see how hard the Tariff of 1816 pressed upon her. The next two or three years saw a slight lull in the controversy, but by 1824, the popular leaders having committed themselves to the policy, a bill fixing higher duties was passed over the opposition of the South and of part of New England. The duties on cotton and woollen goods went up from 25 to  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. There were also increased duties on iron, lead, hemp and wool, the last rendering the advance on woollens somewhat nugatory. In the main, then, the new tariff was by no means an extreme one, but it was quite certain that the more the manufacturers got, the more they would want. Infant industries fed on government bounty are rarely or never known to reach maturity. Why should they?

But the contest for the Presidency and the visit of Lafayette \* to the country he had served nearly half a century before, were more exciting matters than a tariff bill. Lafayette, who journeyed everywhere and was received with indescribable enthusiasm, stood for amity; the presidential candidates stood for just the reverse. Crawford had been paralysed and for some time had done his Treasury work through a deputy, but his friends kept up his fight and cleared him from an investigation of

\* He had been invited by Congress.

his department which was prompted by malice but was after all a piece of poetical justice in view of what had previously happened to Calhoun. Still in spite of Crawford's treatment of his colleagues and of his chief, in sundry matters that need not be detailed, his hard fate moves pity, especially when we find that he gained the caucus nomination early in 1824, only to have the old system break in his hands. None but his friends had attended the meeting, since State legislatures had supported the other candidates and denounced the old caucus as the instrument of a dictating ring.\* Nothing would be gained by an attempt to describe the various local intrigues which preceded the election of November, 1824. As might have been expected, with four candidates running in the only party existing, there was no one capable of receiving a majority, and, as twenty-four years before, the choice of President fell to the House of Representatives, Calhoun having shrewdly secured the Vice-Presidency by an overwhelming majority. Jackson ran ahead both in electoral votes and in the popular vote. In the Electoral College his vote was 99; Adams came next with 84; Crawford followed with 41; and Clay closed the list with 37. The next few months repeated the scenes of the Jefferson-Burr contest, but on a lower scale. Finally Clay, who not being one of the three highest candidates could not be balloted for,† threw the votes of his friends to Adams, who was elected at the first ballot on February 9, 1825. The charge had been previously urged that a corrupt bargain had been struck

\* In Pennsylvania a popular convention nominated Jackson shortly after the caucus at Washington.

† See Appendix A., Amendments, article 12.

between the two, Clay's reward having been nothing less than the succession to the Secretaryship of State. It is true that Adams announced immediately after his election that he should choose Clay for this position, but that any formal bargain was made between them is not probable. Jackson and his friends were much chagrined by the result, and advanced the theory that the General, having been voted for by more individual voters than any of the other candidates, should have been chosen by the House; but this was, of course, tantamount to saying that the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the electoral votes for an election should be made a dead letter. Still it was only natural that four years of petty intrigues should produce rancour, and that the unmagnetic Adams should during the next four years be made to pay the penalty for his narrowly gained success. Meanwhile Monroe closed quietly two momentous Administrations, leaving the Union seemingly at peace, with a full treasury, a people rapidly growing in numbers and wealth, and an absence of party-spirit that seemed to promise a continuance of what fond patriots might deem a veritable golden age of the Republic. It was a delusive prospect that stretched before the good man's eyes; but he had at least done his duty faithfully and with a dignity worthy of the illustrious men who gave him his training in statesmanship.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE PARTING OF THE WAYS.

BESIDES the choice of Clay the new President made only two other changes in the Cabinet. Richard Rush was recalled from England and put in charge of the Treasury, while Senator James Barbour of Virginia was made Secretary of War. Samuel Southard of New Jersey, Wirt, and John McLean of Ohio, held over from Monroe's régime as Secretary of the Navy, Attorney-General, and Postmaster-General respectively. In point of work it was an efficient Cabinet, but McLean, who strictly speaking did not belong to that body, seems to have played toward Adams somewhat the part that Crawford played toward Monroe. It was not, however, internal treachery that Adams had to fear so much as the open opposition of Jackson's adherents in Congress and his own inability to win friends and to stimulate their zeal. He was that most unfortunate of men, whether in public or in private life, the man "compact of" irritating virtues.

But even if he had possessed an engaging personality, the record of his frustrated Administration would not, in all probability, have been greatly varied. He began with a false step—the nomination of Clay; and as a successful minority candidate he was the natural target for the shafts of defeated rivals whose adherents would inevitably

coalesce to form a factious majority. The latter misfortune he could not help; the former mistake his conscious rectitude could only extenuate. He deliberately gave his enemies an excuse to fill the air with cries of fraud which even the patriotic shouts at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the battle of Bunker Hill and at the completion of the Erie Canal could not drown.

Adams's message to the Nineteenth Congress in December, 1825, was a long but well-written document which bespoke both the scholar and the patriot. He abandoned Monroe's position on the subject of internal improvements, and thus gave another handle to his Southern opponents who were rapidly developing a consistent body of States-rights doctrine, which discountenanced not only everything that menaced or favoured a particular section, but also everything that tended to give greater strength and influence to the central government. Under the circumstances it would have been prudent had he been less bold in encouraging Congress to spend money. Certainly universities and observatories were not demanded by the provincial Americans of those days. But Adams belonged to the old race of statesmen who believed in guiding not following the people, and it was his misfortune to stand at the parting of the ways pointing out one road of national prosperity to a self-confident multitude bent on taking another.

It was not the advocacy of internal improvements,\* however, that caused the chief debate of the session, for Congress was now developing the unfortunate

\* About \$14,000,000 were spent on such improvements during Adams's Administration—a very large amount for those days.



practice, which still continues, of paying little attention to presidential recommendations; but rather Adams's action in accepting an invitation that the United States should send representatives to a Congress of all the American Republics which was to meet, at Bolivar's suggestion, at Panama. When the question of confirming the President's nominations of persons to represent the United States came before the Senate, his course in committing the country on his own initiative was much criticised and the propriety of taking part in the Congress was denied by Senators, like Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina, in speeches of considerable force. In fact the Senate committee charged with the matter reported against sending ministers, but the public was decidedly in favour of the grandiose features of the scheme, and the House shared the public's whims; the Senate therefore voted down the report and the Administration apparently won a victory. But Congressional delay and other causes led to the failure of Adams's plans, which had at least been liberal and beneficent in character. The Panama Congress had adjourned without waiting for the arrival of any representative of the United States, and although another meeting was determined on, it never took place. The latter-day student is inclined to think that relations could hardly have subsisted long with such unstable governments as the South American Republics were destined to be, and that, whatever the motives of Adams's opponents were, they made out a pretty strong case for the *laissez faire* policy. Thus the Administration's victory was one of those barren ones that are often worse than downright defeats.

One point must, however, be noticed before the

matter is dismissed. The negro republic of Hayti had been invited to take part in the Congress, and this fact naturally created Southern opposition to Adams's plans. From now on slavery can be found lurking behind most discussions of public policy, no matter how innocent they may appear to be. Social equality with negro ministers to such a Congress was not to be thought of, and perhaps the Congress might discuss the subject of slavery. Strong additional reasons these for a let-alone policy, although by no means strong enough, even when combined with personal ones, to warrant John Randolph, who was now serving for a brief space in the Senate, in indulging in the most celebrated of all his long-winded harangues—the indecent but highly amusing speech in which he attacked both Adams and Clay and goaded the latter into a fortunately bloodless duel by his reference to the “coalition of Blifil and Black George . . . the combination, unheard of till then, of the Puritan with the black-leg.”

From Southerners recalcitrant on account of slavery the conscientious Adams was bandied like a ball to Southerners overbearing in their State pride and resolute to rid themselves of the Indians still lingering in a region they had once possessed. The United States Government was under contract with Georgia to remove the Creeks and Cherokees from the State's borders as soon as possible. The method pursued there and elsewhere was to secure a land cession whenever the chiefs could be induced to conclude a treaty. Naturally the red man got the worst of the bargain as a rule—indeed nearly all his relations with the whites redounded to his disadvantage, in spite of the beneficent intentions of a Jefferson

or a Calhoun. In 1825, a particularly unfair treaty was negotiated with the Creeks at Indian Springs, by which all the lands of the tribe in Georgia and large tracts in Alabama were ceded. The Senate in its ignorance ratified the treaty, but the Indians put to death the chief who had concluded it and despatched a protesting delegation to Washington. Adams, feeling that they had been treated unjustly, sent troops to Georgia to see that they were not driven from their lands, although General Gaines, who was in command, was instructed to secure a proper cession if he could. But the Georgia authorities had already taken possession and were in haste to survey the Creek lands; and Gaines and Governor Troup were soon engaged in a hot dispute. The Governor's language was very irritating, and at his prompting the Georgia legislature undertook to dispose of the lands, unmindful of the treaty rights of the Indians, which lay, of course, beyond the State's jurisdiction.\* Adams firmly told Governor Troup that the State surveys must not continue, but he contrived to bring about a lull in the storm by getting a more moderate treaty signed early in 1826. This was later extended to include all the Creek lands in Georgia after the Senate, aiding the State against the Administration, had refused to agree to the curtailed cession. But the truce did not last long, for in marking off the Alabama boundary line a contest arose, and the Georgia surveyor overrode Indian remonstrance. Adams interfered, ordering the arrest of any person persisting in the survey; but Troup in defiance commanded the release of any surveyors arrested and the arrest of

\* See Appendix A., art. 1, sect. 10; art. 2, sect. 2.

any United States officers interfering with the survey. He rounded off his high-handed measures by ordering the militia to be prepared to repel invaders, by which term he referred to soldiers whom the President might send to maintain the Indians in possession. Adams now sent a special message to Congress recounting in dignified language what had occurred and requesting legislation on the matter if it were deemed wise; but avowing his intention to see that the laws of the Union were executed, even if a contest with Georgia had to be resorted to. Congress, however, was no friend of Adams and was naturally averse to civil strife; the resolutions passed on the subject were consequently very feeble. The President was besought to endeavour to get the Indians to yield the land, and, as such negotiations were already on foot, Troup was content to express himself more urbanely. He could well afford to do so, for he had succeeded in bullying the President and the Union. Still it is only just to him and to Georgia to say that the presence of Indians within the borders of the State was in every way a nuisance that called for abatement, and that the relations between the Union and the individual States were at that time by no means settled. Indeed, more than once, State executives within the past decade have shown a high-handedness comparable with Troup's. Besides Georgia was, in parts of it at least, little more than a rough frontier State, and frontiersmen had little sympathy with Indians, especially with drunken specimens of the race like those whom the novelist Simms saw about this time lying naked in the streets of Mobile. In view of all these facts, it is easier to excuse Governor Troup than to excuse Adams's foes

in Congress who humiliated the Union in order to humiliate him. One man, however, stood by him splendidly—Daniel Webster, whose reply to Representative Forsyth of Georgia may not be one of the great triumphs of the orator, but is certainly one of the finest performances of the man. We may now leave this unpleasant episode with the remark that, as the Cherokees had been too wary to enter into treaties about their lands, Georgia still had trouble ahead of her, not, as will be seen, with the Federal Executive but with that sturdy supporter of the rights of the Union, Chief Justice Marshall, whose weighty decisions throughout the period we are now treating will be briefly noticed hereafter.

It seems to be an instance of the irony of fate that in the course of such a transition Administration as that of John Quincy Adams, the two great survivors of the Revolution, the two men who in their persons summed up nearly all the characteristics of the age now left behind, should have died on the fiftieth anniversary of the great Declaration of Independence which one had drafted and the other had supported with his eloquence. Jefferson and John Adams died within a few hours of one another on July 4, 1826. It was, of course, a happy turn of fate that took them from the world on Independence Day of all others in the year; nor was fate unkind to them in removing them from a scene of strife, of which they had had prophetic glimpses, but fortunately no full realisation. They left survivors in Madison and Monroe, but no other peers; nor could the nation that mourned them foresee to what an extent the standard of statesmanship they had set would remain unapproached, if not unapproachable.



It is sometimes possible, as will be seen in the case of Andrew Jackson, for a President to make up in part, by success in foreign diplomacy, for what he has lost at home on account of unlucky or bad administration; but it was Adams's misfortune, trained diplomatist though he was, to fail signally in both fields. Trade with the British West Indies had been denied to Americans for many years down to the close of Monroe's first Administration. It was a very important trade, and many futile efforts had been made in order to secure by treaty a right to share it, or rather to monopolise it. During Monroe's second Administration Parliament relaxed its laws and American shipping at once profited greatly, Congress at the same time opening American ports to British vessels. But in 1825, Parliament changed its policy, and it became necessary for America to make new concessions within a year. What between misunderstanding of the new rules and the failure of Congress to act promptly enough, the year of grace expired without America's having conformed with Great Britain's requirements, and Gallatin, the new minister in London, found it impossible to induce Canning to negotiate in the matter. Thus Adams's Administration, through little or no fault of its own, suffered a loss for which the large number of other commercial treaties concluded could not compensate. Gallatin did manage to settle certain other points in dispute, but on the whole, remembering the Panama fiasco, one is bound to conclude that most if not all of Adams's diplomatic triumphs came to him before he attained the Presidency.

The Twentieth Congress showed by its temper that Adams would not stand much chance for re-election. Jackson's friends had kept that warrior

steadily before the public, and the Crawford and Calhoun faCTIONS had been won over to him. The compromised Clay on the other hand had failed to do much either for Adams or for himself. The South was solid for Jackson; New England stolidly sustained the equally stolid Adams; the Middle States were, therefore, the real battleground; but with astute leaders like Senator Martin Van Buren arrayed against them, the Administration men could make only a losing fight in the elections of 1826 and 1827. Hence it was no surprise to Adams when the new Congress proceeded to pry into the accounts of executive departments in order to discover irregularities and to check wastefulness of expenditure. It was altogether a petty and mean business that need not be described, since the character of the men engaged in it is sufficiently brought out in the short account that must now be given of the passage of the Tariff of 1828, properly denominated the "Tariff of Abominations."

In the last Congress a bill had been introduced giving increased protection on coarse woollens, which were now being threatened by English cloths. It had failed in the Senate because Calhoun, who was now less of a nationalist in politics, had, as Vice-President, given his casting vote against it. Encouraged by their narrowly missed victory, the protectionists rallied in convention at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in the summer of 1827, and urged Congress and the people to take up the cause of domestic manufactures. This convention had no objects that smacked of disunion, but in reality it was sectional in composition and was instrumental in sowing seed that afterwards ripened to a harvest not agreeable to the Middle and New England

States,\* which practically sent all the delegates that attended the meeting. The Southern Commercial Conventions, that were forerunners of the Secession Conventions, were able to claim with considerable truth that they were by no means the first gatherings held in the United States for sectional purposes.

This protection movement was not unwelcome to the Adams men, as the President's supporters were called, but was a source of great perplexity to the Jackson men, in spite of the fact that their hero was moderately in favour of protectionist theories, about which, it is fair to infer, he knew very little. The South, on which Jackson relied, was practically a unit against high tariffs, and South Carolina, in particular, had denounced them fiercely. But New England woollen manufacturers and Western wool growers, besides protectionists from Jackson's stronghold, Pennsylvania, and other Middle States, had to be considered as well as the South, by politicians whose chief object was not to serve their country but to elect a President. In their dilemma they hit upon a scheme which seems so thoroughly unprincipled that it will be best not to saddle any one man's name with it. They determined to frame a tariff which should lay such high duties on raw materials that New England Representatives and Senators, who were Adams men, would refuse to vote for it. The Southern Jackson men would, of course, unite with them in opposing it. The measure would thus be lost; but the defection of the Adams men would rankle with the protectionists far more than the opposition of Jackson's Southern

\* This section had now abandoned shipping interests for those of manufacturing.

supporters, and consequently Jackson would gain votes everywhere. It was a cleverly contemptible scheme, but it did not work. In spite of the facts that the woollen trade received a blow through certain technical variations from the Harrisburg programme, that a heavy mixed specific and *ad valorem* duty was put on wool, that the duty on hemp, no fine quality of which was grown in the country at all, was raised from \$35 to \$45 per ton, with annual increments of \$5 until \$60 per ton was reached, that the duty on molasses was doubled—in short, notwithstanding the fact that everything was done to make the bill distasteful to them, enough New England men decided that the measure was on the whole better than nothing, to pass it through both Houses and send it to the President, who promptly signed it.

Several States at once protested against the constitutionality and the justice of the act. The most celebrated of these protests was contained in the document known as the "South Carolina Exposition" (1828), the author of which was no less a personage than Vice-President Calhoun. Following, perhaps, rather than leading certain violent spirits of his own far from calm State, and probably influenced by the theories of John Randolph, who always had a method in his madness, and of another Virginian, John Taylor of Caroline, who had written some strict constructionist books, he had let his logical mind work out a theory of State veto, which was an illegitimate offspring of Jefferson's language in the Kentucky Resolutions and will be discussed later when we come to speak of the famous nullification movement. Here it will be sufficient to say that in the end the Abominable Tariff

recoiled on the head of Jackson, for whose benefit it had been devised. This was only poetic justice, for in the often quoted words of John Randolph, "the bill referred to manufactures of no sort or kind except the manufacture of a President of the United States."

But although in South Carolina and Virginia the tariff was perhaps the chief topic of discussion, leading in the former State at least to meetings that indulged in very rash threats, the Presidential canvass was the main thing that occupied the minds of American citizens in 1828. It was a thoroughly undignified affair, descending to low and false scandal about Jackson's wife in a way that reminds one of the disgusting campaign of 1884. Adams and Rush made the best fight they could, but Clay, their chief champion, sickened over his task. On the other hand Jackson and Calhoun, for the breach between them, though about to burst open, had been as yet prevented, had a triumphal progress, in spite of the charges, often true, raised against the old general. The hero-worship natural and not discreditable to a crude population carried everything before it, true charges and all, and, when the electoral votes were counted, Jackson had 178 votes to Adams's 83. The latter had headed a ticket generally known as that of the National Republicans. Jackson had been supported by men now not ashamed to be called Democrats. Thus the Democratic-Republican party of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe had died and suffered a partial transmigration of soul. The new Democratic party represented strict constructionist principles combined on the whole with national loyalty; it represented also the popular party as opposed to the party of the few; but it represented



further a principle unknown to Jefferson, the principle of popular self-sufficiency which prefers obsequious servants ready to do the people's will, to trained statesmen capable of shaping it. On the other hand, the National Republicans represented the Jeffersonian theory of trained statesmen supported by popular consent, but they represented also ideas of a centralised, all-embracing, and active government which sorted rather with the theories of Hamilton. This new party, of which Clay was the predestined leader and which soon became known by the borrowed name of Whig,\* was not the child of the old Federalist party—it accepted the doctrine of popular support too heartily for that—but it was at least its adopted heir.

After the campaign a political lull rested upon the country which the second session of the Twentieth Congress did little to break. Some money was spent on internal improvements, but on the whole the main thing that politicians of every stripe did was to wait. No one could predict exactly what the military statesman who had run such an erratic course in Georgia and Florida would do when he reached the White House; but it was quite certain that he would reward his friends, and naturally he had hosts of them waiting to receive him in Washington. The Southerners, to do them credit, waited rather to see what he would do about the iniquitous tariff; and, as he was a Southern man, even South Carolina retained her patience for the nonce. Meanwhile Adams prepared for a departure strikingly similar to that taken by his father twenty-four years

\* This English party name had been applied to the patriots in the Revolution; the loyalists on the other hand being known as Tories.

before. Another party under an untried man was coming into power. But although Adams also failed to attend his successor's inauguration, he did not drive out of Washington at sunrise to avoid it; nor did he believe, like his impetuous sire, that the cause of the Republic was entirely lost because of the advent of a new régime. He did not, however, perceive how rapidly that cause was approaching destruction or what splendid service he was destined to do it within the next few years.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## A GENERATION'S ADVANCE.

THE census of 1810 revealed the fact that the rate of increase in population was slightly in excess of that of the previous decade; in fact it had reached what was to be the highest point of the century—36.38. The total population stood at 7,239,881—an increase of nearly 2,000,000. The various sections had not kept even pace, however, for the rate of increase in the West had been enormous, while that for the comparatively free North was almost double that for the South. Thus early was the slaveholding section being left behind—not only in wealth and population but in political power, for the North and West were gaining ground in the lower House of Congress. The addition of 1,124,685 square miles to the national area through the Louisiana Purchase had naturally reduced the ratio of density, reduced it indeed to the lowest point in the Union's history—3.62. But the older States in the North were rapidly being covered with a continuous chain of settlements, especially New York and Pennsylvania; and this was true also of Kentucky, and to a less degree of Tennessee and of Ohio, now a State. The border line of population had been extended in the far South, but Creeks and Cherokees barred white advance, and the approaching victory of Jackson (p. 71) would be needed in order that the rich lands of Alabama and Mississippi might be added

to the "Cotton Belt." The Territory of Orleans of course furnished a settled area along the Mississippi, nearly to the limits of the State of Louisiana shortly to be admitted; but in the vast Louisiana Territory proper, settlements could be found only at the mouth of the Arkansas River and at St. Louis. Indiana Territory was as yet no better off, and the newly formed Territories of Illinois and Michigan were still wildernesses save in the neighbourhood of Detroit.

With regard now to the relative position of individual States and cities, it should be noted that Virginia has not yet lost her primacy, but that New York has changed places with Pennsylvania and is now second in rank, while Massachusetts is still fourth, and North Carolina fifth. Ten years later Virginia had changed places with New York and North Carolina stood just below Pennsylvania, while the new States of Ohio and Kentucky had wedged themselves above Massachusetts, which had lost Maine. In 1830, however, Virginia had changed again, this time with Pennsylvania, and Ohio had passed North Carolina. Certainly the convention then framing a new constitution for the Old Dominion was right in devoting a large portion of its time to the discussion of slavery, even if little good came of its deliberations. As for the urban population, the census of 1810 showed that there had been an increase of nearly one per cent. with respect to the total number of inhabitants. The United States was therefore still a nation of farmers. This it remained in 1820, which gave the same percentage as 1810, and in 1830, which showed, however, a gain of nearly two per cent., in consequence chiefly of the growth of the manufacturing spirit and of

the rise of small towns in the West—a phenomenon which had indeed been noticeeable in the second decade. In the latter year New York, which the Erie Canal had made the great seaport of the country, contained about 200,000 inhabitants and had passed Philadelphia for good. Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston had all grown also, but another Southern city, New Orleans, had passed Charleston, which now took the sixth place, little foreseeing, perhaps, that by 1840 it would drop to tenth, being passed for example by Cincinnati, which in 1810 had consisted of a few houses dotting the hillsides rising from the Ohio.

Returning now to consider the country as a whole, we find the census of 1820 giving the Union the same area as that of 1810, for although Spain had engaged to yield up Florida, the transfer had not taken place. Inside the stationary area population has been steadily filling up waste places and the frontier line has been pushed forward. Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi have been admitted as States in the South-West; Indiana and Illinois in the North-West; Maine in the North-East; and Missouri is kept out only on account of the controversy about slavery. Arkansas and Indian Territories have been formed, and Michigan Territory now includes the future State of that name, together with the region later to be occupied by Wisconsin and part of Minnesota. The most populous of all these new States is Maine, which has nearly 300,000 inhabitants; the least populous is Illinois with about 55,000. The frontier States being so thinly settled, one is not surprised to find that after the admission of Missouri in 1821, a halt in State-making is called for fifteen years, Arkansas and Michigan not entering



the Union until 1836 and 1837 respectively. The rich lands of the North- and South-West must first be filled up, which is an easier task now than in both regions the most troublesome Indians have been crushed, and that steamboats are plying upon inland rivers.\*

In the task of filling the 500,000 square miles of territory settled in 1820 a population of 9,633,822 was available, being an increase of nearly 2,400,000, or 33.07 per cent. The rate of increase in the New England and Middle States had fallen to 24.95 per cent., Connecticut being the only State that showed a gain. The New Englanders, especially, were moving westward. The Southern Atlantic States showed a decreased percentage, but the drop was not so marked as in the East. The West and South-West also were not increasing at such a fabulous rate as in the decade just passed, but they still showed remarkable gains. The long waggon trains of emigrants that were to be observed shortly after the War of 1812 wending their way slowly through New York, or Pennsylvania, or Georgia had done their work effectually. Thousands of log-cabins had gone up and hundreds of thousands of acres of virgin land had been purchased from the government at two dollars per acre, a fourth only of the purchase money being required in cash. On such terms every American could be a farmer if he wished, nor was it any wonder that the free-born native showed a dislike to being a hired man.

The census of 1830 gave the Union an increase of area amounting to nearly 60,000 square miles, for Spain had at last let go her hold on Florida. The new Territory hardly affected the total popula-

\* They began in 1811.

tion, however, for it did not contain quite 35,000 inhabitants, apart from the Indians who were to give trouble for years. The work of filling up the existing States and Territories, which save for the admission of Missouri remained practically unaltered, had gone on steadily. Waste places were still to be found—for example in Northern New York, in Pennsylvania, and in the mountainous parts of Virginia,—but population was increasing in density around them, and such an increase was especially noticeable in Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Alabama. The manufacturing North, the farming West, and the cotton-planting Far South were all thriving. The North Atlantic and South Atlantic States actually showed a larger percentage of increase of population than they had done in the preceding decade. Massachusetts gained about six per cent.; Virginia, four; Georgia, now that its Indian troubles were passing, about sixteen and a half. The North-Western States fell behind as did also the South-Western, but they could not expect to keep up their huge percentages. The whole country, however, increased its percentage slightly and could boast of a total population of 12,866,020. But we have dealt with figures long enough; it is time to see what changes have come over the character of the American in this eventful period of thirty years that has witnessed the second war with Great Britain, the rise of the great Democratic party, the acquisition of nearly 1,200,000 square miles of territory, and the admission to the Union of eight new States.

Of course there was not in 1830, and there is not now, a common American character. Not only are the people of the various sections radically different

in many respects, but the people of almost every State differ from their surrounding neighbours. The Southerner differs markedly from the New Englander; the inhabitants of Virginia, North and South Carolina would be easily distinguished from one another by a competent observer. And what is true of 1899 was just as true, probably more true of 1830. But along with radical differences go radical points of likeness, so that we are warranted in speaking of a national American character, which was indeed beginning to impress itself upon early foreign visitors like Harriet Martineau, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Charles Dickens.

The foundation of this national character was, as we have seen, British in the main, for, even in 1830, foreign immigration had affected the population but slightly. There were German and Huguenot and Dutch stocks, but they had harmonised with the English and Scotch-Irish stocks; the people who were fast filling up North-West and South-West were, on the whole, homogeneous native Americans. And both in the cis-Alleghany and in the trans-Alleghany regions they were in many ways different Americans from their fathers of 1801. They were still rural and provincial, but they were far more wide-awake and more truly national in their spirit. Their boundless area seemed to promise them a boundless future. Their naval victories and Jackson's success at New Orleans had saved their pride, and their contentions with France and their war with Great Britain had welded their interests. Their break with tradition and overthrow of aristocracy as represented by the downfall of the Federalists, the success of the democratic experiment for a quarter of a century, culminating in the election of Jack-

son, made them feel that they were continuing the rôle of the Revolutionary Fathers as the political saviours of the world. They had become politically self-conscious; they celebrated with enthusiasm Lafayette's tour and the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic; they sympathised heartily with foreign struggles for liberty whether in South America or in France or in Greece.

But perhaps the most potent cause of change in the national character was the economic impetus of the period. Thanks to Whitney cotton-planting seemed to promise untold wealth to the newer South and the South-West; thanks to the Embargo, the war, and the protective tariff manufacturing offered greater chances for individual and corporate fortunes in the Middle States and New England than farming, trade, or even commerce had done. The improvement in the facilities of transportation represented by the steamboat, the canal, and the incipient railroad also promised to weld East and West together in a mutual prosperity. Agricultural and other products could be laid down at New York for a cost that seemed trifling when compared with the heavy charges for even local freight of the generation just gone. In short the American was fired by the thought that he, his locality, his section, and his country had only to be ingenious and to work hard for a few years in order to dominate the finances of the world. Energy and inventiveness became therefore the most conspicuous notes of the national character. The cities in particular woke up. Threatened with the loss of their Western trade the citizens of Baltimore in 1827 determined to build a railroad to the Ohio River, and began its construction the next year. By January, 1831, a steam loco-

motive had been placed on the tracks of the South Carolina Railroad at Charleston, and in a few years the South was planning for railway connection with the West as zealously, though not so successfully, as the enterprising North.

The task of recounting the industrial revolution of the century belongs to another volume of this series, but it should be noted here that the steamboat and the railroad, while the greatest, were not the only instrumentalities through which the material progress of America had reached the high vantage ground of 1830. Historians of the type of Professor McMaster have pointed out to us that late in the twenties American farmers began to use the threshing machine and mechanics to use edge-tools of native manufacture. About this time anthracite coal began to be generally consumed as fuel—a fact of great importance in the history of that iron and steel industry that was later to show such a great development. Inventors, too, were as busy as bees. Fairbanks was perfecting the platform scales which he was to patent early in the next decade, and Morse was developing that interest in electrical matters that was to lead in a few years to his invention of the telegraph.

The mention of these names reminds us that it is unfair to lay exclusive stress upon the material elements in American progress; there was also an important spiritual element. The American might be shrewd, but he was also honest; he thought much of this world, but he was also religious, though without bigotry; he looked after his own interests, but he was also philanthropical. Men were everywhere waking up from the spiritual lethargy that had characterised the eighteenth century; the divorce of



Church and State by no means meant a religious decline. People who were advanced liberals in politics were almost hidebound in their religious prejudices, although these were breaking down in New England, precisely where they had been strongest. But the spirit of persecution was almost entirely absent save for an occasional mob-outbreak against the Roman Catholics. It was more congenial to the spirit of the times to found emancipation and temperance societies, the latter doing far more good than the former.\*

In education, technically speaking, the generation had made a great advance. The older colleges had waked up, and in the University of Virginia Jefferson had founded an institution of higher character in some respects than the English-speaking world was familiar with. More important, however, was the development of the common-school system, especially throughout the West, where a thirty-sixth portion of the public lands was devoted to its support. High schools, too, had begun in Boston, in 1821, to foster a zeal for education in classes hitherto lacking in such ambition. Thus Americans were able to boast that, while the Old World might possess more culture in its upper classes, the New possessed far the more intelligent population. With illiteracy widely and rapidly decreasing, the American farmer could never become a peasant, the American labourer would easily prove himself the most efficient workingman on earth. In the South alone did educational conditions appear unprosperous.

\* There was great room for temperance reform, as liquor was used by all classes of society to an extent that is now surprising. The movement took a public character when Maine passed a prohibition law in 1851.

They were not so bad as some historians have represented, for there was not a little culture among the planters, who employed private tutors and sent their sons to Northern colleges; but the few free-schools maintained were as a rule wretched farees, and thus the lower whites had less chance to rise than in any other section. Jefferson had seen that truly popular education is the only sure foundation on which a democracy can be built, but he could not induce his native State and section to see it.

Yet, after all, the South was not undemocratic in a way. Inside the planting aristocracy equality prevailed as a rule, and even the poorer whites were treated with respect, especially with regard to their political rights so far as these had been acquired. Rich and poor turned out on court-day to hear some local statesman address his constituents on the questions of the hour. In fact political education was perhaps more widespread in the South than in the North, and certainly was far more widespread in America at large than in Europe. Of course there was more real democracy in the New South-West than in the older Southern States, for the conditions of frontier existence had swept away nearly all traces of a caste system. The backwoodsman was bound by the nature of things to be a true democrat, and if he was still uncouth in 1830, he could nevertheless point with pride to Andrew Jackson in the White House. The more polished Kentuckian could point with equal pride to the dashing Clay; the Missourian to the ponderous but genuinely powerful Benton;\* the Illinoisian would soon point with greater pride to Abraham Lincoln.

\* Senator Thomas Hart Benton, who will be mentioned often hereafter.

But not merely in politics, in war, in industry, in mechanical ingenuity had the American of 1830 made a reputation for himself. He was actually beginning to develop his æsthetic faculties. He naturally aimed first at comfort and convenience in his houses and household belongings, especially in his cities; he was proud of the public buildings rising at Washington, but his renaissance of architecture was to come later. He could point, however, to the fact that Benjamin West, Copley, Gilbert Stuart, Washington Allston, and the fine miniature painter Malbone were countrymen of his who had done good work before the century dawned and who would probably not lack successors. In *belles-lettres* also his cause was not hopeless. At the beginning of the century only one professional author of considerable power was living in America—the ill-fated Charles Brockden Brown, a novelist whose works deserve a greater currency than they at present possess. Prior to Brown only Franklin and Jonathan Edwards had risen to very high rank as authors, and the character of their writings was prevaillingly un-æsthetic. By 1830 Bryant, Irving, and Cooper had done work that showed that the Addisonian essays of Dennie and the heroic strains of Joel Barlow that had charmed the preceding generation had had their day. American literature still preserved a British flavour and perhaps would always preserve it; but there could be little question that the query, “Who reads an American book?” would not long be asked. In the next two decades a brilliant school of historians was to arise, Longfellow, Poe, Hawthorne, Emerson, and Whittier were to lay the foundation of their fame, and New England at least was to undergo a literary and philosophical awakening.

The outlook therefore seemed prosperous in all directions. But slavery had yet to be reckoned with in the political sphere; a reckless spirit of speculation already engendered, and ignorance of the fundamentals of finance would more than once interfere seriously with material progress; and in the sphere of manners and culture the outstripping of education by democracy would have deleterious results. Already it was possible to caricature the American and yet not do him gross injustice. His lank cheeks and nasal tones, his lack of dignity and repose, his naïve eagerness to know what other peoples thought of him and his childish wrath when an unfavourable opinion was expressed, his provincialism, his materialism,—in short his general lack of charm naturally made an impression upon travellers, who were often blind to the better points of his character. Provincial and prosaic the average American of 1830 certainly was, but so was the average European, and on the whole the former had no reason to envy the latter. Besides, throughout the country there was a small class of men of culture fit for any society—a class likely to increase more rapidly in America than elsewhere. And the body of the people, if vulgar, was hearty and honest, and better off than the European masses. There was, of course, a great deal of nonsense talked in America about the “effete monarchies” of Europe, yet there was just as much talked about America by Europeans, some of whom had been misled by superficial travellers, some by their desire to see the Republic fail. But there is no need to dwell on these international misunderstandings. Two generations have nearly sufficed to clear them away, and when one remembers how long Englishmen and Frenchmen have mis-

understood one another, one is inclined to regard the *rapprochement* of Europe and America as rapid rather than slow. That it should have come was most desirable, however, for whatever stress may be laid upon the originality of American life and character, it remains true that, in the large, American history is an extension of European history.

It was a transplanted European civilisation that the American had to develop in a virgin country under peculiarly favourable conditions, and in his success or failure Europe and the world had an abiding interest. By 1830 the initial stages of his task had been accomplished with conspicuous success; the next generation was destined, however, to face a graver problem than had perhaps ever confronted any young nation. New World democracy would have to grapple with a foe introduced from the Old World. If it succeeded in putting slavery down, it would not only have a clear field in which to move toward its goal, it would also furnish Europe with the most important of political lessons. If democracy could conquer slavery, there was nothing in European political or social life that could permanently impede its victorious progress.



## PART TWO.

### THE STRUGGLE WITH SLAVERY.

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#### CHAPTER IX.

“THE REIGN OF ANDREW JACKSON.”

THE part played by Jackson himself in his inauguration was sufficiently dignified; but it was really the sovereign people that was inaugurated, and like most parvenus the people, as represented by the office seekers who had crowded to Washington, behaved badly enough. The new President added to his soldierly bearing the dignity of old age and of unaffected manners learned in Nature's school; his inaugural address, if brief, did not offend by lack of taste; and the ceremonies were simple in accordance with the recent widower's desires. But the mob pursued him from the Capitol to the White House, entered with tumult that no longer private abode, broke plates and dishes in its eagerness to get something to eat, and actually pressed Jackson into a closer corner than any enemy had ever done. The reign of aristocracy was over at last, but so was that of decorum.

There was, of course, nothing unnatural in what happened at Washington on March 4, 1829. In a new country with a liberal republican government,

it was only a matter of time when the people would become conscious of the fact that they were the source of all power, and would be seized with the desire to make use of their own prerogatives. The advent of the people to power was but the natural result of the emancipation of the individual brain by the Renaissance, of the individual conscience by the Reformation, and of the individual will by these two great movements as well as by the political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As it is impossible to think of any backward step in this progress of evolution, and as it is consonant with belief in a beneficent Providence to hold that the world is on the whole improving, it seems wise to trust that the people are being surely if slowly educated to use well their immense powers; in other words, that democracy is realising the hopes of its friends and falsifying the denunciations of its foes. From this point of view it is idle to inveigh against Andrew Jackson as though he were individually responsible for all the blunders and crimes the American people have committed since his day. But it is equally idle to deny that a political Pandemonium was let loose in Washington at the time of his inauguration, and that a considerable number of the evil spirits thus enlarged have been ever since plying their nefarious business both at the national capital and throughout the country. In short, although the historian of the United States for the past three-quarters of a century may consistently be an optimist, he cannot be a wholesale eulogist without forfeiting his self-respect.

The rush made for the White House on the day of the inauguration was but typical of the set made at Jackson for the next few months by the “friends,”

especially the editors, who had helped to secure his election. Rewards for friends, punishment for foes, had been Jackson's lifelong motto, and he adhered to it faithfully now. Under the tenure of office act\* he could dispose of many places without resorting to actual removals of worthy incumbents; but such removals were also indulged in, the terms of dismissal being made needlessly harsh by some of his lieutenants in power. No reasons were proffered to the unfortunate man whose office was wanted by some clamorous Jacksonian; the blow fell without warning; and, if contemporary observers have not exaggerated, Washington for some months underwent the horrors of a real reign of terror, in which suicide and insanity were not unheard of. And yet Jackson was a kind-hearted man. He was also an autocrat, however, and one whose feelings were easily played upon. Offices could be wheedled out of him by flattery, and to arouse his ire against a subordinate official was to seal that unfortunate's doom. He has even been accused of duplicity in some instances, with having lulled his victims by promises before allowing the axe to fall. Such charges should not probably be taken very seriously. There were two men in Jackson, as there are in every frontiersman. The child of nature, he was still a savage; the child of civilisation, he was also a gentleman. It was the gentleman that invited the trembling official to take a social glass of wine with a President who had been satisfied that the subordinate's loyalty to Adams had not passed the bounds of discretion; it was the savage that was goaded by a designing Secretary to take vengeance for past insults and to reward a

\* See *ante*, Part I., Chap. VI., p. 109.

deserving friend by declaring vacant the place of the very man who the day before had pledged long life to the Administration.

The number of removals made under Jackson within a few months of his entrance upon office has been variously estimated at from about 700 to 2,000. As many of the officers dismissed had subordinates who went with them, the distress caused by this introduction of the "spoils system" \* must have been great and widespread. That Jackson realised the fact may, perhaps, be inferred from the lame paragraphs he devoted to the subject in his first message. He actually ventured to make the sophistical statement that "he who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office"—and perhaps with his simple notions about earning a living he believed what he wrote. He doubtless also believed that his proposal to extend the tenure of office act would be salutary in its effects, and judging from recent events, his beliefs are shared by the present Executive of the United States and by quite a large portion of the American people. This only goes to show that while seventy years may be the measure of a man's life, it is not the measure even of a nation's youth.

With regard now to the characters of the men appointed to fill the vacancies so summarily created, it seems to be quite clear that Jackson did not intend to hurt the public service by foisting incompetent or vicious officials upon it, but that, as might

\* It was so called in consequence of Senator Marcy's frank enunciation of the prime article of the political faith cherished by himself and his fellow Democrats of New York, viz., that "to the victor belong the spoils."

have been expected, his leading advisers caused him to make many such appointments. Some of them were so bad that even friendly senators could not bring themselves to confirm them.\* Jackson was a keen judge of character at times, but like many another autocrat he preferred to surround himself with men that did not thwart his will. Hence it was that the supple Martin Van Buren, his Secretary of State, gained so much influence over him. As for the rest of the Cabinet, they were all more or less mediocre men who were destined soon to be replaced, partly on account of a rather absurd episode which may be recounted here instead of in its chronological place.

The portfolio of war had been given to Jackson's Tennessee friend, Major John H. Eaton. The latter had just married a dashing widow, the daughter of a Washington innkeeper, who in her former relations with Eaton had rather scandalised the society of the Capital. On her return as the wife of a member of the Cabinet, society, private and official, was greatly stirred. The wives and daughters of the other Secretaries followed the lead set by the wife of the Vice-President, and refused to recognise Mrs. Eaton socially. The latter used her powers of fascination upon the other sex and secured champions, chief of whom was Jackson himself. Van Buren, a widower, had nothing to lose by falling in line and giving the fair outcast a ball. But Creeks and Spaniards were much easier to subdue than Washington women, as Jackson found to his cost when the wife of his own nephew and private secretary sided with the enemy and had to be banished to Tennessee for contumacy.

\* See Appendix A., article 2, section 2.



Finally a hollow truce was patched up in the Cabinet, but it lasted only a short while. In the spring of 1831, Jackson, having learned of Calhoun's failure to defend him in the matter of the Seminole war,\* broke with the latter and determined to get rid of three of his counsellors who were friends of the Vice-President's. This stroke of policy at once avenged Mrs. Eaton and showed how hopeless were Calhoun's chances of succeeding Jackson as President. Thus a purely sectional bias was given to a great career, and the cause of the Union received a deadly blow. But Jackson was then thinking chiefly of punishing a supposed enemy, of securing himself a strong cabinet that would advance his own plans for re-election, and of settling the final succession on the complaisant Van Buren. His schemes were carried out with an astuteness hardly smacking of the backwoods. Van Buren and Eaton resigned as though to relieve the President of the strain of managing an inharmonious Cabinet; then Jackson hinted that the other members, save the Postmaster-General, now for the first time admitted to full rank in the Cabinet, would do well to follow the delicate example set, and when hints failed, he dropped circumlocutions.

There was naturally a scandal at such high-handed proceedings, but the autocrat had his way. Edward Livingston of Louisiana, an able jurist, succeeded Van Buren, who was subsequently named for the English mission but not confirmed by the Senate; Lewis Cass of Michigan took Eaton's place; and Roger B. Taney of Maryland became Attorney-General. The two latter politicians were destined to become marked men, and the entire Cabinet as re-

\* See *ante*, Part I., Chap. VI., p. 95.

modelled was a fairly strong body. But Jackson, after all, preferred what was called his "Kitchen Cabinet" to his constitutional council. He relied upon old friends like William B. Lewis of Tennessee, who had managed his campaigns for him, and upon a shrewd wire-puller named Amos Kendall, an enemy of Clay's and therefore a man after Jackson's heart. These two, with a few other similar characters, knew how to flatter and manage the old warrior, but, when all is said, the probabilities are that even they stood aside whenever Jackson took the bit between his teeth. "Old Hiekory" as he had long been called was in every way the chief man in his own Administration.

But although the personal element counts for more in Jackson's régime than in the Administration of any other President save Jefferson, and although, if one were aiming at picturesque narration, the temptation to dwell upon this element would be almost irresistible, the influence which the period as a whole exerted upon the subsequent political history of the country is much more important, and must for the future receive our undivided attention.

The Twenty-first Congress assembled in December, 1829, and naturally heard the new President's message with considerable interest. It was a long document, the work in part, apparently, of several hands; it was, moreover, a state paper that compared well, perhaps surprisingly well, with the similar productions of Jackson's scholarly predecessors. He could not, indeed, succeed in defending thoroughly his wholesale removals from office, and he might have refrained from alluding to the hypothetical bargain between Adams and Clay, but at

least, except on the tariff, he spoke like a man with convictions on which he would unhesitatingly act. On internal improvements he took Southern, *i.e.* strict constructionist ground; he spoke of the Union not as a nation, but as a confederacy; he upheld Georgia in her contest with the Indians; he threw out a strong hint that the National Bank ought not to be rechartered; but he gave the South Carolina theorists no reason to believe that he would allow them to resist the laws of the Union with impunity.

Yet actions are more potent than words. Soon after Jackson was elected, the Georgia legislature passed an act extending the State's jurisdiction over the lands which the Cherokees had refused to cede. This act was obviously an equitable one, for an independent Indian State inside one of the sovereign members of the Union was an anomaly not to be tolerated; yet in law the measure was of doubtful validity, as the State showed when its legislature bade Governor Gilmer disregard a citation issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case brought to test the whole matter. The next year, 1831, the Court held that the Indians had the Constitution on the side of their claims, but that nothing could be done in the premises. The Court could not fight a State, and the President would not. Jackson has been praised for his common sense in not enforcing the legal rights of the Indians, and certainly his proposal, which Congress soon acted on, that an Indian Territory should be formed in the unsettled West, to which Eastern Indians might be deported, was a statesmanly one. But did not Jackson encourage individual States to deny, with the Carolina Nullifiers, the ultimate supremacy of the Supreme Court in the delicate matter of determin-

ing the constitutionality of laws, whether State or national, and was it common sense in the Chief Executive of the Union to abandon its Judiciary in the hour of need? Jackson thought it was in 1831, and again in 1832, when Chief Justice Marshall ordered the release of missionaries in the Indian country, who had been arrested for refusing to take an oath of allegiance to Georgia. The State would not obey the mandate, and Jackson is reported to have said: "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." The alleged speech and the indisputable presidential inaction were not indicative of high statesmanship, but would rather have been productive of anarchy in any country not so fortunately situated as the United States. Nor is it easy to believe that Jackson's attitude toward Marshall did not lend some encouragement to the Nullifiers, of whom we shall soon speak at some length.

Meanwhile a word must be said about Marshall, who died near the close of Jackson's régime (1835) after having filled for more than a generation a position inferior only to the presidency itself. Marshall is confessedly the greatest American jurist—perhaps no other jurist that ever lived has wrought such political effects as he has done by means of his lucid decisions which steadily upheld the supremacy of the Union over the States. He was not a marvellous lawyer, but he was every inch a statesman. He was a Federalist and carried to the bench the vital principle of that party—belief in the necessity for a stable government. Thus when Jefferson became President and Marshall Chief Justice, it was a case of democracy's commanding and manning the Ship of State, but of aristocracy's

keeping the compass. Slowly but surely Marshall developed the principle that it is the function of the Judiciary to decide when any law, State or national, is in conflict with the Constitution and therefore void. But such decisions could not remain negative; therefore a body of “judge-made law,” which has been acquiesced in by government and people, has to be added to the written document before the full organic law of the land lies before the student. It is impossible here to cite or comment on even the leading cases, such as *Martin vs. Hunter’s Lessee* (1816), *McCullough vs. Maryland* (1819), *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward* (1819), and *Cohens vs. Virginia* (1821); but it may be confidently asserted that a knowledge of the main points of Marshall’s career—for living and dead he is the Supreme Court—is absolutely necessary to any fair comprehension of the history of the American people. In him the national respect for law, together with the national habit of seeking a legal basis for every political action of importance, will be found personified.

The reverence for the Supreme Court which Marshall had been slowly inculcating had taken little hold upon extreme States-rights men, especially in South Carolina. These theorists clung to the idea that the Union was the result of a compact between sovereign States, and they could not believe that a mere department of a government that was itself a creature of the States could legitimately presume to decide that the latter must obey a law of the Union not to their liking. From a purely legal point of view there was something to be said in favour of this Southern contention; but from the point of view of political theory it was obvious that



for each State to decide whether or not it would obey a law of the Union would speedily induce anarchy. Yet many South Carolinians, fiery by nature and exasperated by the growth of protection in the North and East, had adopted this theory of nullification or State veto—which was a step beyond the State remonstrances advised by Jefferson and Madison in their famous Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798–99—especially after it had been put into a consistent shape by the vigorously logical mind of Calhoun. But for such honest and impetuous people to adopt a theory was to use it, and it was not long before Hayne gave it full utterance in the Senate.

A debate had arisen on a resolution by Senator Foote of Connecticut touching the liberal policy of the government with regard to the sale of the public lands in the West.\* New England, needing labourers for her growing manufacturing enterprises, disliked to see them tempted to emigrate to the newer States. Naturally Benton of Missouri stood up for his section, while Hayne, who wanted to punish tariff-abetting New England more than to aid a section barred to slavery by the late compromise, came to his rescue. The debate soon widened to a discussion of the remedies for aggression on the part of the Union, and Hayne unfolded the theory of Nullification, Calhoun silently approving from his Vice-Presidential chair.

Webster, now in the Senate which, with the speedy reappearance of Clay and with Calhoun in

\* The price at which the lands were sold was liberal, but Benton had solid arguments on his side in the long fight he made against the policy of making revenue out of the public territory.

a seat on the floor, was soon to enter upon its period of meridian glory, replied to Hayne, who was himself an orator of no mean calibre. Hayne returned to the charge in a long speech and Webster answered—the two performances constituting the most important debate in American annals and ranking high in the history of the world's oratory. Merely as a speech Webster's effort was superior, and as an argument it demolished the theory of Nullification, which indeed was opposed by a large number of South Carolinians and by Southerners generally. To stay in the Union yet not obey its laws seemed foolish even to men who believed in the right of secession. But it may be doubted whether Webster's speech was altogether so great as his friends thought at the time of its deliverance or as posterity has been taught to believe. Against the theory of compact he advanced the theory that the government of the United States and the Constitution were the people's—"made for the people; made by the people; and answerable to the people." He believed what he said, most of his contemporaries not living in the South believed it, and most Americans believe it now. Yet it is very questionable whether he was any more right from the point of view of history, than Hayne was from that of political theory and common sense. To men of North, East, and West the government was on that 26th day of January, 1830, truly a popular government, and the United States formed a nation; but a large majority of the Founders had seemingly regarded it as a government formed by sovereign States, and the agricultural, slaveholding, non-progressive South continued so to regard it. It may cheerfully be granted that a government of balanced sovereignty could not

work, that sovereignty had to gravitate toward the general government, that Webster truly enunciated the results of history. But it should also be granted that Hayne's theory of State sovereignty was naturally attractive to a section which had to cling to minority rights in order to save an imperilled institution, and that it had a sufficient basis in history and verbal law to give it a vitality that could be quenched and stifled only after four years of civil war. Webster bore off the honours of the debate, but not to the extent claimed by most historians.

After the Senatorial contest Calhoun and his friends determined to find out where Jackson would stand should South Carolina undertake to pronounce the obnoxious Tariff of 1828 unconstitutional on the ground that it was grievous to a single section. A banquet was given on Jefferson's birthday (April 13, 1830), and Southern speakers expressed ultra States-rights views; but Jackson's volunteer toast was "Our Federal Union: it must be preserved." This might have been expected, for Jackson represented a new State and therefore was more imbued with love for the Union than with State pride, and he had already treated the tariff as constitutional. Still his action with regard to Georgia pointed the other way, and after the break came with Calhoun, through Crawford's instrumentality, there was less reason for the great Carolinian to hold his State back. Accordingly, in the summer of 1831 he issued "An Address to the People of South Carolina" in which he expounded fully the theory of State veto which he had made his own.

It soon became time to act, unless indeed the theorists were to eat their words. The Twenty-second Congress in its first session discussed the


tariff question thoroughly and in July, 1832, passed a new act which did away with most of the bad features of the law of 1828, but by no means abandoned the theory of protection. Calhoun at once published another manifesto and his State answered his call: The legislature called a convention—such a body more fully representing the State—and the latter passed an ordinance nullifying the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832, and prohibiting the payment of duties under them after February, 1833. If the Union interfered, South Carolina would secede. This was in November, 1832. Jackson immediately issued a strong proclamation in which he declared that the laws of the Union must be executed and that the leaders who had seduced the people of the State, whom he urged to yield, had counselled disunion which, if attempted by armed force, would be treason. But South Carolinians have never in their history feared anybody, not even “Old Hickory.” Their new Governor, Hayne, fulminated against Jackson in return, and Calhoun, who had resigned the Vice-Presidency to take Hayne’s seat in the Senate, stood ready to defend his own theories against all comers. Meanwhile, however, Jackson, with Van Buren behind him, had swept the country for a second term—Clay, the candidate of the National Republicans, making a poor showing—and the old hero took this popular verdict to mean that he was to make short work of the Nullifiers. He accordingly asked for a bill to enforce the tariff laws, which was granted him on March 1, 1833, after considerable debate, in which Webster and Calhoun figured.

But while a “Force Bill” was needed to keep up appearances concessions might still be tried. The Treasury had recommended a considerable reduction

of duties, and bills to that effect had been introduced into both House and Senate. In the latter body Clay supported a bill which would gradually reduce duties in ten years to a uniform basis of twenty per cent.—a measure which would be acceptable to the Carolinians. This bill finally became law on March 2, 1833. South Carolina in the meanwhile had hearkened to the advice of Virginia and to the dictates of prudence and allowed duties to be collected after February 1. She thus set aside her own ordinance illegally—at least the leading Nullifiers did; but in such a saturnalia of unreason one does not ask for consistency any more than one asks for true courage in an elected body like the Senate. Congress was backing down by discussing the reduction of the duties at such a crisis; South Carolina, then, could afford not to be precipitate. When the new Tariff Bill had been safely passed the Nullification Convention reassembled and repealed its ordinance, but passed another nullifying the “Force Bill.”

Thus the gravest internal menace to the Union prior to the Civil War ended in weak concessions on the one side, and in childish petulancy on the other. Under these circumstances it is idle to discuss at length the much mooted question as to which party won. The State was ready to fight and Jackson too, but if the survival of the belief in her ultimate power to leave the Union when she chose be a fair test of victory, as it seems to be, then Calhoun was right in claiming the victory for South Carolina. But after all, the main point to be determined is, whether or not the Nullifiers were honest in asserting that they were not disunionists at heart but only stood out against the Union in order to preserve





HENRY CLAY.



it and their State in pristine constitutional purity. In other words, were Calhoun and his followers traitors or only mistaken men? Space will not admit of an extended discussion of this vexed matter, but it is safe to say that now, after the lapse of nearly seventy years, it can be plainly perceived that Calhoun, and presumably most of his followers, really believed in the logical truth of the theory of Nullification, and thought that if it were accepted by the country nothing but good would ensue. They felt that a consolidated government would press harder and harder upon the slaveholding South, which would finally be goaded into open resistance; but that the triumph of Nullification would arrest consolidation and preserve the rights of the sections. They were thoroughly honourable men, to whom treason would have been abhorrent; we are therefore at liberty to denounce their theories only.

## CHAPTER X.

## FROM TRIUMPH TO DEFEAT.

WE left Jackson only a half-way victor over the hosts of Nullification; we must now retrace our steps and watch him conduct a more successful fight against the National Bank. Before dealing with this interesting topic, however, we should notice the fact that Jackson could be diplomatic when he chose and could make his diplomacy profitable. By 1830 he had secured the trade with the British West Indies, which had been lost under his predecessor, and had done it partly at least by requesting as a favour what had been formerly demanded as a right. A lucky change in French monarchs also brought about, though not without a threat of war, a settlement of long-standing claims against France on account of spoliations that occurred during the Napoleonic régime. Such successes naturally far more than counterbalanced the scandal produced by John Randolph's accepting the mission to Russia, spending a few days there and nearly a year in England, and then applying the \$21,000 he drew from the government to the payment of his private debts.

But the President, who, in the language of his foes, truckled to Great Britain, was soon to show himself almost a greater adept than Randolph in paying off old scores, as well as an opponent whom even a powerful corporation could not struggle with successfully. It will be remembered that the mes-

sage of 1829 proclaimed unmistakably Jackson's hostility to the Bank of the United States, which then seemed a thoroughly sound institution with a charter still good for several years. As a Western Democrat Jackson probably started with inherited and acquired prejudices, more or less grounded, against great moneyed corporations,\* but he seems to have become specially incensed against the Bank on account of the unwillingness of its President, Nicholas Biddle, to remove the head of a New Hampshire branch who had been accused of political favoritism. Biddle was an able man, but was too confident of his own position, and in his correspondence with the Secretary of the Treasury he unwittingly made an enemy of Jackson, who could never brook opposition. The latter showed his hand more plainly in his second message and was assisted by Senator Benton of Missouri, perhaps the strongest Administration leader in Congress. Nothing could be done with that body, but at least public suspicion was aroused against the Bank. Most of the charges made were disproved, but that could not prevent the starting of new ones, especially by the men who remained in the background as a "Kitchen Cabinet."

It is doubtful whether even the rash Jackson, after he had determined on trying for a second presidential term, wished to push the Bank fight to an issue before he was certain of re-election. As we have just seen he was politic, and McLane, the new Secretary of the Treasury, was apparently not forbidden to say a good word for the institution in his first report. But Clay had returned to the Senate and was eager for an issue on which to corner the Administration. He thought he had found it in the

\* Jefferson had them also.



Bank controversy, and with mistaken zeal he urged Biddle and his associates to apply at once for a recharter, although the current charter was good until 1836. Like most similar "clever" moves in politics it failed of its mark. Congress did indeed pass a rechartering bill in the summer of 1832; but Jackson did not hesitate to accept the issue Clay had made. He vetoed the bill with emphasis in a message which still deserves to be read. He made a strong argument as to the unconstitutionality of the special charter under discussion, brought out very adroitly the political and financial dangers attending the grant of such monopolistic privileges, laid stress on the amount of stock owned abroad, and finally in a very dignified way stated his perfect willingness to go before the people in the coming election on the issue his opponents had chosen. There were, indeed, statements in the message to which just exception could be taken, and Clay and Webster made the most of them; but the veto could not be overridden and there was nothing left but to fight the matter out at the polls.

As we have already seen Jackson triumphed signally. The campaign (1832) was a bitter one, especially as the Bank issue served to array the rich and well-to-do against people of small and no means, and is memorable for two reasons. In the first place it was ushered in by National Conventions, the era of Congressional caucuses and legislative nominations being over. In the second place it was marked by the rise of one of those side parties based upon a moral issue that have since played such an important part in American politics. With regard to the first fact it may be noted that conventions had previously been used in various States, and that

the Demoerats needed such a gathering for this campaign only to secure a Vice-Presidential candidate. Van Buren gained the honour, not only because he was Jackson's favourite, but also because of the sympathy aroused for him when it became known that a combination of Webster, Clay, and Calhoun had prevented his confirmation as minister and brought him home from England under humiliating circumstances not at all deserved. With regard to the second fact we need only say that a new party of not a little strength and integrity had been formed for the purpose of making war on the Masonic order. A certain William Morgan of Western New York had published alleged revelations concerning the order, and it was claimed by his friends that he had been kidnapped by the Freemasons and drowned in the Niagara River. That he was murdered seems doubtful, but there is no question that the public was greatly agitated and that a large number of men forgot for the moment their previous political affiliations in order to form a party which should prevent Freemasons from holding office. William Wirt was persuaded to accept a nomination for the presidency upon this rather absurd platform, but only Vermont gave him her electoral votes. Nevertheless anti-Masonry taught a lesson which opponents of slavery, drunkenness, and lesser evils have not been slow to follow.

As soon as he was safely re-elected Jackson renewed his war upon the Bank, for he had an almost superstitious belief that he was called upon to execute whatever he thought to be the people's will as expressed at the polls. Accordingly he balanced his pleasant announcement, in his fourth message,

that during his Administration \$58,000,000 had been applied to the reduction of the public debt, by the plain statement that the Secretary of the Treasury was trying to find out whether the National Bank was still a safe place to keep the government deposits, and by the recommendation that Congress should investigate "the serious charges impeaching" the character of the institution. Neither the House nor the informed portion of the public seeming much alarmed, the President with characteristic obstinacy determined to act alone. He rearranged his Cabinet so as to get McLane, a Bank man, into the State Department, and William J. Duane, an anti-Bank man, into the Treasury. The law left the withdrawing of the deposits to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, but when Jackson requested Duane to sign the requisite order, the latter refused, rightly fearing a serious disturbance of the money market. Such a consideration was, of course, lost on Jackson, whose previous stand in the whole controversy had been distinctly creditable to his political sagacity, but whose mind was by no means of an economic cast.

That mind was made up, however, and despite all warnings he informed his Cabinet that the deposits must be removed. Duane still refusing to give the necessary order, he was dismissed and Roger B. Taney, the Attorney-General, who was in favour of the President's policy, was placed at the head of the Treasury. An order was issued withdrawing little less than \$10,000,000, in gradual sums, to meet the government's expenses. Certain State banks were also designated as future depositories. The result was, of course, a curtailing of the Bank's loans, a slight run on its private deposits, and a

stringency in the money market; but the judicious management of the institution and the general financial prosperity of the country, together with a slight halt in the government's oppressive policy, kept off a real panic.

The order removing the deposits had been issued late in September, 1833; in December Jackson defended his course in his message to Congress, laying stress on the fact that the Bank had undoubtedly gone into politics in the late presidential campaign, and charging it with having done its best, since the withdrawal of the deposits, to raise a panic in the country. There was probably truth in the first charge, but as there was no likelihood that a new charter could be secured, Jackson might well have allowed the institution to wind up its affairs peaceably; at least it is certain, after all allowances have been made for the genuineness of his fears of a re-charter, that in his utterances to Congress on the subject he showed himself to be more of a partisan than of a statesman. As the House was a new body with a Democratic majority, it was not difficult to secure approval for his action; but Clay succeeded in getting the Senate to pass resolutions censuring the Executive for his removal of Duane, and Taney for his removal of the deposits. To this censure the indignant President replied in a long and on the whole dignified and powerful "Protest." His theory of the constitutional independence of the three departments of government may have been rather baldly put, but it contained in the last analysis a kernel of truth,\* and his claim that the Senate had acted in an unconstitutional way was

\* For Jefferson's not dissimilar views see his Correspondence, especially the letter to Judge Roane, Sept. 6, 1819.

ably, if not convincingly set forth. It is, of course, easy to denounce Jackson as an autocrat, to show that his actions with regard to the Bank were precipitate and finally productive of evil consequences of a temporary sort, and to prove that if such high-handedness in an executive were long continued the liberties of the country would suffer. But, on the other hand, it seems only fair to maintain that Jackson's political instincts with regard to the possible evil influences that might be exerted by the Bank were sound, that his motives were truly patriotic although partly determined by his prejudices and his irascibility, that his conception of the duties of his station was high, though at times mistaken, and finally, that when he is measured against his opponents in character in its widest sense the advantage seems to be with him. The last conclusion was naturally not that of the Senate, which after a fierce debate declined to receive the President's "Protest." Whereupon Senator Benton gave notice that he would later move to expunge the resolution of censure from the record—a feat which was accomplished under rather ridiculous circumstances in January, 1837. Before this time the Bank had accepted the situation, obtained a Pennsylvania charter, and prepared to imitate its conqueror by withdrawing to the shades of private life. Jackson stood a victor, but his clinging to his policy reminds one strikingly of the disastrous way in which Jefferson clung to his Embargo. Both had high motives; both withstood complaints and petitions of all sorts, though Jefferson grew sad while Jackson grew angry; both lived to see their hobbies hurt the country and, in particular, recoil upon the heads of their successors. Yet there is one striking



difference between the two cases. Jefferson erred by trusting too much to his theories, Jackson by giving way to his prejudices; our sympathies should therefore be given more unreservedly to the former than to the latter.

It was not long before the effects of the President's rashness began to be felt. The development of railways and other enterprises, the rapidity with which the country was being settled, the growth of a national spirit, and the influence of the seething fervour of the times throughout the rest of the world, had induced an era of speculation in America which the attack on the Bank could not arrest. To add fuel to the flames, the payment of the public debt (1835) led to the speedy passage of a law distributing to the respective States as a non-interest-bearing loan the large surplus left after all the government's expenses had been paid. Then again the selection of what were known as "pet banks" as depositories of the public funds gave an impetus to the wholesale chartering of banks of issue the notes of which flooded the country. With the public treasury and the printing press to draw on for money and with a huge territory able to swallow any number of canals, railroads, and enterprises of all sorts, with a raw, untrained population in the newer States and with a dearth of sound statesmen, it is no wonder that speculation and inflation ruled the hour.\*

Such a result had not been one of Jackson's purposes. He had a conservative farmer's dislike for people who try to grow rich too quickly, and he had

\* It was also a period of great mob violence. On January 30, 1835, a half-crazed house-painter named Lawrence, who was out of work, snapped two pistols at Jackson as the latter was walking in a funeral procession.

an honest man's preference for sound money. Five hundred kinds of paper currency doubtless seemed the chaos to him that they suggest to us, and as early as 1834 he tried to mend matters by increasing considerably the coinage of the mints, especially in gold. Certain restrictions were also secured on the State banks of issue, but to little purpose. Then in July, 1836, Jackson issued what is known as his "Specie Circular," which declared that thereafter the Treasury would accept nothing but specie in payment for public lands. Speculation had run rife in these for two years past, which is not surprising since even a statesman like Clay had proposed and carried a scheme, wisely thwarted by Jackson, for distributing among the States the proceeds of the sales made of the nation's magnificent territory. But Jackson's blow, although probably well aimed, fell too late. The notes which would, otherwise, have been employed in purchasing lands were presented for redemption and confusion was confounded. Prices went up, there were bread riots in New York, banks suspended right and left. Congress endeavoured to have the circular rescinded, but the grim old President, as his last official action, let the rescinding bill die without his signature.\* He and the masses still believed that the greedy capitalist was behind the whole crisis, but a worse monster, Popular Ignorance, had at least a hand in it.

Financial distress doubtless seemed to Jackson's contemporaries the characteristic feature of the close of his Administration; but a country's finances often mend quickly, and another feature of the period has more permanently held the regard of posterity.

\* This is known as a "pocket veto." See Appendix A., article 1, section 7, close of second paragraph.

It was during Jackson's régime that the movement for abolition fairly began to make its power felt. It was also at this time that the corresponding movement on the part of the South for an extension of slave territory, especially in the direction of Texas, began to alarm the North. The latter movement will be more conveniently discussed later; the former demands present attention.

There can be little doubt that most of the people of the United States, North as well as South, for many years after the Missouri Compromise deluded themselves with the belief that slavery had been taken out of politics. Anti-slavery agitation practically ceased because it seemed to smack of disloyalty to a Union avowedly based on a compromise. Besides, an age bent on making money does not care to be reminded that it has a conscience. Even in the South it was the tariff that was the ostensible cause of discontent, and few men cared or were able to look so far ahead as Calhoun was evidently doing. But some indignities offered to a young man who was helping to edit an emancipation journal at Baltimore, changed him into a fervid apostle of unconditional abolition and fanned the smouldering embers of a fire that was never to die down until it had done its deadly but purifying work. That young man was William Lloyd Garrison, who established the *Liberator* in Boston in 1831. He made converts, gained financial support, founded societies, and turned a mere reform into a crusade. He and his followers were, of course, denounced at first in every section, then mobbed, and in the person of Lovejoy made martyrs,\* for they disturbed the country and

\* Elijah P. Lovejoy, an abolitionist editor, was murdered by a mob in Alton, Illinois, November, 1837.

actually assailed the Union and the blessed Constitution itself. They believed that slavery was a crime, they went further and declared that slaveholders were criminals; it was not a long stride to the position that political association with criminals was criminal in itself. This seemed monstrous to most people in the thirties and it seems monstrous to many people now; but the monstrosities of fanaticism are the most effective solvents used by Providence. Whatever may be thought of the Abolitionists, of their political tenets, of their incendiary methods, they are at least entitled to a high place among the world's genuine crusaders.

Their first serious appearance on the national stage was made in 1835 in a rather absurd way. They filled the mail bags with literature intended to arouse the slave to a sense of his dignity as a man and the master to a sense of his shame as a tyrant. Unfortunately for them such incendiary matter might stir up a slave insurrection like that of Nat Turner in Virginia in 1831—an effect which even fanatics could hardly justify—and could only exasperate Southern planters, who were as a rule easy-going rather than tyrannical. Besides the immediate result might easily have been foreseen. The obnoxious documents were taken from the post-bags, efforts were made in Congress to have them legally excluded from the mails, absurd demands were put forward for the surrender of Northern abolitionists to Southern magistrates, and Andrew Jackson rose in his wrath once more. Doubtless such wrath was what the abolitionists were working for, but it is questionable whether the ludicrous elements of the affair would not very soon have hurt their cause had not the Southerners, led by Calhoun, stepped

beyond the lines of legitimate resentment and made demands which the North, however much it disliked the agitators, could not submit to without loss of self-respect. In other words the Abolitionists were scarcely authorised to count on the false steps made by their foes.

It is needless to describe the excitement produced in the Twenty-fourth Congress by the endeavour of the Southern men to follow Jackson's suggestion and pass a law excluding incendiary publications from the mails. It was a difficult matter to decide on, as even the astute Amos Kendall, who was then Postmaster-General, had found, and the extreme stand taken by Calhoun and his followers finally led to the failure of Congress to legislate on the subject. But a new phase of the controversy speedily attracted attention. Petitions for the abolition of slavery within the District of Columbia, which was under the control of Congress, were presented to that body, and the pro-slavery members undertook to insist that such petitions should be rejected without discussion. As there was no question as to the fact that they would eventually be rejected, this "attack on the right of petition" would seem to be evidence of sheer madness on the part of leaders like Calhoun, did we not remember that sticking for their rights and more than their rights is an un-failing characteristic of minority parties.\*

\* We cannot enter into a full discussion of the agitation of the slavery question in Congress at this period. The six resolutions defining the powers of the general government with respect to slavery, which Calhoun made the reluctant Senate discuss, and the withdrawal of Southern Representatives from the House when they failed to keep Slade of Vermont from attacking their institution (Dec., 1837), deserve, however, to be specially noticed. See Benton, II., chaps. 33 and 36.



The controversy thus started raged for several years, much valuable time being wasted by Congress, and the gain being entirely on the side of the Abolitionists. In the spring of 1836 the House passed a "gag rule" which laid slavery petitions on the table for once and all, and also declared that Congress had no power to interfere with the institution in a State and ought not to interfere with it in the District. These declarations had been reported by a committee to whom the slavery memorials had been referred. Even for securing the appointment of this committee, Henry L. Pinckney, the member from Charleston, S.C., was outrageously censured in his native State and failed of re-election. Pinckney was no friend of agitation, but the South, especially South Carolina, was beginning to require a partisan pro-slavery zeal at least equal to the zeal of Garrison and his fellow fanatics. Anything less than violence in the expression of his detestation of abolitionism was held to smaeck of treason in any Southerner, as was roundly declared of Pinekney throughout South Carolina. Thus the charge often laid at the door of the Abolitionists that they brought on the Civil War is by no means an unjust one, for they certainly stirred the South to acts of aggression that would never have been dreamed of otherwise. Yet it is, of course, fair to ask whether slavery would ever have been got rid of save through war.

But what was Pinekney's extremity was another man's opportunity. John Quincy Adams had been for years representing Massachusetts in the House, setting an example of active devotion to public affairs such as can be credited to no other ex-President before or since. He was a caustic debater,

but his independence and his illustrious career secured him the respect of the House. The year before, he had astonished people by a vigorous defence of Jackson's equally vigorous demands upon France for a speedy settlement of the Spoliation Claims; \* now he was to astonish them still more by his championship of the right of petition. For years he was a thorn in the side of Southern Congressmen, who would have liked to resort to personal violence, but for respect for his grey hairs, his fame, his honesty, and his brilliant dialectical powers. Indeed it is hard to see how any one who admires courage, whatever may be his sentiments in the matter of the great controversy between North and South, can fail to admit that, with the possible exception of Jackson, the sturdy ex-President battling for the right of petition is the most commanding figure in American politics between Washington and Lincoln. Jefferson and perhaps others are greater, but there is a moral grandeur about Adams that is all his own.

From these forensic contests, prophetic of actual battles yet to come, we must now turn to consider for a moment the presidential campaign of 1836. In the elections of 1834 the opponents of Jackson had taken the popular name of Whigs which was reminiscential of the patriotic party in the era of the Revolution. To this new party flocked the old National Republicans, many of the Anti-Masons, and Southerners whom Jackson had offended. It

\* Space is wanting for a discussion of what might have been a very serious matter. It is worth noting, however, that rather factious opposition to Jackson in the Senate caused French Deputies to think that the United States could be insulted with impunity, while Jackson's undiplomatic language caused warranted excitement in France. Democracy came near discrediting itself, but fortunately did not.

was a somewhat chaotic organisation with rather flexible principles, which perhaps accounts for its failure to cope with great success with the better led Democrats, whose principles were on the whole simpler and more attractive to the masses. The Whigs, however, might be generally counted as favouring a strong government, internal improvements, and a national bank, and if all other elements of union failed, they could fall back upon their dislike of Jacksonian autocracy, which indeed gave them their excuse for assuming their anti-monarchical name. In point of general intelligence and of eloquent leaders the party of Clay and Webster could undoubtedly boast its supremacy; but Jackson and the masses proved too strong for them in 1836. The Democrats met in convention at Baltimore in the spring of 1835, thus prematurely to register Jackson's wishes with regard to the succession. Van Buren was nominated unanimously, Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky being put up for Vice-President. The Whigs reverted to the plan of allowing legislatures to nominate various "favourite sons." Clay to his chagrin was out of the race, General William Henry Harrison, the victor at Tippecanoe,\* who had been in politics in a small way for many years, being the most prominent candidate. When the election finally came off Van Buren did not come up to Jackson's standard, but led by a sufficient majority, receiving 170 votes to Harrison's 73. Four States had thrown away their votes on impossible candidates, and this was done to such an extent with regard to the Vice-Presidency that Johnson failed by one vote to get the needed majority. He was subsequently elected by the Senate, however; this being the first

\* See *ante*, Part I., Chap. IV., p. 64.

and only time that body has been called upon to perform such a function.\*

Jackson might now fairly sing his *nunc dimittis* and retire to his home, the "Hermitage," near Nashville, to prepare for the speedy death which his feeble health prognosticated. As a matter of fact he lived until 1845 and was by no means guilty of keeping his fingers out of politics. But he was doubtless honest in believing that he would soon leave the people without a leader unless he bound Van Buren by every possible pledge to administer the government on true Jacksonian principles. The latter, more from gratitude and from knowledge of the then existing state of public opinion than from any lack of statesmanly intelligence, seems to have given the requisite pledges, which Jackson re-enforced in a rather indelicate way, not only by leaving Van Buren a Cabinet,† but also by making on the eve of retirement some important appointments—among them two justices of the Supreme Court. Such an action smacked of John Adams rather than of Thomas Jefferson.

Yet it was not long before Jackson was doomed to see his party defeated, mainly on account of a financial crisis he had done much to bring on, and if he had had a thoroughly clear eye he might have observed many features of his régime that should have made his "Farewell Address" a gloomier document than it was. Clear vision would have shown him that abolitionism was a spectre that would not down, that the intrigues with Texas which he started would

\* See Appendix A., Amendments, article 12.

† Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina, Secretary of War, was Van Buren's only appointment at first, but he soon had an opportunity of choosing a new Attorney-General.

lead to a war that would be a precursor of the secession he abhorred. It would also have shown him that he had blindly appointed rascals to office and had imposed upon his country a vicious system in this regard that would corrupt politics for more than two generations. It would further have taught him that in a commercial democracy, not guided by wise leaders, speculation will periodically run riot; that plutocracy is an insidious foe not to be killed by cut-and-thrust methods; that government bounty, whether in the shape of protective tariffs or of largesses to States or individuals, is a sure parent of corruption; that finally, while election riots, anti-abolitionist and anti-Roman Catholic mobs, brutal disregard of human life, manifested in duels, in brawls, and in failure to safeguard the new modes of locomotion,—in a word bad manners and morals of both a public and a private kind,—might be set down as transitory characteristics of a young and vigorous people, no such toleration of them as he and statesmen of his kind practised and would continue to practise could fail to vitiate the vital currents of the body politic for many a generation. But after all Jackson was Jackson, and a great man who perhaps saw more clearly in many matters than either Clay or Webster or Calhoun did—not one of whom is really worthy of the name of prophet, although all had a partial gift of divination that has been denied to most of their successors.

Martin Van Buren was in his fifty-fifth year when he assumed the office for which Jackson had long since selected him. He was the first thorough-going politician of a typically American type to attain a position which, as the proverb has it, any American can hope to reach, but which has caused



so many heartaches to defeated aspirants. Yet in him the Presidency did not entirely bid farewell to statesmanship. He was a consummate product of New York politics and was therefore a master of "wire-pulling"; he was also thoroughly capable of smothering his own opinions and of accepting those of the dominant majority; he knew how to attach himself to a great man and thus rise slowly to power; but besides these characteristics of the mere politician he had at least two characteristics of a statesman. He had a fairly wide reaching and trained intelligence and he was capable of taking a firm and dignified stand when it became absolutely necessary. It has been his fate therefore to seem a greater man to posterity than he appeared to contemporaries, who naturally regarded him as a mere creature of Jackson's. A creature of Jackson's he was, or he would never have reached the White House; but he suffered from his thralldom, and when it became possible for him to act with independence he showed the real power that was in him.

Perhaps no other President, save Lincoln and Johnson, has entered upon office with as dismal an outlook as Van Buren. Heavy failures took place almost immediately in New Orleans and New York, and soon a panic swept the entire country. Prices which had been enormously high on account of the inflation of paper currency dropped suddenly, and, to make matters worse, grain had to be imported on account of bad harvests. On May 10, 1837, all the banks in New York City suspended specie payments, those of other leading cities followed suit, and in a short while every bank in the country, including Jackson's "pets," was in the same predicament. The government fared no better than private in-

dividuals, for, owing to favouritism in placing the deposits, several millions of its funds went into the maw of speculation, and an instalment of the surplus was due to the several States. Government employees soon had to take bank notes for their wages and actually tried to remonstrate with the President, who drew specie, on the very grounds of the White House. Other and more influential people remonstrated also, but Van Buren drew into his shell, and declared not only that the "Specie Circular" should still hold good, but that the same principle of specie payments should apply to the transactions of the Post Office as well. He was forced, however, to call an extra session of Congress in September.

His message to this body was a long one and devoid both of rhetoric and of haziness. He stated the situation fairly and showed that in both America and Europe an overweening spirit of speculation was responsible for most of the evils from which the civilised world was now suffering. Millions could not be sunk in unimproved Western lands or in hypothetical Eastern cities with impunity even by Americans living in the era of Andrew Jackson. But what was to be done? Another National Bank was out of the question, and, in the light of recent experiences, State banks were unsafe depositories and their notes a poor currency for the government to accept. The President was therefore inclined to suggest that the government do all its business on a "hard money" or specie basis—already a cardinal doctrine with a body of Democrats known as "Locofocos" \*—and that arrangements be made to enable

\* So called because at a meeting in New York at which the lights were turned out by opponents, these independent Democrats lit candles with "loco-foco" matches and continued their meeting.

the Treasury to take care of the precious metals thus collected. In other words he advocated an entire divorce of the government from the banks and the establishment instead of what is known as the "independent treasury" or "sub-treasury system."

Many objections—some of them pertinent—were at once raised against Van Buren's main suggestion, and in spite of the efforts of leaders like Senator Silas Wright of New York, nothing was done in the matter until 1840 when the desired system was established. New York, Boston, Charleston, St. Louis, and the Mints at Philadelphia and New Orleans were chosen to receive the necessary vaults in which the specie, which after June 30, 1843, would be required by the United States in all payments, was to be stored till needed for public disbursements. The Whigs on coming into power in 1841 repealed the system; but the Democrats renewed it in 1845, and it has ever since served the country.

But debates on the sub-treasury would not tide the government over its difficulties or help the country to get rid of the effects of the panic. Little or nothing in fact was done by Congress in the latter premises, but, as has often happened, the States were left to emerge from their difficulties as best they could. They illustrated the vitality of the country \* by grappling with the bank evil, first in New York, then in other States, by means of laws which made special charters, usually gained through favouritism, unnecessary and allowed the formation of banking companies with perfect freedom, provided certain requirements were complied with. Deposit of

\* The political vitality of the States has contributed much to the stability of the Union and is a fact never to be lost sight of.

securities to cover the amount of circulating notes naturally rendered such currency quite safe. Meanwhile Congress authorised an issue of interest-bearing treasury notes and postponed for fifteen months the payment of the fourth instalment of the surplus for which the States were clamouring.\* It was, of course, an unpopular measure, but it had to be taken, and, as events turned out, a deficit took the place of the expected surplus, and the States were left lamenting. Altogether, if the history of the times teaches anything it teaches that government bounty is dangerous both to giver and to recipient, and that good financial legislation can be expected neither from the people nor from their representatives acting as politicians—nor from an untrained executive, but only from disinterested students and experts. Yet this lesson of history, which he who runs may read, has still to be learned by a very considerable portion of the American people.

Van Buren's firm stand against the banks naturally made him enemies among an important class of financiers, and the general distress of the times was imputed to him and his party for unrighteousness by the large portion of the public that feels rather than reasons about such matters. The Whigs therefore picked up courage and began an assault all along the line. Clay and Webster united to oppose the sub-treasury scheme and Congress abandoned the hard-money principles of the "Specie Circular." During 1838 the banks wrangled among themselves as to when they should resume specie payments, but before the end of the year, owing

\* There was some desire at this time that Congress should assume the debts the States had so imprudently incurred, a desire fostered by luckless British investors.

chiefly to the stand taken by the New York institutions, the better banks of North and East were on their feet once more, the old National Bank, over which so many contests had been waged, sinking, however, lower and lower in the mire of corruption. In the fall elections the Whigs were on the whole encouraged and naturally so, for it was a period of agitations of all sorts, each of which told against the party in power. Even Jackson's fulminations from the "Hermitage" failed to encourage his friends and daunt his foes. In Congress anti-slavery and pro-slavery men continued their wrangles. Outside this amiable body there were disputes with Canada as to the North-Eastern border, which were so intensified by the rebellion in Upper Canada in 1838 that Van Buren had to exercise all his patience and tact in order to preserve neutrality. There were also actual conflicts with the Seminoles of Florida, who were now led by their savage but able chieftain, Oseola. Fortunately, wise policy on the part of the British government, and especially of Lord Durham, prevented serious complications with Canada. The Administration was not, however, so lucky with its Indian war—which was indeed another item in its harassing legacy from Jackson. Hostilities were not concluded until 1842, by which time the war had lasted eight years, had exhausted and baffled the best generals of the army, including Winfield Scott, the hero of Lundy's Lane,\* and had cost the country about \$20,000,000.† For this state

\* It was finally put down mainly by allotting lands to settlers who were willing to take rifles along with their ploughs. See Tyler's special message of May 10, 1842.

† Although the policy of the United States toward the Indians has been in many ways mistaken from the beginning, it is quite possible to go too far in condemnation of it. The



of affairs the pacific President was obviously not responsible; but the voters felt that some one was to blame, and he was the most conspicuous person on whom to wreak vengeance.

Nor was Van Buren to blame for the disgraceful strife precipitated in the House of Representatives when the Twenty-sixth Congress met in December, 1839. The Clerk had to call the House to order for the purposes of organisation, but he would not call the names of five Whigs from New Jersey, whose seats were contested. As their votes were essential in the determination of a majority, a stormy debate arose and for three days no organisation was effected; on the fourth the common sense of John Quincy Adams prevailed over the warring elements and the House at last got down to work. With such an inauspicious beginning it is no wonder that this Congress, although it finally passed the sub-treasury bill, should have distinguished itself as the Seventeenth had done by making all sorts of needless investigations in order to furnish base materials for speeches in the coming presidential campaign. The personal expenses of the honest but not ascetic President were laid bare, and he was represented as a Sybarite who enjoyed golden ease while the average citizen was struggling to keep the wolf of Hard Times from his door. Similar charges have been made against subsequent executives, but one feels that the lapse of sixty years has brought with it a decided improvement in American political manners.

The campaign of 1840 was again fought out between Harrison and Van Buren, but the latter no attitude toward them of Jefferson, Calhoun, Adams, and even at times of Jackson, was highly commendable.

longer had an omnipotent Jackson to clear the foes from his path. Harrison had been nominated late in 1839, by a convention which but for careful manipulation would probably have chosen Clay. The ticket had been completed by the choice for Vice-President of John Tyler of Virginia, a Democrat who had opposed Jackson. No particular principles were avowed, which in part accounts for the enthusiasm with which voters of all shades of belief flocked to Harrison's standard. One principle at least they all had—opposition to the party that had presumably got the country into such confusion—and that was enough. Harrison did, after some taunting, proclaim his belief in banks and his opposition to the spoils system, but desire for a change and a contagious enthusiasm spontaneously generated by the seething epoch did more to elect him than anything said or done by him or by his chief supporters. The enthusiasm of the campaign has seemingly never been equalled. “Tippecanoe and Tyler too” as a party cry satisfied that liking for alliteration that has never died out among men of English stock and also recalled Harrison's military exploits of nearly a generation ago. Monster processions miles in length satisfied a new country's sense for the bigness, if not the fitness of things. A taunt to the effect that the Western candidate, who by the way had been born in Virginia, would be really better off if he finished the few years Nature would allot him in a log cabin with a barrel of cider to make merry on was, with that ready political tact for which Americans are conspicuous, converted into the most effective of campaign catches. Log cabins and cider barrels in miniature were seen everywhere. They were carried in processions, they were worn as medals; and

as emblems of the courage and energy with which men and women had planted the wilderness and made America a mighty and prosperous land, they aroused a responsive thrill in almost every bosom. On the other hand the unheroic descendant of thrifty Dutchmen, the obsequious servant of "King Andrew" the Sybarite of the White House, who had been renominated unanimously, could arouse no enthusiasm himself; and the attempts of his party to vie with the Whigs in noisy demonstration might have recalled the famous verse of Campbell:

"Till a feeble cheer the Dane to our cheering sent us back."

The result was not long in doubt even in those days when there was not a set election day for the whole nation. As the news from the different States came in, it became more and more clear that Harrison had won a sweeping victory. He had 234 electoral votes to Van Buren's 60 and had captured States in every section. He carried New York and Pennsylvania, which alone gave him 72 votes; but he also carried Indiana and Georgia, North Carolina and Massachusetts, even Tennessee itself, which Jackson had lost for Van Buren through his autocratic conduct. On the other hand South Carolina and Virginia made up over half of Van Buren's vote, for he was believed to have given pledges to slavery and the two leading Southern States felt constrained to stand by him. In other words, the final defeat of Jackson in the person of his representative was far more severe than that of Jefferson had been.\* Van Buren

\* Yet Harrison led Van Buren by not quite 150,000 in the popular vote, and the increase in the votes of both parties was so great that many Democrats thought that fraud had been practised on a large scale at the polls.

took his reverses, for which he had not himself been responsible, most gracefully and entered upon a retirement which proved to be permanent. His party was to rally soon under a man who had been Speaker of the House during his Administration, but his own unwillingness to truckle further on the slavery question was to keep him more or less in the background, yet not by any means to damage him in the eyes of posterity.

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON lived exactly one month after his inauguration; it is therefore hard to say what sort of President he would have made. He was evidently not brilliant, but as a territorial governor and as a general, he had had experience, and he at least showed that he would not let either Clay or Webster rule him. Of his short-lived Cabinet we need mention only Webster, who was made Secretary of State. As for the other offices, it soon became apparent that the "Spoils system" had come to stay, for the pressure of office-seekers was tremendous and helped to hasten the President's death. A man of sixty-eight, Harrison simply could not stand the exposure of the long campaign of the year before and the care of starting a new Administration off. He was taken with pneumonia and had no strength left with which to resist. Thus the nation had to solemnise the first funeral of an Executive cut down in the midst of his labours.

If a democracy were capable of learning anything from one or two experiences merely, the American people would long since have learned that the carelessness generally displayed in making choice of a Vice-President is little short of culpable. Thus, in the present instance, slight reflection ought to have shown the Whigs that a washed over Democrat, ex-



cellent and acceptable though he might be in many respects, was not the running mate that should have been selected for a man already verging on three-score and ten. But the American people were not very wise politically in 1840, and they are not very wise to-day. They believe in their luck, and because most Vice-Presidents have simply to preside with dignity over a small deliberative body, they continue to imagine that an office which may be fraught with the utmost responsibility and importance can be safely bestowed on a politician, often obscure, who represents a State or section with votes worth gaining.

John Tyler, who was unwittingly about to give his countrymen a lesson they have refused to learn, reached Washington shortly after the President's death, and at once took the oath of office. He asked Harrison's Cabinet to continue in office, and announced in an address to the people that he would pursue his predecessor's line of policy. He doubtless meant to, but his political and sectional proclivities were too much for him. Although just past fifty, he had had a long career in politics and had shown himself a thorough States-rights and pro-slavery man. He had opposed Jackson, but he had not allied himself with Clay. In fact, he seems to have been quite a typical representative of the Virginia of those days—he kept one eye upon the Founders of the Union, the other upon the Carolina extremists of whom Calhoun was the leader. Such a man was not likely to control any party at such a crisis, yet not thoroughly understanding the situation and occupying, as he did, a sort of middle ground, having moreover patronage at his disposal and plenty of ambition, it is no wonder that he

should have dreamed of reorganising the Whigs into a party of his own.

Harrison had already called an extra session of Congress for the end of May in order to secure financial relief for the country, and in this action Tyler acquiesced. The Twenty-seventh Congress had a safe Whig majority in both branches and, provided the new President worked with it, could promise itself to carry out more of a programme than it had cared to avow at the polls; but unfortunately the sweeping presidential election had involved too many close seats to give a sufficient Congressional majority to override the votes of a recalcitrant Executive. For this conjunction of circumstances, which proved very unfortunate since it threw the Whigs out and gave an impetus to pro-slavery schemes for obtaining Texas, thus widening the breach between North and South, the American people were not responsible, but rather the framers of their constitutional system.

The Whigs soon had reason to regret that their victory had not been more sweeping, and also that their legitimate leader, Clay, had been set aside for the sake of votes. Under the British system Clay would have been prime minister and would doubtless have put through his elaborate programme of a national bank, an increased tariff, distribution to the respective States of the proceeds of public land sales, and one or two other measures. With a real Whig President like Harrison, he might have done it, but with half a Whig like Tyler he had little chance of succeeding, although he cracked his party whip hard enough. Nor could he have succeeded, if he had had his majorities behind him in 1838, for then a Democratic President would have

opposed him: It is easy therefore to see that although the accident of John Tyler's being in the White House was the occasion of the Whig failure, the true cause of that failure is to be looked for in the Constitution itself.

Clay's great measure was, of course, a National Bank, and as a preliminary step to its establishment he needed to clear away the sub-treasury system. Congress was willing to do this and so was the President, who was glad to get rid of a system fathered by Van Buren, and of Jackson's "pet banks" as well. But Clay had already found Tyler obstinate on the subject of a National Bank, and when later he yielded to some of the President's scruples, his conciliation proved to be useless, for Tyler vetoed a bill framed to please him. The space at our command will not permit a thorough discussion of Tyler's views \* on a subject far from simple in itself and rendered more complicated by the financial history of the country during the decade from 1830 to 1840. It will therefore be well to abstain from abusing him as the Whigs did and as not a few historians have done. He was undoubtedly honest in his intentions and did not lack courage, but he seems to have had a hair-splitting mind, an extraordinary facility for persuading men that he would do one thing and then doing another, a supply of tears at command when it was necessary to summon up self-pity in order to give his conscience a reason for some questionable action, and finally a coterie of Virginian advisers whose purpose was certainly not to advance the interests either of the Whig party or of the nation at large. That Tyler was a gentleman

\* His message of June 1st, 1841, ought to have shown how difficult it would be to devise a bank that would suit him.

and not an intentional traitor may be readily granted, but surely the Whigs were excusable for reading him publicly out of their party, and if a historian were to maintain that no President has ever made a worse record in office, it would be hard to prove such a judgment unfair.

Tyler's first bank veto astounded the Whigs on August 16, 1840. He had broken the promises made in his address to the people and had rendered nugatory all the conferences by means of which it had been sought to frame a bill that would please him. Still, not understanding the nature of his mind, which delighted in quibbles, the party would not believe itself abandoned but again resorted to conferences, with the result that a bill for a "Fiscal Corporation" with shorn privileges was brought in and voted for as a presidential measure. Again he interposed his veto, his real reasons being still hard to discover. Of course there could be no further dealings with such a man, whether his intentions were good or not, and instead of driving Clay to the wall as he had intended, he was proscribed himself, all his Cabinet resigning save Webster, who had important diplomatic negotiations to finish and who perhaps thought that his own presidential aspirations would be more forwarded by his clinging to office even under Tyler than by his following Clay into opposition. He miscalculated, however, for it was quite apparent that the party was now prepared to stand by Clay through thick and thin, and that Tyler had lost the confidence of every one save a small clique of politicians headed by Henry A. Wise of Virginia. It was true that the Democrats applauded his course with regard to the Bank, but they did not compromise themselves with him in spite of

his apparent use of patronage to that end. Thus it would have been better for him if Tyler had remained true to his own and the Whig theory recently enunciated with regard to the impropriety of double presidential terms.

The remainder of the Whig policy fared better than their bank schemes, but Clay's favourite plan of distributing to the States the proceeds of the sale of lands was eventually balked by the provision that such distribution should not take effect whenever the tariff was raised over twenty per cent. As the very next session of Congress passed a permanent tariff known as that of 1842, in which, both for revenue and for protection purposes, duties were raised above this percentage, the States, which were then in most cases heavily in debt for extravagant internal improvements and were in some instances threatening repudiation,\* received not a penny of this promised largess and were on no better terms with the Whig party in consequence. It is interesting to note that this tariff bill was vetoed twice before it could gain Tyler's assent. An attempt had been made to saddle it with a provision that in spite of the raised duties the distribution to the States should still take place. Tyler resisted this misapplication of bounty, and as in the case of the bank vetoes was doubtless in the right so far as the ultimate good of the country was concerned. Still one cannot help feeling that in those days it was better to err with Clay than to shine with Tyler.

Yet this hybrid Administration managed to carry

\* Such threats and the general financial muddle hurt American credit abroad to such an extent that in his second message Tyler had to confess the lamentable failure of an agent he had sent to Europe to effect a loan.



through an important piece of diplomacy. The long-standing dispute with Great Britain as to the North-Eastern boundary was settled, in spite of recent troubles on the border and complications concerning the coastwise trade in slaves, by a treaty concluded at Washington, in the summer of 1842, between Webster and Lord Ashburton.\* The compromise line drawn proved satisfactory, and Tyler himself seems to deserve credit for having tactfully helped on negotiations that possibly averted a most undesirable war.† He deserves credit also for a proposed exchequer bill, which Congress would not adopt; for a treaty with China, toward which the civilised world was now turning its eyes; and for careful management of the public funds, which for the nonce could not be kept according to the sub-treasury plan. He chose, too, a fairly strong Cabinet when the Whigs broke with him and was by no means lacking in spirit in his struggles with Congress; but his virtues are generally imputed for vices to a man in a false position. Meanwhile his enemy Clay retired from the Senate, delivering a dramatic speech of farewell which moved friends

\* Generally called by the latter's name.

† War between Great Britain and the United States must always seem undesirable, yet one can somewhat sympathise with the patriotic Benton in his disgust at the Ashburton Treaty. Apart from the question whether Webster defended just American boundary claims in a courageous manner, it seems that the high-handed action of the British with regard to the capture of the *Caroline* on the Niagara River and the subsequent trial of the Canadian McLeod, farcical though this was, might have been handled more vigorously by the American diplomatist. The freeing at Nassau of the revolted slaves of the brig *Creole* naturally does not so fire the American heart to-day, but that organ is still capable of being excited to indignation when the jaunty triumphs of Lord Palmerston are remembered. See Schouler's *History of the United States*, IV. 397-398, and Benton, II., chaps. 75, 76, and 101-106.

and foes alike. Calhoun also retired, but neither had done his full political work yet. This was also true of John Quincy Adams, who kept up his agitation against the "gag-rule" and insisted on handing in all sorts of petitions in defiance of threats and of a resolution of censure, which narrowly failed. Thus confusion reigned everywhere, but chiefly in the House, where members forgot themselves and engaged in tussles.

The elections of 1842 went badly against the Whigs, the Democratic majority in the House being over seventy. The slowly changed Senate remained Whig; thus there was a divided Congress with a new Mr. Facing-both-Ways in the executive chair. No work of real importance could be done, but conditions were ripe for work that should have been left undone. Webster was frozen out of the Cabinet and Abel P. Upshur of Virginia put in his place. Three of the Secretaries were Democrats, and for some time Tyler seemed determined to use his patronage so as to win the Democratic nomination. The stalwarts of that party would have none of him, however, and the latter half of his Administration was practically given up to carrying out a scheme which his bosom friends had been counselling from the first. This scheme was nothing less than the annexation of Texas to the Union—an affair which would have been grand in itself but for the fact that it involved the spread of slavery and was sure to be resisted by the North and West, where abolitionist sentiments had been growing rapidly.

It will be remembered that the United States had had a vague claim on Texas under the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, but that this had been given up by Monroe when the Treaty of 1819 was concluded

with Spain. Monroe had acted in the interests of sectional harmony, but he could not control the course of events. Mexico broke away from Spain in 1821, and by 1827 Texas was a State in the Mexican Federation with a constitution providing for the gradual abolition of slavery. But long ere this attempts had been made by Americans, especially from the South-West, to win the region for slavery, and enough adventurers had colonised it to make the anti-slavery provision of the constitution of the new State of "Coahuila and Texas" practically of no effect. The United States government naturally sympathised with these adventurous Americans, who despised the Mexicans and did not wish to live under their laws, and Secretaries Clay, Van Buren, and Forsyth all requested Mexico to cede the coveted State—requests which that young republic bravely but not prudently refused to consider. Nor did the government at Washington confine its desires to Texas, but during Jackson's régime made a bid for a stretch of country reaching to the Pacific and including the harbour of San Francisco. When this proposal was refused, certain claims were pressed upon Mexico, and she was made to feel in more ways than one that justice is an incomprehensible word to an Anglo-Saxon the moment his heart is set upon his neighbour's land. Whether, indeed, Jackson sent his fellow Tennessean, Sam Houston, to Texas to start a revolution there, is a vexed question; but it is at least certain that, when owing to the efforts of Houston and others the State renounced allegiance to Mexico, proclaimed her independence, framed a pro-slavery constitution and, avenging previous Mexican cruelties at the fortress of the Alamo, defeated Santa Anna in the battle of San Jacinto

(April 21, 1836), great rejoicing took place in Washington and Congress voted that the revolted State should be recognised as soon as she should show herself able to maintain a competent civil government. But annexation was also broached, and Jackson not only bullied Mexico but sent a minister to Texas in indecent haste, basing his action on a clause tacked on to the civil appropriation bill and thus forcing the recognition of the republic.

Under Jackson's successor the foes of slavery awoke to the full meaning of the programme of the Southern expansionists, and anti-annexation petitions were poured upon Congress along with those praying for abolition in the District of Columbia. The new Texan minister proposed an immediate absorption of his lone republic, but no action was taken by Congress, for it was clear that both the North and Mexico would resist. Meanwhile Texas claimed that her territory extended not to the Nueces River but to the Rio Grande, and any espousal of her claims meant war. It was true that Mexico was too much embarrassed with debt even to reduce Texas to submission and that Americans had great contempt for the courage of their rivals; but in the main the pacific Van Buren preferred pressing the claims the United States had against Mexico—many of them fraudulent—and the latter country was glad enough to promise to negotiate.

So matters stood until the close of Tyler's Administration. He and his advisers, as pro-slavery men, naturally favoured annexation and most Texans wished it, but as long as Webster remained Secretary of State no important steps were taken, Mexico in spite of her poverty behaving well about the American claims, although there were filibustering

expeditions against her, and although on one occasion an American Commodore actually took, without orders, the city of Monterey in California.\* It was becoming more and more evident that Mexico would do well to imitate Spain's action with regard to Florida—to sell while she could; but patriotic pride held her back, and perhaps she feared that without resistance on her part her greedy neighbours would push far beyond even the Rio Grande. Every month now brought the crisis nearer. Tyler was more and more playing into Southern and Democratic hands, and he and Upshur proposed annexation to the Texan authorities by the autumn of 1843. Meanwhile Great Britain had entered the game and, aided by European powers, had induced Mexico to consider seriously the propriety of consenting to the independence of Texas on the condition that incorporation with the United States should be renounced. The Texans led by Houston balanced the two propositions and decided in favour of the United States, after making proposals as to a war with Mexico and playing fast and loose with the commissioners of the latter country.

An accident now turned the delicately balanced scales. The President and Cabinet sailed on the trial trip of the steam man-of-war Princeton, and witnessed the experiments made with a very large gun, christened with grim irony "Peacemaker." The cannon exploded, killing several persons, among them Upshur and Gilmer of the Cabinet. Henry A. Wise, the eccentric but bold manager of the President, at once took a step which few men would have attempted and fewer still submitted to. He called

\* His name was Thomas ap Catesby Jones. The capture, which Tyler speedily disavowed, took place in October, 1842.



on Senator McDuffie of South Carolina and sent an invitation through him to Calhoun to take Upshur's place. He acted as though he had been commissioned by the President, and McDuffie did not ask many questions. Then Wise proceeded to the White House, found Tyler in his usual flood of tears, and told him what he had done. The President did not want Calhoun and said so, but Wise laid stress on the tangle that would be caused by Calhoun's acceptance of the invitation already sent and Tyler gave in. Comment upon this transaction is superfluous, but it may be well to remark first that American history shows clearly that the elective principle furnishes just as many freakish executives as the hereditary principle does, and secondly, that in no fictive drama did ever protagonist come upon the stage at the crisis more effectively than Calhoun, the champion of Southern expansion, did at this juncture (March, 1844).

Annexation was now swiftly pressed forward. A treaty with Texas was signed early in April, American troops were placed near the Texas border, and a squadron was sent to the Gulf of Mexico. Efforts were also made to induce Santa Anna, the Mexican President, to yield, but that obstinate warrior did not belie his reputation. British interference, especially with slavery in Texas, was given as the chief reason for the President's action, and Calhoun took the opportunity to deliver homilies on his favourite topic to Pakenham, the British minister. But when, after the matter had leaked out to the press and been much discussed, Tyler sent in his treaty to the Senate, it was rejected decisively and the use made of the army and navy was generally condemned.

It was a bad year to start a new issue so far as the two party leaders, Van Buren and Clay, were concerned, for they naturally preferred to fight their battles on old lines; but it was as shrewd a game as Tyler could play, although in the end he gained nothing by it. Before the gathering of their respective conventions both Van Buren and Clay published letters advising against immediate annexation. Clay's did not affect his nomination by acclamation in Baltimore on May 1, the Whigs giving him his own platform, which left to one side the bank question as well as the more pressing matter of Texas. Van Buren's letter doubtless hurt him with the Democrats, who needed Southern support even more than the Whigs did. Other candidates bid for favour by advocating annexation, and finally the convention, which also met at Baltimore later in May, chose James K. Polk of Tennessee on the ninth ballot. Van Buren would have been chosen but for the adoption of the rather absurd rule that a two-thirds majority of the delegates should be necessary for a choice—a rule which works in favour of the selection of mediocrities or "dark horses" such as Polk. This worthy had aspired only to Vice-Presidential honours, but he was a good party man and was pledged to annexation. The convention pledged him also to agitate for the possession of the whole Oregon region, and adjourned, having done what was politically speaking a good piece of work. It had chosen a man who, although he had been Speaker of the House and prominent in the politics of his State, was not well enough known to have excited much animosity, and it had issued a platform calculated to win the votes of a people young enough to be delighted with the idea of dic-

tating in one and the same breath both to powerful Great Britain and to weak Mexico. A statesman might well have sighed for a better outcome from the deliberations of a great party, but politicians had little better to ask, and it was quite idle for Tyler to let his partisans go through the farce of nominating him, for he was soon obliged to withdraw in favour of Polk, who never showed himself grateful for the submission tendered.

The campaign between Polk and Clay was close and exciting. The latter was far the more brilliant candidate, but unfortunately he wrote too many letters defining his position on the Texas controversy, and the new Liberty Party withdrew needed votes in New York. Polk on the other hand was guarded in his expressions and managed to keep protectionist Pennsylvania in line, although he lost in his own State. It seems, however, quite plain that if a few more Northern and Western anti-slavery men had kept their heads clear and perceived the absurdity of throwing their votes away merely because Clay was not so outspoken against annexation as they would have had him be, the magnetic statesman, who with all his faults was truly a great man and worthy of the honour he had so long sought, would have carried the day and perhaps saved the Union from one of the most disgraceful wars known to history. But it was not to be. The gallant Kentuckian went down before the uninspiring partisan from Tennessee, and the country was launched upon a reckless policy the penalties for which were paid a few years later in the greatest civil war of modern times. It is of course useless for the historian to sigh over lost causes, especially those that are lost at the polls in a democratic country, but the his-

torian would have to be singularly perverted in judgment or singularly callous who would not express regret at the defeat of Henry Clay in the campaign of 1844.

In thus following the course of national affairs we have overlooked a local disturbance that almost threatened to assume the proportions of a civil war. Rhode Island with a conservatism remarkable even in New England had held on to its ancient charter and refused suffrage to all save landowners and their eldest sons. Inequality of representation in the legislature was one result, so that we are reminded of the condition of England before the Reform Bill. In 1841 and 1842 two constitutions, the People's and the Landowners', both more liberal than the older one, but the latter bearing hard on naturalised citizens, were submitted to popular vote. The former was adopted, but fraud was alleged and the legislature forbade its going into effect. Its partisans, however, elected Thomas W. Dorr Governor and a contest arose between him and the Governor under the old charter, Samuel W. King. An appeal to arms was threatened and King called upon President Tyler for aid, which that scrupulous statesman was spared the pain of rendering. Dorr's adherents deserted him; he was tried for treason, imprisoned for life, and pardoned later. A new liberal constitution was then adopted and the little State was at peace. Peace also came to New York, where the Van Rensselaer and other great "patroon" estates, after an anti-rent agitation, were sold at reduced rates to freehold purchasers. Both "revolutions" are noteworthy as illustrating the fact that in a vast country like America, whose citizens are absorbed in great business or political concerns, grave

abuses may continue to exist for years and even for centuries after they have been put down in less progressive countries.

The last session of the Twenty-eighth Congress made itself more memorable than is usually the case when a new Administration is expected to make its entrance upon the political stage. It abolished the "gag-rule" against which Adams had struggled so long, it fixed the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as a general day for presidential elections, and it admitted Texas to the Union by a joint resolution. The latter step was called by the Democrats "reannexation," which was a popular but, as we have seen, a sufficiently absurd term. The claim to Texas under the Louisiana Purchase had been slight, it had been waived by Monroe, and perhaps it did not extend to the Rio Grande. Nor was there seemingly much more truth in the report that Great Britain would, in the face of the Monroe Doctrine, seize upon Texas unless the latter were admitted to the Union at once. But Tyler and Calhoun argued in this way and, with the success of the annexation party at the polls to serve as a sanction, Congress prepared to undo its work of the session before. A suggestion had been thrown out at the time of the rejection of Tyler's treaty that a foreign State could be received into the Union only through an act of Congress. Tyler and Calhoun, though strict constructionists, were too much in earnest over annexation to stand to their former position that a treaty, which would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate, was the proper way to secure incorporation. The House was quite willing to pass a resolution enabling Texas to form a constitution as a preliminary to in-



corporation, and, while the Senate haggled over this awhile, it got out of the dilemma by a subterfuge which allowed the President to communicate to the Texan authorities a joint resolution for annexation. Texas was only too willing to come in, and thus Tyler went out with a show of triumph, while Polk entered to take charge of the war which was sure to follow.

The most one can say for the whole affair is that, while it is quite apparent that the United States must sooner or later have acquired Texas, the way in which it was done reflected no credit on any one concerned. A strict constructionist party, and especially ultra-stringent constructionists like Tyler and Calhoun, should not have seized upon the doubtful method of the joint resolution to accomplish their ends, particularly upon a resolution trickily worded on purpose to let Tyler act speedily. Nor, beginning with Jackson, should American statesmen have bullied a smaller power which had done them no harm and was after all a sister republic of the Union whose honour they had sworn to uphold. One may even leave the slavery question entirely to one side—for recent events have shown that one section is about as willing to grab land on general principles as another—and condemn the whole course of the country in the matter from the point of view of international equity. When, however, it is remembered that pro-slavery advocates were practically responsible for every stage of the annexation business as well as for the war that followed, the only charitable judgment that can be passed upon leaders and people is that it was a sad case of the blind leading the blind.

## CHAPTER XII.

## THE MEXICAN WAR.

THE Administration of James K. Polk, although not characterised by high statesmanship, was pre-eminently what Americans call "businesslike." Polk was above all else a party worker, and his elevation to the presidency, at the age of fifty, merely meant that he would be overseer and labourer in one. Territorial aggrandisement was the main party work on hand; but the restoration of the sub-treasury system and a reduction of the tariff were also parts of the programme. This entire policy was carried out, to the credit of Polk as an administrator, if not as statesman and man. A good Cabinet was chosen, with James Buchanan of Pennsylvania as Secretary of State, Robert J. Walker of Mississippi as Secretary of the Treasury, William L. Marcy of New York, famous for his phrase about the spoils, as Secretary of War, and George Bancroft of Massachusetts, the distinguished historian, as Secretary of the Navy. On the President and these four men the burden of the prospective war or wars would chiefly rest.\*

Fortunately for Polk and for the United States there was only one war. The Democrats had been

\* Mr. Bancroft became minister to Great Britain in 1846, but not until he had founded the Naval Academy at Annapolis. His place in the Navy Department was taken by John Y. Mason of Virginia.

led to insist upon forcing Great Britain out of Oregon in order to strengthen the hold of the party upon North-Western men and opponents of slavery. The great free territory would balance the great slave territory to be taken in. That American claims to the whole of the Oregon region were by no means convincingly strong\* and that a war with both Great Britain and Mexico would tax the country severely were facts to which the more headstrong voters gave little heed during and after the presidential campaign. "Fifty-four forty or fight"† was a party cry alliterative and warlike enough to suit all save quiet souls, and it was sufficiently terse and uncompromising to suit the Scotch-Irish President when he sent in his message to Congress. Tyler and Calhoun had previously tried their hands at settling the matter with the same unsuccess as attended the first efforts of Polk and Buchanan, and Pakenham, the British minister, was now awaiting with some impatience the upshot of Congressional deliberations. Fortunately moderate counsels prevailed, America's previously proposed compromise line at the forty-ninth parallel seeming quite a fair one. Details of the transaction are needless. Congress was sensible, Polk was not obstinate, the British government behaved with dignity and prudence, and a treaty was ratified in the summer of 1846 which laid the long-standing dispute to rest. It

\* They seem to have been due to confusion with regard to the Russian line of  $54^{\circ} 40'$  and to the tendency of professional politicians to practise on popular ignorance.

†  $54^{\circ} 40'$  was the northern limit of American claims. These claims had been steadily upheld, and in the main with wise foresight, by Benton, who was indignant at the joint occupancy which satisfied opportunists, and also at the assumption of an unfair and untenable boundary line.

would have been absurd for America to stand out for more, since she got the Columbia River and rounded off her territory excellently—the Alaska Purchase not being then in sight. On the other hand Great Britain got Vancouver's Island and avoided the troubles that the fast increasing tide of American emigrants into the disputed region would undoubtedly have caused her.\* The treaty was creditable to both governments, especially in view of their discordant relations a generation before, and it is comforting to the modern historian as a proof of real political progress on the part of America—a proof sadly needed at this juncture.

For in spite of the reduced tariff bill, which passed in July, 1846, and of the restoration of the sub-treasury system, which at last brought some order into the handling of the public funds; in spite of the unanimity with which Texas had accepted the joint resolution for annexation and of the promptness with which what was destined to become an imperial State was annexed to a still more imperial Union now stretching from ocean to ocean, the United States was about to enter upon what is perhaps the most discreditable period of its history. In the events leading up to the War of 1812 the country of Washington had been bullied, which was bad enough; in the events leading up to the Mexican War it played the part of the bully, which was worse. It is, of course, legitimate to claim that the world has profited from the fact that the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, as well

\* The Hudson's Bay Company was holding the northern part of the region; the Americans began colonisation in earnest in 1843 under the leadership of the missionary, Dr. Marcus Whitman.

as the far vaster domain now occupied by thriving States and Territories of which California is the crown, is being exploited by Anglo-Saxons rather than by Mexicans. It is also permissible to argue that Anglo-Saxon occupation had to come at one time or another. But it is not permitted the lover of his kind to believe that the rights of nations can be hypocritically overridden with impunity or that the United States can be acquitted of the charge of having played the hypocrite and the bully toward a weak country whose only crime was its possession of land coveted by the American people.

The action of Texas and the United States in drawing close to one another had naturally heated Mexican blood to the boiling point, and diplomatic relations had been broken off between the two Republics. Polk wished to patch these up if he could and thus avoid war; he therefore late in 1845 despatched John Slidell as an envoy who was to endeavour to settle all quarrels and to purchase California, if it were possible. But a revolution had put the soldier Paredes in the place of the peaceful President, Herrera, and Slidell made no headway. Meanwhile Polk had ordered General Zachary Taylor to advance and take position on the Rio Grande and had sent a fleet to the Gulf. Such actions might indicate a desire to be in readiness for whatever might happen, but they also seemed to indicate a desire to provoke Mexico to a war which would force her to part with her territory.\*

\* We cannot do better here than to recall the words of Benton (II., p. 680) :—" It is impossible to conceive of an Administration less warlike or more intriguing than that of Mr. Polk. They were men of peace, with objects to be accomplished by means of war, so that war was a necessity and an indispensability to their purpose ; but they wanted no more



Taylor obeyed orders and posted his small force on the Rio Grande opposite Matamoras, just as he had in the summer of the preceding year obeyed orders and posted his still smaller force across the Nueces at Corpus Christi. His entrance on the disputed territory would have led to war with a stronger power; his blockading the Rio Grande and pointing his guns at a Mexican town was bound to lead to war even with Mexico unless that country had lost all pride, which was far from the case. As he refused to listen to protests, he was of course not surprised when a party of his men who were reconnoitring were attacked by a larger body of Mexicans whom General Arista had sent across the river (April 23, 1846). In about two weeks the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma had been won over superior forces, and Taylor had captured Matamoras in less than a week after war had been actually declared.

On receipt of news of the first encounter Polk sent his now historic message to Congress recounting the many sins of Mexico which had culminated in her shedding "American blood upon American soil." "War exists," he declared, "and notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself." As Polk was personally

of it than would answer their purposes. They wanted a small war, just large enough to require a treaty of peace, and not large enough to make military reputations, dangerous for the presidency." It must not be forgotten, however, that Polk was honest—that he was narrow-minded must be clear to any one who reads the one-sided pleas he sent in as messages to Congress. It should be remembered, too, that Mexico had increased her munitions and forces at Matamoras. In fact, as often happens in such cases, a strong technical defence can be made out for the Administration's actions.

an upright man it is only fair to suppose that to his heated mind the planting of United States troops at Corpus Christi and in front of Matamoras appeared to be heroic efforts to keep the peace. Congress accepted the President's views and voted the necessary funds, while the people at large naturally thought more of the fate of Taylor's army than of the way in which hostilities had been begun. There was no difficulty in securing volunteers, especially from the South and West. These were soon to prove that although American politicians might be untrustworthy, American citizens make as trustworthy soldiers as the world has ever seen.

Operations were now pushed forward with a speed worthy of a better cause. Taylor marched toward the interior of Mexico; Kearney took Santa Fé in New Mexico and then started for California, where intrigues had been going on for some time. Monterey was taken again by an American fleet, this time lawfully, and San Francisco and other places yielded, the whole province succumbing without a blow. That Mexico might see the error of her ways and abandon all idea of resistance was meanwhile an idea of the government's, and to further it an obscure intrigue was entered into with the exiled chieftain Santa Anna. The American fleet connived at his landing at Vera Cruz, and in a short time his partisans placed him once more in power; but he proved to be only an abler and more cruel foe than his predecessor had been. And as if to cap the climax of absurdity, Buchanan gave him an opportunity for refusing to open negotiations with the United States. Negotiations with a reasoner like Polk would have been, indeed, curiously interesting. Even the fellow-citizens of the latter could not, in

many cases, follow the workings of his mind, as any reader of the *Biglow Papers* will recall. New England in particular and anti-slavery men in general opposed the war as unjust and as waged in the interests of slavery, and the Whigs reaped the benefit of dissensions which according to Polk gave "aid and comfort to the enemy." Similar charges have been always, even very recently, preferred against critics of an Administration conducting a war; but as such charges applied with full force to Chatham, Fox, and Burke, one may perhaps be excused for siding with Lowell rather than with Polk.

Polk, however, deserves sympathy for the curious apathy Congress displayed when he requested that the revenue should be increased in order to meet the necessarily augmented expenditures which were acquiesced in. As in the wars of 1812 and 1861 interest-bearing treasury notes seemed to be the only financial expedient satisfactory to the Congressional mind. Perhaps, as a partisan, he deserves sympathy, too, for the ungenerous way, as it seemed to him, his requests for money in order to conclude peace and obtain territory were answered. Mr. Jefferson had asked for such confidential appropriations and had got them, but Polk found himself confronted with a "rider" to the effect that the territory bought should be forever delivered from slavery. This was the afterwards famous Wilmot Proviso—so called from its proposer, David Wilmot of Pennsylvania. Polk and the Southerners had supposed that the Missouri Compromise line of  $36^{\circ} 30'$  would hold in the new Territories, but this proviso, although it was dropped for the nonce, showed them that they would not reap the reward of their intrigues without a struggle. The premature admis-

sion of Wisconsin as a State to balance Texas,\* Iowa having already balanced Florida (1845), also showed that the anti-slavery men were wide awake. But more galling, perhaps, than their fears of the abolitionists were the fears cherished by Polk and his fellow Democrats of the political effects of the victories they could not help looking forward to. Taylor was a Whig and so was the Commanding-General, Winfield Scott, who had been kept from the field at the beginning of the war—in a way that reminds one strikingly of a similar occurrence during the recent Santiago campaign—in order that his well-known presidential aspirations might not be furthered. But to the surprise of the politicians Taylor, whose nickname of “Rough and Ready” described him accurately, took hold of the popular imagination, and the Whig president-makers were obviously quite ready to play upon the public passion for military executives. Something must be done, and a scheme was actually prepared by which Senator Benton, who had years before been a Colonel in the War of 1812, was to be made Lieutenant-General, a position seldom filled in a country jealous of the military prestige it nevertheless adores whenever it can. This scheme failing and Benton refusing to be content with the grade of Major-General, there was nothing to do but to continue to play off Scott against Taylor, who had meanwhile taken the strongly fortified Mexican town of Monterey after some severe fighting.

The employment of Scott dates from November, 1846; by September 14, 1847, the City of Mexico had fallen and the war was practically at an end. Whatever may be thought of the way in which it

\* Wisconsin was finally admitted in 1848.

was begun or of the intrigues by which the military leaders were hampered, it cannot be denied that this struggle with an inferior yet desperate people was prosecuted with remarkable bravery and skill and success. Scott, who was nicknamed "Fuss and Feathers" and was as distinguished for his strictness and love of display as Taylor was for the opposite qualities, conducted his campaign from Vera Cruz to the capital city with fully as much skill as was displayed by his rival subordinate, whose army he had considerably thinned by withdrawing troops; but all his skill and all his victories failed to move the popular heart as Taylor's first successes had done. And when the latter on the plain of Buena Vista gallantly withstood with his 5,200 men Santa Anna's attack with over 12,000 (Feb. 22-23, 1847), the expert in such matters could foresee that a President had been made before Scott's fleet had reached Vera Cruz. Another President, although not of the United States, was at least partly made in the same gallant battle, and oddly enough it was Taylor's own son-in-law. Jefferson Davis distinguished himself both as a tactician and as a bold fighter on the field of Buena Vista.

Scott's march over two hundred miles of difficult country began about the middle of April, 1847, Vera Cruz having surrendered about three weeks before. On April 18, the Americans stormed the pass of Cerro Gordo, routing the Mexicans and making large captures of men and guns. Several towns were then taken, at one of which, Puebla, the troops were rested for two months. Having been reinforced they moved forward again at the beginning of August, and by the 18th had penetrated to within ten miles of the City of Mexico, where Santa



Anna was determined to make a desperate struggle. Scott had about 11,000 men to oppose to nearly three times their number of Mexicans. He used them most effectually in three battles fought on August 19th and 20th. These victories of Contreras, San Antonio, and Churubusco led to an armistice and negotiations, for Scott was under instructions not to grind the enemy to the dust. Polk's commissioner Trist pressed the President's policy of the cession of New Mexico and California, for which America was willing to pay liberally. The Mexican commissioners, however, made a counter proposition which came so far short of the wishes of the conquerors that the truce had to be abandoned, Santa Anna, with his usual cunning, having meanwhile strengthened his defences. On September 8, General Worth won the battle of Molino del Rey (Mill of the King), and a few days later the fortified height of Chapultepec was taken by assault. On September 14, the city was entered and the war was over.

The mere mention of Scott's victories gives no idea of the brilliant success of his campaign. More daring and effective fighting has rarely been seen, and the skill of the commander-in-chief was fairly commensurate with the reliability of his subordinates and the valour of his soldiers. The nature of the country and the ferocity with which the Mexicans fought made every battle a difficult one, yet each obstacle seemed only to whet the eagerness of officers and troops. So far as mere fighting is concerned, this war amply wiped out the disgrace of 1812. It was also a fitting prelude to the still fiercer fighting on a grander scale that was to characterise the Civil War, in which many a subordinate distinguished in these Mexican battles was to achieve

renown as a commander. Lee, Grant, McClellan, "Stonewall" Jackson, Beauregard, and other leaders whose names will hereafter figure in this narrative got their first taste of actual fighting under Scott and Taylor. Of them all Lee seems most to have distinguished himself, Scott, with a prescience for which he deserves credit, actually declaring him to be the greatest military genius in America.

The war was formally closed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed on February 2, 1848. Santa Anna had been again deposed and the more moderate Peña had the sense not to kick against the pricks. The United States secured the enlarged Texas, New Mexico, and Upper California, paying for the same \$15,000,000 and assuming certain American claims against Mexico, which was to be no more molested as by bullying Presidents in the past. After slight changes the treaty, which Trist, who had been recalled, had technically no right to make, was ratified by the American Senate and by the Mexican Congress, and Polk could boast that the main feature of his policy had been carried out to the letter. Yet the war did not close without unpleasant incidents, for Scott's temper got him into trouble with three of his subordinates and a rather discreditable court of inquiry was the result.

Meanwhile political affairs at home had not satisfied the party in power. Taylor had gained strength as a presidential candidate in embryo, and Clay had emerged from his retirement and criticised with much power the course of the Administration. The "Wilmot Proviso" became a very popular device with Northern and Western voters for salving their tender consciences and at the same time gratifying their innate desire to acquire territory. Territory

will accrue, they argued, and the result will be good if only we can check the spread of slavery. This was a very natural course of reasoning, but it does not follow that the historian must praise the celebrated "Proviso." It was the product of practical politics, and probably represented the best solution of their difficulties that the friends of liberty could then think of, but it certainly had little to recommend it from the point of view of that ideal standard of conduct which men and nations should keep ever before them. It suggested the theory that ill-gotten goods should not be employed in one particularly disgraceful way, but might otherwise be kept with impunity.

The Thirtieth Congress, in which Abraham Lincoln emerged for a moment into light, was anti-administration by a small majority in the House. Nothing was done, however, that seriously hampered Polk, and the dramatic death of John Quincy Adams, who fell at his seat, and was removed to the Speaker's room to die, was the most remarkable event of the first session, although there was naturally not a little discussion about the free or slave status of the new possessions. This question was rendered still more complicated by the fact that, as Mexican soil, California and New Mexico were free from slavery; if therefore the principles of the Missouri Compromise were followed the United States would be in the unpleasant position of permitting what even Mexico had forbidden as immoral and unjust. A territorial government was, however, after much difficulty created for Oregon by a bill to which the Wilmot Proviso was attached (August, 1848).

While Congress was extending its sittings far into the summer, the country was undergoing the agony

of a presidential campaign. The Democrats had nominated Lewis Cass of Michigan, Polk not having aimed at a second term. The Western candidate was accused, with seeming justice, of going entirely too far in the direction marked out by the pro-slavery party in the South; he was not therefore greatly respected by either section. His position was one destined to win for a while, but at a later season—for he believed that Congress ought not to legislate on the free or slave status of a Territory, but that the right to determine this lay with the people of the Territory. This doctrine of “popular sovereignty” was not, however, put forward by the Democratic Convention, which took a negative stand on the whole matter, as did also their rivals, the Whigs, who repeated their trick of having no platform at all. The latter also followed their winning tactics of eight years before by setting aside Henry Clay, who was again in the race, and choosing as standard bearer a military man, whose record was, however, fresher and more distinguished than Harrison’s had been. General Zachary Taylor, in spite of the fact that he owned slaves on his Louisiana plantation and that the Whigs were in the main anti-slavery in their sympathies, was nominated for President on the fourth ballot, Winfield Scott and Webster going down in defeat with Clay. For Vice-President a thoroughly safe Whig was chosen, in view of the Tyler fiasco, in the person of Millard Fillmore of New York, an attractive man who had just shown strength in his State and who had been a good member of Congress.

Such ardent anti-slavery men as differed from Garrison in believing political action wise and good, but did not care to vote for a slaveholding Whig,

voted this year with a so-called "Free Soil Party" which absorbed the old Liberty Party and also certain dissatisfied Democrats, especially from New York. These precursors of the Republicans who were to fight out the battle with slavery nominated Martin Van Buren for President and Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy, for Vice-President. In the election which followed, their votes gave Taylor the victory, for they actually cast more votes in New York for Van Buren than were given to Cass, and thus Taylor carried the State by a large majority. The thirty-six electoral votes thus secured by him formed his exact majority over his opponent, since by the final count he had 163 votes to Cass's 127. Thus the election of 1844 was reversed not only by the success of the Whig candidate but also by the fact that the votes of New York anti-slavery men this time cut the ground from under the feet of the Democratic candidate. Taylor fared well where Clay had fared badly, yet after all Providence was not so kind to the American people as seemed to be the case at first. The strong honest man who had been chosen for a position for which he had had no training, but which he would almost surely have adorned, was to enjoy his honours for a longer period than Harrison, but was not to be allowed to exert his powers to their full extent for his country's good.



## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE COMPROMISE OF 1850.

THE second session of the Thirtieth Congress, which assembled after Taylor's election, was unable to accomplish anything of moment beyond establishing a Department of the Interior whose incumbent was to take charge of patents, pensions and other similar matters, and thus to relieve the other secretaries. Polk would gladly have had the question of slavery in the Territories settled by an extension of the Missouri Compromise line of  $36^{\circ} 30'$ , but even this proposal did not satisfy the new school of Southern politicians represented by Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi. These men were disciples of Calhoun, much as the latter had been of John Randolph. The old apologetic tone with regard to slavery had disappeared entirely. Not only was the institution, according to them, one with which no interference, within State limits, would be tolerated; it was one of which the whole Union ought to be proud. It was necessary for the production of cotton, and cotton, which was more and more in demand in Great Britain and the North, was a veritable king with divine rights of its own. Besides the aristocratic society founded on slavery proclaimed itself to be the best in the world, and far superior to the mercantile, shopkeeping society founded upon free labour in the North and West. Slavery, therefore, was to be propagated, not merely

tolerated. The new Territories were naturally fit places for such propagation, and as an important fraction of the Southern leaders had, ever since the time of the Missouri Compromise, denied the right of Congress to prevent any citizen of the United States from carrying his property into any Territory, it was only natural that a clamour for equal rights in the Territories should be the Southern answer to the threats of the abolitionists and the dogged persistence of the advocates of the Wilmot Proviso. Concerted action among Southerners, looking to the enforcement of their view of the constitutional rights of the slaveholder, naturally meant a canvassing of the modes of retaliation to be resorted to should the anti-slavery men make the Wilmot Proviso effective, and resolutions like those of 1798--1799 and Nullification being outworn, frank reliance on secession as a last resort was avowed by Calhoun and many of his followers. They were not consciously traitors, but believed rather that they were only standing up for their rights, yet they had certainly strayed far from the position occupied by such true Southerners as Jefferson and Madison, who could not think of disunion without a shudder. Calhoun thought of it without shuddering, yet with sadness; some of his rasher followers, however, thought of it with positive relish.

On the other hand the North had its extremists like the Garrisonians, who denounced the Constitution as a league with hell and would have destroyed the Union in order to escape contact with sinful slaveholders. It had also its determined Free Soilers as well as its anti-slavery Whigs and Democrats, who were resolved that slavery should deface no new Territory, although they had no intention of inter-

fering with it in any State. The masses of the people, as was the case in the South, loved the Union and regretted the excesses of politicians on both sides; yet in the North public opinion was slowly crystallising into a dogged resistance of Southern aggression, and in the South into a similar opposition to what was honestly regarded as Northern aggression. In both sections, too, could be found men who leaned toward the views held in the other section, but such men were much more numerous in the North than in the South, for politics was, as a rule, their determining motive, and there were more Northern Democrats needing Southern votes than there were Southern Whigs needing Northern votes.

Such being the state of opinion and feeling in the two sections, it is no wonder that Calhoun should have tried to unite all Southerners, Whigs and Democrats, into a compact opposition against the Wilmot Proviso, or that he partly succeeded in the session preceding Taylor's inauguration.\* The House passed a bill for organising California as a Territory without slavery, but the Senate was obstinate, and finally the region acquired from Mexico was practically left under military rule. The new President, although a soldier, disliked this condition of affairs, but his views availed nothing in disengaging the tangle. It was therefore a most difficult problem that Polk's intrigues and, in part, his own military success had set for Taylor to solve.†

\* He had previously (Feb., 1847) offered a series of resolutions denying the power of Congress to discriminate between the States with regard to their "full and equal" rights in any territory acquired by the United States.

† Taylor's difficulties were increased by the growing solidarity of the ultra Southern Congressmen who had just issued an inflammatory address to their constituents.

The new Administration began on March 4, 1849, Taylor surrounding himself with a Cabinet of only moderate ability, a body in which a financial scandal made a breach within a year. Polk meanwhile, whose cares had weighed on him and whose labours for the country had not been highly appreciated, went to his Tennessee home, and in a few months was laid at rest for ever. The storm he had raised was not laid, however, until hostile armies had tramped over his adopted State, jarring his quiet grave. Yet after all his fate was in some ways more fortunate than that which awaited his successor. Polk had entered on his Administration with a settled policy, which he had pursued with silent tact and which he lived long enough to complete, at least in its most important stages. Taylor entered on his Administration with a policy forced upon him by the acts of his predecessor, and was doomed to die before he could either carry it out or defeat by his veto a compromise policy he detested. His career is therefore one of the most pathetic in American history.

Taylor's policy was partly influenced by the anti-slavery views of Senator William H. Seward of New York, who was now about to shine in national as he had already shone in State politics; but it was rather the result, in the main, of the application of his sturdy common sense to the problem before him. He was a slaveholder, but did not believe in forcing slavery upon the Territories, certainly not if the Union was thereby to be jeopardised. In pursuance of these views he did his best to stir up the people of California to frame a constitution before the next Congress should assemble and to apply for admission as a State. He also wished the people of New Mexico to act in the same

manner, the Mormons of Utah having already taken steps themselves to petition for Statehood.

This sensible policy\* of Taylor's, which, if acquiesced in, would have steered safely between Calhoun's followers and the upholders of the Proviso, had been rendered feasible in the case of California at least by one of the most marvellous events of modern times. In January, 1848, that is before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which conveyed California to the United States, was signed, an American mechanic discovered gold while widening a mill stream near Sacramento. The discovery was not kept secret, and soon several thousand people were digging away for the precious metal, leaving their ordinary vocations unattended to. But the Californians did not long maintain their lucrative industry as a local affair. The news that California was a land of gold spread rapidly throughout the world, and a rush was made for the favoured spot compared with which the recent expeditions to the Klondike seem rather insignificant. To add to the excitement and the numbers those were years of increased immigration, especially from famished Ireland. It is no wonder, then, that the year 1849 should have seen a vast number of prospective "Forty-niners" striving in every way to annihilate the distance between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Many tried the overland route, starting in long waggon trains from the Missouri frontier, passing through wild and desolate country, over the Rockies and the Sierra Nevada, until at last they brought


\* See his message of Dec. 4, 1849, which is also noticeable for its reference to the Sandwich Islands and the statement, "We could in no event be indifferent to their passing under the dominion of any other power."



up in an El Dorado which with its hurry and scurry, its crime and dissipation, its extremes of wealth and hardship, would probably have seemed an unideal goal to the romantic adventurers who sought the true but ever-fleeting El Dorado three centuries before. Other adventurers tried sailing vessels and braved the passage of Cape Horn. A steamer which left New York in October with one passenger for California found at Panama in January, so Mr. Schouler tells us, fifteen hundred persons struggling to get places on board. Under such conditions it is no wonder that before 1850 California numbered upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, or that, when these in November voted on the constitution previously framed at Monterey in accordance with suggestions from Washington, they cordially supported a clause forbidding slavery. Such free and adventurous men naturally gave no support to the theory that slavery is the best basis on which to rear a great social structure.

New Mexico, whose boundaries were threatened by greedy Texas, had no such influx of settlers as California and remained much more of a Mexican province; Taylor's plans for its assumption of Statehood have not therefore been realised even to the present day. Utah has been more fortunate, and its peculiar position in 1849 demands a word of comment.

In 1830, Joseph Smith, a mechanic, who must also have been something of a genius, founded the Church of the Mormons or Latter Day Saints on the pretended revelation of the Book of Mormon which he dug up, in the form of graven plates, somewhere near Lake Ontario. He developed a theocracy of the strongest kind, with a "promised land" in



DANIEL, WEBSTER.



the West, in which however there was to be no idleness, although there were soon to be Houriis. The first settlement of the Prophet and his followers was made in Missouri. Troubles ensuing, they founded the town of Nauvoo in Illinois and soon waxed prosperous, but also defiant of the State authorities. In the disputes that naturally arose here Smith was arrested, and finally shot by a mob. Brigham Young, his intended successor, then led the Saints into the wilderness and founded a religious commonwealth on the shores of the Great Salt Lake. A city was soon laid out, and in 1849 a constitution was framed in order that the State of Deseret might be added to the Union, the Head of the Church being, of course, selected as civil governor. Such was the Territorial situation when the Thirty-first Congress assembled late in 1849. Theories as to the respective rights of slavery and freedom were to struggle in the face of such facts as the turbulence of California, the obstinate religious fanaticism of Utah, and the mediævalism of sparsely settled New Mexico. A compromise was to be the result, and the compromisers were to suffer more in the end than the frontiersmen for whom they were legislating.

Although no more interesting or important session of Congress was ever held than the one at which our narrative has now arrived, considerations of space will prevent our doing its deliberations justice. It was the last in which the great triumvirate Clay, Calhoun, and Webster were heard in debate; it undermined the Missouri Compromise and brought the nation a long way forward on the road of disaster; it gave to men the most impressive of warnings against the folly of supposing that any com-

promise on a matter that involves a moral principle can possibly be lasting.

It began with a bad augury. For three weeks the House balloted for a Speaker, and the only solution of the deadlock was found in abandoning the majority rule and electing on a mere plurality. In this way Howell Cobb of Georgia was elected over the regular Whig candidate, Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts; for Southern Whigs and Free Soilers insisted on scattering their votes. When the President's message explained his sensible plan of admitting California as a free State and leaving New Mexico time to frame a constitution before assigning her to definite Territorial status, his fellow Southerners failed to stand behind him, and his great Whig rivals, Clay and Webster, might as well have joined the enemy outright, so little help did they afford him. It was naturally the Senate that took the lead in the debates. Clay, though very feeble, had been persuaded by Kentucky to return to the scene of his early exploits, and was now fired by the ambition to leave one more great compromise on record as the proof of his double attachment to the Union and to the South and West. His plan was, substantially, to admit California as a free State, to establish New Mexico and Utah as Territories without restricting slavery, to settle the boundary strife between New Mexico and Texas by allowing both land and money to the latter, to put an end to the buying and selling of slaves in the District of Columbia, but not to slavery there or in the States, and to pass a new fugitive slave law that would make Southerners certain to recover their negroes when they had escaped to the Free States. This motley scheme was finally turned over to a



select committee with Clay at its head, which reported three bills, the first of which, known as the "Omnibus Bill" from its heterogeneous character, embraced the proposals concerning California, New Mexico, Utah, and Texas. But the Senate so amended the hybrid monster that, on its passage, it provided only for the Territorial government of Utah. Whereupon the discouraged Clay sought the seashore and confusion seemed to have settled upon the land, especially as President Taylor, after too great exposure to a Fourth of July sun, sickened and died on the 10th of that month.

Taylor's death was most inopportune for the country. His plan for settling Territorial difficulties had been a good one, and he would probably have stood to it, thus defeating by his veto the final compromise. Even as it was, although he was cut off in the very midst of the crisis, the chief honours of the epoch belong to him. Although a slaveholder he did not yield to the pressure Southern men brought to bear on him; although not a trained statesman he faced civil dangers as calmly and resolutely as he had faced his Mexican foes. Texas and Mississippi were threatening to settle the former's doubtful claims upon New Mexican territory by force of arms, and Taylor declared that if Southern officers in the Union army failed to do their duty by the Union, he would command the army in person and would hang any man taken in treason against the United States just as he hanged the deserters and spies at Monterey. Such a man was not to be terrified by the meeting of a convention representing several Southern States, at Nashville, Tennessee, in June, 1850—a convention which disappointed the extremists by expressing its hope that

matters would be settled. Taylor was a soldier and a patriot and, in spirit at least, one of the greatest Americans ever raised to the Presidency.

But it is not only in comparison with extremists of both sections that he shines; he shines also when set beside Clay and Webster and Calhoun. All three surpassed him intellectually, but in this crisis his clear sense and courage and uprightness were better than all their experience and acumen. Clay, however, deserves well of posterity because of the purity of his intentions, his unfaltering love for the Union, and the pathetic brilliance and strength of his oratory in this his last great appeal for harmony. All accounts agree that never before had he held his imperious nature so thoroughly under control, yet it would have been well could he have subordinated himself still more and supported Taylor's policy instead of opposing it. As for Webster, his course was destined to lessen his immense influence in the North, yet not to advance him toward that long-standing goal of his desires, the Presidency. His famous Seventh of March speech, in which he supported Clay's compromise, was something that many of his staunchest admirers could not tolerate. He seemed to surrender to the pro-slavery men, and the feeling of the abolitionists of Massachusetts toward him was well expressed by Whittier's "Ichabod." "So fallen, so lost," seemed Webster, yet after all there ought now to be no doubt of his sincerity when he represented himself as putting all his trust in the Constitution, as setting the Union above everything else on earth. His best efforts as an orator had been for the cause of Union; his services as a statesman dated back to the era of hopeful nationalism that followed the War of 1812. To

him as to most of his Northern and Western compatriots the American Union was the hope of the world. Was it to be sacrificed for liberty in the abstract, for the sake of slaves of an inferior race? Besides, did not the Southern men have rights—was not the Union bound constitutionally to protect their property? Webster was too old, his ambition was too stereotyped for it to be possible for him to advance to the position taken by Seward in his famous speech at this crisis. The idea that there could be a “higher law” than the Constitution was almost as galling to him as it was to the dying Calhoun, who thought Seward not fit to be associated with. It is an idea which is not universally recognised to-day, for men still maintain that true patriotism consists in exclaiming, “My country, right or wrong”—which was practically Webster’s position. Yet, surely the time must come when the conscience of the State will be raised to the level of the highest individual consciences and kept there.

If Webster could not rise to the conception of this grand idea, still less could Calhoun, whose last great speech was read for him before a Senate that hung upon his words. He died before Clay’s compromise was passed, but he was prophet enough to foretell the failure of all efforts to preserve the balance of power in the Union unless a change of heart came to the North, unless the rights of minorities were respected and slavery were regarded, as he himself regarded it, as a beneficent institution. That Calhoun still loved the Union is quite apparent, but it was a Union of his own creation, a Union allowing State vetoes, a Union that gave the slaveholder every right that any property-holder could claim—in short, a Union that could not by any pos-

sibility maintain its existence in the midst of the nineteenth century. They were grand debaters and orators, those three great men of the Senate of 1850, but between them they helped on rather than averted the civil war that was to rend the land they all loved.

The death of Taylor after an Administration of only sixteen months, in which but one important political achievement can be chronicled,\* for a second time threw immense responsibilities upon a Vice-President not equal to bearing them. Fillmore, now in his fifty-first year, was a good man but not a strong one. He was not a Democrat in disguise like Tyler, but his conservative Whig proclivities made him all the more amenable to the advice of such tried leaders as Clay and Webster, who were bent on applying the compromise methods of the generation just past to problems that required very different treatment. It was not long before the new President gave proof of the fact that there was also a new Administration. An entirely new Cabinet was constructed with Webster as Secretary of State—the increase of intellectual strength over Taylor's body of counsellors being counterbalanced by the fact that Webster's reactionary influence was predominant. For some time, however, legislation was balked until, about the middle of August, a bill passed the Senate admitting California with her free constitution. Just before, the Texas claims on New Mexico had been met by an offer of \$10,000,-

\* The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty concluded between John M. Clayton of Delaware, Secretary of State, and the British Minister, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, which rather forestalled matters by establishing an Anglo-American protectorate over any future ship canal at the Isthmus of Panama.

000 and of a slice of land, a largess which the contumacious commonwealth, already huge in its dimensions, finally agreed to take. The way was now clear for the rest of Clay's programme, which was put through expeditiously. The most unpleasant feature of it was precisely the one for which the best constitutional sanctions could be cited—to wit, the fugitive slave law. Hitherto the duty of returning slaves to their owners had fallen on State officials and had been but poorly performed. Now the general government was to take upon itself the disagreeable task by means of warrants issued by its judges or commissioners and executed by its marshals, who might call on citizens for aid. Fine and imprisonment would be the reward of any person assisting the fugitive, who could be arrested on a simple affidavit of his putative owner. Such a law would naturally excite indignation when put into operation among Anglo-Saxons not used to slavery, and as Southerners soon began to make use of it in all honesty to recover slaves, some of whom had long been fugitives, it was but a short while before men who had mobbed abolitionists were mobbing United States officers in order to rescue negroes. From such sporadic defiance of law it was but a short step to the passage of "Liberty Laws" of very dubious constitutionality, and the Southerner, who was especially prone to rely on his legal rights as his surest and strongest, had another grievance against North and West, which extremists of his own party urged him to avenge and which Webster's depressive speeches could not render more palatable. Congressional failure to extend the Missouri Compromise line to the new territory or in some other way to control it with regard to slavery, led, as we



shall see, to some disastrous consequences, but the strenuous Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 did even more harm in stirring up the spirit of active, forcible resistance in a people slow to move yet certain to fight their quarrels out when sufficiently aroused, especially against antagonists as fiery as the Southern men of this epoch. But after all, from a purely academic point of view, the historian might be justified in holding that the surrender of the general government to the threats of Texas in the matter of her boundary disputes with New Mexico was the most pusillanimous feature of the **Com-**promise of 1850.\*

\* See Fillmore's message of Aug. 6, 1850.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## CALM AND STORM.

THE Compromise of 1850<sup>1</sup>, whatever its ultimate effects, brought as a reaction to the excitement that had accompanied it a considerable amount of not unwelcome repose. Before it was finally passed the executives of Mississippi and South Carolina had used threatening language and proposed measures that looked to disunion, but the other Southern States not responding and the Georgia Convention of December advocating concession on the part of both sections rather than the secession it had been called to proclaim, it became apparent that the South as a whole preferred the optimism of Clay to the pessimism of Calhoun. In the North many strenuous anti-slavery men left the Whigs for ever, but Webster and other leaders supported the cause of moderation and compromise, and in spite of the friction due to the enforcement of the new Fugitive Slave Law,\* it was soon apparent that the masses

\* Among noted cases of rioting over the enforcement of the law may be cited that of "Shadrach" at Boston in 1851 (see Fillmore's long message of Feb. 19th), and that of Anthony Burns (1854) at the same place (p. 242). The indignation at the law was natural enough, but equally natural was the disposition of Webster, Fillmore and other moderate Northern men to insist upon the carrying out of plain obligations. Abolitionists regarded it as a sin to return a negro to bondage and as a virtue to assist him to escape by means of the "underground railway"—a chain of houses where the fugitive was cared for by day and from which he was speeded by night on his journey to Canada.

of the people were for peace almost at any price and were drifting to the Democrats, who had everything to gain by preserving the equilibrium which the compromisers had secured at the expense of so much ingenious effort.

The public lassitude was speedily communicated to Congress, the last session of the Thirty-first and both sessions of the Thirty-second producing little salient legislation. Indeed the most important events of 1851 had very little permanent political importance. The completion of the longest American railway, the New York and Erie, was celebrated with displays in which Fillmore and his Cabinet took part, and the famous Hungarian exile Kossuth was received with an enthusiasm second only to that which had attended Lafayette's great tour. Kossuth, however, found that his facile oratory could not draw America from her policy of neutrality, although it did stir up native orators to attack Great Britain for her treatment of Ireland—a theme that was to grow more and more congenial to certain classes of politicians. A more important event of the year was the tragic collapse of the filibustering schemes that had been cherished for some time by revolutionary Cubans and Southerners desirous of conquering more territory for slavery. The third and most serious of the expeditions led against Cuba by Narciso Lopez failed dismally, the leader being "garroted" and a considerable number of American adventurers being shot. A riot in New Orleans directed against Spanish residents was one consequence of this sad affair and an exciting political contest in Mississippi was another. The Governor of that State, General John A. Quitman, having been implicated in the Lopez expeditions,

was arrested by the Washington authorities, who had done their best to preserve neutrality, and had resigned his office before standing trial. On the miscarriage of governmental efforts to prosecute implicated parties, he entered into a contest for his former office against Senator Foote, an adherent of the Union. When he saw that his defeat was practically assured he withdrew, and Jefferson Davis, resigning his seat in the Senate, entered the race as a States-rights candidate. Although he had only a few weeks in which to canvass the State and was in feeble health, Davis, while failing to beat Foote, reduced the latter's majority in a remarkable manner. Evidently the Union cause was not strongly planted among the slaveholders of Mississippi, and whenever this zealous disciple of Calhoun should be placed in office with the united people of the South behind him, he would not surrender until absolutely crushed by superior force. But the people of America were too anxious for peace under the Constitution and the last Compromise to be able to understand the full meaning of this Mississippi election of 1851.

They probably did not understand much better the meaning of the presidential election of 1852, for deeming that peace would last they elected a very mediocre man. The Democratic Convention which met at Baltimore early in June pledged itself against anti-slavery agitation of every sort, and, after a spirited contest, threw aside Cass, Buchanan, and other leading politicians and nominated General Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, a Mexican War soldier of no great distinction and a Congressman of perhaps less, but a pleasant, honest gentleman, acceptable to the pro-slavery men. William R.

King of Alabama was selected for Vice-President, and then the Democrats made way for the Whigs, who had to decide whether they would put up President Fillmore or choose General Winfield Scott, for although Webster's friends were staunch they were not numerous enough to make his chances good. Prudence seemed to require that Fillmore be supported, for he had the considerable advantage of being in present control of the government; but, whether it be accidental or not, no one of the four Vice-Presidents who have become Presidents through the deaths of their superiors, has been able to secure nomination at the hands of the party that was willing to give him the lesser office. For fifty-two ballots the contest was continued, Webster not withdrawing as he seemingly should have done. On the fifty-third Scott received the necessary majority, and the ticket was completed by the selection of William A. Graham of North Carolina. The platform adopted favoured the Compromise of 1850, but not so explicitly as the Democrats had done, while Scott himself was not warm enough in his support of it to hold the votes of some of the Southern Whigs like Alexander H. Stevens and Robert Toombs of Georgia, who had already become men of note. There was not, however, any great difference between the two parties save that the Whigs still believed in liberal expenditures on the part of the general government; but between the two candidates, Pierce and Scott, there was all the difference between a mediocrity and a great, though limited man.

But Scott's victories lay too far behind him to attract a people bent on peace, and the Whigs, never a well-united party, were now hopelessly divided.



They lost their chief leaders, too—Clay early in the campaign, Webster before it closed, but not before he had more or less abandoned Scott. The Free Soilers also carried off some votes, and, when November finally came, Scott had the unusual sensation of being thoroughly beaten. He carried only the four States of Vermont, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Kentucky, his amiable competitor carrying all the rest, although not by large majorities. Thus the party of Jackson came once more into power, while the party of Clay practically passed from the political stage; but the Democrats were never to boast another “Old Hickory,” and the age of Great Compromisers had passed as well.

If Pierce was unlike Jackson in nearly every particular, he at least resembled him in having to deal with a host of office-seekers. Yet it was not like the Tennessee hero to ride from Baltimore to Washington in a baggage car and to escape in disguise to a hotel where his zealous friends could not find him; nor was it an act that became the Republic in which it had to be practised. But Pierce made a fine impression by his inaugural, and deserved well of Providence if good intentions could ever be taken as a substitute for good statesmanship. He chose advisers of fair ability, only three of whom need be named here—William L. Marcy of New York, Secretary of State; Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, Secretary of War; and Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts, Attorney-General. Marcy, of spoils fame, was of course no longer in his prime, and although he managed his department well, he yielded in the matter of influencing and guiding the Administration to Cushing and Davis, particularly to the latter, who had re-entered public life only at the

solicitation of his personal friend, Pierce. Both Cushing and Davis were able men and meant to push the easy-going President forward into a policy of aggression.\* They succeeded so well that an Administration which was fitted out like one of the excursion steamers then so constantly seen on American rivers was soon breasting waves which would have severely strained the stoutest man-of-war.

The only event of importance before the advent of the Thirty-third Congress was, however, connected with Marcy's department, and indicated vigour in that branch of the Administration as well. It is important now chiefly because it goes to prove the falsity of the statement so frequently heard at present that it is only of late that America has made herself respected in Europe. Martin Koszta, a Hungarian refugee, having been arrested in Smyrna and confined on an Austrian vessel, found a protector in the American agent, who claimed that Koszta was taking steps to become an American citizen. This claim for Koszta's release was backed up by an American man-of-war, and finally the French consul took him in charge until the contest could be settled. Secretary Marcy, with his fellow-citizens of all parties behind him, upheld vigorously the rights of American citizenship throughout the world, and in the end Koszta was released.† But unfortunately a keen regard for personal liberty was not to be the distinguishing note of this Administration.

A new figure now emerges in the Senate, whose

\* Cushing was a renegade from the Whigs and therefore anxious to prove his zeal. Somewhat similar motives perhaps actuated Davis and other politicians from the Far South, since they could best overcome the prestige of the Virginians by taking a more advanced stand than the latter.

† See Pierce's first message.

old giants are all passed away—Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, already prominent enough to have been a candidate for the Presidency agreeable to the South from his accommodating views on the slavery question, but destined to be still more famous for the part he was to play in dividing the Union into two armed factions.

Douglas was chairman of the Committee on Territories, and, as it was becoming necessary to legislate for civil government in that portion of the Louisiana Purchase now covered by the States of Nebraska and Kansas, he reported early in January, 1854, a bill for the Territorial government of Nebraska (to which of course the provisions of the Missouri Compromise applied), with a faithful reproduction of the Compromise of 1850 so far as it applied to slavery in New Mexico and Utah. Nebraska was not to be dedicated permanently to freedom, but its legislature should decide whether or not slavery should be tolerated, and it should be thereafter admitted as a free or a slave State as its constitution should provide. This was an extension of the principles of the Compromise of 1850, but it was an extension that broke the peace so sedulously aimed at. It was in line with views previously enunciated by Cass and could be called an application of the principle of "Squatter" or "Popular Sovereignty." It seemed a fair solution of a great problem to throw the burden on the people most interested in the adoption or rejection of slavery in a specific region, but at the same time it was a clear surrender of a right Congress had hitherto exercised, and it was a concession to those Southerners who had strenuously argued against the constitutionality of that right. Besides it threw

open to slavery territory which had been specifically barred to it in 1820 and thus annulled the work of former harmonisers. Southerners might, indeed, claim that the admission of California as a free State had broken the spirit of the Missouri Compromise and that the present measure was a fair retaliation for the Wilmot Proviso; but while one may perceive the legal and technical strength of their position, one must always remember that the introduction of slavery into any region where it could take hold at all meant the formation of a slave party, a slave code, and ultimately a slave State. Hence the much-stressed impartiality of the new theory which left the people free to choose between slavery and freedom was entirely specious. It may be readily granted that slavery could hardly have thriven in Nebraska, but pro-slavery men were eager to try the experiment and anti-slavery men were naturally driven to resist them.

Douglas was soon forced to declare himself specifically upon what was after all the main point in his manœuvres, viz., the abandonment of the Missouri Compromise. Late in January, 1854, he reported a substitute bill which provided for the establishment of two Territories, Kansas and Nebraska, and pronounced the famous compromise line of  $36^{\circ} 30'$  void and of no effect, "being inconsistent with the principles of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognised by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures." This bold stand was in reality inconsistent not only with Douglas's previous efforts to erect what was known as the Platte Country into a Territory, but also with the general ideas, both within and with-

out Congress, as to the scope of the Compromise measures of 1850. People had indeed known, from Cass's famous letter to Nicholson, from Calhoun's speeches, and from the utterances of extreme Southerners of the John Randolph school, that the Missouri Compromise by no means held the assent of every American as a constitutional or wise measure; but it had been acquiesced in for thirty-four years, and few or no people before Douglas seem to have thought that it had been done away with by the act of 1850. Even the extreme Southerners wished rather than thought it had been. It is always safer, perhaps, to assume personal integrity and sincerity in statesmen of past generations whose measures move our present wonder and indignation, but it is hard not to believe that his contemporary and subsequent critics have been right in their assertion that Mr. Douglas's coarse, masterful disposition and his selfish ambition for the presidency rather than any desire to see justice done to the South or any love of abstract political consistency induced him, at a period when the country believed itself to be at peace, to raise an issue which was absolutely certain to produce discord and commotion to an extent no man could measure.

Douglas was, of course, too shrewd a politician to take such a step without a fair assurance that he could carry it through. President Pierce's support seems to have been secured at an interview held at the Executive Mansion, in which Pierce told the Committees of the House and Senate that he considered that the proposed bill was based on a sound principle to which the country was returning after having infringed it in 1820. This is one of the most unfortunate statements on record and is a



clear proof of the folly of electing to supreme office an amiable mediocrity. President Pierce undoubtedly believed what he said, but he should have known enough American history to know that no such principle as non-interference by Congress in the Territories had been sufficiently developed by 1820 to be really infringed upon. The precedents had been all the other way, and his so-called principle was merely a development of States-rights construction to suit the particular emergency. What President Pierce really expressed was not his own mind but that of Secretary Jefferson Davis, who had secured this momentous meeting on a Sunday afternoon that might have been better employed. Yet there is no such reason as there is in the case of Douglas to suspect that the President and the Secretary were actuated by purely selfish motives. Pierce was merely weak, while Davis had a vein of fanaticism in his nature.

The President's support having been secured, Douglas and his friends drove their measure through Congress regardless of the clamours of the Northern press and of the comparatively silent amazement of the Southerners at what seemed to be a sheer gift of Fortune. Seward and the other anti-slavery leaders, chief among whom was now Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, resisted as best they might, but the bill passed by a large majority in the Senate, by a slight one in the House, and was signed by Pierce on May 30, 1854.

Just about the time that the Kansas-Nebraska Act was forced through in defiance of legislative resolutions and of private petitions of all sorts, a turmoil was created in usually sedate Boston over the arrest and surrender to his master of a negro named An-

thony Burns. The contemporaneousness of the two events is noticeable; for it was the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the enforcement of the odious Fugitive Slave Law that did what abolitionist agitators like Garrison could not have accomplished in a century, aroused public indignation in the North and political aggressiveness in the South to such an extent that a civil war in which slavery should perish was the inevitable outcome.

But very few persons yet saw with Seward that an "irrepressible conflict" was at hand, and extravagant Southerners still dreamed of conquering Mexico and annexing Cuba. Late in 1853 a certain William Walker undertook to turn Lower California into a republic, much as Houston had done in Texas, but he was soon forced to beat a retreat, leaving to James Gadsden, of South Carolina, the less questionable honour of rounding out the territory acquired from Mexico, by means of a treaty by which something less than 20,000,000 acres, now forming part of Arizona and New Mexico, were purchased for \$10,000,000. Far less creditable to the United States was the bombardment of Greytown on the coast of Central America—a region given over to anarchy and in which preponderant British influences were legitimately feared by staunch upholders or rather expounders of the Monroe Doctrine who were not satisfied with Great Britain's interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. A warrant for the arrest of a steamship captain for shooting a negro was resisted by passengers, led by an American minister, to Nicaragua, and when the latter was afterwards assaulted in a street fight, a United States ship of war was despatched to Greytown demanding apologies and the payment of a certain ex-

travagant claim. No answer being made to the American commander, he bombarded the town and then sent a party on shore to burn it. A worse instance of the unfortunate tendency of strong nations to bully weak ones would be hard to find outside of recent Samoan annals. Yet Pierce defended the deed with considerable unction in his second message.

But diplomatists were also to share with filibusters and belligerent commanders the questionable honours of the day. Pierre Soulé, minister to Spain, had instructions not merely to press for American claims, but also to negotiate, if possible, the purchase of Cuba, which Great Britain and France did not wish to see absorbed by America, but which Southerners had long been scheming to get. To aid his schemes a conference was held at Ostend in which he was joined by James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, then minister to Great Britain, and John Y. Mason of Virginia, minister to France. They issued in October, 1854, their celebrated Ostend Manifesto, which declared for immediate and open efforts to purchase Cuba, the maximum price being afterwards fixed at \$120,000,000. If Spain should refuse to sell, the United States for the sake of its internal peace would be justified in taking it by force. The authors of the Manifesto neglected to state that one of the chief reasons for their precipitancy was the fact that England, France, and Russia were at war and that it would be therefore a good time for the United States to appear before the world in the rôle of a plunderer. They were careful, however, to deal at length with the advantages that would accrue to Spain were she to apply the purchase money to internal improvements, nor were they

false prophets when they intimated that the time might come when Spain would lose both Cuba and the price now offered for it. But if they had known the exact state of the Northern mind over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill they would probably not have wasted their time writing their long Manifesto. Enough had been done for slavery by Douglas; the acquisition of Cuba was to be postponed for half a century. Meanwhile the country might be satisfied with a treaty with Japan secured as a result of an expedition to that country in 1852 under Commodore Matthew C. Perry.

A fusion of the enemies of slavery was the natural result of the Kansas-Nebraska legislation. The Whigs were completely broken up in the North, and some of them went with Free Soilers, Wilmot-Proviso Democrats, and Anti-Nebraska men to form a party known first in a few States as Republicans, but soon accepting the name as a national one. There was, however, another party, a successor of the Anti-Masons, that for a time reaped some of the benefits of party disintegration. This was a secret organisation called the American or the Know-Nothing Party, the latter appellation being due to the fact that members, when questioned, would pretend to be ignorant of their own secrets. As a matter of fact the new party had sprung up, chiefly in the East, as a result of popular efforts to counteract the influence of foreigners in politics and the growth of the Roman Catholic Church. The stream of immigration had been bringing over many undesirable citizens, especially Irishmen, who had been quickly utilised by shrewd leaders in order to plunder the better classes in the cities, especially New York. When the Whig party broke up, the Know-Nothings

gained many votes because they volunteered, as Professor Woodrow Wilson deftly puts it, "with reference to the slavery question, to be Do Nothings." Under ordinary circumstances secret associations are not tolerated in American politics, nor do parties with a single principle, especially an illiberal one, thrive, but such was the confusion during the years 1854 and 1855 that the Know-Nothings gained quite a number of Congressmen and carried several States. Their political mansion was built upon the sands, however, and was soon to be swept away by floods that were to drive the American people into the only structure permanently stable in these democratic times—the temple of popular liberty.

Meanwhile struggles at the polls in the East had been duplicated in the West, with the unpleasant accompaniments of fire-arms and whisky. The Kansas-Nebraska Act had undone the Missouri Compromise, but had not settled whether a Territorial legislature could exclude or admit slavery when the Territory was organised, or only when it was about to be formed into a State. Slave propagators in Missouri read the law as suited themselves and poured over the border into Kansas, till then an Indian reservation, in order to establish their favourite institution. Several pro-slavery towns were thus founded, and it looked for a moment as if freedom would have no chance in the Territory, for the "Border Ruffians," as they were called with at least some show of justice, could easily return to their Missouri homes between election periods, and yet be on hand whenever their votes were required in Kansas. But a shrewd Massachusetts man, Eli Thayer of Worcester, soon developed a scheme which showed that in such struggles brains will triumph



over brawn. He proposed to colonise Kansas with free settlers who would outvote the pro-slavery men and secure the new Territory to Freedom. In pursuance of his scheme he started the "Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Society," and by the close of 1854 several thousand free settlers had poured into Kansas and founded the towns of Lawrence and Topeka. In the meantime the Territorial Governor, Andrew H. Reeder, an appointee of the President's, tried to govern fairly, but could not shut his eyes to the fraudulent proceedings of the Missourians, who, early in the spring of 1855, in the election for members of the Territorial legislature, made the ballot boxes show almost as many voters as a recent census had been able to show inhabitants. Reeder, however, only threw out certain pro-slavery candidates, whose Free State successors were promptly unseated by the legislature. Then a quarrel arose over the legislature's adjournment to Shawnee Springs, and Reeder was removed from office by Pierce, who seems to have taken his cue from Jefferson Davis. The legislators, being now unhampered, passed a stringent slave code and doubtless flattered themselves that slavery had gained a great victory.

But the Free State men, under Charles Robinson, an ex-California emigrant, resolved to imitate the example of that State by framing a constitution at once and petitioning for statehood. Repudiating the Shawnee Springs legislature and arming themselves with rifles so as to be prepared to deal with the Border Ruffians on their own terms, they held several conventions, and finally on October 9th cast over 2,000 votes for Reeder as their delegate in Congress, the pro-slavery men having recently cast more ballots, chiefly fraudulent, for one Whitfield. Later

in the year a free constitution was framed at Topeka, and before 1855 had been ratified at the polls. But the new Governor, Wilson Shannon, of Ohio, sided entirely with the pro-slavery men, who certainly had in their favour the show of legality, always a great point with them. Civil war soon ensued under these circumstances, President Pierce naturally taking the pro-slavery side. Troops were sent into Kansas and the Free State leaders were arrested on the charge of treason. A mob destroyed the town of Lawrence and chaos reigned supreme; plundering expeditions scoured the country, and ruthless murders were committed, which were as ruthlessly retaliated. Such were the first fruits of Douglas's "squatter sovereignty" and of general Congressional ineptitude.

The Thirty-fourth Congress, which was soon to take cognisance of the work done by its predecessor in Kansas, assembled in December, 1855, with the Senate in favour of the Administration, but with the House in opposition. In the latter body there were many new men in consequence of the fact that the Kansas-Nebraska legislation had cost numerous Representatives their seats. In the division of parties no clear majority could be had for any one candidate for the speakership, and it was not until early in February and the one hundred and thirty-third ballot that Nathaniel P. Banks, an Anti-Nebraska man from Massachusetts, was finally elected, and then only on a plurality. Fortunately the members seem to have felt that personal violence would be best confined to Kansas; but before the end of the session Charles Sumner's bitter speeches on the Kansas question and his personal references to Senator Butler of South Carolina had provoked Represent-

ative Preston S. Brooks of that State to such an extent that he assaulted Sumner with a cane while the latter was sitting at his desk, and so injured him that he had to spend several years in travel for the sake of his health. Massachusetts kept his chair vacant; South Carolina returned Mr. Brooks after he had resigned his seat. The unfortunate affair need not be dwelt upon at this late day, but it should be noted that such an occurrence was clear proof that passion was fast getting the mastery of reason throughout the land. Sumner's speeches were needlessly exasperating; Brooks's retaliation was needlessly violent; but both men were merely acting like the champions of old who rode out defiantly before their respective hosts. The days of true chivalry had, however, plainly departed.

In January, 1856, President Pierce sent Congress a special message dealing with Kansas affairs. Exciting debates followed and an investigation committee of the House was sent into the distracted region. Their report was favourable to the Free State men; but a bill for admitting "bleeding Kansas," as it was called in the North, as a State with the Topeka constitution, while passing the House with great difficulty, was rejected by the Senate. The deadlock was unbroken when the session ended on August 18th, nor had any army appropriation bill been passed, so afraid was the House to trust the President with troops that would be used in support of the slave cause. In view of this failure to provide for troops a new session was called for August 21, and after considerable trouble the army bill was put through, the Anti-Nebraska men or Republicans standing fast to their principles but being deserted by some of the Know-Nothings.

In the meantime the quadrennial excitement of a presidential campaign was agitating the country. As early as Washington's birthday (Feb. 22, 1856) a convention at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, had formulated the principles of the new composite Republican party, the character of which cannot be better described than in the following sentence of Professor Woodrow Wilson's: "It got its programme from the Free Soilers, whom it bodily absorbed; its radical and aggressive spirit from the Abolitionists, whom it received without liking; its liberal views upon constitutional questions from the Whigs, who constituted both in numbers and in influence its commanding element; and its popular impulses from the Democrats, who did not leave behind them, when they joined it, their faith in their old party ideals." As the Republican party is still vigorous to-day forty-five years after its organisation, it will be necessary for any one who wishes to understand the trend of recent American politics to bear the above sentence in mind, for it contains the key to much that would be otherwise inexplicable in latter-day political history.

The new party held a convention at Philadelphia about the middle of June for the purpose of nominating candidates for President and Vice-President. For the former office John C. Frémont,\* who had

\* It is only fair to pause for a moment to note the fact that the unheroic character of American politicians at this and other periods should not be suffered to obscure the really heroic conduct and character of some Americans in other walks of life. The career of Frémont is a case in point. He was born in 1813 of a French father and a Virginian mother. By hard work he got himself employed as a teacher of mathematics in the navy, then as 2d lieutenant of topographical engineers. He became engaged to the daughter of Senator Benton and was sent West, probably to break off the engage-

won fame as an explorer of the Far West, was chosen without difficulty, and William L. Dayton of New Jersey completed the ticket. The platform pronounced for the right of Congress to legislate with regard to slavery in the Territories, demanded the admission of Kansas as a Free State, and denounced the Ostend Manifesto. Among the leaders who undertook to advocate both ticket and platform were Seward and Salmon P. Chase, the latter now Governor of Ohio, as well as Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley, the eminent political manager and the foremost editor of New York respectively.

The Know-Nothings had previously nominated ex-President Fillmore for the station for which the Whigs had four years ago rejected him, their theory of non-intervention in the slavery contest being an appropriate platform for him to stand on. More important was the Democratic convention which met at Cincinnati on June 2d. It upheld the

ment. In 1842, having been secretly married to Miss Benton, he began explorations in the Rockies. In 1843 he saw the Great Salt Lake and contributed largely to the knowledge of the wild region around it. Then he explored the Oregon region and after suffering many hardships reached California. In 1845 he explored the same region, withdrew with great bravery before a large Mexican force, then returned and was largely instrumental in securing California for the United States. He was rewarded by a partisan court-martial composed of graduates of West Point, an institution he had not attended, with dismissal from the army on the charge of mutiny. Such a verdict could not be upheld by the President, but Frémont naturally left such a service. He was for a short time Senator from California, then undertook another journey of exploration on his own account. His subsequent career as a general in the Civil War does not concern us here; it is sufficient to observe that with Pike and Lewis and the Clarks and many men whose achievements in subduing the vast continent have been more or less forgotten, he furnishes a complete refutation of the notion that the annals of America are uninteresting and unheroic.



Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Fugitive Slave Law, the filibustering expeditions—in short everything that had caused the formation of the Republican party. It could not thus be accused of cowardice. For President it finally nominated Buchanan, Pierce and Douglas being too unpopular in the North and West. With John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky the ticket represented that fusion of North and South which was the party's need so far as votes were concerned, but hardly its practice with regard to its platform, which was entirely pro-Southern. Yet although geography had its influence on the Democratic platform, it had had a much more obvious influence on the make-up of the Republican party, which practically represented the Free States alone. There was thus a specious ground for proclaiming that the triumph of the Republicans would mean the triumph of one section, which would give the contending South a right to secede, although why on this reasoning the triumph of Southern principles should not give the North the same privilege, as the abolitionists had long contended, is hard to see. Yet while the South might not have fought to preserve the Union, it is most likely that any proposition on the part of the Republicans to secede in the event of a Democratic triumph would have been received by the South with a sense of injury. But men do not reason well in crises, especially conservatives of gentle, lovable natures, and many good citizens in this campaign either voted with the Know-Nothings or else supported the Democrats, believing that they were thus upholding the cause of the Union they loved so dearly. It was poor political reasoning, for if the Republicans had triumphed in 1856 it is doubtful

whether the South would have been sufficiently worked up to undertake immediate secession, and, while Frémont was young and perhaps rash, he and his party would probably have shown that they really had no designs against slavery in the States. Thus an excitement gradually worked up might have been gradually allayed. But no such good fortune—if indeed it would have been good fortune—befell the American people. Buchanan was elected by 174 votes to 114 for Frémont and 8—those of Maryland—for Fillmore. Frémont carried New England, New York, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, and California and ran close in other States; but he could not unite either the Middle States or the West; and the Republicans had to wait four years for a better opportunity and a greater leader.

While this contest was going on the condition of Kansas was slowly improving, for free settlers kept pouring in and the commander of the national troops forbore to use them. A new Governor, John W. Geary, also helped to restore order, but Congress failed to legislate against the slave code promulgated at Shawnee Springs, and even after Lecompte, the Chief Justice and Jeffreys of the Territory, had been removed by Pierce, no successor was confirmed by the Senate. Pro-slavery agitation was thus encouraged in the Territory and Governor Geary abandoned his charge temporarily to take counsel at Washington.

Kansas was not, however, the only scene of pro-slavery activity. Walker, the California filibuster,\* had interested himself in one of the numerous revolutions in Nicaragua and had attracted a large num-

\* He was born at Nashville, Tennessee, but removed to California.

ber of adventurers to his standard, which was nominally that of a person named Rivas. In May, 1856, Pierce, against the advice of Marcy, received a minister of this quasi government, but the step did Walker little good. His effort to re-establish slavery in Nicaragua failed, Rivas absconded, Walker on becoming President was not recognised at Washington, he and his followers were overwhelmed and finally expelled from the country, and the whole enterprise ended as a fiasco. Later in the same year (1857) he conducted another expedition against Greytown, but Commodore Paulding, U.S.N., dispersed the filibusters and sent Walker home on parole. He was not punished as he should have been, for Southerners sympathised with him and Buchanan did not like to offend his real constituents. But Walker could not continue such escapades with impunity, for three years later he was captured on the Honduras coast and shot after a speedy trial.

Returning now to the last session of Pierce's ill-starred Administration we note the passage of a new tariff act (1857), which was more or less of a compromise and gave evidence of the growing power of the lobby. We must further remark the failure of Secretary Marcy to adhere to the proposal of the European powers after the close of the Crimean War to abolish privateering, a failure justified only by prejudice against an efficient navy.\* The Confederates profited later from Marcy's action, but there seems to be a good deal of exaggeration in the

\* It must be stated, however, that the United States would have agreed to the proposition if private property, not contraband, of citizens of a belligerent had been exempted from seizure by "public armed vessels of the other belligerent."

statement that they profited greatly from Jefferson Davis's excellent management of the War Department. That Davis was a most efficient Secretary has never been denied, but he himself has denied that he consciously prepared the South for the struggle soon to take place, and his word is unimpeachable. He was a fanatic and probably Pierce's evil genius, but he was an able man and a gentleman.

Only one more Administration now separates us from the lamentable period of the Civil War. Not quite ten years had elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, yet the progress made toward disunion had been startlingly rapid. The territory coveted by Polk had been gained, but its possession had plunged the country into turmoils far greater than those that preceded the Mexican War. Slavery had been pushed forward so imprudently that an active resistance had been generated in North and West that boded little good to the institution. Yet so blinded were its partisans that they did not perceive this fact; nor had they indeed won all their victories; but the Northern men who supported them might have read in the fate of Pierce their own future reward for their subservience. Pierce had done what he doubtless conceived to be his duty, but he had rendered himself unpopular in his own section and had destroyed his usefulness as a cat's-paw. He retired to solitude, leaving Buchanan to run the ship of state full on the rocks and Douglas to lose both his political and his physical life in the inglorious wreck.

## CHAPTER XV.

## THE BEGINNING OF THE END.

JAMES BUCHANAN inspired confidence through his age \* and experience, and his inaugural address was conceived in a pacific vein. He believed that popular sovereignty would settle the question of slavery in the Territories, and that the vexed point as to when the inhabitants of a specific Territory should determine its status was a legal matter which would soon be decided by the Supreme Court. This was a reference to the famous Dred Scott decision which was to be given to the world two days after Buchanan's inauguration. In this decision the Supreme Court, speaking through the mouth of its Chief Justice Roger A. Taney, Jackson's famous Secretary, who had succeeded Marshall, practically took away from the North all hope of resisting legally the incursions of slavery within any Territory and gave to the Southerners everything that their wildest champions had ever claimed. With the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Fugitive Slave Law it formed a great trio of incentives to Northern resistance, and instead of being the capstone of Southern triumph was in fact a millstone around slavery's neck.

No adequate description of the famous case can be given here, but it may be stated that Dred Scott was a slave belonging to a Dr. Emerson, who had

\* He was nearly sixty-six at the time of his inauguration.



taken him into Illinois, a free state, and there allowed him to marry. The negro with his wife and child was then brought back to Missouri and held as a slave. On Dr. Emerson's death his widow hired Dred out, to his dissatisfaction, and he sued for his freedom in a Missouri court on the ground that his residence in Illinois had put an end to his status as a slave. Later on Mrs. Emerson transferred him to a Mr. Sandford of New York, and Dred sued the latter in the United States Circuit Court, which had jurisdiction, as citizens of two different States were presumably involved.\* A verdict being obtained against Dred, his counsel, an able anti-slavery lawyer, carried the case to the Supreme Court, where it was argued at length. The charge, often made, that Southerners pushed the case in order to get a verdict that would help the cause of slavery in the Territories, from a court known to be composed of a majority of pro-slavery judges, seems to have little foundation. It was a genuine effort on the part of his friends to obtain the negro's freedom, which in fact was given him after the final decision went against him. Indeed it is *à priori* unlikely that Southerners would have forced a case on the Supreme Court, since many of them were inclined to insist that, being a part of the general government, that tribunal was, as such, possessed of no final power to adjudicate upon the rights of a sovereign State.

Be this as it may, they were delighted to take advantage of the free gift presented to them by the Chief Justice, who in a careful opinion, from the main conclusions of which only two justices, McLean and Curtis, dissented *in toto*, not merely de-

\* See Appendix A, article 3, section 2,

cided that Dred Scott had no status in the United States courts as not being a citizen of Missouri in the sense of the Constitution—an opinion which Justice Curtis seems to have demolished—but undertook to argue as to the status of slaves and the right of Congress to legislate on slavery in the Territories. According to the majority of the Court slaves were not persons but property, and as Congress could not keep a citizen from entering a Territory with his cattle, so it could not keep him from entering with his slaves. Thus not only was the Missouri Compromise, which affected Minnesota, a Territory to which Dred had been taken, unconstitutional, but “squatter sovereignty” itself, that new creation of the Democratic party, was without meaning, for Congress would have to protect the slaveholder in his rights against a hostile Territorial legislature until the Territory became a State.

For this famous decision, which naturally caused first consternation, then determined anger and opposition in the North, little defence can now be made. Its legal basis was flimsy, if subtle, and its political and ethical basis was beneath contempt. It was an honest opinion, however, and probably deserves less censure than the Kansas-Nebraska Act, for it was made by jurists wrapped up in the meshes of laws that took no account of human progress. The Court followed the Southern, indeed the American, trend of laying more stress on mere legality than it could safely bear. They forgot that they lived in a world of men, not of precedents, although, when they went beyond the strict limits of the case before them, they ought to have recognised the fact that they incurred the suspicion of being partisans, not jurists. Perhaps, however, they deluded themselves

into believing that by pronouncing on the vexed question of slavery in the Territories, they would furnish a solution of the chief difficulties that confronted the Republic—a solution by which all parties would abide and which would save the Union. It was a wild notion that had entered their minds, but after all they had had a great exemplar of a statesman judge held up to them in Marshall, and they are not to be severely blamed for endeavouring to imitate him by posing as patriots and statesmen. Here as always it is best to believe in human sincerity, even if one has to confess that it is often exhibited in conjunction with the grossest lack of wisdom. This is also the verdict we must bring in when we find statesmen like Buchanan applauding a decision at which our blood runs cold, and setting themselves in sober earnest to make a whole nation of Anglo-Saxons, inheritors of Lord Mansfield's bounty, acquiesce in the perpetuation of slavery. Verily it was a topsy-turvy world in which our ancestors lived.

Buchanan's Cabinet had a strong pro-slavery bias, which was due to the presence of four Southerners and of Cass, who acted as Secretary of State, but left much of his work to the President. Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury, was considered the strongest man of the group, but the department suffered at his hands. After the Cabinet the most important appointment was that of Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, as Governor of Kansas in place of Geary. Walker understood that he was to give up all efforts to defeat the will of the Kansas settlers by forcing slavery upon them, but was rather to attempt the scarcely less herculean feat of making the Territory

a State favourable to the Democratic party. On this understanding he succeeded in inducing the Free State people to vote for members of the Territorial legislature, with the result that they won a clear majority in that body. But the pro-slavery men at a convention held at Lecompton adopted a constitution favouring slavery with a proviso that the article relating to the institution was the only one that should be submitted to the people for ratification. Fearing some trick, as they had a right to do, and knowing that it was proposed to elect a new legislature and thus undo work already done, the Free State people stayed away from the polls and the Lecompton travesty on popular government was easily carried by a partisan vote. Walker, justly indignant, went to Washington in order to protest against conduct which, it was believed, had Administration sanction. The President and his Cabinet were hearty advocates of the Lecompton iniquity, and Walker resigned. Meanwhile the Free State legislature had shrewdly submitted the whole Lecompton constitution to the people, and it had been rejected by a majority of over 11,000. Yet Buchanan in a special message to the Thirty-fifth Congress urged the admission of Kansas as a State under the obnoxious instrument. A long and fierce debate, interspersed with fisticuffs, was the result, Douglas, to his credit, standing squarely up against the majority of his party. Even Buchanan's new Governor of the Territory, Denver, when he had surveyed the situation, wrote begging the President to abandon his attempt to force the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton constitution; but pro-slavery men were obstinate and the fight was waged, the Administration's measure passing the Senate but failing

in the House. Later a distinct and discreditable attempt to bribe Kansas to come in under the pro-slavery constitution was successfully made so far as Congress was concerned; but the Kansas people refused by a large majority to enter the Union hampered by slavery, even if they could thereby acquire a large grant of public lands. Few more contemptible measures than this "Lecompton Junior," as it was dubbed, are on record, and one does not wonder that the Mormons of Utah should, about this time, have seriously thought of waging war on such a government. The Mormons, however, were more concerned with the removal of Brigham Young from his position as Territorial Governor. They put judges to flight and, under the name of Danites or destroying angels, their desperadoes inaugurated a small reign of terror. Buchanan supported his new Governor, Alfred Cumming, with forces under General Albert Sidney Johnston, who was much harassed, however, by the destruction of his supply trains. Congress hesitated to give the President all the troops needed, for fear he might use them in Kansas; but he managed the affair well, notwithstanding, and what with augmented forces and judicious pardons secured comparative tranquillity in Utah before the summer of 1858. But Congress still refused to give so strange and fanatical a sect the right either to form a State or to elect their own officers. Quite contemporaneously, however (1858), the more normally settled Minnesota was duly admitted to the ranks of the Free States, and Oregon was soon to follow (1859), slavery thus losing ground in the Senate. The first attempts at laying the Atlantic cable and thus linking America more completely with the rest of the civilised world



should have taught the South the same lesson of her increasing political and commercial impotence in the face of advancing civilisation; but men learn all such lessons slowly, as, in its own sphere, the panic of 1857-1858, which was due to over-speculation and a defective currency, plainly showed.

The elections of 1858 proved that the Democrats had lost ground in the North and West. The most important fact to be remembered about the campaign is that it brought into national prominence the man who was to be Buchanan's successor and to do more than any other person to save the Union, Abraham Lincoln. Senator Douglas was a candidate for re-election to the Senate, and as his theory of popular sovereignty had been thoroughly discredited, it was quite plain that he would have to make a strong canvass if he expected to have enough of his friends sent to the legislature of Illinois to secure his election at the hands of that body. He could not, as in Great Britain, count on obtaining another seat if his natural constituents failed him. Against Douglas the Republicans set up Lincoln, and a memorable series of joint debates took place between them, Lincoln being the challenger.

At first thought one would have said that the odds were in favour of Douglas. "The little giant," as his friends called him, was very popular, and an orator trained in all the tricks that capture an uneducated crowd. Besides he had had great experience as a public man and possessed the prestige of leadership. But the tall, awkward man who stood up against him really won the debates and the admiration of the North and West, although he lost the election for the Senate. Lincoln had the advantage of Douglas in his finer moral character, and

his ultimate victory should always be remembered by those critics who are inclined to doubt whether a democratic government can be really stable. American history seems to show that moral worth sooner or later makes its due impression on the popular mind and hence on the policy of the nation. It was his moral worth joined to his shrewd, self-trained intelligence that brought Lincoln into this memorable campaign. Only the possession of moral and mental excellence could have made the boy born in 1809 in a shiftless Kentucky home—not far from the birthplace of his patrician rival, Jefferson Davis—into a trained lawyer, an excellent speaker, and a politician respected by an entire State. Yet this was what Lincoln had become after splitting rails, running a flat-boat to New Orleans, keeping a country store, and practising as a self-educated attorney. Only in America could such a man have rapidly made his way to the legislature, secured a term in Congress—which he did not care to repeat—risen to the top of the local bar and been honoured by a minority party with its votes for a vacancy in the United States Senate. Of course Lincoln's kindness, his quaint humour, his flavour of the soil helped to give him the hold he obtained upon his fellow-citizens, but his moral elevation and his mental clarity counted for more, just as they count for more to-day. It should be remarked, however, that although it is probably true that we have, in the Lincoln who emerges grandly from the debates with Douglas, the most typical of all Americans, it does not follow, as so many recent writers seem to suppose, that we have in him the ideal American. Although all truly great men may be said, in a sense, to spring from the soil, and although they

must continue to stand upon it if they are to do their full service to humanity, they must not too constantly remind us of their earthy origin—the grime of the soil must not cling to their faces and their garments. But for all his nobility Lincoln shows traces of the soil; hence he is not so ideal, so supreme a man as Washington, nor one whom the nation can afford to set as an exemplar beside that unapproachable figure. A democratic country naturally prefers a hero who partakes in slight measure of its foibles, its eccentricities, its vulgarity; but this is precisely the reason why such a country should select a more ideal hero standing somewhat aloof and, in admiring and imitating him, purge itself of its grossness.

But if Lincoln was not entirely of the heroic race of the Washingtons, the Alfreds, the Pericleses of mankind, he showed himself in these debates possessed of not a little of the shrewdness of Jefferson. He forced Douglas to declare that even if slaveholders could constitutionally bring their dreaded property into any Territory, they might be forced out at once by “unfriendly legislation” against the institution of slavery. This answer helped Douglas enough with the anti-slavery men of Illinois to win him his coveted seat in the Senate, but it was an answer that displeased the South, and two years later lost him the presidency. Lincoln was shrewd enough to see that his question placed Douglas in a dilemma from which he would escape in the way that promised best for the current campaign: he could hardly have foreseen that he himself would be the man to profit from that answer eventually. Yet while Lincoln was shrewd, he was also bold, and, what is more, was wise. It is to this

campaign that we owe his prophetic statement, which alarmed his timid friends, to the effect that "a house divided against itself cannot stand," that the government of the United States could not "endure permanently half slave and half free," and that he did "not expect the Union to be dissolved." In these words spoke not only "honest Abe Lincoln," but also wise, bold, patient, loyal Abraham Lincoln, great statesman, patriot, and philanthropist.

Far less promising than this utterance was the wild message shortly after sent in by Buchanan, who seemed to think, as so many short-sighted statesmen have done, that a foolish foreign policy is better than a troublesome domestic one. He believed that Mexico and Central America should be looked after, in a military way, and that Cuba should be purchased, and a year later he returned to the charge. Yet he also had to propose a revision of the tariff in order to meet a deficit, and was finally glad enough to be allowed a reissue of treasury notes.

The year 1859 was marked by one event which the passions of the country necessarily magnified—John Brown's raid. Kansas had nearly ceased "bleeding," and even exciting State elections and wild Southern speeches on the necessity of reopening the foreign slave trade had not availed to convince people that a crisis was really at hand. The foolish exploit of a crack-brained old man sufficed, however, to awake all except very sound sleepers. As a combination of a martyr and an outlaw, John Brown is a most picturesque figure, but as a person of historical importance he does not bear very close scrutiny. There can be no doubt that he had his own ideas of righteousness, which would have been partly congenial to a Hebrew prophet or to one of

Cromwell's troopers, but were unintelligible to most of his fellow-citizens living south of Pennsylvania. He believed in abolition and had brooded on the condition of the slaves until his mind had become unhinged. Unfortunately for his fame it is hard to determine the exact extent of this derangement, while it is abundantly clear that during his career as a liberator in Kansas he played the part of a red-handed murderer who destroyed his victims at midnight merely because they happened to own slaves. Such a man ought not to have received, after this, money and encouragement from Northern abolitionists, but he did, and in October, 1859, made a foolish attack upon Harper's Ferry on the Virginian side of the Potomac. He had about a score of supporters, a small supply of arms, and a still smaller supply of money. Yet he managed to capture the United States arsenal without trouble, stopped a train and then let it go on to bear the news of his exploit, and in a few hours had spread consternation, not only throughout Virginia, but throughout the country. Soon, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived with a detachment of marines and the arsenal was broken in, Brown and a few of his companions being secured and the hostages they had captured being rescued unharmed.

The military farce having ended, the judicial tragedy began. Brown's trial was pushed forward, he was convicted as a matter of course, and was hanged on December 2. His offence, sufficiently grave at any time, was especially heinous to Southerners, whose slaves, if they had not risen on this occasion, might on another. Slavery is bad enough, but a servile war is worse, and this is what



Brown had aimed at. To hold him up, therefore, as a genuine martyr at this late day and seriously to condemn the people of Virginia and the South for losing their self-possession in the crisis is little short of ridiculous. The North lost its head just as completely when it denounced the South for its conduct. Yet there can be no question that whatever the wickedness of his Kansas career or the folly of his Harper's Ferry raid, Brown's manly conduct at his trial and his execution commands respect and suggests the thought that confinement for life would have been a more politic punishment for his offence. Yet no people placed in the situation of the Virginians could have been politic, and if blood demands blood, justice of a puritanic sort was inflicted on Brown. But he had his revenge upon the people that hanged him as well as upon those who had egged him on to his fanatical enterprise. In fact he had his revenge upon the country which had tolerated the institution ultimately responsible for his death. His gibbeted body really went "marching on" before both hostile armies in the Civil War, not merely before the troops who sang the famous song.

The Thirty-sixth Congress, a rather motley body, especially in the House which, with neither Republicans nor Democrats in a majority, took nearly two months to elect a Speaker, naturally investigated the John Brown raid, but found no evidence to sustain the Southern charge that a general conspiracy for the destruction of slavery existed in the North. It also authorised what is known as the Covode Investigation, from the name of the Pennsylvania Representative who proposed it. The object of this inquiry was to establish the truth or

falsity of charges of bribery and other forms of corruption that had been made against Buchanan's Administration.\* Truth emerged in a very unpleasant form, although no individual was punished and little good was done the country. Dishonesty and servility continued, as they had done before and as they have done since, to endeavour to shield themselves by bluster and "buncombe" about the necessity for foreign conquests.

But the Covode Investigation soon paled before the nominating conventions of the great parties. The Democrats met at Charleston in April, and there in the hot-bed of pro-slavery radicalism the fate of the party was sealed for the time being. Extreme Southerners upheld the view of Jefferson Davis that Congress not only could not interfere with the right of a Southerner to carry his slaves into a Territory, but ought to protect that right by adequate legislation. The Northern or Douglas Democrats, especially after their leader's famous answer to Lincoln, could not uphold this view, and many of the Southerners seceded, leaving the convention, which could not poll a two-thirds vote for any candidate, to adjourn to Baltimore. At Baltimore there was a further secession, but Douglas was finally nominated, with Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia as his companion. Both bodies of seceders, after holding separate conventions, managed to unite on a single ticket consisting of John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky and Joseph Lane of Oregon. Moderate men, of whom there were still not a few in the country, met also in Baltimore as a "Constitutional Union" Convention. They inherited

\* The President made a dignified "protest" against the whole proceeding.

the Know-Nothing policy of bandaging the eyes of the public in the presence of slavery, and put up John Bell of Tennessee and Edward Everett of Massachusetts to bear their forlorn standard.

The Republicans met in or about the middle of May in the metropolis of the North-West, Chicago, which even then was noted for its push and self-consciousness. The choice of a proper candidate was especially important, not only because of the newness, but also on account of the heterogeneity of the party. Seward of New York was obviously entitled to the nomination on the score of past services and of intellectual eminence; next to him probably came Chase of Ohio. But Chicago was in Lincoln's State, and the local politicians made the best of their opportunity to push him forward. His debates with Douglas had won him a national reputation, which he had recently increased by a remarkable speech on the slavery question at the Cooper Institute in New York—a speech which deserves to rank among the masterpieces of American oratory. Thus Lincoln was favourably known and fortunately had made no such enemies as the more prominent Seward had done. When the voting commenced it was found that the Western candidate stood next to Seward; the second ballot brought him nearly up to the leader, the third gave him a majority—the Republicans not hampering themselves with the two-thirds rule that had so frequently hurt the Democrats. Yet after all Lincoln's nomination illustrated the luck of the Republic rather than its wisdom, for he was really only the "favourite son" of a crude locality and might, for aught the cheering delegates knew, prove a complete failure as an executive. The convention, however, left their vast

“Wigwam” with enthusiasm, having chosen Hannibal Hamlin of Maine to complete the most important ticket ever put forth in America.

The campaign that followed was too intense to be very noisy. The Republicans laboured under the disadvantage of being plainly a sectional party, but they had the advantage of moral earnestness and of being united among themselves, for even Seward supported Lincoln sturdily. They had the further advantage of having a divided party against them. Breckinridge had the support of the ultra-Southerners, who were rapidly increasing in numbers, as well as the secret good wishes of the Administration; Douglas had his popularity and his energy to count on, but they finally brought him only 12 votes, less than a third of the number which the three border States of Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky gave to Bell, the candidate of the trimming Constitutional Unionists. Lincoln and Breckinridge were thus left to divide the bulk of the electoral votes between them, the former obtaining 180 to the latter's 72. Yet after all Douglas's popular vote came next to that of Lincoln, who might not have won against a single candidate.

Meanwhile the Southerners had been for months working themselves up to the determination to secede from the Union should a sectional candidate, a “Black Republican,” be elected. Leaders had threatened such a step for several years and had gradually brought many of their followers to agree with them as to its necessity. They failed to give the Republican party credit for honesty in its announced purpose of not interfering with the institution of slavery within the States; they ignored the fact that no constitutional amendment against

slavery could be passed without a larger majority in Congress than the Republicans could secure for years to come; they were not prudent enough to bide their ground and see what their enemies would attempt. They were simply overweening and rash and had been exasperated by abolitionist agitation. They had also taken deep and not unnatural umbrage at the "Personal Liberty Laws" passed in so many Free States in opposition to the national Fugitive Slave Law and, therefore, to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the Constitution. Besides they feared that if slavery were checked in the Territories and if no fresh fields could be acquired for it, it would gradually decay even within the original Slave States. But most of all, perhaps, they felt chagrined at their isolation in the midst of the civilised world, and were determined not merely to break a connection that galled them, but also to form a powerful republic which should show mankind that the stone rejected of the builders was the very best of corner-stones. In all this they were courageously sincere, and furthermore they believed thoroughly in their legal right to break what they regarded as a mere compact between sovereign States. Having made their threat, they intended to carry it out. South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida were practically prepared to act at once should the Republicans win. The other Far Southern States, though still reluctant, were rapidly being brought up to the point of seceding. The Border States\* were obviously divided in sentiments, but while

\* That is States lying between the seceding South and the loyal North and West, such as Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas may also be included.



clinging to the old Union could not be expected to lend a hand in coercing any seceding State or States. Thus matters stood when Lincoln was elected on November 6, 1860.

South Carolina was the first to act. Her legislature had continued in session until the election was over, and when no doubts remained as to Lincoln's victory, it called a State convention and made military preparations. The convention met in Columbia on December 17, but adjourned to Charleston, and on the 20th passed its famous "Ordinance to Dissolve the Union." Three commissioners were at once despatched to Washington to treat with the now foreign government of the United States with regard to forts and other property of the Union, and efforts were made to bring about the secession of other States and the formation of a Southern Confederacy. The first step in opposition to these momentous actions was taken by Major Robert Anderson of Kentucky, who, abandoning the untenable Fort Moultrie of which he was in charge, posted himself in Fort Sumter, which, being on an island, could be better held for the Union if succour were speedily provided by the authorities in Washington.

These latter were not, however, in a resolute mood. The President was vacillating and, though loyal to the Union, did not believe in the right to coerce a sovereign State.\* His position seems absurd, for to deny both the right of secession and that of coercion is practically to deny that the earth is inhabited by men instead of by metaphysical abstrac-

\* His last message had, however, one pleasant announcement, to wit that the complications with Great Britain with regard to Central America and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty were at an end,

tions. Yet when people base government on ideas of mere legality as Americans are constantly tempted to do, very queer ideas of political duty are sure to emerge. Buchanan was doubtless honest, but he was the worst Executive the country could have had at such a crisis. He had taken no measures to secure Union property in the South, probably yielding to his Southern Cabinet advisers; but he was at least strong enough to resist the demand of the Carolina Commissioners that Anderson should be ordered to evacuate Fort Sumter. He also in the end refused to receive communications from the commissioners after their disappointment in not getting their own way had made them insulting. Finally, too, he surrounded himself with a loyal Cabinet, through resignations which he was not courageous enough to force. Cobb's resignation removed an incompetent financier from the Treasury and Floyd's a distrusted head from the War Department. Cass left the Department of State for better reasons than his colleagues could give, for he was at heart loyal, but it was well that a more vigorous man should have so important a post at such a crisis. The reorganised Cabinet insisted on reinforcing Anderson at Fort Sumter, but the attempt was made with a merchant steamer, *The Star of the West*, which turned back at the fire of the Carolinian batteries (Jan. 9, 1861). This was not a very bold stroke on the part of the Administration, but it at least served the Southerners with matter for indignation and for charges that the North was bent on war. It also led to the discovery that Thompson, the Secretary of the Interior, had warned the Carolinians of the intended reinforcement. This Secretary now resigned, as he would

have done in any case, for his State, Mississippi, seceded on the same day that *The Star of the West* was fired on. Buchanan then concluded with the Southern politicians still left in Congress a sort of armistice by which he was to be allowed to finish out his régime in peace—the forts to be neither reinforced nor captured. It was a most cowardly compromise, but after all he was an old man bred upon political makeshifts, Congress was doing little or nothing to help him, and his now loyal advisers were new to their places and would keep them but a little while. The chief of these advisers deserve, however, to be named. They were Jeremiah S. Black, Secretary of State; Edwin M. Stanton, Attorney-General; Joseph Holt, Secretary of War; and John A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury. The latter is still remembered for his famous order to his subordinates: “If any man attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot”—an order with which Winfield Scott, who, old as he was, had been labouring for months to get Buchanan into an attitude of aggressive resistance, heartily concurred.

Meanwhile the four States of Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana had followed the examples of South Carolina and Mississippi, and had secured the forts and other Union property within their limits. As fast as they seceded, their Senators and Representatives at Washington would bow themselves out of Congress, Senators assuming sincerely the airs of plenipotentiaries withdrawing from a Congress of European powers. Texas followed the lead of her older sisters on February 1, 1861. Three days later the six original seceding States were represented in a Congress at Montgomery, Alabama, where a provisional government for a year was established

with Jefferson Davis as President and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia as Vice-President. Neither was a typical "fire-eater," as the ultra-secessionists were called, and Stephens had actually declared the movement for disunion to be by no means necessitated by the election of Lincoln; but both men believed firmly in the justice of their cause and Davis was destined to give it as hearty and efficient service, when his difficulties are duly weighed, as any cause can well hope to receive. The Constitution adopted differed from that of the United States mainly in safeguarding slavery. There was every disposition on the part of the founders of the new government to settle peaceably and equitably with the United States for the forts and other property taken, and the idea of war was unquestionably far from some Utopian minds. Davis, however, would have preferred to be commander-in-chief in reality rather than in theory, which goes to show that he at least knew that nations are not to be easily disrupted when they consist of States that have worked together for three-quarters of a century and more, whether under a compact or a constitution.

While the South was organising, efforts for preserving peace and the Union were being made both in and without Congress. In Congress Senator Crittenden of Kentucky, mindful of Henry Clay, advocated a compromise, which was seriously considered by a large committee representing both sections, but was finally defeated. Its chief features were the continuation of the line of  $36^{\circ} 30'$  across the continent as a slavery limit, guarantees against interference with slavery in the States, and payment by the general government for fugitive slaves detained in the Free States, which were to be ad-

jured to repeal their "Personal Liberty Laws." This compromise suited neither Republicans, who feared slavery extension to Cuba and Mexico, nor Southerners, whose desire for independence had been whetted. Equally ineffective was the so-called "Peace Convention" which held secret sessions at Washington during the month of February. It had been summoned through the efforts of Virginia, and, although twenty States were represented in it, was in reality an expression of the desires and sympathies of the Border States. In choosing ex-President Tyler to be its chief officer it gave, perhaps, sufficient evidence of the honest ineptitude of its intentions. Still these efforts at peace eased the consciences of some good men and should be treated by the historian with respect.

To describe the state of mind in which the country found itself during these months is almost impossible. The seceders were really less perturbed than any other people, since they had taken their great step, and if fighting was to ensue, they were very far from shunning it. The Border States had no doubt as to their love for both parties to the contest, but also no doubt as to their preference for the South and their intention to resist, if possible, any effort at coercion that the Federal government might make. As for the Northern States, they were willing to promise not to interfere with slavery in the States, to repeal Liberty Laws, to do anything in short that would preserve the Union without giving the Territories over to slavery. But their people were more divided in sentiment than augured well, at first, for the success of Lincoln's Administration. Abolitionists were still fanatical, Democrats were still dubious of the



propriety of coercing a Sovereign State or States, representatives of commerce feared the effects of protracted war upon wealth and industry. Not a few eminent men declared with Greeley that the best policy would be to "let the erring Sisters go in peace." But on the whole, while there was much hope that things would right themselves without bloodshed, a dogged determination to maintain the Union prevailed, and shrewd observers declared that the shop-keeping people, who, according to the "fire-eaters," could not be insulted into fighting, would rise to a man when once the flag had been fired on.

Such was the condition of affairs when Lincoln arrived secretly in Washington on February 23d. Scott had accomplished something toward strengthening the city, but the North had done little towards preparing for war and the South had done scarcely more. A few days after Lincoln's arrival the depleted Congress passed a new tariff act, with an increase of duties ranging from five to ten per cent., and authorised a fresh loan; thus the Treasury was propped up that it might bear the approaching strain. A new State was also added to the loyal list—Kansas, against the admission of which Southern votes could no longer be cast—and the Territories of Colorado, Nevada, and Dakota were organised. But when all is said, Buchanan and the Thirty-sixth Congress handed over to Lincoln the most difficult task that any American Executive has ever been called upon to undertake. What wonder that Europeans and many Americans thought that the Illinois rail-splitter would prove unequal to labours that would have sorely tried a Washington!

## CHAPTER XVI.

THE COUNTRY AND THE SECTIONS ON THE EVE OF  
THE CIVIL WAR.

THE census of 1840 showed for the entire country no gain in area, but the rate of increase of population for the preceding decade was again very large—32.67 per cent—and the total number of inhabitants was 17,069,453. The settled area inside the frontier line was a little over 800,000 square miles; outside the frontier it amounted to only 2,150 square miles; the average density of population was therefore 21.1, or, taking the entire area of the country, 8.20. Waste places are now practically found only in Northern New York, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Georgia—of the original thirteen States—and in Maine, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri of the new States. Only in Missouri, Arkansas, and Michigan, the three States admitted since 1820, was the unsettled area considerable; we see therefore that the process of filling in so characteristic of the decade 1820–1830 had been consistently followed. The Territory of Florida, owing to the Seminole War, showed no such gain in population as Territories had been wont to do. This was true also of Wisconsin Territory, as the remainder of the old Michigan Territory was now called, and of Iowa Territory, which had been carved out of Missouri Territory, the residuum left after the crea-

tion of the State of that name. The filling in had, of course, been greatest in the North- and South-West, the removal of Cherokees, Creeks, Sac and Fox, and other tribes to Indian Territory having freed intending settlers from their greatest dread. The spread of these settlers had been, indeed, so rapid in the North-West that the Mississippi River had been passed and occupied on the Iowa side.

As for the various sections, we find that the percentages of increase for both the North and South Atlantic States have fallen considerably, being respectively 21.99 and 7.67 as compared with 27.22 and 19.11. The drain to the North-West (which has increased from 87.49 to 108.11, Indiana alone showing a falling off) probably accounts for this in part for the Middle and New England States, of which New Jersey and Massachusetts alone show increased percentages. The drain to the South-West also affected the older Southern States, not one of which showed a gain in its percentage, and some of which, like Virginia and South and North Carolina exhibited a conspicuous falling off. Of the South-Western States, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana had gained largely the others had declined. As for the rank of the States in population, Virginia has changed places with Ohio and dropped to fourth. Tennessee has passed its parent, North Carolina, and its elder sister, Kentucky, and comes fifth. Kentucky, North Carolina, Massachusetts and Georgia follow. Next comes the new Indiana preceding the old South Carolina, with the new Alabama following. Maine and Illinois both precede Maryland, which has dropped from the eleventh to the fifteenth place. Missouri, Mississippi, New Jersey, Louisiana, Connecticut, Ver-

mont, New Hampshire, Michigan, Rhode Island, Arkansas, and Delaware follow in order, and suggest the fact that the newer States have been given liberal borders as compared with the older. Just below Delaware comes the Territory of Florida, while the tiny District of Columbia outranks Iowa and Wisconsin Territories. We need not concern ourselves so minutely with the growth of the cities, which was nevertheless marked, the proportion of urban to total population having increased from 6.72 to 8.52. New York, well up to the 300,000 mark, still leads; Brooklyn has made a great stride from the eighteenth to the seventh place; Louisville, Rochester, Buffalo have all ascended the scale, but Pittsburg as yet only holds its own. Just below Pittsburg and in the eighteenth place comes the manufacturing town of Lowell, Massachusetts, which has made the most remarkable upward leap of the decade.

Passing now over ten years we find that in 1850 the country's area has been increased to 2,980,959 square miles in consequence of the annexation of Texas, the treaty with Mexico, and the settlement of the Oregon dispute. By the census the population has risen to 23,191,876—giving a percentage of increase of 35.87, which is little less than that for 1810. The aggregate settled area, including that on the Pacific coast, is nearly 1,000,000 square miles; the density of settlement is therefore 23.7 to the square mile, although for the whole country it has naturally fallen to 7.78. Waste spaces within the frontier have almost entirely disappeared, and the three new States of Florida, Wisconsin, and Iowa have been added, besides Texas. California is ready for admission, and the new Territories of Minnesota, Oregon, and New Mexico have been organised.

With regard now to the relative gains of the sections, we find that New England and the Middle States have not merely held their own, but have decidedly augmented their percentage of increase, which is 27.60 as compared with 21.99 for the preceding decade. Indeed Maine is the only State whose percentage has not risen—a clear proof of the fact that the growth of trade and manufactures has made it profitable for the people of the North to bide at home and for incoming foreigners, of whom more will be said presently, to bide with them. The most remarkable figures are those given for the two manufacturing States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, their percentages of increase being respectively 34.81 and 35.57 for 1850 as compared with 20.85 and 11.97 for 1840. The South Atlantic States have increased even more, their percentage being 19.20 as compared with 7.67. Every State has gained save Georgia, which, like the North-Western States, could not expect to keep up its heavy percentages. The South-West, too, has not made such comparative gains save in Kentucky. The first five States have kept their relative ranking,—New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, Tennessee,—but Massachusetts has advanced to the sixth place, which, though lost between 1860 and 1880, was regained by it in 1890. Other noticeable changes are the rise of Indiana to seventh place, the upward ascent of Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin, and the continued dropping of North and South Carolina and Maryland. Texas stands just below Wisconsin and is twenty-fifth in rank. California would, if included, come twenty-ninth, and Delaware and Florida are last on the list of States, Minnesota being the least populous of the Terri-



tories, to which, by the way, Utah should really be added.

Urban growth in the decade has been remarkable, the proportion of city dwellers to total population having increased from 8.52 to 12.49. New York is above the 500,000 line; Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, New Orleans, Cincinnati, and Brooklyn are holding their own, although the City of the Creoles has had to change places with that of the Puritans. The greatest leap upwards has been made by St. Louis, which, instead of ranking twenty-fourth, is now the eighth city of the Union. Detroit, Albany, Syracuse have also made gains, but Charleston has again made a considerable drop—it is now only fifteenth among the cities. Other Southern towns like Richmond and Savannah have also sunk greatly in the scale. It is interesting to note that San Francisco and Chicago stand respectively twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth.

The year 1860 showed no increase in area save the strip of Arizona and New Mexico purchased by Gadsden in 1853; but the 44,641 square miles thus obtained had raised the national area to 3,025,600 square miles—an imperial domain, especially when compared with the 827,844 square miles with which the century was begun. Inside this great area we find that Minnesota, California, and Oregon have been admitted as States, and Kansas, Nebraska, Utah, and Washington organised as Territories. Population has been moving northward in Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin; westward in Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and the trans-Mississippi States to the South. In Florida and along the Gulf of Mexico there are waste strips, and the vacant patch in Northern New York remains,

but on the whole the filling in process has been remarkably successful. Within the frontier line of 5,300 miles there is a settled area of nearly 1,100,000 square miles, which is increased to nearly 1,200,000 when the outlying settlements are added in. As the aggregate population is now 31,443,321, the average density of settlement has risen to 26.3.

The percentage of increase of population continues large, being 35.58. Only Connecticut of the North Atlantic States has raised its ratio as compared with the preceding decade, and the South Atlantic States have fallen as well, as have also the South-Western States, save Texas. The North-West shows a gain, particularly in Illinois, which now ranks fourth in the whole Union. Virginia has dropped to fifth place, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Kentucky following. Wisconsin and Iowa have taken great upward strides; South Carolina, Maryland and the smaller New England States have sunk considerably in the scale. The urban ratio has meanwhile greatly increased, standing now at 16.13. New York has about 800,000 inhabitants; Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Baltimore, Boston, all following with great gains. Chicago has leaped from the twenty-fifth to the ninth place; San Francisco is now fifteenth. Milwaukee, Detroit, Cleveland have made remarkable progress; Norfolk and other Southern towns have dropped behind. Everywhere we find the influence of freedom or of slavery "writ large."

Nowhere are these influences more plainly shown than in an element of the population with which we have not hitherto had to deal—to wit, the foreign born. In the decade ending in 1830 not quite 150,000 immigrants seem to have come to the United

States. The next decade saw this number increase to almost 600,000. By 1850 over 1,700,000 more had arrived, while the next decade added nearly 2,600,000. Thus between 1831 and 1860 but little less than 5,000,000 immigrants had come in, most of whom threw in their lot permanently with the American people. As was natural, considering the condition of the country and especially its famines, Ireland furnished the largest number of immigrants between 1831 and 1860—a little over 1,900,000; but political revolutions and hard times on the Continent had also proved effective. Indeed in the decade ending in 1860 more Germans had come than Irishmen, and in all three decades there had been considerable accessions of Englishmen and Frenchmen. Immigration from Canada was also becoming noticeable, but as yet the Scandinavian countries and Italy and Hungary, which have played such a part in recent years, were only scantily represented. With comparatively few exceptions these foreigners settled in the North and West, avoiding the South, where, as they were labourers, not capitalists, they would have had to compete with negro slaves. Even to-day they will not compete with free negroes, and thus the population of the South is predominately native born. Such an accession of labourers was on the whole a blessing to the North and West, for they built railroads and towns and cleared up land for farms. In cities like New York they helped to make politics corrupt, but in the impending struggle they would naturally take sides with the Union. If the foreign element had not been loyal, or if it had been entirely absent, especially from the West, where it was often preponderant, the North would have had

a longer, perhaps an unsuccessful struggle against the South.

Another element of the population must now be considered—to wit, the negroes. In 1800, as we have seen, there were about 1,000,000 persons of colour, including free negroes and slaves, in a total population of a little over 4,300,000—a percentage of 18.88. Ten years later the percentage was 19.03, but from this point it steadily declined until in 1860 it was only 14.13—that is to say, of nearly 31,500,000 not quite 4,500,000 were negroes. In the South Atlantic States in this year 38.87 per cent. of the population consisted of slaves; in the South-Western States 35.34. Counting the population of all the slaveholding States, including Delaware and Missouri, as a little over 12,250,000, we see that the slaves formed slightly more than one-third of the number of inhabitants and that over nine-tenths of the 4,500,000 persons of colour were found in the South and South-West. Over 3,500,000 people lived in those Border slaveholding States which did not join the Confederacy, so that practically only about 8,700,000, or in round numbers 9,500,000, if the Southern sympathisers in the Border States are counted, were to be matched against the 19,000,000 whites of the North and West. But the States that actually formed the Confederacy contained about 3,500,000 negroes, so that if we were to say that for every six whites that the South could put into the field the North could put nineteen, we should not be very far wrong, but for one great fact which is too often forgotten. The Southern slaves, being docile, could be and were used to raise crops to support the Southern armies and could also be employed for manual labour in connection with

military operations. Thus the able-bodied whites of the South could rally to their flag in greater numbers, proportionally speaking, than would have been the case in any other country in the civilised world. The whites of the North on the other hand had to keep the country going during the war, as farmers, mechanics, *et cetera*, and to fill the Union armies as well. Hence the ratio of six to nineteen does not fairly represent the proportional military efficiency of the two sections. It would be difficult to obtain such a ratio, but it is at least clear that the North was distinctly the stronger, especially when it is remembered that with her wealth she could and did attract foreigners to her standard. The greater area of the South and its inferior density of population—no State in the Confederacy proper had an average density of 30 to the square mile—was a hindrance to both sections, but particularly to that which must be the invader.\*

Passing now to consider the character of the mighty people whose numbers and possessions of territory have thus far occupied us, we are safe in concluding that the thirty years from 1830 to 1860 have witnessed an intensification of the types of character already described, rather than a departure from them. The Southerner, for example, has changed, but he has done so by becoming more radically conservative of his institutions and more intense in his desire for political domination. Like all other Americans he had been affected by the craze for wealth, but, although, as we shall see, it is a mistake to assert that he did not wish to share in the

\* See the interesting essay entitled "Why the South was defeated in the Civil War," in Prof. A. B. Hart's *Practical Essays on American Government*. New York, 1894.



material development of the country, it is quite true to say that his vision was in the main circumscribed by his own cotton-fields. On the other hand the Northerner and the Westerner had become more intensely interested in developing the country's resources and their own fortunes, by devoting their days, either to trade, or commerce, or manufactures, or farming. The aggressive, alert American of Jackson's day was even more intensely alive in Lincoln's day. He had more colossal interests to attend to in the business world, and he had at last waked up to the fact that he must attend to his equally colossal interests in the political world. He was a less provincial man than he had been in 1830, and he had not allowed abolitionism, New England transcendentalism, or any other of the numerous *isms* of the epoch to unsettle his mind. His business enterprise and his cool practicality had not, however, lessened his patriotism, his honesty, his unaffected piety. He believed in the Republic, in his party, in his Church, in his State or town, and in his own business, trade or profession. If he displayed vulgarity or coarseness, his simplicity and good nature made amends; if he lacked strong and deep ideas, his mind was nevertheless quick and true within its limits. He was better educated than the average man of any other nation, and was seeing to it that his children should be better educated than he; he lived in greater comfort and gave it to his wife and daughters, to whom he was chivalrously devoted; he might put up with political mismanagement, but he must have the best omnibus, or railway, or steamboat, or hotel accommodation and service that money could buy. So he and his cities grew apace, and, if it were ever possible to include a man or a nation in a

formula, we might say that "Success in the big things and comfort in all things" was in 1860 the motto of America and of the average American. Both were soon, however, to have a nobler motto—"The Union must be preserved."

But there were also exceptional Americans. The Northern abolitionist and the Southern "fire-eater" belonged to this class. So did the New Englander who followed Emerson into the mists of Transcendentalism, and, at the other end of the scale, the ignorant man or woman who followed Joseph Smith and other founders of new religions and sects. America was large and populous enough to absorb not merely foreigners themselves, but their ideas and customs, save when the latter militated against the peace of the country. In other words, the microcosm of 1800 had become a macrocosm. But as the task of describing a macrocosm is one to which no finite mind is equal, we may find it advantageous to content ourselves with concluding this chapter with a few paragraphs dealing with certain concrete topics of interest.

As we have seen, the growth of towns in the North and West had been very marked. This was due in large measure to the increase of manufacturing centres and to the spread of railroads. In 1860 the capital invested in manufactures amounted to \$1,000,000,000, and the value of the net product was not far short of this sum. The average capital per establishment was a little over \$7,000—figures which have been doubled in the past thirty years, the use of expensive machinery having greatly increased. About one and a third million persons were employed in manufacturing, the average yearly wage amounting to nearly \$300, the hours of labour no

longer being counted from sunrise to sunset as in 1801, but having fallen to about ten. As his clothes and food were cheaper and better than ever before, the American labourer had little reason to complain, while his efficiency placed his employer in the same comfortable condition.

With regard to farming, we find that the number of farms has increased in a decade from 150,000 to 200,000, the average size being about 200 acres. In many respects the nation is still one of farmers, the value of their property amounting to over six and a half billions of dollars as compared with the three and a half billions of 1850. The average farm was worth about \$3,500—the highest figures in the last forty years. Such inventions as the McCormick reaper, which though patented early in the thirties did not come thoroughly into use until the fifties, aided the farmer greatly, as did also the repeal of the British corn laws. In 1860 over 800,000,000 bushels of corn and 170,000,000 bushels of wheat were raised. The cotton crops, which were in large part exported to Great Britain, were of course the chief support of the South, but it is worth noticing that this prime source of Southern wealth was mainly shipped in Northern vessels. Perceiving this fact Southerners held numerous commercial conventions, which always resolved that a direct trade must be established between Southern ports and Europe. But the vessels were not built any more than were the railroads which had been planned to tap the great West, and ports like Charleston steadily decayed. Yet at the beginning of the Civil War, as Professor Channing tells us, “the tonnage of the United States exceeded that of any other nation: no less than five and a half million tons of shipping

was registered under the American flag in comparison with four and a half millions on the British shipping list."

Even more startling was the showing made by America in the matter of railroads. In the past ten years over 20,000 miles had been built and there were about 30,000 miles in the whole country. There was too much jobbery and speculation in the construction of the roads, but they helped the regions through which they passed, while the comparative absence of them retarded the South. Closely akin to the spread of railways was the growth of express companies in the forties and fifties, and the development of postal business—private individuals taking the initiative in all three cases instead of the government, which did not issue postage stamps until after certain postmasters had issued them for their own convenience. We must also remember that it was not until 1844 that Morse's invention of the telegraph became practically effective over the line built between Baltimore and Washington. Fifteen years later telegraph lines covered the chief States and the great Western Union Company had been formed. The Atlantic Cable had also been laid in 1858, as we have seen, but it had soon ceased to work, and it was not made a thorough success until 1866.

It goes without saying that the inventiveness of the American did not decline during the period we are considering. According to Professor McMaster, while not quite 12,000 patents had been issued between 1790 and 1840, nearly 43,500 had been issued by 1860. Elias Howe patented his sewing machine in 1846, and soon had a number of rival inventors in the field against him. Two years before Goodyear had succeeded in vulcanising india-rubber. During

the forties daguerreotypes were perfected and aesthetics discovered. In the fifties an electric fire alarm system and steam fire engines made less dangerous a scourge peculiarly devastating to American cities. The same decade saw the time between New York and Liverpool brought down below twelve days by the rival Collins and Cunard lines. Verily it was a period of transformation, and, prior to the panic of 1857, it was also one of prosperity. Imports and exports were three times as great as at the beginning of the period we are treating, and although the tariff was very low, manufactures, as we have seen, had greatly increased.

But the gain had not been entirely material. In science the names of Asa Gray, Dana, Henry, Silliman, and Agassiz had continued for Americans the fame first won by Franklin. In literature New Englanders had done notable work. With Emerson in philosophy, Hawthorne in romance, Prescott and Motley in history, American prose took a distinguished even if not a commanding position. In poetry Longfellow, Whittier, Lowell and Holmes had won some readers abroad and many at home. Mrs. Stowe in her *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had not only stirred up greatly the conscience of the North on the subject of slavery, but had also produced a book that seemed and seems likely to be a world classic. What is just as much to the point, the rank and file of writers were producing much less callow work, and the newspapers and magazines had conspicuously improved. There had been a great extension, too, of the lecture or "lyceum" system, Emerson, Henry Ward Beecher, Wendell Phillips, and the scholarly Edward Everett being among the speakers. Altogether, even if transcendentalism had simmered



down, New England had done much to awaken the national mind and to improve the national morals, and the Middle States had seconded her efforts.

It would be wrong to say, as some historians are inclined to do, that the South had no share in the wonderful material and mental development we have just been sketching, for after all the Southerner was an American. As we have seen, he struggled to establish railroads, and by 1860 had built about 10,000 miles, but, owing chiefly to his lack of facility in floating loans and to his improvident habits, his great plans could not be realised. His transatlantic packet lines and his flourishing ports also remained dreams, and shortly before 1860 he actually had visions of reopening the foreign slave-trade! His hands were shackled but not his mind, as he proved by his incessant political activity. He might have only eight cotton mills to the North's one hundred, but as long as he sent his bales, amounting to millions, to Great Britain and the North and received in return imported or domestic manufactured goods he was contributing his share to the country's prosperity. He had done much, moreover, to help the Union to win its great accessions of territory during the century. He felt also that he had preserved the native American type in an uncontaminated form, and that his private manners and morals gave a touch of distinction to American life. Perhaps he did not realise that, as he had fallen so far behind his age with regard to slavery, his patriarchal system of society could have little influence upon the busy world outside; perhaps, too, he spoke far more harshly and disrespectfully of that world than it merited; but we should never forget that he was born to his position and that he did not deserve the

harsh things said about him by the abolitionists. He was not cruel, and, in the aristocracy at least, he was not ignorant. A Southerner by descent and early training, Edgar Allan Poe had already shown himself to be the most artistic and perhaps the most original of all American writers. A Southerner, Matthew F. Maury, had made valuable contributions to the physical geography of the sea. And if Poe and Maury and William Gilmore Simms, the romancer, and Henry Timrod, the poet, are about all the Southern names worth counting in the annals of *ante-bellum* literature and science, it should be remembered that country gentlemen have rarely anywhere in the world done great things in these departments of human achievement. Yet even in our busy century there is room for the country gentleman, especially when from his class come such men as Washington in the eighteenth century and Robert E. Lee in the nineteenth.

The mention of General Lee reminds us, however, that it is time to deal with the great struggle which is to test the respective merits of the two civilisations we have been describing. The philosopher and the poet may regret that the best qualities of both sections could not have been blended peaceably; but the historian sees that this could not have been, and rejoices that the issue of the contest made for the downfall of slavery and the strengthening of national bonds.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THE CIVIL WAR.

LINCOLN's inaugural address must have convinced people who were capable of setting aside their own theories and believing the straightforward utterances of a plain-spoken man, that he intended to uphold the Union and to secure obedience to its laws in the seceded States. This meant war, or submission on the part of the latter. Yet while determined, the new President was far from rash, as the careful make-up of his Cabinet showed. His presidential rivals, Seward, Chase, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, and Edward Bates of Missouri, were made Secretaries of State, the Treasury, War, and Attorney-General respectively. Gideon Welles of Connecticut was placed at the head of the Navy. It was not a Cabinet that satisfied every one, but at least it was not the Cabinet of a partisan. Yet Lincoln dominated it more and more, just as Jefferson Davis dominated his own inferior Cabinet, but the Northern President had to use more tact in order to avoid the appearance of playing the part of a dictator. He had indeed to exercise tact from the first, for Seward feared the issue of a civil war, but did not hesitate to inform Lincoln that he was quite willing to run the government in the latter's name. After quietly putting Seward down and, later, showing his freedom from prejudice by making a per-

sonal opponent, Edwin M. Stanton, formerly of Buchanan's Cabinet, Secretary of War in Cameron's place,\* Lincoln governed prudently and gently, not without making mistakes indeed, but always profiting from experience and always relying on plain dealing and calm thinking. The results he accomplished were so tremendous that it is difficult to avoid exaggerating his personal genius.

For some weeks nothing of moment was done by either side. Commissioners from the Confederacy discussed informally the surrender of Fort Sumter and got the unfortunate impression from Seward that it would be abandoned; but Lincoln finally gave notice that he would reinforce it, whereupon the Confederates opened fire and Anderson was compelled to surrender on April 14. As had been predicted this meant the precipitation of a civil war greater than any other known to history. Lincoln immediately called for 75,000 volunteers, the North responding with a will, and Massachusetts with a promptness due largely to her energetic Governor, John A. Andrew.† The Border States also had their answer ready for the President. At Baltimore the Massachusetts troops had to fire on a mob, while before the end of May Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia had joined the Confederacy. Tennessee joined in an irregular fashion shortly after, but sentiment

\* Next to Lincoln, Stanton probably did more for the Union cause than any other civilian. He was an unlovely character, however, who made many enemies both in the North and in the South.

† In particular, Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and Governor Andrew J. Curtin of Pennsylvania won, with Governor Andrew, the sobriquet of "War Governor" because of the heartiness with which they seconded the efforts of the Federal government.

in the State was greatly divided. So it was in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, each of which furnished thousands of troops to the Southern armies. Yet none of the three left the Union, though some Missourians made an abortive attempt to do so. The retention of these very important States was largely due to Lincoln's patience and tact, seconded as they were by early military successes in Missouri. Meanwhile the Confederates had removed their capital to Richmond and were prepared to threaten Washington itself, and, what was more important, had gained for their armies the soldier whom Winfield Scott thought to be the greatest master of the art of war then living, Robert E. Lee, as well as the most dashing and successful corps commander of modern times, Thomas J. Jackson, soon to be known as "Stonewall."

The first offensive movements of importance on the part of the Federal forces were directed against the Western and the Eastern parts of Virginia, a State which was destined to be the battleground *par excellence* of the war. The former movement under General George B. McClellan was successful, for the Virginia mountaineers, like those of Tennessee and North Carolina, clung to the Union. Later in 1861 General Lee was sent into Western Virginia to retrieve matters, but the task was impossible and his failure temporarily eclipsed his military fame. As a result forty counties in the region set up a government of their own, the State thus irregularly formed being admitted to the Union by Congress on the last day of 1862. This partition of Virginia without her consent was unconstitutional,\* but a legal fiction

\* See Appendix A., article 4, section 3.



satisfied the consciences of men engaged in carrying on a great war.\*

The movement against Eastern Virginia resulted much more disastrously for the Union than that against Western Virginia for the South. General McDowell was defeated on July 21, by Generals Joseph E. Johnston and G. P. Beauregard at Manassas, Va., a few miles from Washington. The battle was stubborn, but ended in a complete rout.† The spirits of the Confederates accordingly rose high and they regarded final victory as certain. They had predicted that Northern soldiers would run; they knew that the Southern officers who had resigned from the Union army to follow their States had left few peers behind them. What they failed to perceive was that a temporary advantage was not a permanent one. Northern life was less favourable than Southern for producing volunteers efficient from the start, but a few reverses and constant drilling would soon atone for this disadvantage. Southern generals were, and on the whole remained, superior to Northern ones; the North also had the heavier task that falls to the invader; but cotton, the South's one staple, if blockaded, would be useless, and the North possessed a navy, a large population, and both wealth and energy. The balance of advantage rested, therefore, with her, and the South was doomed unless foreign nations would do more than merely recognise her belligerent rights. For a time there seemed to be a chance of such aid, especially from

\* The consent of the government set up by the Virginia loyalists was of course obtained, but this was not the real Virginia contemplated by the Constitution, as even such a radical as Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, confessed.

† This battle is also known as that of Bull Run.

England, where the upper classes were largely hostile to the North, and where excitement was caused late in 1861 when the British steamer *Trent* was overhauled and two Confederate Commissioners to Great Britain and France, Mason and Slidell, were taken from her deck. But the Union repaired its fault as best it could, and the sympathy of such men as Bright and Cobden and of the labouring classes kept Great Britain out of the struggle. The year closed with the South confident and the North grimly in earnest, but after all it had been more a year of preparations than of actual achievements.

1862 opened with two series of efforts—to gain Richmond and to secure control of the Mississippi River; the former was frustrated; the latter, which was almost necessary to the former, was successful. General Ulysses S. Grant, aided by gunboats, took Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River. General John Pope, similarly aided, cleared the Mississippi as far as Memphis. Grant meanwhile ascended the Tennessee, which by its winding course gave access to Alabama and Mississippi, and threatened the railway between Memphis and Chattanooga—an enterprise which, if successful, would render the State of Tennessee useless to the Confederacy. On April 6, the Confederates under General Albert Sidney Johnston attacked the Federals at Shiloh and drove them back; but Grant was nothing if not tenacious, and, having been reinforced, within twenty-four hours turned the tables on the enemy, whose gallant commander had been slain. A still more important success came to the Federals a few days later when Commodore Farragut, with extraordinary bravery, ran his vessels past the Confederate forts and took New Orleans,

which had no Andrew Jackson to defend it.\* General Halleck, who commanded all the armies of the West, then took Corinth, Mississippi and Memphis, Tennessee. The town of Vicksburg, in the former State, was now practically the only obstacle to complete Federal control of the great river. It was deemed more important, however, to endeavour to gain possession of Chattanooga and Eastern Tennessee and thus partly to cut off Virginia from the Gulf States. This took time, however, especially as General Braxton Bragg put much energy into the Confederate movements. He actually threatened Louisville, Kentucky, but the battle of Perryville (October 8, 1862) forced him back to Chattanooga. He ventured out again, and was repelled at the beginning of the new year after three days of terrific fighting around Murfreesboro, a small town not far from Nashville. Other repulses had been experienced by the Confederates when they attacked the Federal forces left at Corinth, but nearly a year was to elapse before Bragg would be forced to evacuate Chattanooga, so that the Union commanders can hardly be said to have followed up with any marked success the splendid advantages gained in the spring of 1862. Finally, however, Grant, after several failures which only brought out his dogged persistence, gained a position in the rear of Vicksburg and its redoubtable fortresses, and after a long siege compelled the Confederate commander, Pemberton, to surrender (July 4, 1863). In a few weeks the whole of the Mississippi was clear. Texas and Ar-

\* David G. Farragut was, like Scott and Thomas, a Southerner. His capture of Mobile in 1864 was one of the greatest exploits in naval history. In 1866 he became the first American admiral.

kansas were thus cut off from the Confederacy; Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee were rendered of little value to it; and the Atlantic States could be attacked from the West as well as from the North. But we must now consider the movements in the East.

The early spring of 1862 witnessed an important naval combat near Norfolk between the *Virginia*, which was the old frigate *Merrimac* turned into a floating iron house with a beak for ramming, and John Ericsson's new war vessel the *Monitor*, which was too far submerged and too heavily armoured to fear even the *Virginia*, although the latter had just destroyed two frigates. The two strange vessels fought one another for four hours; then the *Virginia* retired to Norfolk and her career was over. The other Confederate naval exploits were confined mainly to privateers fitted out in foreign ports. As the Union navy was strengthened, these dreaded vessels were gradually disposed of, and Southern harbours, some of the most important of which were taken early in the war, were effectively blockaded.\* Thus not only was cotton, the South's main hope and sinew of war, prevented from finding a market abroad, but munitions and supplies of all kinds were kept out of the devoted region. Much privation ensued, in spite of the fact that the people developed an inventiveness and a capacity for manufacturing that were astonishing in view of their previous absorption in agriculture. But neither courage nor capacity could prevail against privation and bad financier-

\* The most famous of these privateers was the *Alabama*, Captain Raphael Semmes. This vessel was built in England and gave rise to the "Alabama Claims" to be mentioned later. She was destroyed by the *Kearsarge*, June 19, 1864.

ing combined, and the splendid victories now to be recounted could only prolong the struggle and give the Southerners the consciousness that they had fought as gallantly for their cause as any people in history.

General McClellan was given command of the great Army of the Potomac with which Mr Lincoln's Administration hoped to capture the Confederate capital before the end of 1862. He organised and equipped it splendidly, and, reaching Fortress Monroe by water, began his march toward Richmond by moving up the Peninsula.\* He was a slow mover, however, and allowed the Confederates under Joseph E. Johnston to hamper him more than was probably necessary. Nevertheless, by the end of May, he was within ten miles of Richmond, and the great but indecisive battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks was fought on the 31st of the month. General Johnston having been wounded, the command of the Confederates devolved upon General Robert E. Lee, who since his failure in West Virginia had been doing admirable engineering work on the coast defences of South Carolina and Georgia. He strengthened his army and rested nearly a month before he took the offensive. Then, supported by "Stonewall" Jackson, he attacked McClellan in a series of battles, beginning on June 26, which are known as the Seven Days' Fighting Around Richmond. The result was that McClellan retreated steadily, although his troops did splendid fighting, until he reached a point on the James River where he was safe under the fire of his gunboats. Lee thought that with proper support he could have annihilated his opponent; it is at least certain that he outgeneralled McClellan and saved

\* Between the York and James Rivers.



Richmond for the time being. He also laid a firm foundation for his own fame and made his Army of Northern Virginia one of the finest fighting organisations the world has ever known.

Meanwhile Mr. Lincoln's Administration had not yet learned how best to raise troops and was committing the mistake of trying one general after another, such was the eagerness both of the government and of the people of the North to win decisive victories and bring the war to an end. Lincoln was a great statesman, but he was after all a civilian, and it is a serious question whether much of his management of the war in its early stages shows genius. He did show patience, however, and a disposition to learn, and after Grant, Sherman and others forced themselves to the front as great generals, he wisely trusted them. General Pope, who was put in command of the hastily organised Army of Virginia, was not a great general, though he had done well in the West. After issuing braggadocio proclamations he allowed himself to be flanked by Jackson and was totally defeated by the Confederates under Lee on August 30, 1862, at the very Manassas that had already witnessed one Union defeat.

Lee immediately followed up his victory by invading Maryland, judging that success would relieve Virginia from invasion and perhaps help to withdraw Maryland from the Union. He despatched Jackson to take Harper's Ferry, and, while this exploit was being performed, was himself put in an awkward situation through the fact that his order outlining his campaign fell into McClellan's hands by a pure accident. But although the latter acted with more than his usual energy—he was a great organiser but no fighter—Lee managed to get his

scattered troops together and to fight the battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam on September 17 (1862) with very great skill. He was outnumbered and the bloody battle was after all drawn, but the superiority of Lee as a commander was made quite apparent. He was forced, however, to return to Virginia and the campaign was really a failure. The drawn battle was magnified into a victory by the Federals and served Mr. Lincoln as a pretext for issuing on September 22 an important proclamation. This announced that unless the Southern States returned to their allegiance by January 1, 1863, the President would declare free all slaves in the rebellious portions of the country. No Southern State yielding obedience, the famous Emancipation Proclamation duly followed. This was strictly a war measure and was curiously in line with a suggestion made years before by John Quincy Adams. Federal generals had previously tried the policy but had been overruled by Lincoln, who, with his usual tact, had perceived that the Northern people were at first fighting for the preservation of the Union rather than for the abolition of slavery. He had gradually become convinced, however, that the long war could be better fought out on two issues than one, and the effect upon foreign nations of turning the contest into one for liberty could not be gainsaid. Of course his step was unconstitutional, but, all things considered, it was the act of a statesman, although it temporarily hurt the Republican party, the fall elections in several important States decidedly favouring the Democrats. Finally, however, its wisdom was acknowledged in the North, and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution,\* which became law by the end

\* See Appendix A.

of 1865, corrected all technical defects and left the great Republic a free nation.

The South's first answer to the Proclamation of September was the bloody battle of Fredericksburg fought on December 13, 1862, Lee thoroughly defeating General A. E. Burnside, who had superseded General McClellan.

General Joseph Hooker was next sent against Lee in the spring of 1863, but was worsted in the famous battle of Chancellorsville (May 2--3), which cost the South the life of "Stonewall" Jackson. Lee then resolved upon another invasion of the North and moved forward with consummate skill his ragged but indomitable troops. A mistake on the part of his famous cavalry leader, General J. E. B. Stuart, deprived him, however, of needed information, and he had to fight the tremendous three days' battle of Gettysburg (Pennsylvania) on ground not of his choosing. Whether under any circumstances he could have won these battles of July 1, 2, and 3, 1863, is a moot point, but it does seem that his plans were well laid and that his defeat was chiefly due to remissness on the part of his subordinates. Even after Pickett's famous charge, a very effective army was left which would have tasked General George Gordon Meade, the opposing commander, quite severely; but Lee's ammunition was low and he felt obliged to retreat, which he did in excellent order. Meade followed him into Virginia, but little further fighting was done in the East until 1864. The backbone of the Confederacy had been weakened, though not broken, and ultimate defeat was only a question of time. Perhaps a victory by Lee might have meant a serious if not a fatal set-back to Lincoln's Administration, for the recent Draft Act which compelled

conscription by lot was very unpopular and led to serious riots in New York City just after the battle of Gettysburg. Such matters cannot be decided, however, and after all, conscription was working worse in the South, for not only were there complaints against it, but it was taking every effective man for the army and leaving merely the women, children and slaves—who behaved admirably, thus giving the lie to reports of their maltreatment—to work the plantations from which alone supplies could be obtained.\*

We must now turn for a moment to the West. Bragg was able to hold Chattanooga for several months, but Federal movements under Rosecrans rendered his position precarious in the summer of 1863 and he evacuated the town. But on September 19th and 20th he surprised Rosecrans at Chickamauga near by and defeated him badly, the fine generalship of General George H. Thomas, a Virginian who had sided with the Union, alone preventing a rout. Grant then took command, his Vicksburg campaign being over, and under his directions the Confederates were badly defeated on November 24 and 25 in spite of their strong positions on Missionary Ridge and Look-out Mountain just outside Chattanooga. Thomas, W. T. Sherman, and Hooker were the three subordinate generals who achieved these victories, and the courage of their soldiers in storming the frowning heights should have convinced the persons who had denied that Northern men could fight of the folly of passing rash judgments upon a whole people.

\* Much criticism was caused by conscription measures in the South, Mr. Davis being harshly assailed by Governor Jos. E. Brown, of Georgia. Even the Vice-President, A. H. Stephens, stood aloof from the Administration at Richmond.

Indeed nothing is more certain than that the mutual ignorance of the sections had a great deal to do with bringing on and, perhaps, with prolonging the war.

His successes in Mississippi and Tennessee had now clearly proved that Grant was the great soldier for whom Lincoln had been praying; accordingly in March, 1864, he was made Lieutenant-General, and took charge of all operations, attending personally to the campaign in Virginia and leaving Sherman in charge in the South-West. The latter attacked the important though small town of Atlanta, forcing, through his superiority of numbers, a steady retreat of the Confederates under Joseph E. Johnston. Retreating, even when done in a masterly fashion, was not to Southern taste, and Mr. Davis, who seems not to have appreciated Johnston as Lee did, substituted the former commander for the more impetuous Hood. But Hood's attacks on Sherman were unavailing, and when he tried to draw the Northern general away from Atlanta, Sherman merely detached Thomas and Schofield to follow him, and himself destroyed the manufacturing establishments of the town. Then he moved through Georgia in his famous "March to the Sea"—an expedition which no opposing army rendered glorious, but which was grandiose enough and showed plainly how thoroughly exhausted the South was. Danger from Hood and Lee was indeed talked about, but was hardly within the range of possibility. Late in December Savannah was taken; then a northward march was made with the object of preventing support and supplies reaching Lee, who was grappling with Grant in Virginia. No danger was now to be apprehended from Hood, whose army had been absolutely demolished by Thomas at Nashville on December 15.



South Carolina fell an easy prey, the State capital, Columbia, being given to the flames, whether maliciously or not has never been determined.\* It is certain, however, that greater destruction of private property attended Sherman's marches than should have been the case in a war waged against commanders like Lee, who repressed pillage sternly. Lee, who was now in command of all the Southern forces, was, as we shall soon see, too hard pressed himself to come to the relief of the State whose defences he had so greatly strengthened three years before, but he did the best he could by sending Johnston to command once more against Sherman. Yet retreating was again in order, for it was all that could be done, and finally Johnston surrendered to Sherman near Raleigh, North Carolina, on April 26th, 1865, seventeen days after Lee had succumbed.

Meanwhile the Army of the Potomac had opened its campaign of 1864 with 120,000 admirably equipped troops, to whom Lee could oppose only half as many ragged veterans. In his eagerness to move on Richmond, Grant crossed the Rapidan River on May 4 and plunged into a tangled bit of country known as the Wilderness, where Lee had him at a disadvantage. Terrible fighting took place on May 5th and 6th and Grant withdrew to Spottsylvania Court House. Lee forestalled his intentions and barred his line of march, with the result that four days of continuous fighting followed, Grant now aiming, as McClellan had done before, to force his

\* The Northern view is that the fire was caused by Confederate burning of cotton; the Southern that it was wantonly started. The evidence is very conflicting, but the burning of Chambersburg (Penn.) a few months earlier by order of the Confederate General Early ought to be remembered in this connection.

way out and reach the James River. The Federal assaults upon the Confederate intrenchments were heroic and frequent, but entailed tremendous loss. Grant proposed, however, to hammer away if it took "all summer," and as he had troops to squander, while Lee was steadily growing weaker, his methods may perhaps be commended from the point of view of politics. Turn where he would, however, Lee got in his way and battle after battle had to be fought until even the bravest of the Federal subordinates sickened at the carnage and Grant changed his plans. He finally joined Butler on the James and settled down to a siege of Petersburg by the middle of June. This town once taken, Richmond would inevitably fall, but nearly a year was to elapse before either consummation could be secured. Lee, suffering privations with his troops, was the same alert, undaunted commander behind trenches that he had been on many an open field, and the weaker his cause grew, the more sublime became his heroism and his patience. He would willingly have abandoned Richmond to its fate, but Mr. Davis clung to his capital, and the government of the South had long since centred in its unyielding President. Perhaps it was just as well that the great war was brought to an end slowly but at the same time effectually, for time was thus given to both sides for reflection, and when peace came there was no question that it was a final settlement of the issues that had divided the nation.

The end came in the spring of 1865.\* Late in

\* A "Peace Conference" was held at Hampton Roads on Feb. 3, 1865, between Lincoln and Seward on the one hand, and A. H. Stephens and two commissioners on the other. Reunion could not be agreed upon, and Lincoln, of course,

March Lee took the offensive for a moment, but in vain. On April 2 the weakly manned Confederate lines were broken. The next day Richmond surrendered, Mr. Davis having made his escape only to be captured later. Lee retreated to Amelia Court House, where he expected supplies, but failed to find them; then with famished and continually waning forces he pressed on to Appomattox Court House, Grant following his now doomed prey. On the 7th negotiations were entered into which were completed on the 9th at Appomattox in an interview between the two great commanders that is one of the most impressive in history. Grant gave most liberal terms, allowing the Confederate privates to keep their horses for the "spring ploughing," and the greatest war of modern times practically closed with this act of grace. Lee followed his soldiers into private life and devoted his remaining years—he died in 1870—to the endeavour to build up his wasted section and to restore the feeling of loyalty to the Union; Grant was destined to fill the highest office in the gift of the nation, but not to add to the laurels he had won as an indomitable fighter and generous man. The two generals when they parted at Appomattox really represented democracy as opposed to aristocracy, the new régime as opposed to the old. As a man and a general Lee was superior to his conqueror; he was the perfect flower of a civilisation. One cannot think of Grant as a perfect flower, but then there is compensation in the fact that he was the natural product of a soil not artificially enriched with unpleasant fertilisers. For after all democracy is better for the world at large stood out for this. Hence the conference was a failure, but it was a sign that peace was at hand.

and the masses, even if aristocracy does produce here and there a majestic and spotless character like Lee. Yet Grant was not democracy's greatest product. It is the patient, kindly President at Washington, who guided the Union with a steady hand through its manifold dangers, who never felt a trace of enmity either toward the foes who opposed his Administration from without or toward the captious critics who hampered it from within—it is Abraham Lincoln that best deserves to be set over against Robert E. Lee. Some persons may continue to prefer, in their capacity as individuals, the latter hero; but this preference need not preclude their recognising the fact that the civilisation for which Lincoln and Grant laboured was far better adapted to the needs of the world than that for which Lee exerted his noble military genius.

But in pursuing in cursory fashion the chief campaigns of this marvellous war, which in the numbers engaged, in the use made of cavalry, iron-clads, railroads, telegraph lines, and hospital corps begins a new epoch in military history, we have left almost out of sight the course of political events. Lack of space will prevent more than a mere reference to the Administration of Mr. Davis, and that of Mr. Lincoln must be treated almost as briefly. It was the intention of the South to frame a government of more limited powers than that of the old Union, but war is a hard taskmaster, and Mr. Davis, with no sinister intentions, became more or less a dictator. Congressmen tried to exercise some check on affairs but failed, and since men were more and more needed in the field, the character of the legislative body deteriorated. The various Cabinet officers did their best, but as the blockade tightened

around the coast, it became impossible to equip the troops properly, and later on it was difficult even to get soldiers. Inability to send out crops also rendered both public and private financiering extremely difficult. The paper money of the government, as well as its bonds, gradually became practically worthless, and it was soon necessary to seize crops for the support of the armies. This measure and the conscription that included both youth and age finally aroused resistance and made desertion a frequent offence. The Administration was freely and harshly criticised and many loyal souls longed for peace. But the intensity of the Southern character sustained the authorities and the armies until the very end, and it may be fairly said that the South did not yield until she was exhausted. Some writers have claimed that submission should have come earlier, especially as it was impossible to feed properly the Union prisoners whom Mr. Lincoln's government refused to receive in exchange for Confederates in order that the fighting power of the South might be thus reduced; but it is obvious that such criticism does not take account of fundamental qualities of human nature. The South is all the more valuable to the Union of the present day because she fought to a finish in 1865.

The Congress at Washington was naturally better able to legislate effectively than that at Richmond, though it, too, did not a little useless talking. It passed a heavy tariff act in 1862 and levied internal duties on all sorts of manufactures, besides taxing monopolies and private incomes. It gave the President liberal powers with regard to the suspension of the right of *habeas corpus*, and thus laid the foundation for not unwarranted complaints. It gave great



assistance both in lands and in money to the promoters of the much-needed railway to the Pacific Coast. It also passed in 1863 an important act establishing a national bank system on the New York model, and substituted for it the next year an act still in force. As banks organised under the act were required to deposit with the Treasury national bonds to the value of one-third their capital, on which bonds they could issue notes to an amount not beyond ninety per cent. of the par value of the bonds, the government succeeded both in raising money and in improving the currency. Yet after all it seems clear that the financial management of the war, especially with regard to the large issues of legal tender paper money, was not so much better than that of the War of 1812 as might have been expected of a progressive nation.

Faction naturally assailed Lincoln both within and without Congress, the most serious disturbance being connected with the case of Mr. Clement L. Vallandigham, a Democratic Congressman from Ohio, who was as radical in his States-rights proclivities as Mr. Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania was in his advocacy of extreme measures against the South. After leaving Congress in 1863, Mr. Vallandigham made such violent speeches in Ohio that General Burnside, commanding the Department of the Ohio, ordered his arrest. He was tried by court-martial and sentenced to close confinement. Lincoln changed the sentence to banishment across the Southern lines, Vallandigham soon removing to Canada and returning to Ohio after the war. His trial caused great excitement and was sufficiently arbitrary to furnish grounds for criticism; yet it is obviously idle to expect that a great war will be con-

ducted without occasional violations of constitutional propriety and even of justice.

The year 1864 was a presidential year, and the North and West thus had to bear the strain of an election as well as that of the war. There was no question among prudent men that Mr. Lincoln should be re-elected, but some malcontents nominated General Frémont, who afterwards withdrew, and the Democrats, denouncing the war as a failure, put up General McClellan, whom many people, with partial injustice, held accountable for the comparative want of success for the first two years. Lincoln carried all save three States, and his policy of moderation thus stood fairly vindicated.

But there was to be no second term for him. On April 14, 1865, ten days after his second inauguration and five days after Lee's surrender, the great President was shot at Ford's Theatre in Washington by an ardent pro-Southern partisan, John Wilkes Booth, an actor. The crazy tragedian, who lost his life in trying to escape, was the author of the greatest national tragedy ever enacted in America, for Lincoln was killed just at the time his great brain and heart were most needed—just at the time when he, and he alone, could have dealt properly with the South and saved the devoted section years of misery. Yet Booth is not responsible for all the evils that followed his terrible crime. Not a little responsibility belongs to the people, who had acquiesced in the choice of Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, a Union Democrat, for Vice-President. The convention that had nominated Lincoln for a second term had consisted of Union men of varying political creeds, and Johnson had been added to the ticket for much the same reasons as had previously de-

terminated the choice of Tyler. The result will be seen in due time, but we must here again call attention to the fact that if a nation will not exercise due care in its choice of so important an officer as the Vice-President, it has only itself to thank when it finds itself committed to incompetent or bad hands.

But after all, whether through their good fortune or through the vigour native to a democracy or through both, the American people had fared remarkably well since they had been plunged into their great Civil War. Thanks to a wise President, faithful administrators, skilful generals, and brave soldiers, they had passed through an ordeal such as few nations could have stood, and had yet preserved their liberties and the bounds of their Republic intact. Their government became stronger, but it still remained a popular one. Not far from one million men were lost to the entire country, the loss affecting the South more seriously from the point of view of quality, since substitutes were not procurable as at the North toward the close of the struggle. The debt of the Union amounted to nearly \$2,000,000,000, but this was probably not one-fifth of the total cost of the war. In the North, however, industry had been protected and promoted; in the South the economic foundations of society had been swept away and the whole people had to begin life anew. Yet whatever the sacrifice, it was better that the war should have come and gone, since slavery might not have been got rid of through any less heroic means. The Southerner complained, indeed, that local liberty disappeared along with slavery, but this complaint was seemingly not well founded. If the American people should ever lose their liberties, it will be because they are not

capable of grappling with economic and social problems that have emerged since the Civil War; it will not be because they gave their government proper stability during and after that great contest. In fact their safe emergence from that contest seems the best of auguries that they will eventually overcome all present difficulties and perils and secure for their institutions as much permanence as finite and fallible men can safely expect.

## PART THREE.

### THE ERA OF INDUSTRIALISM.

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#### CHAPTER XVIII.

##### RECONSTRUCTION.

THE chief problem that lay before the people of the United States in the spring of 1865 was not what to do with a victorious army of over a million men—for the troops were rapidly disbanded and were absorbed into the body of citizens; it was not how to make up the money lost—for business was flourishing in the North, and Southern men were seizing every opportunity to go to work; it was rather to determine the political standing of the conquered States and of the blacks. Politics had done much to bring on the war; now it was to increase the evil effects of the struggle.

Mr. Lincoln by 1863 had more or less adopted a moderate and sensible plan of reorganising the States that had been taken from the Confederacy. The provisions of his proclamation of amnesty had been liberal, and he had made it easy to recognise new governments in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee, for he acted on the assumption that not States but individuals were in rebellion. But Congress did not act in accordance with him and threw out



the electoral votes of the two States last named (1865). Lincoln, with the people behind him, would probably have managed Congress; perhaps a Republican successor might have done it; but a Democrat, especially when he happened to be Andrew Johnson, could not do it, even on Lincoln's lines.

Johnson, who was about fifty-seven years old at his accession, sprang from much the same stock as Lincoln, but had scarcely learned to read and write before he reached manhood. Then his shrewdness, integrity and personal power pushed him upward, in the State of Andrew Jackson, until he became a United States Senator. His fidelity to the Union and American hap-hazard ways of filling office did the rest. But now as President in place of Lincoln he had a task before him that for its successful performance required the possession of a tact which neither nature nor training had given him. At first he was at liberty to act unhampered, for Congress did not meet until December, 1865. A wiser man would probably have called an extra session in spite of the prejudice against them, would have expounded the necessity of using the better portion of the Southern whites to start the new State governments off, and would at least have given the Republicans no chance to urge that a Democrat was trying to reap political advantages for his party by acting precipitately on his own initiative.\*

Be this as it may, Johnson, who before he came under the influence of Seward seemed inclined to a truculent policy, soon put forward an amnesty

\* Yet Johnson seems to have acted with the advice of his Cabinet, and to have reconstructed the States as though it were unfinished business left by Lincoln.

proclamation much like Lincoln's, and allowed the voters who could qualify under it to hold conventions, form constitutions recognising the death of slavery, and organise governments. In this way all the Southern States, save Texas, were ready with Senators and Representatives for the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress. Eleven of these States had also through their legislatures ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. The State governments were ultimately rejected, yet the Amendment was not resubmitted! \*

But the new Southern governments had made the natural but unfortunate mistake of passing laws to control black labourers and to prevent their becoming vagrants. The main intention of the lawmakers was probably to keep society from being inverted; knowing the negro race they knew that full social and political equality with the whites was an impossibility if an Anglo-Saxon civilisation was to be preserved. But such intentions, when coupled with enactments both foolish and unjust, were easily construed into attempts to deprive the negro of rights that had just been dearly purchased for him by the North. "The Southern white is still recalcitrant," said the Republican politician, "and the only way to secure the freedman in his privileges is to give him the suffrage so that he can defend himself." †

\* "If they were not States, or were States out of the Union, their consent to a change in the fundamental law of the Union would have been nugatory, and Congress in asking it committed a political absurdity." Johnson's Third Annual Message.

† That some of the restrictions put upon the negroes were totally unjustifiable can hardly be denied. The distracted condition of the whites must, however, be considered, as well as the general character of the Southern people, before a rooted hostility to the freedmen can be posited.

We can see now that this was an absurd proposition, but Northern theorists like Mr. Sumner, who had no practical knowledge of the situation in the South, doubtless enunciated it in all sincerity. The Southern whites, with General Lee at their head, recognised their defeat and the death of the old order of things; but while then, as always, the negro's best friends, and while in time they would doubtless have been willing enough to give him civic rights, they saw that political and social rights were simply out of the question. Many people in the North saw this also, yet the Southern men had acted too defiantly and rashly, and there was a political complication that was destined to work mischief. Southern States controlled by whites were sure to go Democratic, but Republicans, having saved the Union, now inevitably adopted the motto of their enemies: "To the victors belong the spoils." It was easy, of course, to put forward the higher moral principle that the negro should be protected in his freedom, and doubtless the people of the North and West supported the Republicans on this principle; but it is safe to assert, that consciously or unconsciously, the political leaders of the time let their desire for party supremacy blind them to the social, political and economic horrors of the régime they were soon to inflict upon the Southern people. It is only fair to add that most historians seem to think that the action of the South in passing laws restrictive of the negro's economic freedom and the tactless course of President Johnson, shortly to be described, were the chief reasons for Congressional bungling, but it may be pertinent to ask whether false steps on the part of a distracted section or the recklessness of one man would have been met by foolish legislation if the

legislators had not been partisans. It has also been contended that Congress in rejecting the State governments founded under Johnson's auspices, and in undertaking itself the task of reconstructing the South, was merely choosing the less of two evils. This is a point on which no settled verdict can be reached as yet; but it does seem the height of rashness on the part of a legislative body to reject governments already organised rather than to persevere in the task of improving them.\* It seems also that less suspicion toward men who had lately proved themselves to be honourable and brave foes would have been creditable to a victorious party. But unfortunately a party means too often a body of partisans, and wisdom and sympathetic confidence do not go hand in hand with partisanship. We should always endeavour to avoid passing harsh judgments, but it is surely difficult to account thoroughly for the monstrous system of government forced upon the South throughout the Reconstruction period—a system the evil effects of which have not fully disappeared after the lapse of about thirty years—unless one posits that its inception was the result of a lack of wisdom rarely found save in conjunction with uncontrolled political partisanship. To represent the horrors of Reconstruction as the legitimate outcome of the false relations between blacks and whites created by the institution of slavery is doubtless an easy solution of a grave historical problem, yet it hardly seems to be a philosophical solution. But our criti-

\* Congress did attempt the task of improving them when it submitted to them the 14th Amendment, but that Amendment was plainly an entering wedge for full negro suffrage, and its rejection was not a sufficient excuse for the formation of military satrapies.

cism has forestalled matters; it is time to inquire what Congress actually did.

As Americans rarely take a political step without having some bit of legality on which to base it, we need not be surprised to learn that various theories were held as to the exact status of the Southern States. The most radical theory finally prevailed, to wit, that Federal laws had been suspended with regard to them, and would continue so suspended until Congress declared the contrary. In other words Congress adopted a theory of forfeited rights which practically made the States conquered provinces, because it was the most convenient theory by which the negro could be secured in his rights and on which a Republican party could be built up in the South. There was a two-thirds majority in both Houses, and, if this could be managed, the President need not be greatly feared. Passion being the best of party whips, and ignorance being a very good second, we are not surprised to learn that even the most drastic and complicated of the measures proposed were carried over Johnson's vetoes; but we must also give to Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and the other Radical leaders whatever credit is due for strenuous and shrewd party management. We need not, however, think with some historians that such management is a proof of high political wisdom.

The first step taken was the appointment of a large joint committee to consider the condition of the revolted States. Then a joint resolution was passed which kept Southern Senators and Representatives out of Congress until that body should declare the seceded States fully readmitted. Military government was also to continue until Congress willed



otherwise. The previously established "Freedman's Bureau," which had for its object the general assistance of the destitute ex-slaves, was also continued with extended functions, but Johnson's veto was not in this instance overridden. That impetuous Executive was not content, however, with exercising his legitimate control over the Radical politicians. He abused Congress roundly in a public speech and thus set the waverers against him, while more deeply exasperating the leaders, who replied by passing over his veto a "Civil Rights Bill" which made any limitation of the civil rights of American citizens—who comprised all persons born in the United States and not subject to a foreign power—a crime of which Federal courts alone were to take cognisance. Johnson declared this bill unconstitutional, and was apparently justified in so doing, although the Supreme Court upheld the measure.

Congress next proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, agreement with which was to be a condition precedent to the admission of any Southern State. This Amendment defined who were to be citizens of the United States, declared all such persons to be citizens of the State in which they resided, and guarded their privileges from infringement by the States. It further provided in substance that any State denying or abridging the right of any male citizen of the age of twenty-one to vote in the Federal and State elections should be deprived of its representation in Congress to an extent proportional to the ratio between the disfranchised class and the whole number of male citizens of twenty-one years of age. Disability to hold office was also denounced against leading supporters

of the Confederacy, but this could be removed by a two-thirds vote of Congress. The public debt of the Union was not to be made a subject of dispute, but claims for loss of slaves or for aid given the rebellion were to be invalid.

Of this long Amendment the second clause relative to disfranchisement proved to be most obnoxious. When slavery existed the Southern States received a representation for three-fifths of their slaves—a fact which might well have staggered the judges who in the *Dred Scott* case reduced the negroes to the level of horses—now they would be entitled to full representation, and if the Republicans could not make the negro vote effective, the Democrats would be the gainers. But to secure full and free suffrage to the negro was as impossible as to change his skin. Troops might secure it for him, but a republic cannot be supported by troops without degenerating into a despotism. This was seen after a while and military government was abandoned, whereupon the whites secured control of the State governments and obtained in Congress representation proportional to population. But in most instances the blacks could be kept out of office only by force or fraud; yet, having once secured full representation, no State was willing to give it up for the sake of disfranchising the negro by a property or educational qualification, which would be legal but would also disfranchise certain white men. Thus the Republicans brought it to pass that the negro was cheated out of his vote, that the Democrats gained representation in Congress to which they were not entitled, and that the voting population of a whole section was debauched by indulgence in fraudulent practices on which a premium had

been set by the Constitution itself. It would be hard to discover a worse piece of legislation, judged by its results, in the whole range of history; but it is still operant, although some States like Mississippi have evaded it by adopting educational qualifications indefinite in application yet quite effective as against the negro.\*

Before Congress adjourned it admitted Tennessee and received the report of its own Reconstruction Committee, which was quite radical in character. The campaign of 1866 that followed was fought out practically between Radical Republicans and the President, whose policy was conservative but whose speeches were just the reverse. The Radicals won by a large majority, especially as the Southern States were rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment—not wisely, perhaps, under the circumstances, but with at least a clear conception of its dangers.

Fortified by the approval of their constituents, who as usual were not specially qualified to judge of the wisdom of the proposed treatment of the South, the Radical Republicans carried out their programme with a high hand. They arranged that the Fortieth Congress should assemble on March 4, 1867, instead of meeting regularly in December, so that Johnson might take no advantage of the long recess. This measure was almost if not quite revolutionary, as it treated the President as though he were a tyrant and not a co-ordinate part of the government. Then an equally revolutionary Tenure of Office Act was passed which provided that the President could not remove officials without the con-

\* It is of course true that negro suffrage was not directly forced on the South by this Amendment, but it was clear that such suffrage was the goal of the Radical party.

sent of the Senate. As the Senate had to confirm appointments to office, this bill would, if its provisions were continuously carried out, make the Upper House of Congress the real Executive of the country; it is therefore no wonder that Johnson denounced it bitterly as unconstitutional. But more important than these and other similar measures was the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, which, as subsequently supplemented, determined the fortunes of the South for nearly ten years. The States still out of the Union \* were grouped into five districts, each under the control of a Federal general, who was to superintend the enrolment of citizens under the terms of the Reconstruction Act of March 2. Such citizens were to vote for delegates for State conventions; by the latter bodies constitutions satisfactory with regard to the franchise were to be framed; these were to be submitted to the original voters, and, if ratified, were to be transmitted for the approval of Congress. When that approval had been obtained, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment would finish the process of Reconstruction and the State would be received into the Union. It is needless to comment on this doctrinaire scheme, for it can be sufficiently judged by its fruits; but we may at least question the value of constitutional amendments obtained by compulsion.

The saturnalia that ensued can be better imagined than described; the horrors of war paled before the disgusting outrages of Reconstruction, and it is to be hoped that never again will any considerable body of Anglo-Saxons be treated as the Southern whites

\* The total number of States had been increased by the premature admission of Nevada in 1864 and by the more normal admission of Nebraska in 1867.

were. Yet it would be wrong to blame the people of the North and West for their part in the matter. With respect to personal vindictiveness and mean tyranny the sequelæ of the Civil War may fairly be said to reflect the very greatest credit upon the loyal citizens of the Union. A few Southern leaders like Mr. Davis were mistreated, although trials for treason were finally dropped; some injustice may have been done in the case of a few executions that followed Lincoln's assassination; but on the whole the conquering North was better disposed toward the conquered South than the victors in any other civil war have ever been. This fact is one of the chief moral glories of American history and should be insisted upon. The injury done by the North to the South in the Reconstruction period was due almost entirely to ignorance and partisan passion. Any repetition of such injury by civilised people, now that the South has furnished such a warning example, would be, however, an outrage almost past pardon.

The best Southern whites being unable to vote for delegates to the constitutional conventions, these bodies were controlled by the shrewder and more corrupt negroes and by white adventurers from the North, who had hurriedly packed their carpet-bags and hastened to the new gold-fields. These "carpet-baggers," some of whom were good men, soon ruled the situation in spite of the honest efforts of the generals in command. In about a year North and South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana were fully admitted to the Union. Georgia too had Representatives in Congress, but as she had declared negroes ineligible to office, her Senators were not seated and she was not fully reconstructed



until 1871.\* In Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas Reconstruction was delayed on account of the fact that some of the provisions of the new constitutions offended moderate Republicans in the States, with whom the Democrats joined forces. Fortunately General Grant had now succeeded Johnson and was in favour of getting the three States back into the Union with as little friction as possible. The constitutions were submitted to popular vote, and in Virginia and Mississippi voters were allowed to vote separately on the obnoxious clauses, which disfranchised too many persons. The Conservatives won in Virginia, the Radicals in the two other States; and after much discussion all three were restored to the Union by the spring of 1870, their consent to the Fifteenth Amendment, which denied the right of the United States or any State to deprive any citizen of the power of voting "on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude," having been previously required. This Amendment of course supplemented the Fourteenth and removed the anomaly caused by the fact that some loyal States had not conferred the franchise on the negro.

But it was not the difficulty they experienced in getting back into the Union that formed the chief burden of the woes of the Southern States—it was the misconduct of the Radical government in each State. In a few, like Virginia and Georgia, the whites were sufficiently numerous to outvote the negroes and get the management of affairs in their own hands. They thus incurred the suspicion of Congress, especially as they supported the Democratic party, which from

\* Several of the reconstructed States sent negroes to Congress.

its attitude during the war was in disfavour at the North; but that was better than the local misgovernment under which States like South Carolina and Louisiana groaned. In these States the negroes and their "carpet-bag" friends piled up taxes and looted the treasury in a scandalous fashion. The bills for public printing for example were farcically enormous. The debt of South Carolina increased fourfold in five years; that of the South at large amounted to nearly \$300,000,000. But the insolence of the misguided negroes was harder to bear than their antics as legislators, and naturally led to violence, especially on the part of the lower classes of the whites. Organised resistance to negro rule followed as a matter of course; the so-called Ku Klux Klan spreading from Tennessee to other States and committing outrages which naturally increased the partisan fervour of the North. It is impossible at present to tell how far these illegal practices of the whites were exaggerated. In some places the negroes were merely intimidated; in others they were undoubtedly murdered, sometimes, as in New Orleans in the summer of 1866, in such numbers as to amount to a massacre. Some of the restrictions placed upon the race the year before, such as heavy licences for their engaging in legitimate trades, had been revolting enough; but now their anomalous condition had been rendered all the more horrible by the indiscretion of their friends in Congress.

At this late day it would be worse than useless to pass harsh judgments upon any of the actors in this bloody farce. The freedmen were little to blame in view of their ignorance and the suddenness of their transition from slavery to freedom. The "carpet-baggers" and "scalawags," as native Southerners

who acted with the negroes were styled, were in many cases unprincipled men such as always come to the surface in revolutionary epochs. Their tyranny over the better whites, which extended to confiscation of property, personal violence, and sometimes to murder, should, however, be set, by any fair historian, over against the outrages of the Ku Klux Klan. As for President Johnson's share of blame, it may at least be said that too much has been charged against him by Northern writers like Mr. Blaine.\* That he was vulgar and irascible and needlessly exasperating cannot be denied, but these facts do not excuse Congress for not having given his plans of Reconstruction a fair trial. Nor is the precipitancy of Congress to be excused by casting a large share of blame upon the Southern whites. Many of their actions, such as the passage of laws infringing the personal liberties of the blacks, much of their extravagant speaking and writing, cannot be excused, but may surely be condoned when their condition after four years of warfare is duly considered. As for the Radical leaders in Congress, they too may claim condonation for their actions, but only on the ground that the Civil War had affected them likewise in a disastrous manner. They had tasted the fruits of power; they had grown immoderate and masterful in their advocacy of principles originally noble. Personal and partisan considerations entered into their management of affairs. They would trust neither the Executive nor the Judiciary, although the latter power was already beginning to show how the obnoxious legislation of the South might be done away with. They made the fatal mistake of de-

\* See his *Twenty Years of Congress*, first half of the second volume.

veloping a doctrinaire system of government and employing force to uphold it. They created not merely the military régime but much of the necessity for it. They did this as honest partisans, and, as we have already seen, they reaped their due reward in the weakening of their political power; but at the same time they injured a section of their country almost irretrievably. And after all many of their mistakes as well as many of the mistakes made by historians in treating this tangled period may be set down to a failure to perceive that the great uprising of the South was not in the least treasonable in character, that it was due to the fact that two peoples of different institutions and habits had been living under a form of government which they interpreted in different lights. The idea of punishment was never far absent from the minds of the Radicals; but when men are punished for actions which they do not believe to be positively immoral, the consequences both to punishers and to punished are likely to be disastrous.

Meanwhile the President of the United States was being baited more cruelly than any ex-slave. Johnson was as radical in his obstinacy as the Republicans of the type of Stevens and General B. F. Butler of Massachusetts were in their doctrinaire theories. It is not surprising therefore that the thought of impeachment should have come early to his opponents, or that so extreme a measure should have failed twice before it could be carried into effect. In August, 1867, however, when Congress had adjourned, Johnson had suspended Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War whom he had kept over from Lincoln's Cabinet and whose resignation he had vainly endeavoured to secure. The Senate on reas-

sembling refused to sanction the action, as Stanton was *persona grata* and Johnson was not. The President had never believed the Tenure of Office Act to be constitutional, so he determined to test it by removing Stanton once more, doubtless believing that a judicial process would be resorted to for the purpose of testing the law. Such would have been the course pursued in normal times, but Stanton appealed to the House of Representatives, which late in February, 1868, resolved to impeach the President. The trial began before the Senate early in March, and ended in an acquittal after about two months and a half. Johnson's escape was narrow, however, for if one of the seven Republicans who voted with the twelve Democrats against the eleventh count had voted with the thirty-five Republicans for the same, the necessary two-thirds majority would have been obtained. Voting on other counts after a ten days' recess brought the same result and illustrated the difficulty of securing an impeachment in a republic. On the whole the trial is now conceded to have been a mistake. Congress had pushed its power to a limit which could not be overpassed without making it the real tyrant it had accused Johnson of trying to be. It had shown a partisanship in its prosecution that alarmed moderate men, and besides, a certain clause of the Tenure of Office Act had been so loosely worded that it was by no means clear that the removal of Stanton was not legitimate under it. That officer, in consequence of the issue of the impeachment, resigned and Johnson had comparative peace for the rest of his term.\*

\* For an interesting discussion of this trial, which unfortunately did not settle certain important constitutional points, see Prof. Wm. A. Dunning's *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction*. New York, 1898.



In dealing with local matters we have left unnoticed the department of foreign affairs, which occupied considerably the attention of this unfortunate Administration. The action of France, Great Britain, and Spain in sending troops to Mexico in 1861-62 in order to punish that Republic for offences against their citizens, which was followed by the establishment of an empire under the auspices of the French, with Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, at its head, had drawn a cautious protest from Secretary Seward while the Civil War was going on. When the war was over the demand for the withdrawal of the French troops became peremptory, all Americans feeling that the stand of Monroe against the extension of foreign influence in America must be maintained unflinchingly. Napoleon III., although impractical enough to espouse a scheme of American empire less promising even than the one his great kinsman had abandoned, was not enough of a dreamer to ignore the threats of a nation that had just shown so signally its military prowess; he accordingly withdrew his troops and Maximilian was captured, tried, and shot.

Another action of Seward's, more important in many respects, was the extinction of Russia's hold upon the North American continent by the purchase of Alaska in 1867.\* The price paid for over five hundred thousand square miles of practically unsettled territory was \$7,200,000. Seward's purchase naturally caused slight excitement at the time and Alaska was little in the public mind until the recent discovery of gold in the Klondike. Its bound-

\* The offer to sell came from Russia. There was some unwillingness in the House of Representatives to vote the purchase money.

aries adjoining those of Canada, a country with which war will be impossible should the ties of race have their due influence, Alaska may be considered to be a legitimate acquisition which reflects credit on Seward's foresight; but bad statesmanship might easily neutralise the good effects of his action.

At the time he made his purchase, however, relations with Great Britain were considerably strained. The favour shown the South by the British upper classes and the "Trent" affair \* had stimulated American indignation, which was increased by the negligence exhibited by the British government with regard to the fitting out of Confederate privateers, especially the famous Alabama. Fortunately difficulties were adjusted under Grant's first Administration by the Treaty of Washington (May 8, 1871), which dealt with certain boundary and fishery troubles and provided for the arbitration of the Alabama Claims. The next year the arbitrators, meeting at Geneva, awarded the United States \$15,500,000 damages.

Returning now to local affairs we find that Johnson's success in his impeachment trial brought him no return of political favour. His own party, the Democratic, while maintaining that his principles as to Reconstruction were sound, was too wise to saddle itself with such an unpopular candidate in the presidential campaign of 1868,† and chose instead Horatio Seymour, a prominent politician of New York. The Republicans naturally nominated General Grant, whom Lincoln's death had left the

\* See *ante*, Chap. XVII., p. 298.

† Johnson went out of politics for a while, but in 1875 was elected to the Senate from Tennessee. He died shortly afterwards.

idol of the people. He could not have been defeated under any circumstances, especially when the Democratic platform was unsound with regard to the nation's credit, and when the North had not awakened to the folly of the radical legislation the Republican Congressmen had inflicted on the South. He received 214 electoral votes to Seymour's 80, the votes of many of the Southern States being cast for him because the negroes were in control of the political machinery. Yet his popular majority in some of the loyal States was not great, and the success of his party in the South was more apparent than real.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE RESTORATION OF UNITY.

GENERAL GRANT when he entered upon his duties as President on March 4, 1869, was forty-seven years old and had had no training whatsoever as a statesman. But neither had Zachary Taylor had such training, yet the latter in one short year gave evidence of possessing more clear-sightedness and force than either Webster or Clay displayed in the great crisis of 1850. Another great crisis was upon the country; might not Grant do as well or better?

He did not do so well; but although we are forced to deny him greatness as a statesman, we need not deny him greatness as a man. No one could safely have inferred greatness from his youth and early manhood, but the pertinacity and skill that finally made him the foremost Union general were only the most striking features of a character that was at bottom singularly manly and true. That he was possessed of a keen, clear mind is apparent to every reader of his great *Memoirs*. Why, then, he should not have made a good statesman and so furnished democracy with an even greater type than Lincoln is hard to tell. Perhaps a certain slovenliness of character kept him from thoroughly understanding men and measures, just as a certain overdelicacy of character would have probably prevented his great opponent, General Lee, had he been called from military to political life. Be this as it may,

the fact remains that Grant's Administrations were not all that he and his true friends desired.

It was a specially difficult time, however, in which to govern well. In the South the evil effects of the Congressional policy of Reconstruction were making themselves visible in all directions. In the North the evil effects of the spirit of speculation, which had been fostered by the war and the tariff, as well as by lavish grants for the building of railroads, were equally visible. Grant suffered from both sets of evils, but more from the latter, with which a blunt honest soldier was ill-prepared to cope.

Early in his first term he was brought into unfortunate contact with two notorious New York financiers, Jay Gould and James ("Jim") Fisk, and accepted their hospitality without suspecting that they intended to use him. Their object was to prevent the Treasury from selling gold, in which metal there had been great speculation owing to the fluctuations of its value in terms of the paper currency introduced during war times. Grant seems to have been taken in by them, but to have had no sinister interest in the series of shady transactions which led to the panic and riots of September 24th, 1869,—New York's "Black Friday." A later scandal affecting Congress more than the Executive was connected with the "Crédit Mobilier," a corporation chartered by Pennsylvania to manage the affairs of the Union Pacific Railway which, along with the Central Pacific, had been helped by large Congressional grants.\* In 1873 a committee of in-

\* The former of these companies began work at Omaha, Nebraska; the latter at San Francisco. The lines met in Utah in May, 1869. Besides being useful from a military point of view, the through route from New York to San Francisco



vestigation showed that at least two members of the House had been discredibly connected with the unsavoury affairs of the corporation, while several other politicians were left under suspicion. Three years later (1876) the climax was reached when W. W. Belknap, Secretary of War, was impeached for accepting bribes, and resigned to escape conviction. Shortly before, the trial of General O. E. Babcock, Grant's private secretary, for alleged complicity in frauds on the government practised by Western distillers and allied Federal officials, had induced many of the President's enemies to hope that even he would be proved guilty of corrupt practices.

But the hero of Vicksburg was not dishonest even if he was the most indiscreet of Presidents. Like Andrew Jackson he almost turned friendship from a virtue to a vice. He reposed blind confidence in men who betrayed him and the nation; he had military favourites as subordinates when he should have had trained public servants. Fraud and corruption were rampant in Washington during both his Administrations, and were also only too evident in local scandals such as those connected with the famous Tweed Ring in New York City. The fever of speculation and losses connected with the great fires of Chicago (1871) and Boston (1872) led to the panic of 1873, one of the most disastrous in history. Altogether the country was in a deplorable state, and the tendency to make Grant a scapegoat was irresistible. Like Van Buren before him, he was accused of living in vulgar luxury. Vices of which he was totally innocent were attributed to him. He was accused of scheming for the establishment of a added to the political solidarity of the country and opened up the Far West to rapid settlement.

military despotism, yet he was in reality one of the most simple-hearted American citizens ever lifted to high office by good fortune and his own energy. At times he bitterly regretted his elevation, and those to whom his fame is dear have regretted it also. It would have been better, perhaps, had he remained merely the General in charge of the Army, with only routine office work to do, in the discharge of which he might have smoked his countless strong cigars in peace. Then we should have been spared the spectacle of an old friend like Sherman being forced to leave Washington and the Commanding General's proper official quarters in disgust because low politicians had the President's ear on every occasion. Yet after all, while it seems sad to behold a man like Grant in such a plight, it must be remembered that his Administrations have a strong side which will be shown presently, and that in their worst features they but typify the confused and corrupt state of the country at the time. No nation can go through a great civil war without breaking down morally to a greater or less extent. Sensual debauchery such as characterised the court of Charles II. did not make its appearance in America, although there was a marked growth of extravagant luxury in the North; but commercial debauchery flourished to a distressing degree and, as we have seen, political debauchery was domiciled in the South. In the midst of this seething chaos a simple soldier was called upon to assume the duties of the presidency; what wonder that he was not entirely equal to the task?

The mention of the "Tweed Ring" reminds us that a brief sketch of the career of its founder will throw light not only upon the corruption characteristic of the period we are treating, but also upon

that curious product of American political life, the modern "Boss." As has been previously remarked, New York and Pennsylvania had long been notorious for political partisanship and corruption and had produced very astute political managers. When loyalty to party in spite of its corruptions was erected into a virtue, when possession of the spoils of office made politics a lucrative trade, when the development of nominating conventions and of "primary" elections within a party threw the choice of candidates for office into the hands of a comparatively small number of intriguing managers, it became evident that an astute man could easily make himself a political dictator. In New York City the large ignorant foreign vote and the existence of a long established political organisation, the so-called Tammany Society, rendered the evolution of the "Boss" peculiarly natural and easy. Tammany was a Democratic institution, and its managers have cleverly induced decent men to vote with them by playing upon their desire to preserve party unity in order to exert influence on national affairs. Until municipal politics can be divorced from national and until the masses are treated sympathetically, it will be impossible permanently to reform the politics of New York or any other great American city, for the "Boss system" is still flourishing nearly thirty years after the downfall of Tweed, to whom we may now devote a few words.

William Marcy Tweed was born in New York—the "Boss," by the way, is often foreign-born—in 1823, the son of a chair-maker, which trade he himself followed for a time. He became well known and popular in connection with a local fire-company and was made alderman by the age of thirty.

Shortly after he served as Congressman and then held several municipal offices, his common-school education and his knowledge of men being all the equipment demanded by his constituents. In 1870 he was appointed Commissioner of the Department of Public Works of New York City—an office which gave full scope for the exercise of his sinister genius. Associating with himself other prominent officials and politicians, he organised his “ring” and appropriated vast sums of the public money for ostensibly public purposes. Of course much of this money went immediately into the pockets of Tweed and his associates, and queer stories are told of the barbaric luxury for which some of it was expended—for example, for the purchase of diamond suspender buttons! Detection ensued and public denunciation, especially through the agency of *The New York Times*, which set an example of patriotic journalism that a few newspapers have ever since followed. Tweed was arrested in October, 1871, and managed to furnish bail for \$1,000,000. A few days later he was actually elected to the State Senate, so strong was his hold on the people. After the failure of one suit against him he was convicted early in 1873 and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment and a fine. In 1875 he was released on a technicality, but having been again sued and required to give a heavier bail than he could secure, he was thrown into jail. He managed to escape to Cuba and Spain, but was brought back and died in prison in 1878. Subsequent “Bosses” have as a rule avoided the clutches of the law, but they find their prototype in Tweed, whose partial expiation of his crimes makes him, indeed, a less offensive figure than some of his suc-

cessors. We must now turn to a different although a not much pleasanter topic.

We have already seen, in the preceding chapter, how the last Southern States were added to the Union in the early part of Grant's first term, and how creditable his attitude was toward them. He understood the Southern whites better than most Congressmen did, but in his soldierly way he was determined to have the laws obeyed and political equality given to the negro. But to secure this consummation was beyond his or any other man's power. Election frauds continued to be committed and Ku-Klux outrages increased. To withdraw the troops from the South seemed therefore out of the question to the Republicans, although the Democrats were not slow to point out that it was inconsistent with American principles to declare States theoretically reconstructed and yet practically to assert, by the presence of a military force at the polls, that they could not be trusted to use their privileges with discretion. The same objection applied to the coercive legislation of 1870-1871 known as "Force Bills"—legislation threatened also about twenty years later but now fortunately abandoned as unwise.\* Yet Congress and the President persevered† and quieter times ensued, not probably on account of governmental interference so much as because the South perceived the folly of violence and began to recover from the anarchical effects of the war. It is only fair to Congress to add that it modified its drastic

\* The chief objects of this legislation were the suppression of Ku-Klux outrages and the securing of the negro's right of suffrage. The writ of *habeas corpus* could be suspended, and both the Federal courts and the army could be employed.

† A number of persons were sent to prison under the provisions of the enforcement laws.



legislation as soon as order seemed to be in a fair way of being established, and that a general amnesty bill (1872) relieved the political disabilities of all save an extreme class of so-called rebels. Indeed within less than ten years only two or three Southerners were personally obnoxious to the North—one of these being Mr. Davis, who had to bear the brunt of displeasure because of his eminent and representative position. The experiments Congress had made with the Constitution in respect to Reconstruction were about this time (1873) partly upheld and partly rendered nugatory by the Supreme Court, which in the famous "Slaughter House Cases" decided that the States still possessed the right to control in many ways the privileges of their citizens. Thus, for example, it became impossible to force the Southern States to admit to the same schools the children of whites and blacks.

But even after Ku-Klux outrages were lessened, election disputes still harassed the South and still provoked hostile criticism in the North. The situation was worse in Louisiana than elsewhere, but was bad enough in other States, such as South Carolina, where the negroes were in a majority. Electoral machinery was in the hands of leading negroes and their Republican advisers, whether "Carpet-bag" Northerners or "Scalawag" Southerners, but the whites had their prestige as former masters and as present employers, and managed to keep many a coloured voter from the polls. The struggles were therefore continuous and bitter, and the creation of "Returning Boards" to canvass and validate election returns concentrated rather than dissipated partisan energies. Two rival boards vied with each other in Louisiana in 1872. Federal troops supported the

Republicans, but finally a division of the spoils was made. Grant, with great reluctance, let the troops interfere and in later cases refused to act. He and many other sensible Northern men were beginning to see the absurdity of treating a race question in a doctrinaire manner.

Meanwhile the President had been renominated for a second term, not without opposition from men who counted themselves Republicans. His San Domingo policy, shortly to be described, and his careless appointments had alienated men like Senator Sumner, who delivered against him a philippic as atrocious as the one that had drawn down the vengeance of Brooks. In Missouri owing to local complications great dissatisfaction with the Republicans became manifest under the leadership of Carl Schurz, the most famous of German-American politicians. A "Liberal Republican" movement began in this State and spread rapidly, with the result that Horace Greeley was nominated in answer to the campaign cry—"Anything to beat Grant." The Democrats, seeing the hopelessness of trying to elect any candidate of their own, gave their support to Greeley, while small "Labour" and "Prohibitionist" parties ran tickets of their own. Grant, however, was elected by a very large majority, the country rightly preferring him with all his faults to his eccentric competitor, who was a combination of great editor, public speaker, and simple-hearted farmer, with absolutely no qualifications as a statesman. But Grant did not win without being subjected to the horrors of a presidential campaign of the worst type, in which his enemies magnified his every fault and minimised his heroic services. In spite of his self-contained nature he showed how deeply he had

been hurt by referring to his vilifiers in his second inaugural; but the historian, while regretting that a hero should have been so ill-treated, can take comfort in reflecting that the great public rarely allows the extravagant and indecent personalities of a campaign to disturb its judgment.

The worst scandals of Grant's régime came to a head during his second term,\* but these have already been described and we shall do well to concern ourselves rather with the good features of his Administrations. One of the best things he did was to stand by the friends of Civil Service Reform who were endeavouring to repair the ravages of years. The Commission authorised by Congress (1871) was filled with good men and a system of competitive examinations for appointments was inaugurated, but Congressional politicians finally withheld the necessary funds. Yet Grant himself had made probably worse appointments than any preceding President. With the exception of Hamilton Fish, his excellent Secretary of State, he had a poor Cabinet, which was constantly changing its personnel. His predilection for military appointees has been already noted, and the most charitable critic can hardly help wishing that when the Tenure of Office Act was modified to suit the wishes of a President who was as little likely to relish it as Johnson, some celestial mode of controlling his appointments had been substituted for the obnoxious terrestrial one.

Still more important than his services for Civil Service Reform were the financial measures of his two Administrations. He approved an act "to

\* Among them was an act (1873) raising salaries, even of the Congressmen passing the measure. This obnoxious feature was repealed.

strengthen the public credit" (1869), which had been hurt by Democratic proposals to pay the government's debts in paper except when coin had been specified. He urged refunding the enormous debt in bonds bearing moderate interest, and the good Refunding Act of 1870 was passed accordingly. Customs charges and internal duties were also reduced and the income tax was finally done away with, the last-named measure of retrenchment being probably not altogether wise. Grant was also decidedly opposed to inflation of the paper currency, vetoing a bill to this end (1874), and in favour of a resumption of specie payments; but it was not until the Republicans lost their majority in Congress in consequence of the effects of the Panic of 1873 and of other causes, that legislation in this direction could be secured from the party. Then, in the final session of the Forty-third Congress, an Act for resumption was brought in by Senator John Sherman of Ohio and passed with great expedition. The Republicans were determined that the Democrats of the next Congress should not get a chance to make effective any of those wild views about finance that were characteristic of a period that saw the rise of a "Greenback" party\* affected by the craze for illimitable quantities of paper money and of a "Granger" party that thrust the class interests of the farmer into politics and sought to control railroad freight rates. By the Sherman Act specie payments were to be resumed on January 1st, 1879, and it is interesting to note that as Secretary of the Treasury under President Hayes, Mr. Sherman, a brother of the famous general, had an opportunity

\* So called from the appearance of the paper money current at the time.

to prove his great ability as a financier by strengthening the Treasury deposits in order to prepare for a demand for gold which did not come in consequence of that preparation.\*

The chief feature of Grant's management of foreign affairs was of course the settlement of difficulties with Great Britain by the Treaty of Washington and the subsequent Geneva award already described. More characteristic of the man, however, was his policy with regard to the annexation of the Dominican Republic occupying the eastern portion of the Island of San Domingo. He was first approached by the Dominican authorities, and then seems to have thought that the island would afford a refuge for Southern blacks and would thus improve the condition of the race. He also had extravagant ideas of the benefit that would ensue to the country from the decrease in tropical imports. He accordingly sent his friend General Babcock to report on the situation, and this agent negotiated a treaty of annexation, apparently going beyond his instructions. The Senate, however, in spite of Grant's popularity at the time, rejected the treaty on June 30, 1870. The President, not discouraged, pressed the matter again in his next message, and finally Congress consented to authorise a commission to visit the island, with the stipulation that the action must not be construed as binding the legislature. Even this bare courtesy to Grant was accompanied by unpleasant incidents, the chief of which was the famous attack upon him by Senator Sumner which has been mentioned already. The charges of personal corruption brought against the President

\* Another financial measure of Grant's second term, the Coinage act of 1873, will be mentioned later. See p. 357.



by the great Senator seem to have been totally unfounded, but they hardly warranted the subsequent removal of Sumner from his long held position at the head of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Commission which Grant had besought to make a full investigation and to report the whole truth completely exonerated him and advocated the annexation of the island; but Congress remained inexorable. Grant let the matter drop, but did not cease to think his policy a good one. Perhaps the mildest judgment that can be passed upon it is to say that it was at least premature and that the reasons on which he relied were inconclusive. If, however, the present tendency toward expansion continues, it may well happen that posterity will regard him as a far-seeing man. It will regard him at least as a fair man in view of the neutrality he observed toward Spain during the long Cuban revolution, and as a firm one in view of his bringing Spain to terms for the murder of the passengers and crew of the *Virginius* (1870).

But whatever may be said in defence of Grant's character and policy, there were enough discreditable features about his Administrations—especially the second—to account for the Democratic victory in 1874 and to warrant the belief that a Democratic President would be elected in 1876. There was not a little talk about a third term for Grant, but the unprecedented idea aroused much opposition, and he gave it a quietus through a letter that might have been more explicit. For the honour of succeeding him there was quite a sharp struggle between the Republican leaders, chief among whom were James G. Blaine of Maine, lately Speaker of the House, perhaps the most brilliant but not the most reliable

of recent American politicians; Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, one of the "War Governors" who supported Mr. Lincoln heartily; Benjamin H. Bristow of Kentucky, who as Grant's Secretary of the Treasury had waged effective war against the men engaged in the whisky frauds; and General Rutherford B. Hayes, the popular Governor of Ohio. Mr. Blaine was the favourite candidate, but, as so often happens in America, he was finally defeated by the less brilliant but more reliable Governor Hayes, to whom William A. Wheeler, a successful Congressman from New York, was given as a running-mate.

The Democrats met at St. Louis shortly after the Republicans adjourned at Cincinnati. Only two ballots were necessary for the choice of a candidate in the person of Governor Samuel J. Tilden of New York, an able politician who had effectively fought against the Tweed Ring and who was as honest as he was sagacious. He was a great lawyer and a thoroughly trained politician, who, if he had been given a wider sphere of influence, might have made an eminent statesman. He had the great State of New York thoroughly in hand and was in touch with the leaders of his party throughout the country. He was believed to stand a good chance of carrying the entire South together with several Northern and Western States, and if any Democrat could be elected President, he seemed to be the man. Governor Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana was chosen as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency and gave strength to the ticket in the West.

The campaign that followed, in which the new fiat money party called the "Greenback" took a small share, was not specially exciting until it be-

came clear that the election was to be a disputed one. Tilden carried New York, New Jersey, Indiana, and Connecticut—if he had the “Solid South” he was a plain victor. But in Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina complications arose. Two sets of governors and legislators were contending for the control of Louisiana and South Carolina, and each Governor certified to the choice of presidential electors of his own political faith. United States troops had guarded many polls and used their influence against the Democrats, according to the claim of the latter. On the other hand the Republicans charged fraud and intimidation, and could at least rely on the well-known numerical preponderance of the blacks as an argument against Democratic success. In Florida the Returning Board was charged with usurping functions, and here also two sets of electoral certificates were forthcoming. Even in far away Oregon the choice of one Republican elector was in doubt on account of a technicality.

The confusion that followed the announcement of this anomalous condition of affairs was naturally very great. The one hundredth anniversary of the Republic had been celebrated at Philadelphia by means of a large international exposition known as the Centennial, and a new era of peace, prosperity, and internal amity seemed to have been inaugurated. Was the healing work of a decade to be undone and a new civil war to be inaugurated? Business men asked themselves this question, and trade naturally suffered. To add to the confusion there was no definite constitutional method of determining how the electoral votes should be counted—whether no disputed vote should be received save by the concurrent vote of both Houses—as had been the rule

in 1865—or whether the Vice-President should merely declare the vote in the presence of the two Houses. If the first rule were followed, the Democratic House by objecting to the returns from any one State could secure Mr. Tilden's election; by the second rule, the acting Vice-President, a Republican, would certainly decide in favour of Mr. Hayes. In this dilemma, notwithstanding the fact that double returns from Louisiana had caused the exclusion of that State's vote in 1872, it was resolved to create a special Electoral Commission which should regulate the counting of the votes. This body consisted of five members chosen by the Senate, five by the House, and five Justices of the Supreme Court. Four of the Justices were named—two being Republicans and two Democrats, and it was hoped that they would choose as a fifth colleague a Justice more or less non-partisan. Unluckily this consummation was not attainable. The Commission decided every question in favour of the Republicans by a partisan vote of eight to seven. The Democrats were naturally enraged, but they had supported the projected means of escape from the national dilemma—doubtless with good reason to hope for victory—and they now abided by the result, especially as President Grant, who behaved well throughout the crisis, had taken measures to prevent civil disturbances, and as Mr. Tilden counselled peace. Mr. Hayes was consequently inaugurated on March 4, although the counting had not been finished until March 2. That the country should have stood the strain so well was a remarkable proof of the inherent stability of democratic government in America.

The credit that is due the people is not, how-

ever, shared by the politicians, although it is just to say that even if an Electoral Count Bill had not been passed ten years later, it would probably not be so difficult to get a non-partisan to-day as it was to secure one to resolve the doubtful electoral questions raised in 1876. So far as the justice of the Commission's action is concerned, it is now generally believed that Mr. Tilden had the stronger case, but that it was perhaps better that Mr. Hayes was installed, since Northern suspicion of the Democratic party was so strong that the country would have suffered from political confusion for a very long time had Mr. Tilden's claims been upheld by the Commission. Mr. Tilden had the popular vote in his favour, had carried important Northern and Western States, and had the right to expect that the precedent of dropping Louisiana in 1872 should have had great weight in his behalf. On the other hand, his friends seem to have been injudicious in their use of money, and fair counts had doubtless not been made in the South. Yet when Mr. Hayes proceeded to recognise the Democratic Administrations in the congested States, he apparently though not really invalidated his own title and suggested a bargain struck between Southern and Northern leaders, however statesmanlike an action we must concede it to have been. On the whole we may conclude that justice was not done to Mr. Tilden, but that the South at least secured a partial victory in the withdrawal of Federal troops from the polls. The evil effects of Reconstruction were to continue to be felt; the "negro problem" took the place of the "slave problem"; the "Solid South" was to be an obstacle to true political progress, but after all the gulf that had so long



separated the sections were rapidly filling up and disappearing. The Union was a fact as well as a name, whether one looked north or south or east or west.

But twelve years separated the inauguration of Hayes from Lee's surrender at Appomattox, yet how much had been accomplished within that period, whether for weal or woe! The tremendous experiment of Reconstruction had been tried and found wanting; the financial stability of the country had been threatened by speculation, corruption, popular ignorance, yet had been firmly maintained; industrial development had been unprecedented, so that save in the South the traveller could hardly have inferred that a few years before the nation had been in the throes of the greatest of modern wars; the transcontinental railway had linked East and West with the firmest of bonds; the great mineral resources of the Far West were beginning to be exploited; cities like Chicago were growing with marvellous rapidity even in spite of the devastating flames. In short, if the Centennial Exposition stood for the fact that the nation had turned its first century, it also stood for the further fact that, whether in war or peace, that nation possessed the power and vitality of an inexhaustible youth. Peace seemed to spread her banners in all directions even in the West, where a small Indian war with the Sioux, for the inception of which the savages were by no means entirely responsible, had led (1876) to the massacre of the brave Gen. George A. Custer and his entire command. The American's conduct toward Indian and negro might not be ideal, but he was at least faithful to his highest duty of subduing, in the interests of civilisation, every foot of his imperial domain.

## CHAPTER XX.

## THE FLOUNDERING OF PARTIES.

SINCE Reconstruction broke down and the Southern States regained their full rights in 1877, strictly political questions have occupied public attention in the United States less and less, while social and economic questions have attained a paramount importance. Such being the case, it should not surprise us to find that the tendency to form small parties for temperance reform and other purposes has increased and that the two historic parties have floundered about, struggling vainly for an issue that would bring them victory. That their struggle has been vain is quite apparent. 1876, under normal circumstances, would have been a Democratic year; 1880 was a Republican; 1884 a Democratic; 1888 a Republican; 1892 a Democratic; 1896 a Republican. In other words, till Mr. McKinley at the end of the century, and the parties have alternated regularly, no President since Mr. Hayes had two consecutive terms. The mid-term Congressional elections have often indicated within two years the dissatisfaction of the voters, and have thus limited the effective work even of the single term Administrations. That the election of 1900 broke the chain of alternate Republican and Democratic Administrations was at least partly owing to the fact that a new political question in the shape of the

so-called "Imperial Policy" had been sprung and that the currency question was still unsettled.

But it is equally clear that this vain floundering of the two dominant parties has not been accidental. The two-party system originated in England at the end of the seventeenth century, and served its purpose both there and in America so long as political questions were paramount, because these could generally be viewed logically from one of two points of view. Social and economic questions can rarely be so viewed, and when they can, it is obvious that it is difficult to pick out one for a chief issue in a campaign and to bring sufficient pressure to bear upon every member of a large party in order to carry it through. In other words, a period of economic and social changes such as the present offers a number of issues on which party men can rarely agree with unanimity, the result being that they bolt their party or else are kept within its ranks through mere partisan prejudice or through "log-rolling" and other corrupt practices. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that parties have see-sawed in the United States, that the number of independent voters has grown steadily, that partisanship and corruption have maintained, if not increased, their hold, and that unsafe measures like the Free Coinage of Silver have been advocated by desperate leaders bent on securing some issue that would defeat their opponents.

Signs of this decay of party government were visible during Grant's régime, making their appearance in fact as soon as the Radicals had done their work of Reconstruction. Having saved the Union and, as they thought, secured by legislation the political results of the war, the Republicans, threatened

with disintegration, had to seek some issue or issues that promised victory. After some years of uncertainty they chose the tariff and rang the changes on it. The Democrats, always a party in favour of simple government and consequently of moderate revenues, took the congenial post of an opposition party, although it was some years before their own protectionists, who were led by Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, could be weeded out. The ups and downs of the tariff controversy to be presently described were due to the fact that the people naturally did not know their own mind on a subject better suited to expert than to popular discussion. As might have been expected, however, shrewd politicians confused the issue so as to gain votes. The increased revenue was spent in pensions, in vast internal improvements; \* in short, in bribes to whole classes of voters—thus the task of the opposition party became herculean, involving as it did either the destruction of vested interests or willing connivance in established instrumentalities of corruption. It is almost needless to say that corruption gained more victories than it should have done, and that such a political conflict soon drove the party in opposition to seek an issue that would furnish a more effective means of bribing. They found it in the currency agitation of the past few years, to which their adversaries have recently opposed the grandiose attractions of a policy of expansion.

This preliminary sketch of American political

\* Especially in improvements of rivers and harbours, many of which, or rather the people interested in them, could absorb vast quantities of money. Many Presidents have protested against this corrupt extravagance, but their constitutional inability to veto the separate items of an appropriation bill has left them almost powerless.

conditions during the past quarter of a century has been rendered necessary by the fact that the reader will be left in a hopeless state of confusion by the perusal of the pages that follow unless he realises that it is the two-party system rather than the character of the American people or their failure to progress that is responsible for the low tone of present political conditions. The American people have not gone backward—they are more honest, more enterprising, better educated, wealthier—in short more powerful as a nation than ever before in their history, but they have not yet succeeded in adapting their political machinery, especially their party machinery, to the complexities of our modern period, and they have floundered accordingly. Nor have they been alone in this, for if we may trust Mr. Goldwin Smith and other competent students, the two-party system has of late been working badly in the country of its birth.

President Hayes, who was in his fifty-fifth year at the time of his inauguration, was not a great man and the virtues he had were not fully recognised by the country, partly on account of his clouded title to the office he held; but he made on the whole an excellent Executive. He was single- and simple-hearted, honest, and possessed of sound intelligence. But he lacked the power of impressing himself upon the popular imagination, and after his retirement—for he did not seek re-election—his rural proclivities became the subject of much newspaper merriment. The “chicken-fancier,” the man who through deference to his wife’s prejudices would not have wine on his table, might have seemed out of place in the fashionable and new Washington, which had been turned into a great city during



Grant's régime; but, with his manliness in resisting Congressional dictation as to appointments and his devotion to Civil Service Reform, he was a good man to have at the head of the nation in those corrupt times. At any rate he gave clear proof of possessing political wisdom in at least one particular—in his choice of a strong Cabinet. William M. Evarts, the well-known New York lawyer, as Secretary of State, John Sherman as Secretary of the Treasury, and Carl Schurz as Secretary of the Interior, would not have been out of place in any Administration. There was also an evidence of statesmanship and of freedom from sectional bias in the selection of a Southern Democrat, David M. Key of Tennessee, as Postmaster-General.

Two of the chief measures of Mr. Hayes's Administration have been already mentioned—the removal of Federal troops from the South, which naturally offended Republican partisans, and the Resumption of Specie Payments.\* The latter measure was, of course, most creditable to the country, but it had been determined on before the Democrats got control of the Lower House, nor did it prove that sound economic ideas could be expected of politicians of either party. In 1873 silver, which had long been practically out of circulation, had been demonetised, save for the purposes of subsidiary coinage, in accordance with contemporary European policy. But the mines of the Far Western States—to which Colorado had been added in 1876—were now yielding large quantities of the inferior metal,† and a demand arose for

\* See Mr. A. D. Noyes's *Thirty Years of American Finance*, N. Y., 1894.

† One mine which yielded \$645,000 of silver ore in 1873, yielded \$16,000,000 in 1875. See Noyes, p. 37.

the free coinage of silver dollars of  $412\frac{1}{2}$  grains, which should be "full legal tender for all debts public and private." This demand found expression in the "Bland Bill," named after Congressman Richard P. Bland of Missouri, a gentleman who, up to his lamented death in the year 1899, never faltered in his honest advocacy of a financial policy which seems to most students of economics to be both belated and mischievous. Financial distress following the panic of 1873; low prices in terms of gold, especially as these affected the agricultural classes; the idea that to pay off bonds in gold would oppress the taxpayer and enrich the capitalist—these were the chief causes of the agitation for cheap money which was a natural complement of the craze for fiat money that was contemporaneously giving impetus to the "Greenback" party. The whole movement was also related to the financial disorder occasioned by the large issues of legal tender paper as a war-measure—an unconstitutional experiment so far as anterior debts were concerned according to the Supreme Court in *Hepburn vs. Griswold*, but constitutional according to the same tribunal when its personnel had been changed. What with reversals of judicial decisions, speculations in gold, frantic haste to grow rich on the part of all classes, Whisky Ring and other frauds, it is no wonder that simple-minded people who knew nothing of economics should have listened to Congressional oracles and imagined that a crime had been committed when silver was demonetised. Nor is it any wonder that the same public has not yet been educated in the matter.

But free coinage of silver was not risked in 1873 any more than it was to be in 1896. The Bland

Bill became in the Senate, chiefly through the tinkering of Republicans under the lead of William B. Allison of Iowa, the Bland-Allison Bill and required the Secretary of the Treasury to buy monthly not less than two nor more than four million dollars' worth of silver and to coin it into dollars. This unwise measure was passed by large majorities. President Hayes then showed his courage by vetoing the bill on sound economic grounds, declaring that if the country was to be benefited by a silver coinage this could only be through the issue of silver dollars of full value which would "defraud no man." Congress immediately passed the bill over the veto, and it remained law until 1890. Meanwhile Providence was guarding a people who would not guard themselves. The success of the resumption legislation was made secure by the great harvest of 1879, which occurred contemporaneously with a notable failure of European crops.

In foreign affairs the most important action of Mr. Hayes's Administration consisted in paying an award to the British government made by the Halifax Fishery Commission, which sat in 1877 under terms of an article in the Treaty of Washington (1871). We need not detail the troubles that have arisen between Canada and the United States relative to the question of the fisheries, but we should note that an unedifying controversy had originated concerning the personnel of the Commission, and that the United States considered the award of \$5,500,000 ridiculously unfair. Considerable discussion arose in Congress, but Mr. Hayes's request for the requisite appropriation and for reliance on the discretion of the Executive was finally complied with. Mr. Evarts then argued the point with Lord Salis-

bury, and, after stating the American position in a strong and dignified way, ordered the award to be paid.

In estimating the strength of Mr. Hayes's Administration one must take into account the fact that the Forty-fifth Congress was Democratic in the Lower House and the Forty-sixth in both Houses. Yet the President was very courageous in his vetoes and was strong enough to prevent the passage of an act to restrict Chinese immigration, which, he thought, should not be allowed to abrogate, without notice, the existing treaty of 1858.\* He had need of all his firmness however. In February, 1879, the Democratic House tacked a "rider" to the Army Appropriation Bill in order to prevent the possible use of troops at the polls. This and other bills similarly loaded down failed to pass the Senate, whereupon Mr. Hayes called an extra session. The new Congress being entirely Democratic, the same use of riders was resorted to; the general object being to sweep away the laws that had so irritated the South a decade before. The President took exception to such methods of forcing legislation, and Congress could not go over his veto. Finally after other vetoes certain appropriations were made, but officers connected with the Judiciary were forced to wait until the next session for their salaries. Whatever one may think about the propriety of removing the objectionable legislation, one can hardly praise the course taken by the Democrats and can heartily admire the firmness of Mr. Hayes.

This controversy over the Army Appropriation Bill fortunately took place after the great strike of

\* A treaty which would allow restriction was obtained in 1879-81.

1877,\* in which employees of most of the large railroads were engaged. Fierce riots occurred at Baltimore and Pittsburg (Pennsylvania), being especially serious at the latter place. The President, when requested by the Governors of the threatened States, sent out Federal troops in July, and the rioters yielded peaceably. An immense amount of damage to property, especially by incendiarism, was done during the period of commotion, and similar disturbances were continued for some years. Pennsylvania had previously struggled against something worse than riots—against organised murdering and pillaging at the hands of a secret society known as the “Molly McGuires.” The members of this order were desperate miners who killed superintendents and set fire to corporation property. For several years they terrorised whole districts and even rendered railway travel unsafe, but finally in 1875 they were brought to justice, along with influential political accomplices, chiefly through clever detective work. Their outrages were a noteworthy symptom of the wretched condition of the country—of the piled up wealth of corporations, the flourishing of corruption in every department of public life, the indifference to the rights of labour or in fact to anything that did not sort with Iago’s injunction—“Put money in thy purse.” Industrial conditions in America to-day might be improved, but at least considerable progress in the right direction seems to have been made since the seventies. And even in the midst of the turmoils just described patriotic citizens might have claimed that great enterprises like the

\* Yet even at this time owing to the remissness of the last Congress of the Grant régime the army was left for a short time without pay.



deepening of the lower Mississippi River by means of the jetties of Capt. James B. Eads (1879) were a convincing proof of the nation's real advance.

In the summer of 1880 the rival parties met in conventions to determine their presidential candidates. The Republicans were much divided as to men, and it was only after the campaign was well on that the tariff developed as a leading issue. General Grant, who had returned from his remarkable tour around the world, during which he was accorded practically sovereign honours, was urged for a third term by several leading politicians and quite a body of voters. Opposition to any man's having what Washington had declined naturally made itself strongly felt, and the scandals of Grant's régime were once more rehearsed. Besides, there were several leaders like Blaine and Sherman and Senator Edmunds of Vermont who were warmly supported by their friends. The main fight was between Blaine and Grant, the latter finding his chief supporter in Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York, Blaine's determined opponent. The session of the Convention at Chicago was a long and exciting one. Grant led from the first, but he could not gain, and on the thirty-sixth ballot the Blaine and Sherman delegates united on General James A. Garfield of Ohio, who received 399 votes to Grant's 306. Chester A. Arthur of New York, a politician who had been removed from office by President Hayes for undue partisanship,\* was chosen for Vice-

\* In 1879. There was considerable controversy as to the propriety of this removal, but Hayes's struggles for decent civil service, in face of opposition from both parties, deserve the heartiest commendation, as do also his wise and humane recommendations with regard to the policy to be pursued toward the Indians.

President. The Democrats meeting at Cincinnati—the Western towns now depriving Baltimore of its prestige as the Convention City—had less difficulty in securing a ticket, for it was quite obvious that the great commercial prosperity of the past year would give the party in power a victory, and leading Democratic statesmen did not wish to contest for the privilege of being defeated. Mr. Tilden not desiring to be renominated, the choice lay between General Winfield Scott Hancock of Pennsylvania and Senator Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware. Hancock easily carried the day, and Mr. William H. English of Indiana completed the ticket.

Of the two nominees General Hancock, who had gained a splendid reputation as a fighter, especially at Gettysburg, was probably the more popular man, but was little of a politician and made himself rather ridiculous by the famous statement that the tariff was only a local issue. General Garfield, on the other hand, was a man who had “before the war” risen from driving the mules of a canal boat to being the President of a small Ohio college. Then he had fought finely in the war, had entered the Lower House of Congress, and had finally just been elected Senator. It was a typical American career and a good one, much above the average, in fact, with regard to culture, and smirched only by indiscretion, rather than guilt, in connection with the *Crédit Mobilier* scandal. Yet he did not win his campaign without being charged not only with his relations with this gigantic fraud, but also with having sympathised with the introduction of Chinese cheap labour. The latter charge was made in the so-called “Morey Letter,” which was promptly proved to be a forgery. The Electoral vote finally stood—

Garfield and Arthur, 214; Hancock and English, 155—the latter ticket winning few votes outside of the “Solid South,” which was now destined to be a constant quantity in politics and included not merely the old Confederacy but every State that had had slaves at the time of the war. The South was solidified by race prejudice; the Republican vote in some States seems to have been solidified by the use of money.

The Republican victory was in part due to the fact that Senator Conkling had got the better of his bitter disappointment and had taken the stump for Garfield, carrying General Grant along with him. Before the new Administration was fairly begun, however, the same Senator had done a good deal to disturb the painfully acquired party unity and had given clear proof of the fact that personal influence is as great a factor in a democratic republic as under any other form of government, if indeed it be not a greater factor. He had proved also in his own person that such an influence need not be, in fact, is not generally, of a very high order. Conkling was a brilliant orator—one of the most remarkable, if report can be trusted, that America has ever produced, but he was also a most vindictive and a shallow-minded man. He was capable, too, of overreaching himself, as will soon be shown.

General Garfield determined that he would have Mr. Blaine for his Secretary of State, regardless of the fact that such a choice would be offensive to Mr. Conkling. Then he offered the Secretaryship of the Treasury to a New York man, as he had promised, but not Mr. Conkling's nominee, and, on failing to secure his first choice, gave the post to William Windom, a not very sound financier from

Minnesota. New York, which, according to Conkling, had been saved by him for Garfield, received only the Postmaster-Generalship, which was given to Mr. Thomas L. James, a most competent official. On the news of these intended appointments Mr. Conkling assailed General Garfield in his hotel with most vituperative language. Matters became worse when the new President gave an important New York post to a local enemy of Conkling's, in spite of the fact that it had become an unwritten law that Senators should control all such appointments. Conkling and his fellow Senator, Thomas C. Platt, at once resigned, expecting to be immediately re-elected by the New York legislature; but they were disappointed, their faction, known as the "Stalwarts," being outvoted by the adherents of the Administration, known as the "Half-Breeds." Meanwhile Conkling had resisted all appeals on behalf of party unity, had denounced Garfield in a speech said to have been a model of vituperation, and had published a letter which at least proved that the latter was not a model civil service reformer. The whole affair showed that Conkling was not above acting like a spoilt child, and he would doubtless be remembered with disjain were it not for his brilliant oratorical gifts and for his sad death occasioned by exposure in the "blizzard" of 1888. It is needless to add that his colleague Mr. Platt, who by his subservience earned the sobriquet of "Me-too Platt," regained his hold upon politics, became the Republican "Boss" of New York, and is now in possession of his former seat in the Senate.

The details of this factional dispute have been given because they illustrate the lowering effect of the spoils system upon American politics—under

what other system would a Senator have dared to berate a President to his face?—and because they lead up to one of the most pathetic tragedies in American history. On July 2, 1881, General Garfield was shot at the railway station in Washington by a disappointed office-seeker named Charles J. Guiteau. For weeks the President lay in agony, and after medical skill had been exhausted, he died on September 19th, mourned by the civilised world.\* The assassin was subjected to a long trial, and was finally convicted and executed in spite of the plea of insanity. There seems to be little doubt that he was really responsible for his act, but disappointed ambition and political fanaticism suggested the crime, and the public rage against him, which took the form of attempts upon his life, might with justice have been directed in part against the corrupt political conditions of the time.

As had been the case with Lincoln, Garfield's sad death made him a "martyr," and has rendered it difficult to estimate what success he would have had as an administrator, had he lived. Fortunately the parallel with Lincoln ceases when we turn to examine the career of the Vice-President who took up the succession. General Chester A. Arthur's antecedents, politically speaking, had been not altogether desirable, and his selection as Vice-President had been determined by normal hap-hazard principles; but he was a gentleman and on his elevation proved to be not a little of a statesman. His career illustrates, therefore, both the good luck of the Republic and the power of democracy to shape the tools it needs. His succession illustrated also defects in

\* He lacked exactly two months of being fifty years old.



the organic law, for it was not and is not certain whether, in case of a President's "inability" to perform his functions, the Vice-President should at once take his place or do as Arthur did, allow the existing Cabinet to manage affairs. Then again it was questionable what would happen should Mr. Arthur die \* prior to the next meeting of Congress, for no President *pro tem.* of the Senate had been chosen and no Speaker of the House could be elected until Congress met—these two officers being entitled to the succession according to a law of 1792. Yet it cannot be doubted that even if the nation had found itself without a head, no revolution, save a purely technical one, would have occurred. The latest ex-Speaker or some other functionary would have taken temporary charge of affairs and democracy would again have been justified of its adherents, but not of its notion that the Constitution of the United States is a perfect instrument. President Arthur pointed out to the Forty-seventh Congress the necessity of providing some better law of succession; but although the matter was discussed, it was not until January, 1886, that it was determined that members of the Cabinet should succeed the Vice-President in the order of the seniority of their respective departments. Under the new law therefore the Secretary of State would be President should both President and Vice-President die during an Administration, and the Secretary of the Treasury would be next in succession. It is obvious that, even should a worse accident than that on board the Princeton occur, there is now little chance that the Republic

\* He was in the prime of life, however, nearly fifty-one. Yet he died shortly after leaving office.

will ever be without a legal head, but it is equally obvious that Congress does even its most important business in a slipshod fashion.

That other bad feature of the government forced into relief by Garfield's death—to wit, the spoils system—was also brought to the notice of Congress by President Arthur, with the result that the bill prepared by the Civil Service Reform League and already before the Senate through the efforts of Senator George H. Pendleton of Ohio became law early in 1883, and a good Civil Service Commission was appointed. The work of this Commission went steadily forward in spite of a few reverses and of the antagonism of the professional politicians; but in his third year (1899) President McKinley, by exempting numerous places from the working of the law, took a backward step which was not reassuring. The cause of reform is, however, doubtless bound to succeed in the end, and even now there is little likelihood that such corruption as was exhibited in the famous "Star Route Frauds" of Hayes's time—in which contractors for carrying the mails in the Far West joined with post office officials and other public men to make the government pay extortionate prices for services received—will ever again be so brazenly rampant in the country.

Mr. Arthur chose a good Cabinet, but one not equal to that of Hayes, or perhaps to that of Garfield. The Administration, however, was a successful one owing to the absence of great foreign complications and to the President's firmness in vetoing bad measures. In foreign affairs the recognition of the Congo Free State and participation in the Berlin Conference on African matters (1884) seemed to argue an abandonment of the home-keep-

ing policy of the government, while the claim, advanced under Hayes and continued by his successors, that the United States, in view of De Lesseps' abortive Panama Canal, could not consent to the control of an inter-oceanic canal by any European power or powers seemed to necessitate some modifications of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,\* which, America contended, applied only to canals in contemplation at the time of signing. Secretaries Evarts, Blaine, and Freylinghuysen, Arthur's chief Cabinet officer, made the most of their case, but the British government refused to consider that it had done anything to invalidate the Treaty or that the instrument should be amended. It is indeed hard to see what basis the United States had for its claims save such as any nation has that has made a bad bargain and wishes to get out of it. Great Britain's control of the Suez Canal and her large navy, which could easily command a Central American waterway, were natural American arguments, but hardly appealed to the other contracting party. Fortunately the matter was dropped, but it had doubtless added point to the protests that had been increasing against the long-standing policy of neglecting the navy. Mr. Arthur and his Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler, inaugurated a policy of increasing this important arm of the service, and their efforts, seconded by those of subsequent Administrations, have resulted in the creation of a navy whose exploits have recently made the whole nation proud. But as schemes for a Nicaraguan Canal are still being pushed and as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty still holds, it is obvious that the possession

\* See *ante*, II., xiii., p. 230, note.

of a new navy by the United States renders it all the more necessary that American diplomatists should be in the future both cautious and honest in their handling of international affairs. Unfortunately, however, a tone of "Jingo" excitability and special pleading, which rightly or wrongly is fathered primarily on Mr. Blaine, has more or less characterised American diplomacy of late, and may involve the country in grave difficulties, especially if naval officers are not required to exercise more discretion than some of them seem to have shown of late.\*

In internal affairs President Arthur's bravest and most important act was his veto, in 1882, of a bill restricting Chinese immigration.† Race prejudice and unwillingness to compete with cheap labour had aroused the people of the Pacific Coast against the increasing number of Chinese immigrants, and for several years an agitation against them on the one hand and the propertied classes on the other had been going on under the name of "Kearneyism." Dennis Kearney, whose name has attained such an unpleasant notoriety, was one of those demagogic Irishmen who have been brought to the front in America in considerable numbers. He was an aggressive speaker and had confidence enough in himself really to found a party, which, after running a short course and giving California a new constitution, collapsed, as such parties always do, along with its demagogue founder. Anti-

\* It should be noted that Arthur's Administration made special efforts to put the United States on a good footing with the South American nations.

† Ten years later an extraordinarily strict exclusion act, known by the name of Mr. Geary of California, became law.

Chinese agitation was, however, too popular a craze to be dropped by the politicians, and even after Arthur's veto of the first bill, another was at once introduced lessening from twenty to ten years the period of exclusion. This became law in spite of Chinese protests. The policy thus inaugurated was not in conflict with the new treaty with China of 1881, but was somewhat antagonistic to the doctrinaire position taken by the Republicans in the days of Reconstruction.

The lawlessness of "Kearneyism," which was a counterpart of the strikes and "Molly McGuire" outrages in the East, was represented in the Middle West by the train robberies and other crimes committed by the gang of which Jesse James was the head. The assassination of James by members of his gang, who had been bribed by the authorities of Missouri, was bitterly resented even by honest people in the region in which he lived. The fact is that lawlessness was an almost necessary concomitant of the new West at this time, just as it had been in Alabama and Mississippi in the forties and in California in the fifties. But the Eastern States had grown more and more like Europe in their ideas of life and conduct, and hence could hardly understand Western outrages or the street fights and lynchings of the restless unsettled South. They understood political conditions in the latter region just as little, or Republicans would hardly have welcomed with open arms such a politician as Senator William Mahone of Virginia, who had risen to power by agitating for a "readjustment" of the State debt. But amid all these domestic turmoils the celebration of the centennial of the battle of Yorktown in 1881 and the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial



Exposition held at New Orleans in 1884 showed how much the country had progressed, not merely since the Revolution, but since the Civil War. The heroism of the Arctic explorers led by Lieutenant A. W. Greely and of their rescuers (1881--1884) showed also that if undue commercialism had fostered corruption and lawlessness throughout the land, the heart of the people was still splendidly sound. Even Congress awoke to the necessity of repressing polygamy in Utah \* (1882).

A new presidential election was also about to illustrate this popular soundness of heart. Mr. Arthur was a candidate for re-election, but could not gain a firm hold on his party, in spite of or perhaps in consequence of the excellence of his Administration, all things considered. The rank and file of the Republicans wished Blaine, the "plumed knight," as he was ridiculously styled; while the reform element in the party wished Mr. Edmunds of Vermont. The reformers and the Arthur men could not unite and the Chicago Convention nominated Blaine and Logan as their ticket amid tremendous enthusiasm. The Vice-Presidential candidate, General John A. Logan of Illinois, had been himself a presidential possibility for years and was popular, but Blaine seemed to be a tower of strength in spite of the charges of corruption that had been made against him and from which he had never quite freed himself. It is difficult to account for his popularity, but the fact remains that no American since Clay has, as a mere civilian, so fired the popu-

\* Other important measures of this Administration were a revision of the tariff (1883), a reduction of postage rates (1883), a repeal of stamp taxes (1883), and the prohibition of the introduction of contract labourers (1885).

lar imagination. Yet his enemies were as thorough-going as his friends, and it was soon found that many of the Reform Republicans would bolt the party.

The Democrats, realising that they could hardly hope for a better chance of victory, determined to put forward their best man, whom they found in Governor Grover Cleveland of New York. He was the son of a Presbyterian clergyman, but had practically educated and made himself, having become a lawyer in Buffalo (N.Y.), and filled with success many local offices before he won the governorship by a phenomenal majority. He was not a showy man, but had given evidence of remarkable honesty, energy and intelligence. Besides as Governor of the greatest State he had an excellent chance of gaining its large electoral vote. The Chicago Democratic Convention had little trouble, therefore, in giving him a two-thirds majority on the second ballot. For Vice-President Thomas A Hendricks of Indiana was chosen, the West being thus appealed to as well as the numerous voters who wished to right what many people regarded as the "crime of '76." In the person of Cleveland, another Democratic Governor of New York, Tilden, would be avenged.

The campaign that followed was marked by much excitement and by bitter partisanship. Some of the Reform Republicans swallowed their disappointment and worked for Blaine as the regular party nominee, no Democrat being a safe candidate in their eyes. But the absurd charge that Cleveland's election would put "the South in the saddle" once more could not blind distinguished Reformers like George William Curtis to the danger of supporting on mere party grounds men whom they believed

to be corrupt; hence quite a large number of influential Republicans announced their intention of voting for Cleveland whose integrity they trusted. The action of these Independents, or "Mugwumps" \* as they were named in derision, naturally made the campaign hotter. The careers of both candidates were subjected to close scrutiny, neither emerging scot-free, and the better element of the nation being quite disgusted. Blaine's followers stood up for him manfully, especially the Northern clergy, who seem to have imagined in their innocence that a Democratic victory in 1884 would mean the revolution that their prototypes of 1801 had expected from Jefferson. One divine, the Rev. Dr. Burchard of New York, was unfortunate enough to express their sentiments in an alliterative form that gave great offence and probably cost Blaine votes. He seemed to think that "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" were the main allies of the Democratic party.

Two R's instead of three were the main allies of the Democrats—to wit, the Reform Republicans. The election was very close, and when after several days of anxious waiting it was found that Cleveland had carried New York by only 1,149 votes, it became quite apparent that without Independent support he could never have been elected. The electoral vote finally stood, 219 for Cleveland and 182 for Blaine, the former's popular plurality over Blaine, in a vote of more than 10,000,000, being only 62,000. Thus the first Democratic candidate since Buchanan to reach the White House was one chosen by Independents to receive their votes. The spirit of partisanship had received its most serious

\* An Indian word meaning "chief" or "big man."

setback since the days of Jackson, and thenceforward the Independent vote was to be a serious factor in politics and an admirable and sure proof of the nation's real progress.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE TARIFF TO THE FRONT.

MR. CLEVELAND, who was young for his office, being just forty-seven, began his Administration by selecting a good Cabinet with Senator Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware as Secretary of State. The South was given its fair representation in the choice of Senator A. H. Garland of Arkansas as Attorney-General, and Senator L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi as Secretary of the Interior. Other Southerners found good posts, and the cry was raised that the President was not loyal to the Union, especially after he issued an impolitic and ineffective order that Confederate flags held in Washington might be returned to the Southern States. The organisation of the Union veterans known as the Grand Army of the Republic at once became vindictive critics of the Administration, particularly after the President showed his firmness by vetoing over one hundred of the private pension bills by means of which Congress was squandering the surplusage of revenue received through the tariff. Mr. Cleveland was made still more unpopular by his veto of the extravagant largess to very short term veterans and their indigent parents, known as the Dependent Pension Bill (1887). He pursued his course unflinchingly, however, and thus gained the approval of the thoughtful men who were not averse from



relieving deserving veterans, but had no desire to add to the incomes of prosperous citizens or of deserters or of persons who had never seen a battlefield. But extravagance was in the Washington air, and all sorts of schemes, some of them speciously charitable, were devised for spending the nation's money. One of the most unnecessary of these, which nevertheless did not become a law, was the Blair Bill—so called after the New Hampshire Senator who fathered it—which proposed to distribute money to certain schools in the South.

If Mr. Cleveland's unpopularity had been due to his vetoes alone, it would not have been a matter of great consequence, but unfortunately, he managed to alienate the leaders of his own party by lack of tact, and to a certain extent lost his hold upon the Reformers by his final yielding to Democratic demands for "spoils." He was, of course, in a difficult position, as his party had been out of office for years and could naturally claim with Jefferson that it was unfair for the political opponents of an Administration to hold all the offices. Although the choice of the Independents, he was first and foremost a Democratic President, and all the leaders of his party urged him to "turn the rascals out." If he could have maintained the boldness by which he finally forced Congress to repeal entirely the Tenure of Office Act, he might have proved himself a very great man and after all not a bad politician, for Americans admire strength and bravery of every sort. But he yielded slowly to the pressure of the spoils-men, supplanting a very considerable number of Republican officials within three years. Extreme Reformers denounced him, partisan Democrats still bore a grudge against him for not having given

them all the offices at once, but the historian can only regard him as a man who kept his actions within legal bounds and believed in doing right, yet was not quite strong enough at first to scorn consequences. In his second Administration Mr. Cleveland proved that he was a true friend of a reformed service, but he undoubtedly made many mistakes with regard to patronage in his early years as President. He assisted local Democratic leaders whom he should have known to be corrupt, and there is a touch of poetic justice in the fact that, as we shall soon see, such leaders in his own State helped to compass his defeat in 1888.

But although he was not an ideal Executive, it would be folly to maintain that Mr. Cleveland was not a good one. He inculcated and practised economy in public expenditures; he looked after the people's interests in the Western lands;\* he conducted foreign affairs, including a revived dispute on the perennial subject of the Canadian fisheries, in a creditable manner; and he continued to augment the navy. Of course his Cabinet, on which only one slight scandal rests, deserves much praise in all these particulars, but it is quite clear that the President was in fact as well as in name the head of the government.

One important measure of this period has already been mentioned—the law providing for the succession to the Presidency; Vice-President Hendricks having, like not a few of his predecessors, died in office (1885), Congress simply could not afford to dally longer with the matter. The Electoral Count

\* He drove cattle men from public and Indian lands on which they had intruded in large numbers.

Bill,\* also previously mentioned as designed to settle the questions raised in connection with the Hayes-Tilden election, became a law in the year following the last-named enactment (1887). Another important measure of 1887 was the Interstate Commerce Act, which was designed to remedy certain railroad abuses, especially with regard to discrimination in favour of particular individuals and localities. It will be remembered that in the late sixties and early seventies the "Granger Party" † in the West had endeavoured to control the railroads, especially through the State governments. It had been asserted at the time, however, that Congress could deal with the subject in its *inter-state* relations, and the Act of 1887 confirmed this assertion. Legislation was sorely needed, for competition in many instances was rendered impossible for producers who had no corrupt hold on gigantic natural monopolies; but although some good was done at first by the Commission appointed to look after the operations of the Act, the provision against "pooling" was evaded by the railway companies and the work of the Commission was brought nearly to a standstill. All the measures mentioned in this paragraph are, however, memorable for at least one reason—they show that, while legislation is very slow in America, no party of reformers need ever despair. Sooner or later a needed bill will become law, and the fact that the great Republic is making progress even in legisla-

\* This empowered each State to decide how its vote stands in a presidential election. In case of failure to decide, the question comes to Congress.

† See *ante*, III., xix., p. 345.

tion, in spite of the floundering of the parties, will be apparent.

We have not space to describe the agitation, political and other, conducted at this time by the various organisations of workingmen, the "Knights of Labour" with upwards of a million members being the most conspicuous. It must suffice to say that it was the South-West, and particularly the City of St. Louis and the Missouri Pacific Railroad, that suffered most from the great strikes and riots of the spring of 1886. The contemporaneous outburst of the Chicago anarchists, which led to the killing of several policemen in Haymarket Square, cannot be so briefly treated. Labour strikes and riots were bad enough, yet might be regarded as ebullitions of class feeling natural to a new and free country; but the throwing of dynamite bombs and the deliberate promulgation of anarchistic principles made even the most optimistic Americans grow apprehensive. The millions of foreign immigrants, whose numbers had long been frightening thoughtful students, were evidently not all leaving their old world ideas behind them. The foreign sections of New York and Chicago, where not a word of English was spoken but where thousands of ignorant and dishonest votes were cast, were now clearly seen to be plague spots that must be eradicated. At first popular indignation was widespread. Since the return of calm the efforts of philanthropists to purify the great cities, to which the rural population has migrated in enormous numbers throughout the present Industrial Epoch, have been constant and, it is hoped, increasingly successful. But the Chicago Anarchists were dealt with by magistrates and not by philanthropists. Several of them were imprisoned for life and four were

hanged. The verdict and its execution did not give satisfaction to the few people who believe that the "terrors" of the law have little efficacy in deterring from crime; but when several years later Governor John P. Altgeld of Illinois pardoned the surviving anarchists, he found from the outcry raised that the American public as a whole still believed that justice had been meted out to dangerous criminals. Perhaps, however, if another statesman, less suspected than Governor Altgeld of sympathy with lawlessness, had done the same thing and given the same reasons, the American people, in spite of their conservatism and hatred of anarchy, might have viewed the matter in a different light.

But it is time to discuss the most important feature of Cleveland's first Administration—his assault upon the tariff, even though we have to pass over such interesting topics as the great funeral and popular mourning accorded General Grant when he died, in 1885, under peculiarly distressing circumstances; the terrible earthquake of 1886 which almost destroyed Charleston; the erection at New York of the colossal Bartholdi statue of Liberty as a token of Franco-American amity, and the like.\*

Mr. Cleveland was not elected primarily because he was a low tariff man, but being a careful observer of political conditions he soon became one. That he did not want for courage in foreign issues upon the politicians was proved by his first message to the Forty-ninth Congress (1885), in which he drew attention to the fact that not a fourth of the silver dollars coined under the Bland-Allison Act of 1878

\* The presence of Confederate generals at Grant's funeral and the help given to Charleston were clear proofs that sectional differences were being smothered.



had gone into circulation, and argued that a continuance of the policy would be ruinous. He was little heeded, however, and eight years were to elapse before he could force the adoption of a new policy. But the enormous revenue derived from customs duties seemed as pernicious as the practice of locking up silver dollars, and he argued at the same time for a reduction of the duties "upon the imported necessities of life." He did not believe in rashly assailing industries that counted on governmental help and he spoke about protecting the American workingman, but he also thought that the American taxpayer needed protection as well. He saw that owners of long period bonds would not surrender them and that the normal expenditures of the government were not sufficiently great to prevent the piling up of a heavy surplus in the treasury, which Congress was only too willing to squander in pensions, internal improvements, and questionable schemes like that embodied in the Blair Bill. As he believed in economy, like the true Jeffersonian Democrat he was, he could only advise reduction of a tariff which took money out of the pockets of the taxpayers and put it directly into a plethoric treasury and indirectly into the coffers of manufacturers.

Congress did nothing to carry out the President's views, but he did not change his course. In December, 1887, he wrote a bold message in which, while protesting that he was not a free trader, he advocated free wool, low duties on raw materials and on necessities, and the taxing of luxuries. This time the Democratic House passed a reduced tariff, but not a free trade act, known as the Mills Bill, from its chief author, Roger Q. Mills of Texas. The Senate was Republican, however, and the measure

failed, but Mr. Cleveland had at least determined the choice of the chief issue for the next campaign. He has been blamed for doing this, on the ground that his boldness lost him the election of 1888, whereas if he had waited, he could have sent in his famous message later. The obvious reply is that the message of 1887 did much to win the election of 1892, and that Mr. Cleveland was always more of a statesman than a politician, and was consequently alive to the country's best interests.

For the new campaign the Democrats had practically no choice but to nominate Cleveland, who was strong with the party, if not with the politicians, but they gave him a thorough party man as a colleague in the person of Allen G. Thurman of Ohio, whose sobriquet "The Old Roman" was sufficiently suggestive of freedom from "Mugwump" proclivities. The Republicans were at first at a loss for a candidate after Blaine had declined to be considered, Mr. Sherman seeming, on the whole, the favourite. But he was finally defeated by General Benjamin Harrison, a distinguished Indiana lawyer who had made a good record during the war and who was a grandson of President William Henry Harrison. Levi P. Morton of New York was named for Vice-President.

Between the two tickets there should have been no question how a patriotic citizen of independent views ought to vote in spite of the ability and honesty of Harrison. But the Republicans were aided by a large campaign fund contributed by anxious manufacturers, and they used it in a most thorough manner, especially in Harrison's own pivotal State, Indiana, where fraudulent voters were divided into "blocks of five" and carefully supervised by party

managers who saw that the bought ballot was duly cast.\* The Democrats were not too honest themselves, but their efforts at corruption paled before those of the Republicans. The latter also circulated "campaign lies" to the effect that undue British influence was at the bottom of a free trade movement which would deprive the American labourer of his just protection against the pauper labour of Europe. It is needless to say that many of the simpler-minded voters were completely taken in by these plausible falsehoods, and that the public at large could not be educated on the complex question at issue in the course of a short campaign. An "American policy" at least sounded well, and besides Harrison was a veteran of the Union Army, while Cleveland not only had not fought but had actually tried to send back the Rebel flags. Prejudice, ignorance, and corrupt use of money carried the day, and the ablest and most independent President since Lincoln was defeated by an electoral vote of 168 to his opponent's 233. Yet Cleveland's popular vote exceeded that of Harrison by 100,000, and he would have been elected in all probability had not the Tammany Hall and other Democratic leaders in New York given votes to the Republican national ticket in return for aid in securing the success of the Democratic State ticket.

But if corruption marked this campaign, personal scurrilities did not. It is to be regretted, however, that the Republicans drew from the British Minister, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, a letter touching on the campaign, which that gentleman should

\* The frauds of this election accelerated the adoption of laws for secret balloting, after the Australian model. Such laws are now in force in nearly every State.



JAMES G. BLAINE.





not have written, but which President Cleveland, for rather paltry political reasons, deemed worthy of official notice. Great Britain refusing very properly to withdraw her minister, his passports were sent him. His post remained unfilled till the expiration of Cleveland's term—a period which, if it did not fully meet the expectations of patriotic Reformers, at least proved the falsity of the dangerous assumption that the Republican party which had saved the Union was the only one that could keep it running prosperously.

President Harrison began his Administration with a Congress (the Fifty-first) Republican in both branches and with a good Cabinet headed by Mr. Blaine. The latter statesman was chiefly responsible for the first important event of the term—the meeting of the Pan-American Congress at Washington in the autumn of 1889. The objects of this conference of delegates would have delighted Henry Clay, and were quite legitimate—to wit, the formation of an American Customs Union and the general promotion of the common interests of the American Republics. Little came of the meeting, but international sympathies were fostered, and it was clear that Mr. Blaine and other Republicans were opening their eyes to the fact that the United States, so long as it insisted on building a high tariff wall around itself, could not complain if South American “neighbours” preferred to trade with Great Britain and Europe.\*

Mr. Blaine was less fortunate in his relations two

\* The Union was at this time enlarged by the admission of six new States: North and South Dakota, Montana, and Washington in 1889, and Idaho and Wyoming in 1890. The constitution of the latter granted political equality to women—an experiment confined at present to the Far West.

years later with one South American country—Chili. An indiscreet diplomatic appointment began the trouble—the American minister\* becoming a partisan of the Chilian President in the civil war then going on between that personage and the Congress of the country. Popular indignation against the United States was aroused in Chili, and this was increased by the seizure of a Chilian vessel, the *Itata*, on the request of the Chilian minister at Washington, who claimed that she was carrying arms to the insurgents. The *Itata* put to sea, however, and was illegally chased by the U.S. cruiser *Charleston*. In October a party of American sailors from the *Baltimore* were attacked in Valparaiso and two were killed and several wounded. Sharp correspondence followed, and President Harrison sent a message to Congress which his critics thought too hectoring for so small an affair. Fortunately Chili made amends and a war which could scarcely have proved creditable to the larger power was averted. The obvious lesson that the United States should employ trained diplomatists rather than partisan office-seekers in its foreign service has not yet been learned.†

Mr. Blaine managed well another foreign complication of 1891. The Sicilian secret society known as the “Mafia” had branches in several of the larger cities of the United States—notably in New Orleans,—and pursued quite successfully its congenial occupation of black-mailing and murdering. David C.

\* Mr. Patrick Egan, former Treasurer of the Irish League and but lately naturalized at the time of his appointment.

† See the excellent paper “The Chilian Controversy” in Prof. A. B. Hart’s volume of essays already cited. Prof. Hart thinks that Mr. Blaine conducted this correspondence with discretion.

Hennessy, chief of the New Orleans police, got a clue to the nefarious doings of the order, but in following it up was cruelly murdered. Several Italians were arrested and tried for the crime, but to the surprise and indignation of the public, the jury acquitted six and failed to agree on a verdict with regard to three. Bribery or intimidation seemed to have interfered with the course of justice, and the next day (March 14, 1891) the "best people of the city" resolved to take matters in their own hands. Led on by the District Attorney they marched to the prison where the Italians were confined, battered their way in, and then, to the number of about sixty, searched for the prisoners and disposed of them by both shooting and hanging. The deed caused great comment throughout the world, and was seemingly more praised than condemned. Yet, making all due allowance for righteous popular indignation at so notorious a miscarriage of justice, and granting that what occurred at New Orleans might have occurred almost anywhere, we may doubt whether such outbreaks do not always do more harm than good whenever they take place in a civilised community. When law does not exist, or is in its infancy, its place must be supplied by rough and ready methods such as those of the Vigilance Committees of early Californian days (1851, 1856, 1877). But when law does, or should, exist popular violence may or may not do away with a present evil or nuisance, yet almost certainly does not lead to any reform of courts and codes. This is the reason why the existence of lynch law is such a menace to the South at the present moment—it puts off the day of reform and does not really check crime.

But we are more concerned with the international

complications that arose out of the New Orleans tragedy. The Italian government demanded an indemnity as well as the punishment of the mob leaders, and naturally could not understand Mr. Blaine's explanation of the situation. The Federal government could pay out money even though it stood no chance of getting it back from Louisiana; but the lynchers could be punished only in the State courts, which were certain not to convict. In other words, the situation was anomalous. The United States were responsible to Italy for the act of Louisiana, yet Louisiana was not responsible to the United States. The Italians thought that Mr. Blaine was juggling and for a time withdrew their minister, but finally accepted \$25,000 for the families of the unfortunate victims of popular justice.

Mr. Blaine had American law in his favour in his dealings with Italy, but he seems to have had little law of any sort on his side in his management of long-standing disputes growing out of the American claim to exclusive rights in Bering Sea, with regard at least to seal fishing. Early in 1892 it was agreed to submit the questions at issue to a board of arbitrators—two of whom were to be appointed by the United States, two by Great Britain, and one by each of the three selected impartial countries, France, Italy and Sweden. The arbitrators met in Paris in 1893 and rendered an award distinctly antagonistic to the American claims. They also prescribed regulations for the protection of seals, to be enforced by both the governments interested in the matter.

Turning now to domestic affairs we find the Lower House of Congress agitated over the method adopted by its new Speaker, Mr. Thomas B. Reed of Maine, to prevent the Democratic minority from "filibus-

tering" *i.e.*, impeding legislation by refusing to vote, and thus, by the old rules, causing the lack of a quorum. Mr. Reed counted as present all members whom his eye could see, whether they voted or not, and was denounced as a tyrant in consequence. Both parties had in the past adopted the fiction that a member present but not voting was absent, but it had impeded legislation to such an extent that the "Czar," as he was called, was quite justified in his procedure. His usurped power was afterwards given him by the rules of the House, and when later the Democrats were in control they did not go back to the old rules. It may be noted that this partisan use of his power by the Speaker was not at all new in its general principles, since for three generations the Speaker has not been, like his British prototype, the impartial moderator of an assembly, but rather the leader of a party whose business it is to forward by his appointment of committees, and in other ways, the legislation the party has determined to press.

There were three measures on which the Republicans had set their hearts—the Federal Elections or Lodge Bill, framed by Mr. (now Senator) Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts; the Dependent Pensions Bill; and the McKinley Tariff Bill. The object of the first bill was to secure fairness of elections by authorising Federal supervision whenever Federal officers were to be elected. It was immediately denounced by the South as a "Force Bill"—for troops could be employed in emergencies and doubtless would have been used to secure the counting of negro votes. The measure was also aimed at large Northern cities, but, whatever its theoretical merits, was likely to do much more harm than good,



and was finally defeated in the Senate by a coalition of Democrats and Silver Republicans. Election reforms were meanwhile secured, as we have seen, by the adoption of Australian and other good ballot laws by many States.

The Pension Bill and the Tariff Bill were carried. Congress was lavish enough in its expenditures—earning in this way the name of “The Billion Dollar Congress”—and a few more millions for pensions meant more votes for the Republicans. There was no Cleveland to interpose his veto, so the pension attorneys and their claimants reaped a rich harvest—pensions rising in 1893 to nearly \$160,000,000. The Tariff Bill (1890), reported by Mr. William McKinley of Ohio, made its reputed author famous and pushed the principle of protection to an extent almost prohibitive of importation.\* It admitted sugar free, however, and had reciprocity features intended to attract South American trade. It caused a rise of prices in certain articles that did a good deal to open the eyes of the public to the fact that protection of such an extreme sort pressed heavily upon the consumer, and in this way it undoubtedly contributed to the crushing defeat of the Republicans in the Congressional elections of 1890.

Other important measures of this Administration were the Sherman Act of 1890, which, as a substitute for the still wilder ideas of Secretary Windom, provided for the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver on which legal tender Treasury notes were to be issued, the silver dollars of the Bland-Allison

\* Its avowed purpose, indeed, was to reduce the excessive revenue—the chief financial problem of the day. Much of the surplus had, previously, been expended in reducing the nation's debt on disadvantageous terms.

Bill being thus superseded; the choice of Chicago as the site of the great exposition in honour of Columbus's discovery of America; and the Anti-Lottery Bill which denied the use of the mails for the transmission of money to lottery companies. The last named law hurt the famous Louisiana Lottery, which had done immense harm but was finally expelled from the State at the end of 1893, not, however, without a bitter political fight in which large amounts of corruption money were employed.\*

Besides the Louisiana contest labour troubles in Pennsylvania and Tennessee attracted much attention. In the summer of 1892 a strike occurred at Homestead (Pa.) among the employees of the Carnegie Steel Company, and Pinkerton detectives sent for to enable non-union men to begin work were bombarded by the strikers and forced to surrender. The almost fatal wounding of the president of the company, H. C. Frick, by an anarchist took away popular sympathy from the strikers. In Tennessee trouble arose through the practice of farming out convicts as miners. In the riots precipitated by the free miners, whose work had been cut short by bad times, several convicts escaped and the militia had to be called out. After a little bloodshed order was restored. Meanwhile in the West slight Indian troubles had followed the opening of Oklahoma, a part of Indian Territory, to white settlers who fairly scrambled across the border to secure good tracts of

\* Another evil was finally put down about this time. The Edmunds Act against polygamy in Utah had been supplemented in 1887, and the property of the Mormon Church had been confiscated. The Supreme Court upholding the act, the Mormons renounced polygamy and their property was restored.

land.\* But while a scramble for wealth, whether by the enactment of an unjust tariff, or by armed contests with organised capital, or by the erection of "boom" towns to answer the needs of a hypothetical population, or by normal commercial activity, seems to be the characteristic feature of American life during the years we are describing, it must always be remembered that the solid work of civilisation was being carried on by millions of workingmen who engaged in no strikes or riots and by millions of men and women aiming to do their daily duty and content with moderate means. Such great calamities as the Johnstown (Pa.) flood of 1889 brought out the fact that if Americans were a money-getting race they were equally conspicuous for their generosity and public spirit.

In 1892 Cleveland and Harrison were again pitted against one another. The former, who had been quietly practising law for four years, had won the admiration of the people for his strength and independence; it was therefore idle for mere politicians to oppose him, however much they might dislike him. Harrison, too, had governed well from the point of view of his party, and its new leaders, McKinley and Reed, had to wait their turn. But the Republicans were handicapped by the McKinley Bill, the attempted Force Bill, their loose expenditures, although the Democrats in the Fifty-second Congress had gone beyond the famous Fifty-first, and as a result Cleveland and Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, a strict party man, beat Harrison and Whitelaw Reid of New York by 277 to 145

\* This Territory was settled up with remarkable rapidity, its capital, Guthrie, becoming quite a city within a few months.

electoral votes. A new party, the Populists, who represented the old Grangers, demanding free silver, government ownership of railways and other monopolies—in short, legislation wise and unwise in favour of the agricultural classes, managed to gain 22 electoral votes for its candidates, James B. Weaver of Iowa and James G. Field of Virginia. It is a curious fact that this upstart party should have been the first to recognise fully that the war was over by putting a Southern man on its ticket.\*

\* It should be noted that during the two Administrations covered by this chapter several important centennials were celebrated, each of which accentuated the fact that the nation was becoming very self-conscious. The formation of great associations, whether for political, economic, or religious purposes, and the large attendance on their annual meetings in different cities brought out and still brings out the fact that, although inhabiting a huge country, Americans are a united people.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## FIN DE SIÈCLE.

IF Mr. Cleveland's second Administration was less successful than his first, it was not because he made his former blunder of yielding to the spoilsmen. He increased decidedly the number of offices subject to Civil Service rules, and made good appointments, although his second Cabinet, of which Judge Walter Q. Gresham, a former Republican, was premier,\* was hardly equal to his first. He did not, however, gain in tact, and he did not keep pace with his party in its wild efforts to prevent the growth of the Populist movement by the adoption of paternalistic or socialistic rather than truly Democratic issues. Before the end of his term, therefore, he had broken from the party leaders and had been doomed to see the measures he had most at heart mutilated and thwarted. He lost, moreover, in part that hold on the people which had always been his chief source of strength, he was made the subject of ugly but unsubstantiated rumours with regard to his relations with the capitalistic purchasers of public bonds, and when he left office went into a retirement which has grieved the many competent judges who consider him to be the ablest statesman America has produced since Lincoln. What his true rank will be among the American Presidents time alone can de-

\*A scarcely correct term applied to the Secretary of State.



termine, but it is at least clear that his second Administration, more than any other in the history of the country, save that of the younger Adams, shows that in a republic statesmanly wisdom is of little avail unless it is accompanied by skill in the art of governing those second-rate political leaders known as politicians. It is also clear that he was unjustly held accountable for financial troubles due in large measure to the pension, tariff, and monetary legislation of Harrison's Administration.

The first matter of importance that confronted Mr. Cleveland was inherited by him from his predecessor. American residents in the Hawaiian Islands had revolted against Queen Liliuokalani, had set up a republic, and had applied for annexation to the United States, American troops having been previously landed, ostensibly for the protection of American lives and property. Mr. Harrison rather precipitately allowed a treaty to be agreed upon and sent to the Senate. As this had not been ratified on his accession to office, Mr. Cleveland withdrew it from the Upper House \* and sent a commissioner to the islands, who proclaimed the previously established American protectorate at an end, though President Harrison had already disavowed it. A subsequent report induced Mr. Cleveland to believe that improper actions on the part of the American minister and the premature landing of American troops had had much to do with the success of the Revolution; he therefore recalled Mr. Stevens, the minister, and replaced him by Mr. Blount, the com-

\* He had acted thus with regard to treaties at the beginning of his first term—particularly with regard to a treaty with Nicaragua looking to the construction of an interoceanic canal.

missioner, later on sending, rather unwisely, perhaps, another minister, Mr. Willis, who was to try to help the Queen to regain her authority. But the provisional government was too firmly entrenched, and as Congress was opposed to Mr. Cleveland's policy, he could do nothing to repair what he believed to have been a wrong done by America to a friendly government. The Queen having sold her rights, the republic maintained itself in existence, hardly by republican methods, until the summer of 1898, when, the war with Spain having somehow altered the situation in President McKinley's view, a joint resolution of annexation passed Congress and the islands became part of the United States. They have since received a Territorial organization, and have seemingly prospered more than the dependencies ceded by Spain.

Mr. Cleveland's policy with regard to Hawaiian annexation was unpopular with many people, but was certainly dictated by his conscience. It is not yet possible to pronounce positively on the merits of the controversy, but the history of the race and the nation warrants the presumption that the revolutionists were not solicitous of complying with the demands of justice, and that to have received Hawaii in 1893 would have been an act not altogether to the credit of the United States. Annexation in 1898 was more creditable owing to the fact that the revolutionists had made their title more secure through the lapse of time. American motives also were slightly more creditable, for the country was actually engaged in war and was not merely listening with avidity to the "Jingo" portion of the press or to the pleas of naval officers who were thinking more of the strategic importance of the islands than of the

principles of the Declaration of Independence. The main issue is now a practical one, however, rather than an academical one—it is how a good government can be speedily given to the new possession.

If the attitude of many Americans toward Hawaii in 1893 was scarcely creditable, there can be little doubt that the fact was obscured to men's minds through the lustre of the achievements of the great city of Chicago. The Columbian Exposition or "World's Fair" had surpassed even the expectations of the nation and had impressed the world, in a material and an artistic sense, more than anything the great Republic had ever undertaken. The Era of Industrialism had culminated in something stupendous, but perhaps that might have been expected. It had also culminated in something marvellously beautiful—that surprised the world and a majority of the Americans themselves. To say that the national pride was blown into a flame would be to state but a half truth—the beginning was made of a renaissance of industrial and architectural beauty from which many a generation will profit. Men saw clearly that there was no inherent reason why the city of gigantic abattoirs should not have a fairy "White City" near at hand, the offspring of its wealth, intelligence, and energy; but they went further and inferred that the beauty of the artistic creation might be transferred in part to the hitherto grimy instrumentalities of American commercial and industrial life. This is the crowning glory of the World's Fair of 1893—that it liberalised the spirit of America to an incalculable extent.

A financial panic was not a proper accompaniment of such an enterprise as the World's Fair, but the summer of 1893 saw one of the worst periods of

stringency the country has ever known. Various causes have been assigned for it,—the suspension of free silver coinage by India, the fear of European investors in American securities that the United States would come to a silver basis, the extravagant legislation of the Harrison Administration, recent over-production, and speculation in real estate. Whatever the cause the country was drained of its gold and the Treasury as well. The President, therefore, called an extra session of Congress for August in order that the clause in the Sherman Act authorising the purchase of silver bullion might be repealed. Mr. Cleveland's views as to the prime cause of the panic thus stood revealed; but when, after considerable haggling in the Senate, which, with the House, was Democratic, he secured the desired legislation, no immediate financial improvement was seen.\* The evil effects of an inflated currency had to wear themselves out.

The country was doubtless waiting, in the meantime, to see what would be done with the tariff. The Democrats stood pledged to its reduction, but the Republicans, who were financially more potent, clamoured that the adoption of lower duties would ruin business. Such clamour, distrust of the Democrats for other reasons, fear of free silver, and the want of confidence that follows a panic probably kept the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman Act from producing the effect expected. To

\* "November 1, 1893, the bill became a law, and the date is memorable as marking the close of a long period of fifteen years' folly in the purchase of silver. It is a policy unique in monetary history; it is unequalled for audacious disregard of all sound reasoning and of the experience of the past."  
—Laughlin, *History of Bimetallism in the United States* (1897), p. 277.

these causes was soon added the failure of the Democrats to carry out any consistent programme. In December, 1893, Mr. William L. Wilson of West Virginia reported a tariff bill which placed sugar, wool, coal, lumber, and iron ore on the free list and reduced duties on other articles. It was amended by a provision for a tax on incomes over \$4,000. Passing the House by a large majority the bill went to the Senate, where it was held up and greatly amended. The House at first refused to "concur," but at last yielded to the Senate, and Mr. Cleveland in disgust would neither approve nor veto the final measure, which thus became law against the real wishes of its authors. As it ultimately emerged the Wilson Bill receded from its original position on raw materials and merely reduced duties about a quarter on an average. Thus it satisfied no one, and when later the Supreme Court declared the income tax unconstitutional and the government, in consequence of this diminution of its supplies, had to issue bonds to meet its expenses, when, too, there was much unfavourable criticism as to the way the bonds were placed, it was no wonder that the Republicans should have carried everything before them in the Congressional elections of 1894.\*

It will long be a moot point whether Mr. Cleveland should not have vetoed the hybrid Wilson Bill. The country believed, and with reason, that the Sugar Trust and other powerful interests had been enabled to work their will with certain Democratic Senators. A veto by Mr. Cleveland and a frank ap-

\* About this time the American Protective Association, an organisation generally believed to be inimical to the spread of the political power of the Roman Catholic Church, had a short-lived influence on politics.



peal to the people might have rallied the voters who supported him in 1892 and forced the Senate from its position, with the result that a fair experiment of the low tariff policy might have been made. As it is, other issues have supervened, the Dingley Tariff of 1897 has raised duties in a confused and irritating way, trusts and combinations have been formed in great numbers under it, and the country in 1901 is little further advanced in its understanding of the tariff controversy than it was in 1892. Should questions arising from the possession of outlying dependencies react upon the tariff question and make it an unprofitable issue, it would only be another instance of American good luck. But had Mr. Cleveland forced the low tariff issue in 1894 things might have been very different. He acted, however, on the homely principle that half a loaf is better than no loaf.

Yet there was no lack of firmness in him, as was clearly proved by his action with regard to the great Chicago strikes of the summer of 1894, which followed the ridiculous demonstration by unemployed labourers and tramps known as "Coxey's Army." \* Industrial conditions were generally bad, and in the town of Pullman (Illinois), owned by the famous Palace Car Company, a cut in wages had caused great discontent. The American Railway Union came to the rescue of the employees, but found the Pullman Company firm and unwilling to arbitrate. A boycott of the Company's cars followed and the strike soon spread in all directions. Violent labour agitators came to the front, against whom injunctions were issued by the United States Courts, and Federal

\* This "army" reached Washington and was dispersed by United States troops with little trouble.

troops were sent to Chicago to keep order. Governor Altgeld protested that he wanted no help, but Mr. Cleveland replied that he was determined that the mail service of the United States should not be interfered with and that the injunctions of the Federal Courts should be properly served. This firm stand fortunately checked disorder in Chicago and a presidential proclamation quieted the Far West. The leading men of the Railway Union were then arrested and imprisoned for contempt of court—an extension of judicial power seemingly far more dangerous than Mr. Cleveland's interference by means of Federal troops.

Curiously enough the President, whose whole career had shown him to be possessed of strength far above the average, was supposed for several years to be weak in regard to the matter of foreign policy. An insurrection was going on in Cuba and Americans were incensed both by Spanish cruelties and by the losses incurred by their own trade, but Mr. Cleveland gave no sign that he would tolerate a policy of intervention or even recognise belligerent rights. As in the case of Hawaii, he intended to keep America within the bounds of strict legality. Suddenly in December, 1895, he startled every one by his now celebrated Venezuelan message. His Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Olney of Massachusetts, who had been promoted from the Attorney-Generalship on the death of Mr. Gresham, had been for some time endeavouring vainly to induce Great Britain to arbitrate a dispute she had for a long time been waging with Venezuela over a question of boundary. The British naturally questioned the right of the United States to interpose, but Mr. Olney supported himself on that convenient but much distorted principle of

American policy, the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Cleveland espoused his Secretary's cause and in his far from urbane message urged the appointment of an American Commission to determine the true boundary, maintaining that should their report be accepted and should Great Britain persist in appropriating territory adjudged to belong to Venezuela, the United States should resist in every possible way.

Congress and the country at large, regardless of party, supported the President warmly, the Commission was appointed, and for a few days war seemed so imminent that American securities fell heavily and Mr. Cleveland had to ask help of Congress in order to meet the drain on the Treasury's gold.\* Fortunately Great Britain kept her temper, and finally an agreement to arbitrate the Venezuelan question relieved the public tension. Whether that tension should ever have been caused is a hard matter to decide. Both the tone and the matter of the message have been severely criticised, and it seems clear that the Monroe Doctrine was considerably stretched in order to make it fit the case; but it is equally clear that the doctrine of the message, no matter whose it be, suited the American people. The wisdom of that people in being thus suited is not so apparent, for the welfare of the race is of more moment than a nation's tenacity in holding to a traditional policy, and there was no proof whatsoever that Great Britain intended to use her claim on Venezuela as a wedge for extending her power in South America. Whatever suspicions America might have had of

\* The loan of 1896 was managed much better than previous loans had been, but the financial history of this and most recent Administrations has been probably unparalleled since the days of John Law.

the mother country in this particular should have been courteously veiled in a regret that arbitration had failed and a statement that the Monroe Doctrine would apply as soon as the disputed boundary had been settled within the limits of the current British claim. Mr. Cleveland ignored the interests of the race, assumed sinister intentions on Great Britain's part, and stirred up in his own countrymen a spirit of aggressiveness that soon led to a war and a lust for territorial domination which he was among the first to oppose. We need not, however, join his enemies in accusing him of truckling for popularity, nor should we forget that the entire affair is too recent for perfectly impartial treatment.\*

We have already noticed the fact that the elections of 1894 were very favourable to the Republicans, who naturally reaped advantages from the failure of the Democrats to carry out their programme. They reaped advantage also, in all probability, from the discredit cast on their opponents by the disgusting revelations brought out by the Lexow investigating committee in New York City in 1894. New York politics had been notoriously corrupt for years, the responsibility lying at the doors of the Democratic organisation known as Tammany Hall, which, as we have seen, based its power on blackmail, on the ignorance and viciousness of the lower classes, especially the newly landed immigrants, and on the partisanship of the better classes of Democrats. Owing, however, to the brave exertions of a Presby-

\* The decision of the arbitrators giving to Great Britain a large portion of the territory she claimed shows how wrong and absurd a war over such a matter would have been, and should put to the blush all the blatant American speakers and writers who discussed the complicated question with such omniscience five years ago.

terian clergyman, Rev. Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst, the corruption of Tammany, especially of its police force, which connived at any sort of immorality, was brought into full relief before the Lexow Committee, and in the fall of 1894 a reform ticket swept the city. Unfortunately the reformers did not prove to be acceptable administrators, and three years later the Tammany party carried everything before them.

More important, however, than Congressional and local elections was the presidential election of 1896. The chief candidates for the Republican nomination were Speaker Reed and Mr. McKinley, the latter having left Congress to be Governor of Ohio. The more intelligent element of the party favoured Mr. Reed, but Mr. McKinley was easily successful owing to the manipulation of the venal Southern delegates \* by his chief backer, Mr. Marcus A. Hanna, a shrewd Ohio business man. Mr. McKinley was, of course, well known for his high tariff views, but his nomination was unquestionably secured by machine methods, and his election was determined rather by the extreme stand taken by his opponents than by any merit of his own or of his party.

For the Democrats at their Chicago Convention had finally broken from Mr. Cleveland and all that he represented and had formed an alliance with the Populists. They advocated the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, attacked the Supreme Court for certain obnoxious decisions, and actually

\* Southern delegates to Republican conventions are venal because it is difficult to secure Republicans of good standing in that section and because their votes are only important to the nomination, not to the election of a candidate. The admittance of delegates from States that by no possibility will support a party's candidate seems to vitiate present nominating methods.



condemned the Administration of President Cleveland. The silver plank of this platform was more clear cut than the gold plank of the Republicans, but for once boldness did not pay. Nor did sensational eloquence win the campaign although it secured the nomination for Mr. William Jennings Bryan, a young politician from Nebraska. The leading free silver candidate had been Mr. Bland of Missouri, but a single eloquent speech from Mr. Bryan carried the convention. The campaign that followed was exciting. Mr. Bryan delivered a remarkable series of speeches throughout the country, Mr. McKinley remaining quietly at home, allowing Republican leaders and, what was better, Democratic dissensions to work for him. The Populists had indeed rallied to Mr. Bryan, although they repudiated the Democratic candidate for Vice-President, Arthur Sewall of Maine, and substituted Thomas E. Watson of Georgia. But large numbers of Democrats had followed Mr. Cleveland in disavowing the new ticket and platform, and had nominated a ticket of their own consisting of a Union and a Confederate general respectively—John M. Palmer of Illinois and Simon Bolivar Buckner of Kentucky. What with this open split among his adversaries and the support of some Democrats and Independents who passed over his tariff and other views in order to maintain a sound currency, Mr. McKinley won a decided victory, actually breaking the "Solid South." It was not a victory for high tariff as some persons immediately proclaimed, nor was it a victory won by William McKinley and Garrett A. Hobart of New Jersey in person, for Mr. Bryan in spite of his economic vagaries proved himself to be a most magnetic candidate; it was a

victory for sound financial principles and as such reflected great credit on the American people. The final vote was 271 for McKinley to 176 for Bryan, the popular vote for the latter showing, however, that even an educational campaign cannot do a great deal in overcoming the effects of partisanship. It is necessary, though unpleasant, to add that when a party elected, like the Republicans, to carry out a particular policy fails, as they have so far done, to legislate in the direction of that policy, a distinct blow is struck at the cause of good government and reform.

As Mr. McKinley's term has not expired and as the results of the war with Spain and in the Philippines cannot yet be gauged, we can afford to pass over the three years, 1897-1899, with great rapidity. It soon became evident that the tariff was of more moment to the Republicans than the currency, and scarcely had an extra session of Congress provided the Dingley Bill (1897), when the situation in Cuba was pressed to the front as an issue, whether by design or accident or both is hard to say. Mr. McKinley's overtures to Spain were fairly well received, but Spanish schemes for autonomy in Cuba did not meet the wishes of the revolutionists, while the cruel treatment of the wretched "reconcentrados" incensed the American people even more than the long continuance of hostilities and the consequent loss to their commerce had done. On February 15, 1898, matters reached a crisis in the blowing up of the American battle-ship *Maine*. A court of American naval officers reported that the ship was "destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine," and the American people, with few exceptions, accepted this verdict of "foul play," which was not

definitely fastened on any one. A Spanish court denied the correctness of the American report, but little attention was paid to it in the United States. "Remember the Maine" was a more popular cry than "Be calm and do justice." Sensational newspapers fanned the popular agitation, thoughtless preachers encouraged it, and finally Senator Proctor of Vermont, in a speech describing the horrors he had seen in Cuba, stirred the heart of the nation until war was a foregone conclusion. Congress answered quickly, very few representatives having the courage or the desire to offer calm counsels, and the President, who had shown great discretion, was practically forced to send in a message, which is known as his "war message," but which, when carefully read, shows that war was by no means necessary except on the supposition Americans were bent on making, that Spain was not to be trusted to keep her promises. On April 19, Congress, not without some previous discreditable scenes, passed resolutions declaring that Cuba ought to be independent, an ultimatum was sent to Spain, and in a few days war was finally begun.\*

The fighting was not of long duration, as might have been expected from the unequal nature of the contest. The new navy was well equipped for its work, and if the management of the army left much to be desired, there was no lack of volunteers and of popular enthusiasm.† At last it was clear to every one that the country was thoroughly united, for the

\* The Act of May 25 declared the existence of war from and including April 21.

† Shown for example in the promptness with which the loan authorised by the War Revenue Act of June 13th was subscribed for. Internal taxes have since been borne cheerfully, but will probably soon prove burdensome.

South furnished her quota of men as loyally as any other section. It was clear also that a great change had taken place in the relations of the daughter with the mother country, for in face of the evident sympathy with Spain manifested by the chief Continental nations Great Britain gave unmistakable signs that her heart was with America. Perhaps Englishmen did not fully realise how much low politics, a sensational press, and democratic incapacity to reason in the midst of prejudices and passions had had to do with bringing on the crisis, but the *rapprochement* was nevertheless genuine on both sides, and, together with the marked decline of the sectional spirit within the Union, it constitutes a gain to America from the recent war that cannot be overestimated.

Another considerable gain, although not comparable in importance with the similar gain in the War of 1812, is to be found in the increase of national pride consequent upon the remarkable victories won by the American navy. The statement often made of late that the Spanish war gave America a needed stand in the eyes of Europe is ridiculously untrue, but that it increased Europe's respect for American power and that it gave the American people a stimulus toward great accomplishments in the future is undeniable. Such a stimulus, if not governed by judgment, may work mischief, but a people that can produce such a man as Dewey has a right to optimistic confidence in itself. Nor is it the victory won by Commodore George Dewey at Manila on May 1, 1898, that furnishes the only ground of this confidence. Dewey's entrance of the channel was bold, his destruction of the inferior Spanish fleet was workmanlike, his victory placed him among

the great naval commanders of the world; but his subsequent management of affairs at Manila proved that he was not merely a great commander but a man of affairs worthy of his recent elevation to the rank of admiral. For the difficulties that have since arisen, he can hardly be held responsible.

As a naval exploit the destruction, on July 3, of Admiral Cervera's fleet as it endeavoured to escape from the harbour of Santiago is probably as remarkable as Dewey's victory, but unfortunately Rear-Admirals W. T. Sampson and W. S. Schley have had injudicious friends who have exalted now the one commander and now the other, and have by their partisanship almost neutralised the glory justly attaching to both. And, along with Lieutenant R. P. Hobson, who bravely attempted to blockade the channel through which the Spanish fleet had to pass, these heroes of the home waters were too near the reporters and the politicians to be able to play in Cuba the part of Dewey. The victor of Manila has therefore emerged as the single figure of notable importance brought to the front by the Spanish war; but the average American sailor, engineer, and gunner, who, under their trained officers, managed the huge battle-ships of 1898, emerged also as perhaps the most efficient defenders of its honour and safety any country has ever known.

So far as the war on the island of Cuba is concerned, it cannot be denied that the invading volunteers and regulars, who landed late in June for the purpose of capturing Santiago, showed that in bravery at least the American soldier was still to be relied upon. In the skirmishes and in the assaults of El Caney and San Juan (July 1) great difficulties and losses were cheerfully borne. The in-



vestment of the city was undertaken boldly in spite of many obstacles and the siege was of very short duration, General Wm. R. Shafter entering the place on July 17. But the management of the campaign, whatever its results, was seemingly bad from a military point of view, and the destitution of the American troops and their exposure to diseases were shockingly unnecessary. Even in camps within the borders of the United States disorder and disease held carnival; and the country was thoroughly shamed in its own eyes and in those of the world. For much of this shame the Secretary of War, General Russell A. Alger, and some of his subordinates, especially Quarter-Master General Eagan, were held responsible, and the official investigations that followed the close of hostilities could not by any "whitewashing" process do away with the conviction that from the political side the war had been a disgrace to the country.\* The easy taking of Porto Rico by General Nelson A. Miles (August, 1898) somewhat atoned for the raggedness of the success gained by the army in Cuba, but could not bring the exploits of the military up to those of the naval arm. This fact is not surprising when it is remembered that, as in the case of Scott in the Mexican War, General Miles, the head of the army, was long detained in Washington apparently for partisan reasons. Meanwhile troops had been hurried to the Philippines on the plea that the United States was bound to maintain a stable government in the islands.

\* General Alger held to his post in spite of all criticisms and was at least outwardly supported by the President. Quite recently he resigned and was succeeded by Mr. Elihu Root, of New York, who is in sympathy with the President's policy of overwhelming the Philippine insurgents.

Preliminary terms of peace were signed at Washington on August 12, 1898; the final treaty at Paris on December 10, 1898. Spain relinquished her hold on Cuba, gave up Porto Rieo and the Philippines to America, receiving for the latter \$20,000,000, and in spite of her expostulations was well rid of a bad bargain. The Senate ratified the Treaty on February 6, 1899. There has been continuous fighting with the Philippine insurgents ever since February 4, with slight results so far as can be determined at the present writing. A considerable body of influential Americans protested against the acquisition of the islands, nor have they ceased to denounce the war waged against the insurgents as contrary to American ideals and to the best interests of humanity. On the other hand "expansion," as it is called, or "the imperial policy," has aroused much popular enthusiasm, especially in the West, and has been advocated on humanitarian and religious grounds. The Anti-Expansionists have perhaps had the best of the argument, but the Administration, having committed the country, has pursued its policy of putting down all armed resistance, and the people have seemingly supported it. Little political capital was made of the matter until the recent campaign, and then the currency issue overshadowed it.\* It may, however, be predicted with safety that if Mr. McKinley's recent blow at Civil Service Reform represents the permanent policy of the party in power, the withdrawal of military control from Cuba and the Philippines, whenever that may come, will mean

\* At the moment of revising (February, 1901), the Democrats seem determined to keep up their anti-imperial tactics, while the Republicans will support Mr. McKinley's policy of crushing what is erroneously termed a "rebellion."

the looting of the new dependencies. The friendship shown the United States by Great Britain during the late war and the corresponding good will aroused toward the mother country is by all odds the greatest gain derived from the success of the American arms, but unless friendship with Great Britain should suggest the propriety of imitating her methods of dealing with dependencies, the abandonment by America of her "policy of isolation" will be fraught with disastrous consequences both at home and abroad. A truly great Colonial Empire cannot be built up on the "spoils system." It is only fair to add, however, that the recent rehabilitation of Cuba at the hands of the American forces stationed in the island has proved abundantly that the country can give good government to its new possessions and has induced in many persons the belief that it will. Should it do so, the Spanish War will have been justified by its results, even if the impartial historian concludes that, like the Mexican War, it was by no means justified by its causes.

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NOTE.—At the moment of passing these pages through the press (February, 1901), a few additional facts may be noted. The tripartite agreement between Great Britain, Germany, and the United States relative to the Samoan Islands has been abrogated and the Islands have been divided between the two last-named Powers. The United States has, in the main, acted in concert with the Powers in the complications arising out of the Boxer insurrection in China, President McKinley having displayed statesmanlike qualities in the crisis that have been generally recognised. Indeed, it may fairly be admitted that he has strengthened himself as an administrator in spite of his unfortunate yielding to the clamours of the protectionists with regard to the tariff finally determined on for Porto Rico. The excellent diplomatic work of the new Secretary of State, Mr. John Hay, especially in his efforts to secure a revision of the Clayton-Bulwer

Treaty, deserves hearty recognition. In legislation the most important event is doubtless the passage by the Republicans in Congress of a bill designed to settle the currency question in favour of gold—a tardy measure which is a great gain to the country, but, according to some authorities, is not entirely satisfactory. The expulsion of the polygamist Roberts of Utah from the House of Representatives was unfortunately accomplished in a bungling manner, but the denial of seats in the Senate to Messrs. Clark and Quay was a step in the interests of good government. In local affairs the wretched gubernatorial contest in Kentucky, culminating in the assassination of the Democratic contestant, Mr. Goebel, the flight of the Republican, Mr. Taylor, and sundry unsavoury trials, is the most marked event. That a civil war was prevented is a creditable fact, but the country was shamed in the affair as well as in the recent prolonged labour strikes, especially in St. Louis, and in the lynchings and race riots, particularly in New Orleans. The large increase of trusts and of hasty laws against them, the considerable gains in the numbers of immigrants, in face of recent losses, the firm hold still maintained by the “machine” in politics especially in New York City and State and in Pennsylvania, may be set down as unfavourable signs of the times. The repeal of prohibition and Sunday laws, the greater attention paid to public sanitation, the increased business and commercial prosperity of the country, may be looked on in the light of compensations. With regard to the new dependencies, the general Congressional tendency to leave everything to the discretion of the President is greatly to be deprecated. Porto Rico has already suffered much from industrial depression. The situation in Cuba has improved, but there is talk of not allowing the island full independence. In the Philippines the backbone of the insurrection has by no means been broken, irregular fighting continues, and American losses, especially from disease, are still discouraging. The future of the Islands remains unsettled, the Democrats having pronounced themselves in favour of ultimate independence, the Republicans being somewhat non-committal. In the recent campaign between Mr. McKinley and Governor Theodore Roosevelt (Mr. Hobart, the former Vice-President, having died) and Mr. Bryan and Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, “imperialism” was made a leading issue, but the Democrats were defeated on account of their declaration in favour of the Free Coinage of Silver at 16 to 1. Many small parties were also in the field, but there was and is slight chance of their coalescence into a new party with a rational and liberal programme. The Anti-Imperialist movement took quite a fanatical turn, and the Independent vote was unfortunately more perplexed and of less service than in former years. The general political situation is, therefore, unsatis-

factory in many respects. It is becoming more and more clear that "machine" politicians have obtained such a hold upon the nominating conventions of both parties that these are now as inefficient in registering the popular will as the old Congressional caucuses were. The absurd fiasco of Admiral Dewey's candidacy for the presidency emphasises the dominance of the "machine," the unsatisfactory state of politics, and the tendency of democracy to reduce to the general level all save the strongest characters. The same facts have been emphasised by the return of Mr. Quay to the Senate and by the legislation accomplished and proposed by the present Congress.



## CHAPTER XXIII.

## PRESENT AND FUTURE.

THE census of 1870, in consequence chiefly of the defects of the law under which it was taken, was inaccurate with regard to the population of the Southern States to the extent of about one and a quarter millions. Corrected figures would give the total population at about 39,800,000 and would raise the rate of increase to 26.64. The area remains the same as in 1860 save for the 531,000 square miles of Alaska. The density for the Union proper is 12.74, or for the total settled area 30.3—figures which would be slightly increased for the corrected population. Four new States have been admitted—Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, and West Virginia; seven new Territories have also been organized—Arizona, Colorado, Dakota, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming, the appearance of Nevada in both lists indicating the precipitancy with which a “mining camp” was made a State.

Within the frontier line, which has been steadily pushed westward, the waste places are still considerable in Maine, New York, and Florida, but have lessened in Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota. Kansas and Nebraska\* have naturally gained more than Texas—such immigrants as came to the country during the confused decade not caring to go South,

\* The settlement of these States was much helped by the influx of Union soldiers after the close of the war.

and interstate migration being similarly affected. Hence we are not surprised to find the comparatively unsettled portions of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia remaining practically unchanged. In the Far West the country is still dotted with Indian reservations, but there is a strip of settlement running up from New Mexico, through Colorado, into Wyoming; there is a parallel strip, not so long, running down from the Great Salt Lake; there are belts in Washington, Oregon, and California; and there are small spots scattered over the whole area. Only in California is there a fairly thick belt, reaching across the width of the State.

With regard to the population of the various sections we find that all percentages of increase have fallen considerably, the figures given for the South being, however, much too low. The first four States have not changed their rank since 1860; they still run New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois. Virginia, overrun by war and dismembered, has dropped from fifth to tenth place, her population having increased only 100,000 in the decade. In her place stands Missouri; immediately below her comes Iowa, which has made the greatest gain of all the States. The cities still stand New York, Philadelphia, Brooklyn; but Baltimore has now dropped from fourth to sixth, St. Louis and Chicago having both shot past in their heated rivalry for the commercial control of the Central States. Notable gains have also been made by San Francisco, Cleveland, Jersey City, and greatest of all—Indianapolis. The proportion of urban to total population has reached the high point of 20.93; New York is little short of 1,000,000 inhabitants;

Philadelphia is nearing 700,000, Brooklyn 400,000, Chicago 300,000.

The census of 1880 showed no increase of area but reported a population of 50,155,178, an increase of 30.08 per cent. Allowing for the defects of the census of 1870, this percentage has been corrected to 25.96. All the sections save the North-West showed gains in their percentages of increase, the heavy influx of foreigners partly accounting for the fact. No new State had been added except Colorado, but a very large extent of country had been brought under occupation in Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Texas and the Far West. Florida, too, was being settled up, and the whole South showed a considerable increase in density of population. From Indiana to Massachusetts the country was in the main settled at a density of from 45 to 90 to the square mile. Counting the area of settlement as a little over 1,300,000 square miles, the average density of settlement stood at 32.

The first eight States have retained their relative ranks—New York with a little over 5,000,000, Pennsylvania with over 4,250,000, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Massachusetts, Kentucky—the last containing nearly 1,650,000. Virginia is now fourteenth instead of tenth; Michigan, Texas, Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado have made noticeable gains, as has also Dakota Territory. Tennessee, Maryland, and Maine have dropped in the scale, but South Carolina has made a slight rise. The proportion of urban population is only 22.57—the smallest gain for many decades, but there are now twenty cities containing over 100,000 inhabitants, compared with fourteen in 1870. In New York City alone we find upwards of 1,200,000, and if we

were to add in the populations of Philadelphia and Brooklyn we should have in these three cities considerably more inhabitants than could be found in all the towns and cities of the States that held slaves in 1861! Certainly the effects of an institution like slavery are far reaching. They are seen in the fact that Charleston has now dropped from the twenty-sixth to the thirty-sixth place, and that immediately below it stands the manufacturing town of Fall River, Massachusetts, which a decade before had been at the foot of the list.

In 1890 no gain of area had been made, but the population had risen to 62,622,250, the percentage of increase being 24.86. In this count, as in all previous ones, the non-taxed Indians were not enumerated; if the Indians in Indian Territory and the reservations had been counted, as well as the inhabitants of Alaska, the population would have fallen little short of 63,000,000. Six new States have been admitted to the Union, in some cases perhaps prematurely, to wit, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. One new Territory, Oklahoma, has been organised out of a portion of Indian Territory, and there are now five Territories left. The admission of Utah as a State in 1896 makes the Union of to-day consist of forty-five States, four Territories exclusive of Alaska, and one District. In 1890 eight of the extreme Western States, including Nebraska, had increased their populations over one hundred per cent. Fourteen States and Territories showed increases ranging from twenty-five to one hundred per cent., conspicuous among them being Florida, which as a health resort and a fruit-growing region had almost doubled its population. Texas and Arkansas, as

grazing and farming States, had also gained largely, and so had Minnesota. The lumber State, Michigan, and the home of manufactures, Massachusetts, did not show such a conspicuous rise but were both above the twenty-five per cent. line. On the contrary, Maine had grown very little; Vermont, whose farmers had sought more fertile fields, scarcely at all. Nevada had actually decreased twenty-six and a half per cent. and numbered but little over 45,000 inhabitants. On the whole manufacturing States had flourished, farming States, even like the rich Ohio, had not gained so much as might have been expected, owing to the competition of the Farther West; and the mining States had naturally fluctuated in population, their percentages of increase, while large in appearance, not being so enormous as used to be the case with frontier States and Territories.

In relative rank New York and Pennsylvania still held the first and second places with nearly 6,000,000 and slightly over 5,250,000 respectively. Illinois had now taken third place and Ohio dropped to fourth, their populations being, in round numbers, 3,826,000 and 3,672,000. Missouri still stood fifth, but Massachusetts and Texas had passed Indiana. Kentucky had dropped to the eleventh place, formerly occupied by Texas. Georgia, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Virginia, North Carolina and Alabama followed with populations ranging from 1,837,000 to 1,513,000. Besides Texas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Colorado, and Washington had made the most conspicuous gains in relative rank; Mississippi, Maine, Vermont, Delaware, Arizona and Nevada had all declined considerably.

As for the urban population, its growth had been



very pronounced, the percentage standing 29.20 as compared with 22.57 for 1880. Of the eighteen and a quarter millions living in towns and cities nearly five-sixths were found in the North and North-West, where manufacturing was at its height and where railroads were most widely spread. In New England and the larger Middle States more than half the population was urban, in the South less than thirteen per cent. The South therefore is not only the native American section, but also represents the nation of two generations ago by being in the main a section of farmers. For the entire country there were in 1890 448 towns and cities having 8,000 inhabitants and upwards; there was one city with over 1,500,000—New York; there were two with a little over a million,—Chicago and Philadelphia. Brooklyn had over 800,000; St. Louis over 450,000. Eleven cities had over 200,000 and less than 450,000; twelve had between 100,000 and 200,000. If New York's suburbs had been counted in 1890 the aggregate population would have formed after London the largest city on the globe, a position which is now held by Greater New York with its estimated population for Jan. 1, 1899, of 3,549,588. If estimates may be trusted, Chicago will count at the next census not far from 1,700,000, while the general increase of urban population will probably be maintained. We may now pass to more general matters with the remark that in the decade 1880–1890 the most noticeable gains in relative position among the cities were those made by Minneapolis, St. Paul, Kansas City, Denver, and Atlanta; the most noticeable decline that of Troy, New York.

We have dwelt in a preceding chapter upon the

important services rendered the country between 1830 and 1860 by its foreign-born citizens. These services have increased rather than diminished since the Civil War. Between 1861 and 1870 over 2,300,000 immigrants came in; between 1871 and 1880 over 2,800,000; between 1881 and 1890, 5,246,613. During the present decade there has been a falling off from the enormous figures just given, partly in consequence of restrictions on paupers and criminals, but the total number will probably not fall far short of 4,000,000, in which Canadians will not be included. In the face of this tremendous influx of foreigners many Americans have felt that their institutions are in danger and have advocated restrictive legislation, especially as there has been a steady increase of immigration from Austria-Hungary, Russia and Poland, and Italy—countries which do not furnish as good material for citizenship as do the Teutonic nations.\* That there is much to be urged in favour of restricting the lowest or pauper class of immigration cannot be denied, yet it would seem that all, or nearly all, that was formerly said about the service done the country between 1830 and 1860 by the foreigners who built railroads and performed other manual tasks may be affirmed of the period from 1860 to the present day. The American is averse from domestic service; hence foreigners, especially Irish and Scandinavians, who are too sensible to object to filling positions in households, have helped to raise the standard of comfortable living. In many of the States they have done great good by recruiting the farmer class,

\* At the close of his second Administration, President Cleveland vetoed a bill providing a rather unwise educational test for immigrants.

which, so far as natives are concerned, has been more and more attracted to the cities. In trade, commerce, and manufacturing they have often proved themselves capable of success. In railroad building and manual labour generally they have continued to be immensely useful, while as miners they have had a large share in promoting the phenomenal growth of the iron, steel and other cognate industries. On the whole, then, the country of to-day owes little but thanks to the majority of its emigrants—to the nearly 2,000,000 natives of England, Scotland, and Wales; to the nearly 3,500,000 Germans; to the more than 1,000,000 Scandinavians who have landed on its shores since 1860. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that in the recent warlike flurry that swept over the land, the foreign element of the population was distinctly in favour of peace.

It may, of course, be true that immigration has reduced the rate of natural increase; that the country would have been nearly as populous if the foreigners had not come. But it is doubtful whether material progress would not have been slower than it has been; whether the capital brought with them by the immigrants, and their willing hands, and their perfect freedom of movement throughout the Continent have not stimulated the native American to greater activity and helped to bridge over the nation's period of adolescence. However this may be, it is at least certain that, in 1890, 14.77 per cent. of the inhabitants of the United States were foreign born, and that the proportion of the white element of native birth and extraction to the white element of foreign birth or extraction was as 62.49 per cent to 37.51 per cent. For weal or woe the foreigner has indelibly impressed himself upon America.

With regard to the distribution of the foreign-born population, we find that it has been steadily attracted to the northern half of the country. In New England and the Middle States nearly one-fourth of the inhabitants are foreign born; the proportion for the North-West is lower, but in some States it is very high, as for example in North Dakota and Minnesota (44.58 and 35.90 per cent. respectively). In the Far West the proportion again rises to a fourth, while for the entire South it is still very low—less than three per cent. The rich lands of Texas and the newness of the State have attracted the largest number of immigrants, 6.84 per cent. of the inhabitants being foreign born in 1890. Mississippi on the other hand, with its large negro population, has proved so little attractive that only .62 per cent. of foreign born whites could be enumerated. In North and South Carolina the proportions were still lower, being .23 and .54 per cent. respectively. In the same year nearly 640,000 persons of foreign birth resided in the City of New York alone, and about 450,000 in Chicago; in Texas there were not quite 150,000; in North Carolina only about 3,700.

But the South has had a class of inhabitants far more productive of grave problems than foreigners have ever been, although the latter have undoubtedly caused trouble in municipal politics and in matters connected with public education and with the employment of labour. As has been stated, the figures of the Ninth Census with regard to the negroes were misleading. They made the coloured population of the Union amount to only 4,880,009. Ten years later 6,580,793 were reported, making the percentage of increase appear to be 34.85 as compared with

only 29.22 for the whites. These figures would have been ominous if they had been correct, but the statistics for 1890 showed plainly that there was no reason to fear that the inferior was increasing faster than the superior race. In that year the total number of negroes was found to be 7,470,040, and the percentage of increase to be only 13.51, that of the whites being almost twice as great—26.68. The question, therefore, seems now to be, not whether the negroes will overrun the South, but whether the South will have enough labourers peculiarly suited to its climate.\*

With regard to the distribution of the race, which constitutes, by the way, not quite twelve per cent. of the total population of the country, it may be roughly said that it does not average two per cent. for any of the sections save the South and South-West. Even in Missouri it does not amount to six per cent., and the figures for New Jersey, the highest for any Northern State, are only 3.30. In the South Atlantic States, however, the negroes constitute nearly 37 per cent. of the population, and in the South-West nearly 32. In most of these States there had been quite a constant increase in the proportion of coloured inhabitants up to 1880; but in 1890 only West Virginia, where the number of negroes is trifling, Mississippi, and Arkansas showed an increase. South Carolina and Mississippi are the only States in which the whites are outnumbered, although Louisiana has only in the last decade obtained a bare white majority—her percentage of negroes standing 49.99. Time is thus seen to be working for the Southern white, and he has also secured his

\* The larger birth-rate among the negroes is more than counterbalanced by the heavy infant mortality.



supremacy in some States by constitutional, if unfair, means; but he has still to put down mob law and to increase his appropriations for public education if he wishes to attract labour and capital to his rich fields and his teeming mines.

The fact that the South stands to-day ready to bestow fortune upon incoming labourers and capitalists recalls the further fact that the population of the United States has long been characterised by extreme mobility. In 1890, 11,500,000 persons were found living in States in which they had not been born. We have all along had occasion to notice the tendency of population to move westward, but it is hard to realise how greatly certain States have been affected by the migratory habit of the American, who seems to foreigners to change his home with as little concern as he does his coat. New York for example, according to the census of 1890, had received over 400,000 native immigrants from other States, but had sent out over 1,200,000 of her own people. Ohio and Pennsylvania also had lost more than twice as many as they had gained. Virginia had lost nearly 600,000 and had not gained 100,000 in return. Illinois and Missouri and Texas on the other hand had gained far more than they had lost, and this was true of Florida and of all the States west of the Mississippi River. Horace Greeley's advice, "Go West, young man," has been unhesitatingly obeyed by his countrymen.\*

Turning now to consider what this immense, ac-

\* This westward migration has created several successive "Farther Wests," with the energy and crudeness of pioneer settlements, and has greatly affected American social, industrial and political history. See "The Problem of the West," by Prof. F. J. Turner, *Atlantic Monthly*, Sept., 1896.

tive American people, whether native or foreign born, white or coloured, is doing, throughout its immense possessions, for the development of the nation and of the world, we find ourselves confronted with a task which even a trained body of statisticians would regard with dismay. The utmost that we can here do toward its accomplishment is to array a few salient facts and bid the reader let his imagination do the rest.\*

The government of the United States has on its civil list 178,717 persons, who receive an aggregate annual salary of nearly \$100,000,000. When the civil lists of the forty-five States are added as well as the civil lists, if we may thus speak, of all the towns and cities, we can form some idea of the importance that public employment holds in the mind of the average American. But the Federal government, even with its recently augmented army and navy, does not employ so many men as the aggregate railways of the country, which in 1897 had 823,476 employees at wages and salaries amounting to \$465,601,581.

But even these figures pale before those that represent the wage earners in the chief groups of occupations. In 1890 about one-half the population over ten years of age were wage earners—over 9,000,000 in agriculture, fisheries, and mining; nearly 950,000 in the various professions; 4,360,000 in domestic and personal services; 3,326,000 in trade and transportation, and nearly 5,100,000 in manufacturing and mechanical industries. The total value of industries for 1890 was estimated at \$8,535,000,000, of which vast amount 28 per cent. was assigned to

\* Some of the facts here cited are taken from that invaluable manual *The Statesman's Year Book* for 1899.

agriculture, 52 to manufactures, 12 to transportation and 8 to mining. There were 4,600,000 farms, worth on the average about \$3,000. On them were produced 399,262,000 bushels of wheat, 1,489,970,000 of corn, 488,256,646 pounds of tobacco, and 7,472,511 bales of cotton, to say nothing of other crops. Yet that even these enormous figures will be greatly increased at the census of 1900 is clear from the fact that in 1898 the corn crop was little short of 2,000,000,000 bushels and the wheat crop upwards of 675,000,000 bushels. As for manufactures, the capital invested in 1890 was \$6,139,000,000, over twice as much as that for 1880. The gross value of the product was \$9,000,000,000, the net value \$4,000,000,000. In consequence of the growth of corporations the average capital per establishment has increased in ten years from \$11,000 to \$15,000. The increase in number of persons employed has not been so great, on account of the largely increased use of machinery, but the net product per hand was nearly \$1,000 and the annual stipend was on the average \$440.

It is hardly necessary to burden the reader's mind with more figures. Still it may be well to note that for the year ending June, 1898, the total exports amounted to \$1,231,482,330—figures which were surpassed by those for 1900. Imports for 1898 were \$616,049,654—a decided decrease. There was also a slight decrease in the tonnage of the merchant marine, which amounted to 4,749,738 tons; but every year has seen an increase in the number of miles of railroad in operation. In 1890 there were 166,691 miles; in 1897 there were 184,603. Details as to banking, insurance, *et cetera* might be given indefinitely, but perhaps as good an idea of

the flourishing state of the country may be gained from a few educational statistics as from any other source. For the year 1896-97 over fourteen and a half millions of scholars were enrolled in the public schools, and over four hundred thousand teachers were employed to instruct them. At the same time there were over 217,000 students attending universities, colleges, normal and professional schools. In no other country is education more highly prized—a fact brought out well by the percentages of illiteracy supplied by the Census of 1890. Only 6.2 per cent. of the native white population of over ten years of age was found to be illiterate. For the foreign born whites the percentage was 13.1; for the negroes, 56.8. The largest number of illiterate whites and negroes is of course found in the South, precisely the section that spends least money on its public schools.

With regard now to the comparative standing of the United States among the great nations, we find, according to the eminent statistician, Mr. M. G. Mulhall, that American foreign trade is less than that of France or Germany or Great Britain, although domestic industries nearly equal the aggregate of those of the three countries mentioned.\* Yet there has been a great development of foreign trade, especially since 1880. The value of food exports is of course enormous, American farmers supplying 30,000,000 people in Europe besides the 70,000,000 at home, and Mr. Mulhall saw no reason why their exports should not continue to increase with population throughout the next century. The same is true with regard to cotton and petro-

\* See his article in *The North American Review* for November, 1897.

leum, nor is it likely that trade with Europe will, as in the past, throw into the shade commerce with other countries. Trade with the West Indies and South America has greatly increased of late, while the outlook for trade with the Far East is encouraging, although, according to some authorities, not to be compared in importance with that with nations to the South.

Turning from trade to aggregate power and wealth, we find little reason to think that Mr. Mulhall exaggerated when he said : " If we take a survey of mankind in ancient or modern times as regards the physical, mechanical and intellectual force of nations, we find nothing to compare with the United States. . . . " \* In 1820 the working power of the country was 4,293 millions of foot-tons daily; in 1895 it was 129,306 millions. " The United States possess almost as much energy as Great Britain, Germany and France collectively." As for total wealth, this was estimated for 1890 at \$66,336,000,000—thirty-five per cent. more than that of Great Britain, although less per inhabitant than that of Great Britain, France, or Holland. This enormous wealth was not of course distributed evenly, the Middle States having nearly twice as much as the Southern and over three times as much as New England; the Pacific States falling between the Southern and New England; the North-Western or Prairie States having not merely almost a third as much again as the Middle, but more than the three remaining sections combined. † The Middle States

\* See his article in *The North American Review* for June, 1895.

† The figures are: New England, \$5,223,000,000; Middle States, \$17,819,000,000; Southern States, \$9,928,000,000; Prairie States, \$25,256,000,000; Pacific States, \$6,811,000,000.



are, however, the most potent portion of the Union in spite of the agricultural wealth of the North-West, and of the manufacturing, banking and educational progress of New England. The South is naturally the most backward section, her educational, banking and railroad facilities being quite inadequate to her needs, her chief labouring class being unintelligent, her laws not properly enforced, and her immense resources but beginning to be utilised. The progress of Texas and Florida, however, and the brave efforts made by the whole section to overcome the disastrous effects of the Civil War seem to indicate that in time the South may surpass the other sections in power and wealth. As for the Pacific States their rise to prominence in less than half a century is one of the world's greatest marvels. Although the population is still small, considering the great area to be covered, yet the development of railways, of public schools, of mines, of farms, of vineyards, the grappling with difficulties connected with distance from the world's great centres and with lack of water supply, must ever reflect credit upon the early pioneers and their successors, and must cause a thrill of patriotic pleasure to the far-off American who lives and dies without sight of their great cañons, without a breath of their balmy air.

It is quite needless to say in conclusion that the period of which we have just sketched imperfectly the enormous development, has been marked as fully as any previous period by the characteristic American notes of energy and inventiveness. Never before have such colossal fortunes been made in so short a time; never before has speculation been so rife, competition so fierce, or the rewards of energy more alluring. At the same time it must be con-

fessed that seemingly never before has labour been so discontented, or corporate capital so heartless, or the average citizen so goaded by the desire to become rich and notorious. The quiet, rural life of 1801 is the exception, not the rule, in 1901. The children of the rich tend to lead luxurious lives, which people of moderate means too often strive to imitate. Extremes of wealth and of poverty confront one another in the great cities; a plutocracy has arisen in the midst of the democracy. Nevertheless it seems clear that the masses of the people still lead clean, wholesome lives, respect family and church ties,\* and are practically unaffected by decadent tendencies. The divorce, the temperance, and other problems are serious; but they are not vital in the eyes of the historian, although they are in those of the reformer.

The inventions of the period have in many ways tended to increase the power of corporate capital. Companies have been formed to supply towns with electric street railways, with electric lights, with telephones, and the like. A gigantic corporation controls the oil supply not merely of the country, but of the world. Great amounts of capital are invested in fire-proof buildings of immense height. Factories are built with slight regard to the beauty of the landscape. More and more costly machinery has come into use supplanting labourers and absorbing capital. In like manner the trust or "combine" is crowding out the single corporations. It is *par excellence* an industrial era, in which man's

\* In 1890 the communicants of the various churches aggregated 20,612,806 or 32.92 per cent. of the total population. The four leading churches are the Roman Catholic, the Methodist, the Baptist, and the Presbyterian.

life is dominated by the mechanical arts. Even the great author uses a typewriter and takes his exercise on a bicycle.

But although the whir of machinery is heard everywhere intellectual life has not been repressed in America. On the contrary it is seen to have made great strides when we view it in the aggregate. There has been an educational renaissance; schools and colleges have grown in numbers, in excellence, in influence. Magazines and newspapers have been greatly improved and cheapened; more good books are being produced than ever before and more fairly talented writers are coming to the front. Longfellow, Hawthorne, Emerson, Lowell and Poe have not left their equals, but the average man of letters of 1901 far surpasses his predecessor of 1850. In the arts, too, general progress has been made, especially, as we have seen, in that of architecture. In pure science, in technical scholarship, in applied sciences like medicine and engineering, Americans have not merely held their own but have won the admiration of the world. In astronomy and physics and meteorology and geology and anthropology their work has been especially noteworthy, nor is the list exhaustive. No aristocracy of poets, thinkers, and artists has given or gives a crowning glory to the nation, but the intellectual and artistic achievements of the democracy have been just as memorable, perhaps, from the point of view of the greatest good to the greatest number. It seems, therefore, permissible to conclude that on the whole the American people have every reason to be proud of the advance they have made in the nineteenth century in practically every sphere of human activity, save in that of politics.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

## CONCLUSION.

IN the preceding pages we have traced the progress of the United States through what a great scientist has rightly denominated as "this wonderful century." We have recorded a phenomenal growth in area, in population, in wealth, in military and intellectual achievements. Had it seemed well to dwell upon facts of immediately contemporary history, we could have made the record still more striking by dilating upon the possibilities of the colonial empire which is being founded in the islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific by a people for whom a continental stretch of over 3,000,000 square miles seems to be too narrow a territory. But is America's colossal growth in this tremendous century the most important fact in her history?

Obviously not. The most important fact in her history is that she began the century as a small Republic just inaugurating a democratic régime, and that she ends it as a gigantic Republic under nearly the same régime. The prime fact in American history is the comparatively encouraging success of the democratic experiment. If this chapter had been penned twenty years ago it would have appeared fair to omit the qualifying "comparatively." Then the fact that the Republic had survived the shock of the greatest civil war of modern times would have seemed sufficient proof of the vitality

of the nation and of the complete success of the democratic experiment. But, as we have seen, within the past two decades social and economic questions rather than political have confronted the voters of the country, and they have not known how to adjust their party machinery to them. Political corruption and social and economic unrest have grown apace, and the issue is not yet. Finally it has been proposed that the Republic should undertake the task of governing alien and distant peoples to whom it is not thought advisable to promise rights of citizenship in the near future. In view of these facts and of the general and specific criticisms that within the last quarter of a century have been passed upon the workings of the government, it would seem that the careful student cannot now affirm that the democratic experiment in America is an unqualified success.

But that it has been on the whole a fair success seems undeniable. It has stood both the strain of time and the stress of war. It has satisfied and still satisfies a nervous, restless people who will not put up with anything less than the best. Rich or poor, foreign or native born, learned or ignorant, the American loves his democratic country where all men are equal before the law and where the will of the majority rules or is supposed to rule. Even when he has become sophisticated enough to criticise the workings of his government, he still loves it and prefers it to any other; he still believes that the defects that he has discovered will be remedied in time through the action of the people themselves. He cannot even fancy himself or his fellow-citizens submitting to any form of government less liberal. He desires no radical change and can con-



ceive of none. He ridicules the suggestion that a plutoeraey, an oligarehy, or a tyranny may some day supplant the Republic.

Now an experiment in government that has come to seem to the people living under it as eternal and as natural as the very land and sky is surely a success in many important respects. It can hardly indeed be called an experiment. Yet nothing is clearer than the fact that, while demoeraey has been a success in America, while in all likelihood it will never be supplanted by an inferior form of government, it has nevertheless not meant the same thing to successive generations in this century and will not in all probability attain a fixity of content or meaning for future generations. The demoeraey of Jefferson was not that of Jackson; nor would either statesman greatly sympathise with that of Mr. Bryan. In other words American demoeraey is subject to the law of evolution; in the last analysis the democratic experiment remains an experiment.

As we have seen, Jefferson believed in the right and power of the people to elect able men to office and to determine the general character of the government under which they would live. Jackson believed in the right of the people to aspire to office, in the soundness of their general views upon public issues, and in the sanction given by their votes to the actions of the man of their choice. Mr. Bryan has apparently constituted himself the voice rather than the leader of the people, and would give the latter a scope in the management of social and economical forces which even Jackson would probably have thought unwise. A pessimist might, then, easily find it in his heart to declare that the

democratic experiment has gone through three stages in America, to each of which the people at large and the politicians of all parties have readily accustomed themselves. Beginning with a philanthropical and philosophical sharing of the power of the classes with the masses, it speedily degenerated into the formation of a vulgar partnership between leaders and people, from which it has passed into the establishment of a huge political phalanstery (to borrow the expression of Fourier) in which seiolistic orators blindly direct the chaotic labours of a multitude of ignorant men, women and children.

No such pessimistic view shall be taken in these pages because whatever strictures may be rightfully passed upon the present status of politics in America, no impartial observer can fail to perceive that the heart of the people is thoroughly sound; that they have made and are making great strides in education; that they have displayed much practical wisdom not only in their private concerns, but also in such public matters as the overthrow of the Federalists and the abolition of slavery; that they have a deep and abiding love for their country and an indomitable determination to preserve and hand on to posterity the blessings of liberty and equality. Of such a people, honest, kind-hearted, capable of enthusiasm, energetic, practical, ambitious, one can hardly believe too much.

The history of America affords, therefore, little room for pessimism and much room for a healthy optimism; but it does not afford room for sentimentalism or for foolhardy confidence. Yet it is quite plain that there is a type of American that will not bear sober criticism of his country and government, as well as one that fondly imagines that because

Nature has abundantly blessed the land her blessings can be exploited without thought for the future, and that because the American people has uniformly succeeded in its past undertakings, it is warranted in the belief that nothing is impossible to it. Both types are numerous and noisy, the latter being especially the product of the Middle West with its rich fields, its streaming oil wells, its large, prosperous population.

Yet nothing can be plainer than that the American has been wasteful of his resources, and that these, though tremendous, are not inexhaustible. Slavery was immensely wasteful. Absurdly liberal pension laws, high and unscientific tariffs, bad methods of financiering, a partisan civil service, dishonest municipal administrations, "log rolled" appropriations for so-called "internal improvements"—all these things are wasteful to-day—much more wasteful than even slavery was. Railroads unwisely built and owned by private parties, natural monopolies for the supply of gas and water and the like given away by cities to capitalists and speculators, public lands lavished on corporations or amassed by shrewd individuals—these things too are wasteful, and they by no means exhaust the heart-rending category. How long can America stand them? is the question of the thoughtful inquirer. "None of your business" or "We'll mend things by-and-by" are the answers he gets from super-sensitive and over-pampered patriots. As for the criticisms that have been justly passed upon the government of which Americans are so proud, their mere enumeration would fill more pages than we now have to spare. The philosophic foreign student of politics used to look to America for political lessons; it would be idle for

him to seek instruction of a positive character in the history of the country during the past quarter of a century. The frequency of elections and the consequent turmoils; the state of the civil service even after years of attempted reform; the method of choosing Senators; the popular inability or unwillingness to cope with the lobby; the blundering experiments made with the tariff, with the public debt, and with the currency; the toleration of express, telegraph and other private monopolies; the injudicious treatment of the Indian and the negro; the failure to put down mob-law—from these and similar things the foreigner can surely learn nothing that would be profitable save as a warning and deterrent.

But the native student of politics has been of late even more thoroughgoing in his criticisms than any foreigner has been, and his countrymen have winced under his strictures. He has pointed out that many present evils are of native growth—such as the “boss” system and the pension scandal. He has subjected the machinery of government to rigorous analysis and found it defective in many respects. He has shown conclusively that Americans are governed not by a great bi-cameral deliberative body known as Congress, but by small groups of Senators and Representatives forming committees. He has called attention to the vastly augmented power of the Speaker of the House. He has regretted the absence of ministerial influence upon Congress and the consequent gulf that separates the heads of executive departments from the legislature that votes supplies. In short the Federal Judiciary is almost the only department of government that has emerged practically unscathed from his analysis.

He has gone further and declared that the country has many positive reforms to make. He declares that a permanent official class is needed in subordinate administrative positions whether national, State, or local, as well as commissions on banking and currency, taxation and revenues, appropriations and internal improvements, labour problems and the like. All this in order that Congress and the State legislatures may be relieved of work they cannot do well, and that the electorate may be freed from the responsibility of voting upon matters which it cannot comprehend and could not even under the most favourable educational conditions. He declares further that there is need of courts or boards of confirmation to office and of impeachment and removal, as well as of some differentiation of the suffrage. In other words he would strengthen the executive, even while relieving the individual President, would render the legislature more efficient by confining it to its proper lines of activity, and would limit the interference of the people with the practical conduct of affairs.\*

Now it does not behove us to attempt to play the part of prophet and endeavour to determine whether a people that has once tasted political power will ever consent to give up privileges acquired. Nor need we dilate upon the theory already advanced in these pages to the effect that most of the political evils at present afflicting America are due to the unfitness of the two-party system for coping with social and economic problems. We are not even concerned with trying to show that the probable outcome of contemporary complications will be the

\* See Prof. J. H. Hyslop's *Democracy*. New York, 1899.



gradual introduction of a modification of the group system now in vogue in Germany, and a slow transformation from a democratic to a semi-socialistic state. All these things belong to the future, and we are now required merely to emphasise two facts—first, that the United States in spite of its great past and its inspiring present is like all other nations fallible and subject to much adverse criticism; secondly, that there is no reason to believe that the immense forces that are shaping the destiny of the country will necessarily take either a sinister or a still more prosperous direction. In other words what is required of us is to take neither a pessimistic nor a blatantly optimistic view of the future, but to be grateful for the abundant mercies of Providence in the past and present, and to believe that the destiny of America is in the hands of her own people acting under the eye of God.

## APPENDIX A.

### CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

#### PREAMBLE.

WE the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

#### ARTICLE I. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

##### *Section I. Congress in General.*

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

##### *Section II. House of Representatives.*

1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.

2. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

3. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such man-

ner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

4. When vacancies happen in the representations from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

5. The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment.

### *Section III. Senate.*

1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six years, and each senator shall have one vote.

2. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided, as equally as may be, into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

3. No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

5. The Senate shall choose their officers, and also a president *pro tempore*, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the chief justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

7. Judgment in case of impeachment shall not extend farther than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.

*Section IV. Both Houses.*

1. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators.

2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

*Section V. The Houses Separately.*

1. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each house may provide.

2. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.

3. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

4. Neither house during the session of Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

*Section VI. Disabilities of Members.*

1. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to or returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

2. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.

### *Section VII. Mode of Passing Laws.*

1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

3. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

### *Section VIII. Powers granted to Congress.*

The Congress shall have power :

1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States;



3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes ;
4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States ;
5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.
6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States ;
7. To establish post-offices and post-roads ;
8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries ;
9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court ;
10. To define and punish felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations ;
11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water ;
12. To raise and support armies ; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years ;
13. To provide and maintain a navy ;
14. To make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces ;
15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions ;
16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
17. To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings ; and,
18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof.

*Section IX. Powers denied to the United States.*

1. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit shall not

be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight ; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

2. The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

3. No bill of attainder, or *ex-post-facto* law, shall be passed.

4. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.

5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.

6. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another ; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

7. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law ; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.

8. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States ; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

#### *Section X. Powers denied to the States.*

1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; coin money ; emit bills of credit ; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts ; pass any bill of attainder, *ex-post-facto* law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts ; or grant any title of nobility.

2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.

3. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in times of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delays.

## ARTICLE II. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

*Section I. President and Vice-President.*

1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:

2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.

3. [The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice-President.] <sup>1</sup>

4. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they will give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the United States.

5. No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have

<sup>1</sup> Altered by the XIIth Amendment.

attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.

6. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President ; and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President ; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected.

7. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

8. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation :

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

### *Section II. Powers of the President.*

1. The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States ; he may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices ; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur ; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law ; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments..

3. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session.



*Section III. Duties of the President.*

He shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them; and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.

*Section IV. Impeachment of the President.*

The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours.

## ARTICLE III. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

*Section I. United States Courts.*

The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour; and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

*Section II. Jurisdiction of the United States Courts.*

1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.<sup>1</sup>

2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the

<sup>1</sup> Altered by XIth Amendment.



Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury ; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed ; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

### *Section III. Treason.*

1. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

2. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason ; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

## ARTICLE IV. THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

### *Section I. State Records.*

Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

### *Section II. Privileges of Citizens, etc.*

1. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

2. A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

3. No person held to service or labour in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.

### *Section III. New States and Territories.*

1. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this

Union ; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State ; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

2. The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory or other property belonging to the United States ; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular State.

#### *Section IV. Guarantee to the States.*

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion ; and, on application of the Legislature, or of the executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.

#### ARTICLE V. POWER OF AMENDMENT.

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress ; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first Article ; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

#### ARTICLE VI. PUBLIC DEBT, SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION, OATH OF OFFICE, RELIGIOUS TEST.

1. All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation.

2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the

Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

3. The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution ; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

#### ARTICLE VII. RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.

The ratifications of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth.

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#### AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

##### ARTICLE I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

##### ARTICLE II.

A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

##### ARTICLE III.

No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

##### ARTICLE IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures

shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

## ARTICLE V.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in active service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

## ARTICLE VI.

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

## ARTICLE VII.

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.

## ARTICLE VIII.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.

## ARTICLE IX.

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

## ARTICLE X.

The powers not granted to the United States by the Consti-

tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.

#### ARTICLE XI.

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.

#### ARTICLE XII.

1. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately by ballot the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of death or other constitutional disability of the President.

2. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.



3. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

## ARTICLE XIII.

1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

## ARTICLE XIV.

1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No States shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male members of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

3. No person shall be a senator or representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or holding any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.

5. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.

#### ARTICLE XV.

1. The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.

2. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.

## APPENDIX B.

LIST OF PRESIDENTS AND VICE-PRESIDENTS WITH  
THEIR TERMS OF OFFICE.

- 1789-1793—George Washington.  
John Adams.  
1793-1797—George Washington.  
John Adams.  
1797-1801—John Adams.  
Thomas Jefferson.  
1801-1805—Thomas Jefferson.  
Aaron Burr.  
1805-1809—Thomas Jefferson.  
George Clinton.  
1809-1813—James Madison.  
George Clinton.  
1813-1817—James Madison.  
Elbridge Gerry.  
1817-1821—James Monroe.  
D. D. Tompkins.  
1821-1825—James Monroe.  
D. D. Tompkins.  
1825-1829—John Quincy Adams.  
John C. Calhoun.  
1829-1833—Andrew Jackson.  
John C. Calhoun.  
1833-1837—Andrew Jackson.  
Martin Van Buren.  
1837-1841—Martin Van Buren.  
R. M. Johnson.  
1841-1845—Wm. Henry Harrison.  
John Tyler (became President, 1841).  
1845-1849—James K. Polk.  
George M. Dallas.  
1849-1853—Zachary Taylor.  
Millard Fillmore (became President, 1850).  
1853-1857—Franklin Pierce.  
William R. King.  
1857-1861—James Buchanan.  
J. C. Breckinridge.

- 1861-1865—Abraham Lincoln.  
Hannibal Hamlin.  
1865-1869—Abraham Lincoln.  
Andrew Johnson (became President, 1865).  
1869-1873—U. S. Grant.  
Schuyler Colfax.  
1873-1877—U. S. Grant.  
Henry Wilson.  
1877-1881—R. B. Hayes.  
Wm. A. Wheeler.  
1881-1885—Jas. A. Garfield.  
Chester A. Arthur (became President, 1881).  
1885-1889—Grover Cleveland.  
T. A. Hendricks.  
1889-1893—Benjamin Harrison.  
L. P. Morton.  
1893-1897—Grover Cleveland.  
Adlai E. Stevenson.  
1897-1901—Wm. McKinley.  
G. A. Hobart.  
1901—Wm. McKinley.  
Theodore Roosevelt.

## APPENDIX C.

STATES AND TERRITORIES OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA, WITH DATES OF ORGANISATION  
AND ADMISSION, POPULATION AND AREA IN  
1900.

States and Terri- tories.	Dates of Organisa- tion as Territory and Admission as State.	Population 1900.	Area in sq. miles.
Alabama.....	1817, 1819	1,828,697	51,540
Alaska.....	1884	44,000	532,409
Arizona.....	1863	122,212	112,920
Arkansas.....	1819, 1836	1,311,564	53,045
California.....	1850	1,485,053	155,980
Colorado.....	1861, 1876	539,700	103,645
Connecticut.....	One of the 13 states.	908,355	4,845
Delaware.....	"	184,735	1,960
District of Columbia....	1791	278,718	60
Florida.....	1822, 1845	528,542	54,240
Georgia.....	One of the 13 states.	2,216,329	58,980
Idaho.....	1863, 1890	161,771	84,290
Illinois.....	1809, 1818	4,821,550	56,000
Indiana.....	1800, 1816	2,516,463	35,910
Iowa.....	1838, 1845	2,251,829	55,475
Kansas.....	1854, 1861	1,469,496	81,700
Kentucky.....	1792	2,147,174	40,000
Louisiana.....	1805, 1812	1,381,627	45,420
Maine.....	1820	694,366	29,895
Maryland.....	One of the 13 states.	1,189,946	9,860
Massachusetts.....	"	2,805,346	8,040
Michigan.....	1805, 1837	2,419,782	57,430
Minnesota.....	1849, 1858	1,751,395	79,205
Mississippi.....	1798, 1817	1,551,372	46,340
Missouri.....	1812, 1821	3,107,117	68,735
Montana....	1864, 1889	243,289	145,310
Nebraska.....	1854, 1867	1,068,901	76,840
Nevada.....	1861, 1864	42,334	109,740
New Hampshire. ....	One of the 13 states.	411,588	9,005
New Jersey.....	"	1,883,669	7,455
New Mexico.....	1850	193,777	122,460



New York.....	One of the 13 states.	7,268,009	47,620
North Carolina.....	"	1,891,992	48,580
North Dakota.....	1861, 1889	319,040	70,195
Ohio.....	1802	4,157,545	40,760
Oklahoma.....	1890	398,245	38,830
Oregon.....	1848, 1859	413,532	94,560
Pennsylvania.....	One of the 13 states.	6,301,365	44,985
Rhode Island.....	"	428,556	1,085
South Carolina.....	"	1,340,312	30,170
South Dakota.....	1861, 1889	401,559	76,850
Tennessee.....	1796	2,022,723	41,750
Texas.....	1845	3,048,828	262,290
Utah.....	1850, 1896	276,565	82,190
Vermont.....	1791	343,641	9,135
Virginia.....	One of the 13 states.	1,854,184	40,125
Washington.....	1853, 1889	517,672	66,880
West Virginia.....	1863	958,900	24,645
Wisconsin.....	1836, 1848	2,068,963	54,455
Wyoming....	1868, 1890	92,531	97,570

To the above are to be added :

Indian Territory (organised in 1834) and Indian Reservations with a population of 537,242.

Hawaii—Annexed in 1898 ; area, 6,740 sq. miles ; population (1900), 154,001.

Porto Rico—Ceded in 1898 ; area, 3,668 sq. miles ; population, 900,000 (about).

Philippines—Ceded in 1898 ; area, 120,000 sq. miles ; population, 8,000,000 (about).

Guam (in the Ladrões)—Ceded in 1898 ; population about 9,000.

# INDEX.

## A.

Abolitionists, 171-175, 217, 220-221, 243.  
 Adams, Henry, quoted, 44 note.  
 Adams, Prof. Henry C., 80.  
 Adams, President John, 3, 10, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, 30, 59, 125.  
 Adams, President John Quincy, 15 note, 70, 72, 75, 88, 95; candidacy for Presidency, 108, 116-117; on Monroe Doctrine, 114; chosen President, 118; selects Clay as Secretary of State, 118; his administration, 119-132; on Internal Improvements, 120; favours Panama Congress, 121-122; trouble with Georgia, 122-125; loses West Indian trade, 126; defeated in 1828, 130-131; defends right of petition, 174-175, 195, 203; quiets House of Representatives, 184; death, 216; referred to, 303.  
 Alabama Claims, The, 300 note, 333.  
 Alaska, Purchase of (1867), 332-333.  
 Alger, Gen. R. A., 410.  
 Alien and Sedition Laws, 10, 13, 19, 40.  
 Alliance, The Holy, 111-114.  
 Altgeld, J. P., 381.  
 Amendments to Constitution—XIIth, 38; XIIIth, 303-304, 318; XIVth, 320 note, 322-324, 327; XVth, 327.  
 American Colonisation Society, 105.  
 American Protective Association, 399 note.  
 Anarchists, The Chicago, 380-381.  
 Anderson, John, Bribery case of, 92.  
 Anderson, Major Robert, 272-273, 295.  
 Andrew, Gov. John A., 295.  
 Anti-Masons, The, 165, 175.  
 Anti-rent agitation in New York, 202.  
 Antietam, Battle of (1862), 303.  
 Armstrong, Secretary John, 71, 73.  
 Appomattox, Surrender at (1865), 309.  
 Arbuthnot and Ambrister, Case of, 94-95.  
 Arthur, President Chester A., 362; succeeds Garfield, 366; his administration, 366-372; increases navy, 369; fails of renomination, 372.  
 Ashburton Treaty, The (1842), 194.  
 Atlantic Cable, The, 261, 290.

## B.

Babcock, Gen. O. E., 337, 346.

Baltimore, Mob in (1861), 295.  
 Bancroft, George, 205.  
 Bank, The National—Hamilton's not rechartered (1811), 64; second bank chartered, 82-83; bad management of, 105-106; Jackson's fight against, 162-164, 165-169; its decrepitude, 183; Clay's struggle to re-establish, 191-193; national banking system established (1863), 312.  
 Barbary States, War with (1801-5), 23-24, 42, 67; war threatened (1815), 84.  
 Barbé-Marbois, 34.  
 Bayard, James A., 12, 27, 66, 72.  
 Bayard, Thomas F., 363, 376.  
 Beauregard, Gen. G. P., 215, 297.  
 Bell, John, 269-270.  
 Belknap, W. W., 337.  
 Benton, Thomas H., 142, 156, 163, 167-168, 212, 250 note; quoted, 66 note, 97 note, 103 note, 105 note, 173 note, 194 note, 206 note, 208 note.  
 Behring Sea controversy, 338.  
 Berlin Conference (1884), 368.  
 Berlin Decree (1806), 51, 53, 62.  
 Biddle, Nicholas, 163-164.  
 Bladensburg, Battle of (1814), 73.  
 Blaine, Jas. G., 347-348, 362, 364, 370; nominated for Presidency and defeated, 372-375; refuses renomination, 383; as Secretary of State, 385, 386-388; quoted, 329.  
 Blair Bill, The, 377, 382.  
 Bland, Richard P., 358-359, 405.  
 Blennerhassett, H., 47-48.  
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 9, 26, 32-36, 51-62, 69.  
 Booth, John Wilkes, 313.  
 Border States, The, in Civil War, 271 note, 276-277, 295-296.  
 Bragg, Gen. Braxton, 299, 305.  
 Breckinridge, John C., 252, 268, 270.  
 Brock, General Isaac, 67.  
 Brooks, Preston S., 249.  
 Brown, Gen. Jacob, 72.  
 Brown, John, his "Raid" (1859), 265-267.  
 Bryan, Wm. J., 405-406, 411, 413, 435.  
 Buchanan, President James, 205, 206, 210, 235, 244; nominated for President, 255; elected, 253; his administration, 256-277; attitude toward Kansas, 259-261; his foreign

- policy, 265; attitude toward seceded States, 272-274.
- Buena Vista, Battle of (1847), 213.
- Burchard, Rev. Dr. S. D., 374.
- Burns, Anthony, Case of (1854), 233 note, 242-243.
- Burnside, Gen. A. E., 305, 312.
- Burr, Aaron, 10-12, 14, 30, 38, 41; his conspiracy and trial (1806-1807), 47-49, 54.
- Butler, Gen. B. F., 308, 330.
- Butler, Senator A. P., 248.
- C.
- Cabot, George, 78.
- Calhoun, John C., 65, 82, 84, 122; his bill for Internal Improvements, 85-86; in Cabinet, 88; quarrel with Jackson, 95, 151; candidacy for Presidency, 108, 117; elected Vice-President in 1824 and 1828, 117, 130; on tariff of 1828, 127, 129; in Nullification movement, 156-161; opposes abolitionists, 172-173; retires from Senate, 195; enters Tyler's Cabinet and negotiates annexation of Texas, 199, 203-204; negotiations as to Oregon, 206; on question of slavery and the Territories, 220-221; attitude toward Compromise of 1850, 225-229; his death, 229.
- California, 112, 198, 208, 210, 214, 215, 222; Gold discovered in (1849), 223-224; Kearneyism in, 370-371; Vigilance committees in, 387.
- Cameron, Simon, 294-295.
- Campbell's Report, 56.
- Canada, Invasions of in war of 1812, 67; troubles with in 1838, 183; fishery disputes with, 359.
- Cauning, William, 52, 112, 114, 126.
- Caroline, Capture of the, 194 note.
- Cass, Lewis, 151, 217, 235, 241, 259, 273.
- Centennial Exposition (1876), 349, 352.
- Cervera, Admiral, 409.
- Chauning, Prof. Edward, quoted, 289-290.
- Charleston, Democratic Convention at (1860), 268; Earthquake at (1886), 381.
- Chase, Salmon P., 251, 269, 294.
- Chase, Justice Samuel, Impeachment of (1805), 37, 40-41, 47.
- Cheves, Langdon, 106.
- Chicago Fire (1871), 337.
- Chili, Trouble with (1891), 386.
- Chinese, Tyler's treaty with, 194; Legislation against, 360, 370-371; insurrection (1900), 412.
- Cities. See Urban Growth.
- Civil Rights Bill, The, 322. See Slaughter House Cases.
- Civil Service Reform, 344, 362 note, 368, 377-378, 411-412.
- Clark, George Rogers, 99.
- Clay, Henry, 65, 70, 72, 75, 82, 84, 88, 92, 105, 107, 114; secures second Missouri Compromise, 102; candidacy for Presidency in 1824, 108-9, 116-117; becomes Secretary of State, 115, 119; duel with Randolph, 122; supports Adams, 127, 130; caudidate for Presidency, 1832, 159; compromises with Nullifiers, 160; fights for the Bank, 163-164; not nominated in 1836, 176; opposes Van Buren, 182; not nominated in 1840, 185; opposition to Tyler, 190-193; retires from Senate, 194; nominated for President and defeated, 1844, 200-201; criticises Polk's administration, 215; set aside in 1848, 217; secures Compromise of 1850, 225-232; death in 1852, 237.
- Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, The (1850), 230 note, 243, 372 note, 369, 412.
- Cleveland, President Grover, nominated and elected, 373-375; his first administration, 376-385; tariff message, 382-383; renominated and defeated, 383-384; renominated and elected, 392-393; second administration, 394-414; character as a statesman, 394-395; attitude toward Hawaiian revolution, 395-397; toward Chicago strikers, 400-401; his Venezuelan message, 401-403; vetoes educational test for immigrants, 421 note; quoted, 23.
- Clinton, De Witt, 69, 86.
- Clinton, George, 38, 55.
- Cobb, Howell, 226, 259, 273.
- Cockburn, Admiral, 72-73.
- Columbia (S. C.), Burning of, 307.
- Columbian Exposition (1893), 391, 397.
- Compromise of 1850, 225, 234.
- Confederate States, Organisation of, 274-275; Administration of, 310-311.
- Conkling, Roscoe, 362, 364.
- Constitution, fight with *Guerrière* (1812), 67-68.
- Cooper, James Fenimore, 8, 143.
- Covode Investigation, The, 267-268.
- Coxey's army, 400.
- Crawford, Wm. H., 84, 89, 95, 107; candidacy for Presidency, 109, 116-117.
- Crédit Mobilier, 336-337, 363.
- Crittenden, Senator, 295.
- Cuba, 234, 243, 244-245, 265; in Spanish American War, 405-410, 412; present state of, 413.
- Cumberland Road, The, 86, 110.
- Curtis, Geo. W., 373.
- Curtis, Justice B. R., his opinion in *Dred Scott Case*, 257-258.
- Cushing, Caleb, 237-238.
- Custer, Gen. Geo. A., 352.

## D.

- Dallas, A. J., 74, 84.  
 Davis, Jefferson, 41, 213, 219, 235, 268 ; as Secretary of War under Pierce, 237-238, 241-242, 247, 255 ; made President of Confederate States, 275 ; his administration, 294-215 ; difficulty of his task, 310-311 ; treatment of after the war, 326, 342.  
 Debt, Imprisonment for, 28-29.  
 Decatur, Stephen, 42, 68, 84.  
 Democratic Party, Formation of, 130-131.  
 Detroit, Surrender of, 67 ; retaken, 71.  
 Dewey, Admiral George, 408-409 ; 414.  
 Dix, John A., 274.  
 Dorr's Rebellion (1842), 202.  
 Douglas, Stephen A., pushes through Kansas-Nebraska legislation, 230-242 ; candidate for Presidential nomination in 1856, 252 ; debates with Lincoln, 262-265 ; nomination in 1860, 268, 270.  
 Dred Scott Case, The (decided 1857), 256-259.  
 Duane, Wm. J., 166-167.  
 Dunning, Prof. Wm. A., 331 note.

## E.

- Eads, Capt. Jas. B., his jetties (1879), 362.  
 Eaton, John H. and wife, 150-151.  
 Eaton, Gen. Wm., 42.  
 Edmunds, G. F., 362, 372, 391 note.  
 Education in 1801, 7 ; in 1830, 141-142 ; in 1896, 428.  
 Election frauds of 1888, 383-384.  
 Electoral Commission of 1876, 350-351.  
 Emancipation Proclamation (1863), 303.  
 Embargo, Jefferson's (1808), 54-58.  
 Emerson, R. W., 143, 291, 432.  
 Erie Canal, 86, 120.  
 Erskine, D. M., British Envoy, 60-61.  
 Evarts, Wm. M., 357, 359-360, 369.  
 Everett, Edward, 269, 291.

## F.

- Farragut, Commodore David G., 298-299.  
 Fillmore, President Millard, 217 ; succeeds Taylor, 230 ; not re-nominated in 1852, 236 ; nominated by Know-Nothings, 251.  
 Fisk, "Jim," 336.  
 Florida, Jefferson tries to acquire, 45 ; Madison seizes West Florida (1811), 63 ; troubles in under Monroe, 91 ; Jackson in, 93 ; ceded by Spain (1819), 96-97 ; organised as territory, 111. See Seminoles.

Floyd, John B., 273.

Foote, Senator S. A., his resolution, 156.

Foreigners in U. S., in 1801, 8-9 ; in 1830, 138 ; in 1830-1860, 283-285 ; 1860-1900, 421-423.

Fort Mims massacre (1813), 71.

France, settles claims, 162, 175. See also Louisiana Purchase, Napoleon, and Maximilian.

Fredericksburg, Battle of (1862), 305.

Freedman's Bureau, The, 322.

Frémont, John C., 250, 253 ; his career, 250, note, 313.

Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 231-234 ; 242-243.

## G.

Gadsden, Christopher, quoted, 15-16.  
 Gadsden, James, his "Purchase" (1853), 243.

Gaines, General E. P., 93-94, 123.

Gallatin, Albert, 22, 27, 39, 56, 60, 65, 70, 79, 126.

Garfield, President James A., 362-364 ; his administration, 364-366 ; assassination (1881), 366.

Garrison, Wm. Lloyd, 171, 217, 243.

Georgia, controversy over Yazoo Lands, 37, 39-40 ; troubles with Creeks and Cherokees, 122-125, 153-154 ; convention of 1850, 235.

Gerry, Elbridge, 69.

Gettysburg, Battle of (1863), 305.

Ghent, Treaty of (1814), 75.

Giles, W. B., 27.

Goebel, Wm., 413.

Gold discovered in California (1849), 223-224.

Granger, Gideon, 39.

Granger Party, The, 345, 379, 393.

Grant, President U. S., 15 note, 215, 302 ; takes Fort Donelson, 298 ; takes Vicksburg (1863), 299 ; commands at Chattanooga, 305 ; made Lieutenant-general, 306 ; opposes Lee in Virginia, 307-308 ; receives Lee's surrender, 309 ; his character, 309-310, 335, 337-338 ; attitude toward reconstructed South, 327, 341-343 ; elected President, 333-334, re-elected, 343-344 ; Scandals under, 336-337 ; his San Domingo policy, 346-347 ; third term agitation, 347, 362, 364 ; death, 381.

Great Britain, attitude toward U. S. prior to 1812, 42-47, 51-66 ; in war of 1812, 67-75 ; supports Monroe Doctrine, 112 ; denies U. S. West Indian trade, 126 ; grants it, 162 ; concludes Ashburton Treaty, 194 ; influence on Texas negotiations, 199 ; concludes Oregon Treaty, 206-207 ; attitude in Civil War, 298 ; concludes treaty of Washington,



- 346; withdraws her minister, 385; arbitrates Behring Sea dispute, 388; attitude in Venezuelan controversy, 401-403; sympathy of in Spanish War, 408.
- Geece, Revolt of, 114-115.
- Greely, Lt. A. W., 372.
- Greeley, Horace, 251, 277, 343.
- "Greenback" Party, The, 345, 358.
- Greytown, Bombardment of, 243-244, 254.
- Guadaloupe Hidalgo, Treaty of (1848), 216.
- Guiteau, Charles J., 366.
- H.
- Halifax Fishery Commission, 359-360.
- Hamilton, Alexander, 12, 19, 22, 33, 38, 47, 59, 64.
- Hampton Roads Conference (1865), 308 note.
- Hancock, Gen. W. S., 363-364.
- Hanna, Senator M. A., 404.
- Harrisburg Convention (1827), 127-128.
- Harrison, President Benjamin, nominated and elected, 383-384; his administration, 385-393; attitude toward Chili, 386; renominated and defeated, 392-393; attitude toward Hawaiian revolution, 395.
- Harrison, President Wm. Henry, 39, 64, 70-71; candidate for Presidency in 1836, 176; wins in 1840, 184-186; death, 188.
- Hart, Prof. A. B., 286 note, 386 note.
- Hartford Convention (1814), 76-79.
- Hawaiian Islands, 223, 395-397.
- Hawthorne, Nath., 143, 291, 432.
- Hay, John, 412.
- Hayes, President R. B., 345, 348; election of disputed, 348-351; his character, 356-357; his administration, 356-362; his vetoes, 359, 360.
- Hayne, Robert Y., 121; debate with Webster, 156-158; as Governor of S. C., 159.
- Hendricks, Thomas A., 348, 373, 378.
- Henry, John, disclosures of, 65.
- Hepburn vs. Griswold, 358.
- Hobart, Garrett A., 405, 413.
- Hobson, Lt. R. P., 409.
- Hooker, Gen. Joseph, 304, 305.
- Houston, Sam., 196, 193.
- Hull, Captain Isaac, 68.
- Hull, General, 39, 67.
- Hyslop, Prof. J. H., 439 note.
- I.
- Impressment, 43-44, 46, 51, 75.
- Independents in politics, 374-375, 405, 413-414.
- Internal Improvements, 85-86, 110, 120, 153.
- Interstate Commerce Act (1887), 379.
- Interstate migration, 425.
- Italian lynching in New Orleans (1891), 386-387.
- J.
- Jackson, President Andrew, 15 note; defeats Crecks, 72; wins Battle of New Orleans, 74-75; as President, 88; in Florida, 93-95, 111; Sketch of, 95-96; candidacy for Presidency, 108, 117-118, 126-129; elected President in 1828, 130; his administrations, 146-178; attitude towards the Spoils System, 146-150; changes his cabinet, 151; attitude towards Georgia Indians, 153-154; towards nullification, 155-161; re-elected, 159; contest with Bank, 162-169; his specie circular, 170; close of his career, 177-178, 183, 186; his efforts to get Texas, 196; referred to, 435.
- Jackson, James, British minister, 61.
- Jackson, Thomas J. (Stonewall), 215, 296, 301, 302, 304.
- James, Jesse, 371.
- Japan, Treaty with (1852), 245.
- Jefferson, President Thomas, 3, 9, 10-60; his inauguration, 16-17; sketch of his early life, 18-19; his character, 19-21; his attitude toward the civil service, 21-22; his correspondence, 24-25; secures Louisiana, 30-37; tries to secure Florida, 45-46; conduct relative to Aaron Burr, 47-49; his struggle with Napoleon and Great Britain, 51-58; estimate of his executive career, 58, 97, 98, 104, 111, 122; his death (1826), 125; referred to, 141, 154, 168, 186, 211, 220, 435; quoted, 5 note, 22, 53 note, 58 note, 60 note, 70 note, 81 note, 113 note, 163 note, 167 note.
- Johnson, President Andrew, 15 note, 41, 313; takes up Lincoln's work, 317; sketch of, 317; opposes Congress, 322-329; impeachment of, 330-331; close of his career, 333 note; quoted, 318 note.
- Johnson, Richard M., elected Vice-President, 176.
- Johnston, Geo. A. S., 261, 298.
- Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., 297, 301, 306-307.
- Johnstown floods (1889), 392.
- Judiciary, The Federal, Reduction of in 1801, 26-27, 40.
- K.
- Kansas, Conflict in, 246-249, 253, 259-261, 265, 277.
- Kansas-Nebraska Legislation (1854), 239-242, 245.



- Kearney, Dennis, 370-371.  
 Kearsarge destroys the Alabama (1864), 300 note.  
 Kendall, Amos, 152, 173.  
 Kentucky, disputed election of 1900, 413; Resolutions (see Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions).  
 King, Rufus, 38, 55, 85.  
 Know-Nothings, The, 245-246, 249-250, 251, 252.  
 Kossuth, Louis, 234.  
 Koszta, Martin, Case of, 238.  
 Ku Klux Klan, 328, 341.
- L.
- Lafayette, visit of (1824), 116.  
 Laughlin, Prof. J. L., quoted, 398 note.  
 Lecompton Constitution, the, 260-261.  
 Lee, General Robert E., 215, 266, 293, 296; takes charge in Virginia, 301; invades Maryland, 302-303; defeated at Gettysburg, 304; opposes Grant in Virginia, 306, 307-309; his character, 309-310, 319, 335.  
 Leopard-Chesapeake incident (1807), 52-53.  
 Lewis, Capt. Merriwether, his expedition with Clark (1804-1805), 36.  
 Lexow Committee, the, 403-404.  
 Lincoln, President Abraham, 216; debates with Douglass (1858), 262-265; sketch of, 263-264; nominated for President, 269-270; his administrations, 294-315; issues Emancipation Proclamation, 304; his character, 310; assailed by faction, 312; re-elected, 313; assassinated, 314; his plan of Reconstruction, 316-317.  
 Literature in 1830, 143; in 1860, 291; in 1900, 432.  
 Livingston, Edward, 151.  
 Livingston, R. R., 24, 31, 32-35.  
 Loco-focos, 180.  
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, his bill, 389-390.  
 Longfellow, H. W., 143, 291, 432.  
 Lookout Mountain, Battle of (1863), 305.  
 Lopez, Narciso, 234.  
 Louisiana, Admission of (1812), 63.  
 Louisiana Lottery suppressed (1893), 391.  
 Louisiana Purchase, The (1803), 30-37, 97.  
 Lovejoy, E. P., 171 note.  
 Lowell, James Russell, 211, 291, 432.  
 Lundy's Lane, Battle of (1814), 72.
- M.
- McClellan, Gen. George B., 215, 296, 301-304, 307, 313.  
 Macdonough, Commodore Thomas, 73.  
 McKimley, President William, 368, 392; his tariff bill, 390; nominated and elected, 404-406; his administration, 406; attitude toward Spain, 406-407; his expansion policy, 411; his improvement in statesmanship, 412.  
 McLean, John, 119.  
 McMaster, Prof. J. B., 140, 290.  
 Macon, Nathaniel, 25; his Bills, 62.  
 Madison, President James, 22, 39, 47, 55, 56; his character, 59-60; his administrations, 60-86; forced into war, 65-66; re-elected, 69; on Internal Improvements, 83, 85; survives Jefferson, 125, 220.  
 Mahone, Wm., 371.  
 Maine, Admission of, 101.  
 Maine, Explosion of the (1898), 406-407.  
 Mauassas, First battle of (1861), 297.  
 Manassas, Second battle of (1862), 302.  
 Manila, Battle of (1898), 408-409.  
 Marbury vs. Madison, 21.  
 Marcy, Wm. L., 149 note, 205, 237-238, 254.  
 Marshall, Chief-Justice John, 14, 21; in Burr trial, 48-49; in the case of the Georgia Indians, 125, 153-154; his career, 154-155.  
 Mason, John Y., 205 note, 244.  
 Maximilian in Mexico, 322.  
 Meade, Gen. George G., 304.  
 Mexico, opposes acquisition of Texas, 196-199, 203-204; war with U. S. (1846-1848), 207-215; Gadsden Purchase from, 243; Maximilian in, 322.  
 Milan Decree, 54, 62.  
 Miles, Gen. N. A., 410.  
 Missouri Compromises, The (1820-21), 100-105, 211, 219-220; Repeal of (1854), 239-242.  
 "Molly McGuire's," The, 361.  
 Monitor, fight with the Virginia (1862), 300.  
 Monroe, President James, 33, 47, 51, 56, 64, 66 note, 73, 83; elected President, 84-85; his administrations, 87-118; protects Jackson, 95; secures Florida, 96-97; re-elected, 107; on Internal Improvements, 110; promulgates his "doctrine," 111-114; closes his career, 118.  
 Morgan, Wm., 165.  
 Mormons, The, 223-225, 261, 372, 391 note.  
 Morris, Gouverneur, 27, 33.  
 Morton, Gov. Oliver P., 295 note, 348.  
 Mulhall, M. G., quoted, 428-429.
- N.
- Napoleon III. See Maximilian.  
 Nashville, Battle of (1865), 306.  
 Nashville Convention, The (1850), 227.

- Negroes in South, 422-425. See Slavery.
- New Orleans, Battle of (1815), 74-75 ; Lynchings in, 328, 386-388, 413. See Louisiana Purchase.
- Non-Intercourse Act, 57-58, 60, 63.
- Noyes, A. D., quoted, 357 note.
- Nullification in S. C. (1832), 129, 153-161.
- O.
- Oklahoma, Territory, Opening of, 391-392.
- Orders in Council, 54, 57, 60, 62, 66.
- Oregon region, 97, 200 ; Treaty with Great Britain concerning (1846), 206-207.
- Osceola, 183.
- Ostend Manifesto, The (1854), 244-245, 251.
- P.
- Pacific Railways, 311, 336.
- Packenham, Sir Edward, 74-75.
- Panama Congress, The (1826), 114, 121-122.
- Pan-American Congress (1889), 385.
- Panic of 1818-19, 105 ; of 1837, 179-180 ; of 1857-8, 262 ; of 1869, 336 ; of 1873, 337 ; of 1893, 397-398.
- Paris, Treaty of (1898), 411.
- Parkhurst, Rev. C. H., 404.
- Party government in the U. S., 353-356, 438-440.
- Pension legislation, 376-377, 390.
- Perry, Commodore M. C., his expedition to Japan (1852), 245.
- Perry, Capt. Oliver H., 71.
- Petersburg, Siege of (1864-1865), 308.
- Philippines, Revolt in (1899-1900), 411, 413.
- Pickering, Timothy, 55, 78.
- Pierce, President Franklin, nominated and elected in 1852, 235-237 ; his administration, 237-255 ; part in Kansas-Nebraska legislation, 241-242 ; attitude toward Kansas, 249 ; not renominated, 252 ; close of his career, 255.
- Pike, Lt. Z. M., his expedition (1805), 36 note.
- Pinckney, C. C., 33, 38, 55.
- Pinckney, H. L., 174.
- Pinkney, William, 51.
- Pitt, William, 43.
- Platt, Thomas C., 355.
- Poe, E. A., 143, 293, 432.
- Polk, President James K., nominated for President and elected (1844), 200-201 ; his administration, 205-220 ; negotiates Oregon Treaty, 206-207 ; conduct of Mexican War, 207-215 ; attitude with regard to conquered territory, 219.
- Pope, General John, 298, 302.
- Populist Party, the, 393, 405, 414.
- Porto Rico, 410, 413.
- Presidential Succession, Act determining, 367.
- Princeton, Accident on the, 198.
- Privateering, U. S. refuse to abandon, 254.
- Proctor, Col. H. A., 71.
- Prohibition, Maine law (1851), 141, 213.
- Protection, 81-82, 127-130. See Tariff.
- Q.
- Quincy, Josiah, quoted, 63.
- Quitman, John A., 234-235.
- R.
- Rambouillet Decree, 62.
- Randolph John [of Roanoke], 27, 33, 39-41, 45-46, 65, 84, 86, 102, 105, 114-115, 122, 129-130, 162, 219.
- Reconstruction, Lincoln's plan of, 316-317 ; discussion of Congressional plan of, 319-320 ; theories of, 321 ; acts of 1867, 325 ; effects in South, 325-328 ; 341-343.
- Reed, Thomas B., his "rules," 388-389 ; candidate for presidential nomination, 392, 404.
- Reeder, Andrew H., 247.
- Republican Party, organised (1856), 250.
- Resumption of Specie Payments (1879), 345, 357.
- Returning Boards, 342, 349.
- Roberts, B. H., Expulsion of, 413.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 8, note 413, quoted 73 note, 99 note.
- Rush, Richard, 112, 119, 130.
- Russia, mediates in war of 1812, 70 ; has designs on California, 112 ; cedes Alaska, 332.
- S.
- Sackville-West, Sir Lionel, 384-385.
- Samoan Islands, 412.
- Sampson, Rear-Admiral W. T., 409.
- San Domingo, Grant's policy towards, 346-347.
- San Jacinto, Battle of (1836), 196-197.
- Santa Anna, 196, 199, 210-215.
- Santiago, Battle of (1898), 409 ; Capture of, 409-410.
- Savannah captured by Sherman (1864), 306.
- Schley, Rear-Admiral W. S., 409.
- Schouler, James, 97, 194 note, 224.
- Schurz, Carl, 343, 357.
- Scott, Gen. Winfield, 183 ; in Mexican War, 212-215 ; not nominated in 1848, 217 ; defeated for Presidency in 1852, 236-237 ; at beginning of civil war, 274 ; referred to, 410.
- Secession, South resolves on, 270-272.

- Seminoles, 93; Chief war with (1834-1842), 153-154, 278.  
 Semmes, Capt. Raphael, 300 note.  
 Seven Pines, Battle of (1862), 301.  
 Seward, Wm. H., 222, 229, 242; fails of nomination, 269-270; as Secretary of State, 294, 308 note, 317; protests against French in Mexico, 332; secures Alaska, 332-333.  
 Seymour, Horatio, 333-334.  
 Shafter, Gen. W. R., 410.  
 Sherman, John, 345, 357, 362, 383; his Act, 390, 398.  
 Sherman, Gen. Wm. T., 302, 305, 306-307, 338.  
 Shiloh, Battle of (1862), 298.  
 Silver, Legislation about, 357-359, 381-382, 390-391; free silver campaign of 1896, 404-406; of 1900, 413-414.  
 Slaughter House Cases, The, 342.  
 Slavery, in 1801, 4; foreign slave trade prohibited (1808), 49-50, 88; in 1820, 98-99; in the Territories, 215-216, 219-220, 257-259; in 1860, 285-286.  
 Slidell, John, 208, 298.  
 Smith, Prof. Goldwin, quoted, 59, 87.  
 Smith, Joseph, 224-225, 288.  
 Smith, Robert, 60, 64.  
 Soule, Pierre, 244.  
 Specie Circular, The, 170, 180, 182.  
 Spain, cedes Louisiana to France, 30; her attitude toward the U. S., 31-35, 45-46; her revolted colonies, 91-92; sells Florida, 96-97; relations with Holy Alliance, 111-112; clings to Cuba, 244-245; 347; War with, 406-411.  
 Spencer, John C., 105.  
 Spoils System, The, 147-150.  
 Squatter Sovereignty, 217, 239. See Cass and Douglas.  
 Stanton, Edwin M., 274, 295, 330-331.  
 Star of the West fired on (1861), 273.  
 Star Route Frauds, 368.  
 Stephens, A. H., 236, 275, 305 note, 303 note.  
 Stevens, Thaddeus, 297 note, 312, 321, 334.  
 Stevenson, A. E., 392, 413.  
 Stowe, Mrs. H. B., 291.  
 Strikes of 1877, 351; of 1886, 380; of 1892, 391; of 1894 (Chicago), 400-401; of 1900, 413.  
 Sub-treasury system, 180-181.  
 Sumner, Charles, 242; attacked by Brooks, 248-249; on Reconstruction, 319, 343, 346-347.  
 Sumter, Fort, 272-273, 295.  
 T.  
 Tallmadge, James, 100, 104.  
 Tammany Hall, 339, 384, 403.  
 Taney, Roger B., 151, 256-259.  
 Tariff of 1816, 83-84; tariff movement of 1820, 115-116; tariff of 1828, 127-129; tariff of 1833, p. 160; tariff of 1842, 193; tariff of 1846, 207; tariff of 1857, 254; of 1862, 311; Mills Bill, the, 382-383; McKinley Bill, the, 390; Wilson Bill, the, 399-400; Dingley Bill, the, 400, 406.  
 Taussig, Prof. F. W., 83, 115.  
 Taylor, John (of Caroline) 129.  
 Taylor President Zachary—in Mexican war, 208-215; elected President, 217-218; his administration, 222-228; attitude toward Compromise of 1850, 225-230; death, 230.  
 Tecumseh, 64, 71.  
 Tenure of Office Act, 324, 330-331, 344, 377.  
 Texas—U. S. claims to, 97; schemes to acquire, 195-199; annexation of, 203-204; claims against New Mexico, 226-227, 230-232.  
 Thayer, Eli, 246-247.  
 Thomas, Gen. George H., 299 note, 305, 306.  
 Thomas, Senator J. B., 101.  
 Thompson, Jacob, 273-274.  
 Tilden, Samuel J., 348-351, 363, 373.  
 Tippecanoe, Battle of (1811), 64, 176.  
 Tompkins, Daniel, 85, 107.  
 Toombs, Robt., 236.  
 Trent, Case of the steamer, 298, 333.  
 Troup, Governor, 123-124.  
 Turner, Prof. F. J., quoted, 425 note.  
 Tweed, Wm. M., 338-341.  
 Tyler, President John, 105; elected Vice President in 1840, 185-186; becomes President, 188; his administration, 189-204; his vetoes, 191-193; schemes to get Texas, 195-199; withdraws from presidential contest, 201; presides over Peace Convention, 276; quoted, 183 note.  
 U.  
 United States, The, area and population in 1801, 1-2; characteristics of people in 1801, 4-9; area and population 1810-1830, 133-137; characteristics of people in 1830, 137-145; area and population, 1840-1860, 278-283; character of people in 1860, 286-288; area and population 1870-1890, 415-420; character and occupations of people in 1890, 426-432.  
 Upshur, Abel P., 195, 198.  
 Urban growth in 1801, 5; in 1810-1830, 134-135; in 1840, 280; in 1850, 282; in 1860, 283; in 1870, 416-417; in 1880, 417-418; in 1890, 420-421.  
 V.  
 Vollandigham, C. L., 312.

Van Buren, President Martin, 127, 150, 151, 165; elected Vice-President, 159; elected President, 1836, 176; relations with Jackson, 177-178, his character, 178-179, confronts financial situation, 179-182; difficulties of his administration, 182-184; defeated in 1840, 184-186; attitude toward Texas, 197, 200; fails of nomination in 1844, 200; nominated by Free Soilers, 218.  
 Venezuelan Message, The (1895), 401-403.  
 Vicksburg, Siege of (1863) 299.  
 Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 19, 76, 129, 156.  
 Virginia Presidents, The, 87-88.

## W.

Walker, Robert J., 205, 259-260.  
 Walker, William, 243, 253-254.  
 Washington, President George, 3, 9, 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 23, 28, 58, 87, 89; compared with Lincoln, 264.  
 Washington, Treaty of (1871), 333, 346, 359.  
 Washington City, Capture of in 1814, 73.  
 War of 1812, 66-75; Results of, 76-82;  
   War, Civil (1861-1865), 294-315;  
   War, Spanish-American (1898), 407-412. See also Barbary States, Mexico, and Seminoles.

Webster, Daniel, 82, 84, 114-115, 125; debate with Hayne, 156-158, opposes Van Buren, 182; in Harrison's Cabinet, 188; in Tyler's, 192; negotiates Ashburton Treaty, 194; not nominated for President in 1848, 217; attitude toward Compromise of 1850, 225-232; Secretary of State under Fillmore, 230; in campaign of 1852, 236-237; his death, 237.

Weed, Thurlow, 251.

West Indies, British, Trade rights to, lost, 126; regained, 162.

West Virginia, cut off from Virginia (1863), 296-297.

Whig Party, formation of, 131, 175.

Whittier, J. G., 143, 228.

Wilmot Proviso, the, 211, 215-216, 220-221, 240.

Wilkinson, General James, 47-48, 71.

Wilson, W. L., 399.

Wilson, Prof. Woodrow, quoted, 246, 250.

Windom, Wm., 365, 390.

Wirt, William, 89, 119, 165.

Wise, Henry A., 192, 198-199.

## Y.

Yazoo Lands, the 37, 39-40.

Young, Brigham, 225, 261.





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